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Modern scholarship understands myth to be neither fact nor fiction, only what is 
believed, and what is believed is subject to change.  In order for the British 
war-made myths of 1940 to prove sustainable post-war, they had to prove 
adaptable; they had to have the capability to evolve.  Fortunately it is in the nature 
of myth to be both synchronic, transcending time, and diachronic, evolving through 
time.  This study is an enquiry into how the Spitfire in performance has been one 
agent of the evolution of the war-made myth.  Beginning in the 1950s, a new 
generation of adolescent boys wanted to experience the Battle of Britain as an 
imaginary playground.  The Spitfire helped them to achieve this.  By the late 1980s, 
those adolescent boys had grown up and had families of their own.  A new 
generation wanted to know what the Battle of Britain had to say about nationality 
and collective identity.  The Spitfire answered these questions too.  It was able to 
answer these questions because almost from the day of its public debut, it has had 
the chameleon like facility of a palimpsest.  The Spitfire has made an important 
contribution to the evolution of the war-made myth of the Battle of Britain, an 
evolution that has guaranteed the myth ?s cultural relevance post-war.                
Word Count: 95,972 
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On 1 September 1930, Air-Vice Marshall H. C. T. Dowding joined the Air Council as Air 
Member for Supply and Research.  His was now the responsibility for RAF procurement, for 
ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƐĞƌǀĞƚŚat vision.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂǀŝƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞďůƵƌƌĞĚŽĨůĂƚĞ ?^ŝƚƚŝŶŐŽŶŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƐŬ
awaiting his arrival was one casualty of this loss of focus, a specification for a new day-night 
fighter.  Specification F7/30
1
 had begun life almost a year before, in October 1929, in 
response to a requirement to replace the 178 mph fighter bi-plane, the Bristol Bulldog.  
Over four hundred Bulldogs would eventually be delivered to the RAF, equipping ten out of 
the thirteen home fighter squadrons and making it the standard RAF fighter of the early 
1930s.  As such, any firm supplying its replacement would have expected good business, but 
what the RAF expected remains controversial to this day.  However, there is one point of 
consensus over specification F7/30 amongst historians of the Spitfire, and that is that this is 
the beginning of the Spitfire story.   
After much discussion and delay, specification F7/30 was eventually signed off and sent out 
to tender in November 1931.  Its arrival had been anticipated in the offices of at least one 
major airframe manufacturer.  Sir Robert McLean, chairman of Vickers Aviation, had made it 
the topic of his October board meeting.  Present at that board meeting were his three chief 
designers, the veteran Rex Pierson, who had made his reputation building bombers in the 
First World War, his new assistant Barnes Wallis, and R. J. Mitchell who had come up to 
London from Southampton, home of Supermarine.  Mitchell, like Barnes Wallis, was a 
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŶĞǁďŽǇ ?ƚ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƌĞquest Supermarine had been bought by Vickers 
ƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐtŽŽůƐƚŽŶtŽƌŬƐŽŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZŝǀĞƌ/ƚĐŚĞŶ
had cost Vickers £390,000, but McLean had not bought Supermarine for its bricks and 
mortar; he had bought it principally to acquire the services of Mitchell.  In 1928, Mitchell 
ǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌŽĨĨůǇŝŶŐďŽĂƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐŝŶĨůǇŝŶŐ
boats that Sir Robert McLean saw the future.  Vickers Aviation was going to build the boats 
that would open up the Empire to civilian air travel. 
                                                     
1
 The specification number is broken down as follows, F identified the type of aircraft, in this case fighter, the 
number 7 referred to the seventh specification issued in a particular year and the year itself was the last 
number, in this case 1930. 
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It was a bold vision but, unfortunately for McLean, not one shared by Sir Eric Geddes 
chairman of newly incorporated Imperial Airways.  It was Imperial Airways that was going to 
fly these new air services on behalf of the government as a monopoly carrier.  Geddes was 
faced with daunting problems right from the start, logistical as well as financial, and decided 
on a cautious approach.
2
  Imperial Airways was in no hurry to open up new Empire air 
routes and would prove, at best, a parsimonious purchaser of flying boats.  Sir Robert 
DĐ>ĞĂŶŚĂĚƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŚĞsŝĐŬĞƌƐDĂŝŶŽĂƌĚƚŽƉĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
designer of flying boats just as the bottom fell out of the market.  It was, therefore, no 
surprise that in OĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ŚĞǁĂƐĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐůĂƚĞƐƚ
specification F7/30.  This new specification was for a fighter aircraft, not a flying boat, but 
fortunately for Sir Robert, R. J. Mitchell was not only famous for his flying boats; he was 
even more famous for his work in high-ƐƉĞĞĚĨůŝŐŚƚ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƐŚĂĚǁŽŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
prestigious high-speed aero event in the calendar, the Schneider Trophy, an unprecedented 
three times.  Just eight days before the Vickers Aviation Board convened to consider 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ& ? ? ? ? ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐůĂƚĞƐƚ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƌĂĐĞƌƚŚe S6B, had broken the world 
air-speed record.
3
  It was, therefore, presumably with some confidence that Sir Robert 
explained his new plan to his board.   
Mitchell and McLean drew up a tender document which the Air Ministry accepted.  They 
were keen to see what Mitchell could come up with.  The next step was to build a 
prototype.  It soon had a number, Type 224, and then a name, the Spitfire.  The unromantic 
Mitchell was not impressed.  He ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇƐĂŝĚ ‘ŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŽƌƚŽĨďůŽŽĚǇƐŝůůǇŶĂŵĞƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ
give it ?.4  Sir Robert had apparently named it in honour of his feisty young daughter Annie.5  
This prototype Spitfire turned out to be a disaster.  The reason seems to have been a 
combination of conservatism and complacency.  With both his Schneider racers and his 
outstanding his flying boats, Mitchell had been given a free hand, but with Type 224 he had 
not.  He had to report to a design committee chaired by Sir Robert McLean himself, and Sir 
Robert knew nothing about aircraft design.  In the spring of 1934, after the failure of Type 
                                                     
2
 The story of Imperial Airways is told in Gordon Pirie, Air Empire: British Imperial Civil Aviation 1919-39 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). 
3
 The best guide to the Schneider Trophy is Ralph Pegram, Schneider Trophy Seaplanes and Flying Boats: 
Victors, Vanquished and Visions (Stroud: Fonthill, 2012). 
4
 Cited in Jonathan Glancey, Spitfire: The Biography (London: Atlantic, 2006), p. 1. 
5
 See Leo McKinstry, Portrait of a Legend: Spitfire (London: John Murray, 2008), p. 55.  
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224 and as gloom descended upon the increasingly idle Woolston Works, Mitchell and his 
team struck out on their own, initiating a re-design programme independent of higher 
authority.  After seven months of intensive work in the Supermarine design office, which left 
both Sir Robert McLean and the Air Ministry scurrying to catch on and then catch up, the 
new design was ready ĨŽƌ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐŚŽƉ ?ůŵŽƐƚĞǀĞƌǇĂŶŐůĞ ?ůŝŶĞĂŶĚĐƵƌǀĞ
of the original and disastrous Type 224 had been erased and re-drawn.          
This second Spitfire prototype had its maiden flight on 5 March 1936 and was delivered to 
RAF Martlesham Heath for testing on 26 May.  Eight days later, Sir Robert had an order for 
310 Spitfires.  It was the beginning of a long and painful pre-production phase.  Tragically, R. 
J. Mitchell died in June 1937.  Mitchell was an innovator, a restless, creative designer and 
engineer.  In the months before his death he had already moved on from the Spitfire and 
was busy on new projects, specifically a four-engine bomber.  His successor as chief designer 
Ăƚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?:ŽĞ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŶŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŽƌ ?^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐƚĂůĞŶƚǁĂs as a developer, and 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶǁĂƐƌŝƉĞĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƐZŽůůƐ-Royce steadily 
increased the power output of its Merlin engine and then went on to introduce the even 
more powerful Griffon engine, the Spitfire, in the hands of Joe Smith, just got better.  This 
policy of incremental development also matched the moment.  It was cheaper and faster to 
produce improved Spitfires than to move onto a new type, with all its disruption, especially 
as no new type ever offered significant improvements over what Joe Smith was achieving 
with the Spitfire.  When production of the Spitfire finally ended in February 1948, some 
20,400 Spitfires had rolled out of the factories.
6
  The end of the war saw the RAF with a 
surviving complement of 5,864 Spitfires.  By September 1946, only two Fighter Command 
squadrons were still equipped with Spitfires.   
The Spitfire was gone but it has not been forgotten and the fact of its continuing cultural 
relevance now forms the subject of this thesis.  We must therefore begin with the source of 
ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨĂŵĞ ?dŚĂƚƌĞƐƚƐƵƉŽŶŝƚƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?tĞĚŽŶĞĞĚƚŽ
be clear and unambiguous on this point.  We do mean participation and not contribution.  
dŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ in the Battle of Britain has long been a source of 
controversy.  Stephen Bungay, who has written the best modern popular history of the 
                                                     
6
 Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Arms and Armour, 1986), p. 249. 
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Battle, is one historian chary of entering this debate.
7
   ‘^ŽŵĞƐŽďƌŝĞƚǇŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚŝŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ
the role played by the Spitfire and Hurricane and in comparing both with the Bf 109, for it is 
ĂŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚ ? ?8  Just how emotional can be judged from this blast from former 
Hurricane pilot Roland Beaumont in 1996, in an interview he gave to the Imperial War 
DƵƐĞƵŵ ? ‘KŶĞ hears so much about the superiority of the Spitfire over the Hurricane.  It is 
all rubbish.  The Hurricane was more rugged...You could aim could aim the guns more 
ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇƚŚĂŶǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐďĞƚƚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ?9  Perhaps it 
ǁĂƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ ?ĂŶĚfor most modern commentators, including Bungay, the Spitfire 
was the superior aircraft.
10
  On the merits of each fighter, though, this thesis will have little 
to say as it is not, as we will discover, strictly germane to the central question, which is why 
the Spitfire has remained culturally relevant. 
>ĞƚƵƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨĂŵĞ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĞcontroversy concerning its technical 
prowess and fighting ability as compared to the Hurricane and Bf 109, there is an obvious 
first question to answer.  Why was the Spitfire granted the position of prima inter pares 
during the Battle itself?  We can go further and suggest this was actually a position settled 
ƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞĨŽƌĞďĂƚƚůĞǁĂƐĞǀĞŶũŽŝŶĞĚ ?11  Evidence of just how early 
comes in the name scratched on so many collection tins proffered nationwide to buy 
replacement fighters for the RAF in June 1940.  It was usually Spitfire and not Hurricane.
12
  
More evidence for this early decision comes in ƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐ ‘ůŝǀĞ ?ďƌŽĂĚĐĂƐƚĨƌŽŵŽǀĞƌďǇ
BBC correspondent Charles Gardner on 14 July 1940.
13
  What Gardner told his listeners he 
saw were Spitfires engaging German dive-bombers over the Channel.  What he actually saw 
were Hurricanes as well as Spitfires.  What almost certainly lay behind his mistake as well as 
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶis answered in two parts.   
                                                     
7
 The best modern scholarly account remains Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang (eds.), The Burning Blue: A New 
History of the Battle of Britain (London: Pimlico, 2000). 
8
 Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum, 2001), p. 80. 
9
 Roland Beaumont, Oral History Interview, tape 17129 <www.iwm.org.uk>collections> [accessed 12 Sept. 
2017]. 
10
 Recent interventions include Dilip Sarkar, How the Spitfire Won the Battle of Britain (Stroud: Amberley, 
2010); David Isby, The Decisive Duel: Spitfire vs 109 (London: Little Brown, 2012).  
11
 The start and end date of the battle have both been subject to speculation.  See Malcolm Smith, Britain and 
1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 55. 
12
 For a recent account of the Spitfire Funds see Helen Jones, British Civilians in the Front Line:  Air Raids, 
Productivity and Wartime Culture, 1939-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 126.   
13
 See Garry Campion, The Good Fight: Battle of Britain Propaganda and the Few (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), pp. 123-126.  
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The first part is wholly subjective.  It lies in the eye of the beholder.  Evidence of the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂƉƉĞĂůŝƐĂƐůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂƐŝƚŝƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůming.  Admiration of the lines 
of the Spitfire began very early in its career.  Charles Grey, the cantankerous founding editor 
of Aeroplane, first saw the Spitfire on static display in the new type park at the 1936 Hendon 
Air Show.  It was only three months after its first flight.  He was impressed by what he saw.  
 ‘DƌDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐůŝƚƚůĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ůŝŬĞĂďĂďǇ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌZĂĐĞƌǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůĚƐƵƉŝƚƐĨĞĞƚ ?
ŝƐĂƐǁĞĞƚůŝƚƚůĞũŽďĂůůŽǀĞƌ ? ?14  Lord Balfour, Under Secretary of State for Air, from 1938 to 
194 ? ?ƌĞĐĂůůĞĚŚŝƐŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ‘/ŬŶŽǁ/ĨĞůůŝŶůŽǀĞǁŝƚŚ
her the moment I was introduced that summer day in 1938.  I was captivated by her sheer 
beauty; she was slimly built with a beautifully proportioned body and graceful curves just 
where they should be. ?15  What he actually said to the press that day was altogether more 
circumspect but no less positive for all its lack of purple prose.
16
  What was first said of the 
Spitfire, and by disinterested observers, has not been gainsaid.  Martin Francis in his recent 
study of airmen in the wartime RAF is following in a long tradition when he notes of the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚƐĐƵƌǀĞĚĞůĞŐĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĨůƵĞŶĐǇŝŶĨůŝŐŚƚĞŶƐƵƌĞĚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽƐĂŝĐĂůůǇ
inclined flyers testified to iƚƐĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐĂƉƉĞĂů ? ?17   
The second part of the answer as to why the Spitfire was granted the position of prima inter 
pares during the Battle of Britain is prompted by the speed the matter was settled.  On 14 
July 1940, the BBC correspondent Charles Gardner did mistake Hurricanes for Spitfires 
engaging the enemy over the straits of Dover.  It was a mistake born of expectation.  In the 
early summer of 1940 the Spitfire was expected to shoot down the enemy.  The Spitfire had 
only recently been widely acclaimed as an exceptional aircraft ?dŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ
had been presented to the public three months before the outbreak of war, on 20 May 
 ? ? ? ? ?ŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ ?tĞĐĂŶďĞƐŽƉƌĞĐŝƐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĚĂǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚ
                                                     
14
  ‘EĞǁdǇƉĞƐ ? ?Aeroplane, 1 July 1936, p. 9. 
15
 Lord Balfour,  ‘Foreword ? ?ŝŶ'ŽƌĚŽŶDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?R. J. Mitchell: Schooldays to Spitfire (Olney: Nelson & Saunders, 
1986), p. 11. 
16
  ‘DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ&ůŝĞƐĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĂŶĚƐĂǇƐŝƚ ?ƐŽĐŝůĞ ? ?Daily Mirror, 26 Aug. 1938, p. 6. 
17
 Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 165. 
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major public engagement, not its public debut, but the first time a large audience saw it in 
action, more than a million people nationwide.
18
   
dŚĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůŽƉĞŶĚĂǇ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐto nothing routine about this 
particular occasion however.  It was a celebratioŶŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐŽŵŝŶŐŽĨĂŐĞ ?ŝƚƐ ? ?st 
birthday.
19
  It was also a chance to satisfy an acute need for recruits created as a 
consequence of an accelerated expansion programme which had begun four years before.
20
  
Acting as recruitment sergeant on the day was its brand new fighter, the Spitfire.  The 
Hurricane had to play the bridesmaid because it had already had its press launch, a more 
muted affair, the year before.
21
  Reports on the day suggest that the Spitfire made quite an 
impression.  It was in fact greeted by an unprecedented reception.  No new aircraft had ever 
received such a reception on an Empire Air Day programme.
22
  There was a perception of 
outstanding performance, a perception fed on a drip-feed to the public by the press ever 
since 1934.
23
  There was nothing that unusual in this.  The Hurricane on its debut was 
trumpeted as state of the art.
24
  Much more significant, however, ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛ
first major public display, was the timing.  In May 1939 war clouds were gathering.  The 
huge crowds were responding emotionally to a re-assuring sight.  It was certainly reported 
as such.
25
  An emotional response to the Spitfire will be a recurring theme in this thesis.   
dŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐwere presented before the outbreak of war but it was in the 
summer of 1940, during the Battle of Britain, that its fame was born.  It was a fame that 
flourished in the early creation of a myth.  Recent scholarship on mythology understands a 
myth to be  ‘ŶŽƚĂůŝĞŽƌĂĨĂůƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚƌƵƚh or reality or fact or 
                                                     
18
 For an account of ƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ ‘ŵƉŝƌĞĂǇ ?ƐĞĞ:ŝŵŶŐůŝƐŚ ? ‘ŵƉŝƌĞĂǇŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ? ?Historical 
Journal, 24 (2006), pp. 247-276. 
19
 The RAF was established on 1 April 1918. 
20
 See Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935-1942 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 1997). 
21
 &ŽƌĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐůĂƵŶĐŚƐĞĞ>ĞŽDĐ<ŝŶƐƚƌǇ ?Hurricane: Victor of the Battle of Britain 
(London: John Murray, 2010), pp. 68-70. 
22
 It was witnessed nationwide by correspondents from Aeroplane ƐĞĞ ‘EŽƚĞƐĨƌŽŵ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Aeroplane, 24 
May 1939, p. 17.  
23
 ^ĞĞ ‘ ? ? ?DW,^ĞĐƌĞƚtĂƌƉůĂŶĞƐ ? ?Daily Mail ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ‘ZĞĂƌŵŝŶŐĨŽƌWĞĂĐĞ ? ?The Times, 5 March 
 ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶ-WĂƌŝƐ ? ? ?DŝŶƐ ? ? ?Daily Express, 26 Nov. 1938, p. 7. 
24
 See Mckinstry, Hurricane, pp. 68-70. 
25
 ^ĞĞ ‘ĐĞWŝůŽƚ^ƉĂŶƐƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶ ?,ŽƵƌƐ ? ?Daily Mail ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ‘ĂŵĞƌĂƐƌĞ^ĞŝǌĞĚĂƚ^ůŽǁ-Flying Air 
ĂǇWůĂŶĞƌĂƐŚ ? ?Reynolds News ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ‘ŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇdŚƌŝůůƐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?Sunday Pictorial, 21 May 
1939, p. 7. 
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ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ?ĂŵǇƚŚŝƐĂďŽǀĞĂůůĂƐƚŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŝƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŽďĞƚƌƵĞ ? ?26  Historians of the 
myths of 1940, of which the Battle of Britain is one, Dunkirk and the Blitz the other two 
components, have treated them with such due circumspection.  Angus Calder describes 
myth almost scornfully ĂƐ ? ‘ƉƐĞƵĚŽ-ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƉŽƐŝŶŐĂƐĂĨĂĐƚ ? ?27  Malcolm Smith is a little 
more balenced recognising ŵǇƚŚĂƐĂ ‘ǁŝĚĞůǇŚĞůĚǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƐƚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐŚĞůƉĞĚƵƐ
ƐŚĂƉĞĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ?28  Both of these positions are tenable in the light of recent 
scholarship on myths and myth-making.  It is also true that myths are no longer read as 
simple allegories for something else.  Each is now treated as a unique entity, one with 
literary merit as well as a historical and psychological dimension in which what is true is less 
important than what is perceived to be true.  In the 1960s and 1970s, a structualist 
approach to myths, popularised by Claude Lévi-Strauss, attempted to strip myths down to 
simple universal building blocks.  This is not an approach favoured today where certain 
tropes are consistently recognised, familiar symbols, themes and plot, but the variations are 
now judged so numerous as to defy attempts at unification.
29
  There is one point of 
reference that binds the work of Lévi-Strauss to more recent scholarship on myth, and that 
is the idea that myths are diachronic.  This is, the idea that myth, what is believed, evolves, 
changes over time.
30
           
We will return to this point in a moment but before discussing change we must establish 
origins.  The myth of the Battle of Britain was very quickly established.  Here it is presented 
almost fully formed in this Home Office communiqué from 1943.  The occasion was the 
organisation of one of the first commemorations of the Battle of Britain.    
it is intended to commemorate tŚĞĂŝƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?,
the prolonged series of night attacks that followed and the services of all those, 
whether members of the Royal Air Force, the Anti-Aircraft Gunners, The Civil 
Defence Services, the Police, the Royal Observer Corps, the aircraft workers or 
                                                     
26
 Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998), p. 2. 
27
 Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), p. 3. 
28
 Smith, Britain and 1940, p. 2. 
29
 See Doniger, Implied Spider; Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology and Scholarship (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1999). 
30
 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ PZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?tĞŶĚǇŽŶŝŐĞƌ ? ‘Claude Lévi-
^ƚƌĂƵƐƐ ?Ɛ Theoretical and Actual Approaches to Myth ? ?ŝŶŽƌŝƐtŝƐĞŵĂŶ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?The Cambridge Companion to 
Lévi-Strauss (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 211.   
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members of the general public, who by their skill, fortitude or devotion to duty 
contributed to the defeat of the whole of the attacks, which were aimed first at the 




Three key elements of the myth of the Battle of Britain are already firmly in place.  The first 
is the seemingly obvious one of when it was actually fought, before the Blitz but after 
Dunkirk.  The second is the reason that it was fought, to stop invasion.  The third is the 
identification of exactly whom it was who was doing the fighting.  It was not just the airmen 
of the Royal Air Force.  This original manifestation of the myth was constructed in three 
quick phases.  The first phase began even as the Battle was being fought.  This was the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ?‘ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂ
running commentary for the news media, and thereby raising morale at a difficult 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ? ?32  It was not pre-planned and it was propaganda as facts fell by the wayside in the 
ƐĐƌĂŵďůĞƚŽŬĞĞƉƵƉ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶůŽƐƐĞƐƌĞƐĞŵďůĞĚ ‘ĐƌŝĐŬĞƚƐĐŽƌĞƐ ?
and the Few took on the mantle of David against Goliath.
33
  Phase two began five months 
after the Battle effectively ended in March 1941 on the publication of Hiliary Aiden St 
'ĞŽƌŐĞ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ? ? ?ƉĂŐĞƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚƚŚĞ Battle of Britain.34  Historians have always 
recognised this as Ă ‘ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞĞƐƐĂǇŝŶŶĞĂƌ-ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?35   
What made it so remarkable was the fact that it defined the Battle, framing it, turning it into 
a coherent event with a start and an end and even defining a  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĚĂǇ ? ?This was all 
something of a revelation In March 1941.    ‘DŽƐƚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞŶŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
the air attacks were intense and sustained, but might have struggled to invest them with a 
ĚĞĞƉĞƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ? ?36  It was no doubt one good ƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚ ?ƐƉƌŽĚŝŐŝŽƵƐ
                                                     
31
 The National Archives (TNA), HO 207/214, Home Security Circular No. 138, 1943. 
32
 Garry Campion, The Battle of Britain, 1945-1965: The Air Ministry and the Few (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), p. 1. 
33
 See Mark Connelly, We Can Take It!: Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (London: Pearson, 
2004),  pp. 109-115. 
34





 October 1940 (London: HMSO, 1941). 
35
 ƌŝĂŶŽŶĚ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶWĂƵůĚĚŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ:ĞƌĞŵǇƌĂŶŐ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?The Burning Blue: A New History of the 
Battle of Britain (London: Pimlico, 2000), p. 1. 
36





  tŚĂƚŵĂĚĞ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĐƌĞĚŝďůĞǁĂƐŝƚƐƉƌŽǀĞŶĂŶĐĞ ?/ƚŚĂĚƚŚĞŝŵƉƌŝŵĂƚƵƌ
of the Air Ministry, the Ministry ŽĨ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ,ŝƐDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƌǇKĨĨŝĐĞ ?,D^K ) ? 
A battle had been fought and a victory won before a seemingly oblivious public, so its 
significance was also at stake.  Phase three of the myth-making process now began.  This 
was the start of a process of valorisation of the Battle of Britain.  The Home Office 
communiqué quoted above talks ŽĨ ‘ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞĂŝŵĞĚĨŝƌƐƚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?38  The truth of this has never been firmly established.39  Nevertheless, it is early 
evidence that this process of valorisation had begun and which would very soon take on a 
life of its own.  ZĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚ ?'ĂƌƌǇĂŵƉŝŽŶ, author of a two volume 
study of the myth of the Battle of Britain, ŶŽƚĞƐ ‘ƚhere is no question that it set in train a 
wide and creative response, the confidently asserted shape and importance of the Battle 
generating literature, films, art, radio plays and other celebratory cultural media from 1941 
ŽŶǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŽŶĐĞƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚ ?ƐĐŽƌĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞhad sunk in ?.40    
From 1941 onwards, and notwithstanding the significance of the Few, the Spitfire was well 
placed to take on the mantle of this newly created myth.
41
  First, there was its role as prima 
inter pares during the Battle itself.  The Hurricane never would supersede the Spitfire in the 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌĚƵƌŝŶŐŽƌĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĞĂƐŽŶǁĂƐĂsignificant 
intervention in the myth-making process on behalf of the Spitfire in 1942.  At a time when 
70% of the adult population frequented the cinema, and 32% went at least once a week, 
there was one wartime feature film made about the Battle of Britain.
42
  This was Leslie 
,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐThe First of the Few (1942), the story of the design and development of the 
Spitfire.  As we will discover, the film, which was a big box office hit was more fable than 
fact ?dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƌĞĂƐŽŶďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƐĞĂŵůĞƐƐtransfer into the myth of the Battle has 
much to do with the way the Battle was presented to children and young adults after 1941, 
not least potential RAF recruits.  Valorisation of the Battle had little room for bad news, 
                                                     
37
 It sold 300,000 copies on the day of its publication and total sales are approximately 15 million.  See Brian 
ŽŶĚ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝn Paul Addison and Jeremy Crang (eds.), The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of 
Britain (London: Pimlico, 2000), p. 1. 
38
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 See Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain: Myth and Reality (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 16-23.  
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 Campion, The Battle of Britain, p. 4. 
41
 ^ĞĞĚƌŝĂŶ'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?ŝŶWĂƵůĚĚŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ:ĞƌĞŵǇƌĂŶŐ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?
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stories of death and life-changing injury.  Focusing on the Spitfire as a  ‘ĐŚĂƌŝŽƚŽĨĨŝƌĞ ?
avoided such difficult issues.
43
                     
We now return to the diachronic nature of myth.   It was the question of perception, what 
was believed in the present rather than the past, which drew Angus Calder, one of the first 
and still most important historians of the myths of 1940, to study them in the mid 1980s.
44
  
Calder, aĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽWĂƵůĚĚŝƐŽŶ ?ǁĂƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂůŬůĂŶĚƐǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĚƌĞǁ ? ? ?ƚŚĞŵǇƚŚŽĨƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ?dŚĞŵǇƚŚ ?
ŚĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ?ŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂŵŽŶƐƚĞƌ ? ?45  Calder ?Ɛstudy, setting claims of popular 
enthusiasm and solidarity against evidence of disunity and dysfunctionality, was influenced 
by the work of cultural theorists and most particularly Roland Barthes.
46
  Calder examined 
the construction of the myths using a cornucopia of evidence.  This included a host of 
artefacts from popular culture.  It was an eclectic approach that has set the standard for all 
future examinations of the myths, their construction and reception.  Such evidence includes 
film, television, radio programmes, books, comics, newspapers, posters, paintings, 
photographs, exhibitions and more.  There is one piece of significant evidence, however, 
that has been all but lost in the deluge and it has to do with the diachronic nature of myth.  
The Spitfire, as this thesis will demonstrate, has acted as an interpreter of the myths, most 
particularly that of the Battle of Britain, for new audiences drawn to them post-war.  These 
new audiences have typically wanted to believe something a little different from that which 
was presented in the Home Office communiqué of 1943.   
What has enabled the Spitfire to do satisfy these new requirements has been its ability to 
behave as a palimpsest.  What is a palimpsest?  According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED )ĂƉĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚŝƐ ‘Ăparchment or other writing surface on which the original text has 
been effaced or partially erased, and then overwritten by another; a manuscript in which 
ůĂƚĞƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐƵƉĞƌŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ?ĞĨĨĂĐĞĚ )ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ?47  Sarah Dillon has studied 
                                                     
43
 ^ĞĞKǁĞŶƵĚůĞǇĚǁĂƌĚƐ ? ‘dŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶĚŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ>ŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŝŶWĂƵůĚĚŝƐŽŶĂŶĚ:ĞƌĞŵǇ
Crang (eds.), The Burning Blue: A New History of the Battle of Britain (London: Pimlico, 2000), pp. 163-190; 
Campion, Battle of Britain, p. 307.   
44
 Smith, Britain and 1940, p. 2; Connelly, We Can Take It! p. 1. 
45
 WĂƵůĚĚŝƐŽŶ ? ‘ŶŐƵƐĂůĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ? ) ? ?History Workshop Journal, 70 (2010), p. 303. 
46
 &ŽƌĂƌĞĐĞŶƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŽŶĂůĚĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽŵĞ&ƌŽŶƚĂŶĚŵǇƚŚ-making, see Penny Summerfield 
and Corinna Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence: Men, Women and the Home Guard in the Second World 
War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 2-7. 
47
  ‘WĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚ ? ?Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, online edn. 2017).   
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the etymology of the word and suggests that it was Thomas De Quincey in 1845, in an essay 
in ůĂĐŬǁŽŽĚ ?ƐDĂŐĂǌŝŶĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘dŚĞWĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚ ? ?ǁŚŽĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ
concept of the palimpsest.
48
   Dillon, a literary theorist, suggests it is a concept on the move 
but here we will rely on the K ?Ɛ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚĂƐĂƐŝŵŝůĞŽƌŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌ ? ‘/Ŷ
extended use: a thing likened to such a writing surface, especially in having been reused or 
altered while still retaining traces of  its earlier form; a multi-ůĂǇĞƌĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?49  This thesis 
will argue that the Spitfire possesses such a multi-layered record.     
How has this ability to behave as a palimpsest been demonstrated?  What is the process of 
engagement with post-war audiences?  The answer lies in the air, in action, specifically in 
performance.  This is not performance as theatre.  What audiences see in a Spitfire flypast 
for instance is nothing to do with fabrication.  It is a cultural production, a means of making 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂƉůĂĐĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶǁŽƌĚ ? ?50  It was Richard Schechner who first 
ĐŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘WĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌthe doyen of that field, that other place than 
the written word ŝƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĚŽŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?51  This is activity 
that ranges across a broad spectrum of endeavour, from ritual to play, from popular 
entertainment to performing art, from the enactment of social, professional, gender, race 
and class roles to shamanistic acts of healing.  One thing they all have in common is 
advocacy.  Performance as a cultural production is all about acquiring knowledge, 
 ‘ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵĚŽŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ? ?52 
Henry Bial offers a clear as well as usefully succinct explanation of performing as a way of 
knowing, a key concept in Performance Studies.   ‘ůůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ
of doubleness through which the actual execution is placed in mental comparison with a 
potential, an ideal, or a remembered oriŐŝŶĂůŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?53  Let us return to that 
Spitfire flypast.  The execution is the flypast, the remembered original model, is the myth.  It 
is the act of mental comparison between the two, in the moment, which effects change.  
                                                     
48
 Sarah Dillon, The Palimpsest: Literature, Criticism, Theory (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007), p. 1. 
49
  ‘WĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚŝĐ ? ?Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, online edn. 2017).  
50
 Diana Taylor, cited in Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 
13. 
51
 Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 1. 
52
 Dwight Conquergood, cited in Schechner, Performance Studies, p. 26. 
53
 Henry Bial (ed.), The Performance Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 73. 
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The myth of the Battle of Britain, in that moment of flypast, is examined and re-configured 
to better to suit the aspirations of those watching on.                    
This is a study about the past in the present; it is therefore a study about memory, 
particularly collective memory.  The idea of collective memory originated in the 1920s with 
the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs and was later developed by anthropologist Roger 
Bastide, in his work on African folk culture.
54
  Historian and anthropologist Nathan Wachtels 
distiůƐ,ĂůďǁĂĐŚƐ ?ŝĚĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
,ĂůďĂĐŚƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ŽŶůǇĞǆŝƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĞůŽĐĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚďǇůŝŶŬŝŶŐƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
memory of others: one only remembers as a member of a social group.  The singularity, the 
irreducible originality of personal recollections are in fact produced by the criss-crossing of 
several series of memories which themselves correspond to the various groups to which we 
ďĞůŽŶŐ ? ?55  It means, according to Halbwachs, that personal memory and social memory are 
inextricable.
56
         
This idea is contentious.  James Fentress and Chris Wickham point to the danger that such 
an idea suffocates personal identity, renders the individual little more than an automaton.
57
  
Nevertheless the link between collective memory and identity was at the root of what Jay 
tŝŶƚĞƌŚĂƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨĂŶĞǁƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?
which had its beginnings in the 1990s and is still reverberating today.
58
  dŚŝƐ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ? 
owed its birth to the legacy of the Second World War and had its own antecedence in the 
1960s.  It was in the mid 1960s, twenty years after the end of the war, that the narrative of 
resistance, so necessary for national reconstruction after the war, was finally called to 
account.  Questions about the honour of the nation state soon turned to questions about 
ƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŚĂƌůĞƐDĂŝĞƌŚĂƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ? ? ? ?ƚŽŵĂƌŬƚŚĞ ‘ĞŶĚŽĨ
                                                     
54
 See Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. Lewis Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); 
Roger Bastide, Les Religiones Africaines au Brasil (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960). 
55
 EĂƚŚĂŶtĂĐŚƚĞůƐ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?History and Anthropology, 2 (1986), pp. 207-224. 
56
 &ŽƌĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ,ĂůďǁĂĐŚƐ ?ŝĚĞĂƐƐĞĞEŽĂ'ĞĚŝĂŶĚzŝŐĂůůĂŵ ? ‘ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞDĞŵŽƌǇ-tŚĂƚ/Ɛ/ƚ ? ? ?History and 
Memory, 8.1 (1996), pp. 30-50.  For a review of subsequent developments in memory studies see Aleida 
Assman, Arts of Memory: Cultural Memory and Western Civilization, Functions, Media, Archives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
57
 James Fentress and Chris Wickham, Social Memory: New Perspectives on the Past (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 
p. ix. 
58
 :ĂǇtŝŶƚĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĞŵŽƌǇ PZĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞ “DĞŵŽƌǇŽŽŵ ?ŝŶŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ?Raritan, 21 (2001), pp. 52-66. 
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ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ-building which had begun a century before.59  
In Europe new political constructs were evolving as old ones appeared to be in terminal 
decline.  The European Community was growing in the shadow of the Berlin Wall and then 
the Berlin Wall came down. 
1989 may not have marked the end of history as postulated by Francis Fukuyama, the end of 
ideological evolution and the triumph of Western liberal democracy, but much was 
crumbling along with the concrete of the Berlin Wall.
60
  dŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ŚĂƐ
been seen as a ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĂĨůĂǁĞĚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶŝŵƉůŝĞĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?
that were supposed to explain the contemporary world.  Kerwin Klein dismisses the 
 ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ĂƐůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ‘ĂƚŚĞƌĂƉĞƵƚŝĐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?61  
'ĞŽĨĨůĞǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐĂĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ‘ƵŶĞĂƐĞǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?
inviting a different historical sensibility ? ?62  That new sensibility has seen memory become a 
meta-ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞŽŶĐĞǁĞƐƉŽŬĞŽĨĨŽůŬŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽƌƉŽƉƵůĂr history or oral 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽƌƉƵďůŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽƌĞǀĞŶŵǇƚŚ ? ?63  There is a problem, however.  This brand new 
meta-historical category is already looking vulnerable to stratification as memory becomes 
 ‘multidirectional ?,  ‘transactive ?,  ‘prosthetic ?,  ‘public ?,  ‘popular ?,  ‘mass ?, as well as a  ‘vector ? in 
the hands of those working in the field.
64
   
There are still historians prepared to deal in myth, however, especially when considering the 
legacy of the Second World War in Britain.  Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that what 
has shaped historiographical interest in the wartime myths, an interest which began in the 
1990s, has been an interdisciplinary collaboration between historians and cultural theorists.  
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 See Charles Maier, Dissolution: The Crises of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). 
60
 &ƌĂŶĐŝƐ&ƵŬƵǇĂŵĂ ? ‘dŚĞŶĚŽĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ?National Interest, 16 (1989), pp. 3-18. 
61
 <ĞƌǁŝŶ<ůĞŝŶ ? ‘KŶƚŚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨDĞŵŽƌǇŝŶ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?Representations, 69 (2000), p. 145. 
62
 'ĞŽĨĨůĞǇ ? ‘dŚĞWĂƐƚhŶĚĞƌƌĂƐƵƌĞ ?,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?DĞŵŽƌǇĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ? ?Journal of Contemporary 
History, 46 (2011), p. 558. 
63
 <ůĞŝŶ ? ‘KŶƚŚĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨDĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
64
 ^ĞĞ>ƵĐǇEŽĂŬĞƐĂŶĚ:ƵůŝĞƚƚĞWĂƚƚŝŶƐŽŶ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ>ƵĐǇEŽĂŬĞƐĂŶĚ:ƵůŝĞƚƚĞWĂƚƚŝŶƐŽŶ ?ĞĚƐ ? ) ?British 
Cultural Memory and the Second World War (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 2; Michael Rothberg, 
Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford 
hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?'ƌĂŚĂŵ^ŵŝƚŚ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ/ŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞDĞŵŽƌǇ PtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐdƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝǀĞDĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ
ŽĨ&ŽŽĚ ?&ĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?Oral History, 35 (2007), pp. 77-90; Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory: The 
Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƵƐĂŶŶĂŚZĂĚƐƚŽŶĞ ? ‘ZĞĐŽŶĐŝĞǀŝŶŐŝŶĂƌŝĞƐ PdŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨDĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?History Workshop Journal, 59 
(2005), p. 136; Nancy Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe (London: Berg, 1999); 
Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (eds.), War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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In particular, it is the conception of memory as shaped by fields of representation, and 
which owes much to the work of Roland Barthes.
65
  Barthes in his seminal study looked to  
the science of semiology for explanation.
66
  It was certainly a debt owed to Barthes which 
was acknowledged by Angus Calder in his The Myth of the Blitz (1991).
67
  ĂůĚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞďƚƚŽ
Barthes was not strictly methodological, however.  Barthes, in his preface to the 1970 
edition of his book, explained the motivation behind his own work.  His was an ideological 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?,ĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶĚĞƚĂŝůĨŽƌƚŚĞŵǇƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵƐƉĞƚŝƚ-




ĂůĚĞƌƚĞůůƐƵƐŚĞǁĂƐĂŶŐƌǇ ‘ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵŽĨ ? ? ? ?ďǇ>ĂďŽƵƌĂƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶ
ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĂďƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŝƐŵ ?ďǇDƌƐdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ĂůŬůĂŶĚƐtĂƌ ? ?70  His self-
appointed task was to try and undermine the credibility of the mythical narrative altogether, 
ƚŽĚŝƐŵŝƐƐ ‘ĞǀĞŶƚƐĨůĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƐŵǁŝƚŚŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?71  He was also 
perhaps ĂŶŶŽǇĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? ‘/ĚŝĚƐŽŝŶĂƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨƐĞůĨ-criticism, since I realised that 
many, perhaps most, readers of my WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ(1969) has seen the book as confirming 
ƚŚĞŵǇƚŚ ? ?72  ĂůĚĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŵŝŶĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽŵĞ&ƌŽŶƚǁĂƐŽĨĂǁĂƌ ? 
particularly the first half, fought in a ferment of participatory democracy which had seen its 
reward in 1945 with the establishment of a welfare state.  It was a thesis which had not met 
with general academic acceptance.
73
  It turned out that his new work, The Myth of the Blitz 
(1991), ǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĂŶǇĐƌŝƚŝĐƐũƵƐƚĂƐĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ? ‘/ƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƌĞĂĚƐĂƐĂƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ
ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚƐŚĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŽƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚ ? ?74  The implied criticism was 
that Calder still believed in what he had written in 1969.  Calder now ŵĂĚĞŶŽĂƉŽůŽŐǇ ? ‘dŚĞ
Myth, while it dealt tenderly with antiquated elements in the British social structure, was 
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firmly orientated against snobbery, selfishness and greed and could be given a forthrightly 
ĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ? ?75              
What Calder described in 1991, to the dismay of some, has not in fact been significantly 
revised since.  The heat of revisionist battle over the Home Front was actually at its most 
intense during the 1980s, when Calder was writing, led by ƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚƐ ? ?ĂƐ
described by Mark Connelly, the likes of Clive Ponting and Nicholas Harman.
76
  This battle 
swept over the individual myths of 1940 but left no indelible marks.
77
  Where the 
historiography of the myths has made gains is in its analysis of the reception of the myths 
post-war, a subject which had inspired Calder and which he briefly examined at the end of 
his own study.
78
  'ĞŽĨĨůĞǇŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐtŽƌůĚtĂƌ
2 [sic] requires no immediate experience of thosĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?79  What he was alluding to was the 
fact that later generations had discovered a war of their own through a range of filtering 
media.  The effect was inevitably evolution.  The diachronic nature of the myths of 1940 has 
been further explored by Graham Dawson and Michael Paris.  They noted what Calder had 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ĨŽƌƚŚƌŝŐŚƚůǇĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ? ?had replaced with a more individualistic 
impulse as younger audiences became interested in the myths in the 1950s.
80
  The 
complicated politics of myth perception has been explored by Mark Connelly who has 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐŚŝĨƚĨƌŽŵůĞĨƚƚŽƌŝŐŚƚ ? ‘/ŶĂďĂŶĚŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ƚŚĞůĞĨƚŽƉĞŶĞĚƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŽĂ
right-wing domination of the myth-ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚǁŽƌůĚtĂƌ ? ?81         
This brings us to this present study and its place in the historiography.  This does seem an 
appropriate moment to define cultural history as it will be understood in this thesis.  For 
that we turn to Jay Winter.  In response to a review of his book, Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (1995), he provides us with this 
ƵƐĞĨƵůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ P ‘ƵůƚƵƌĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?/ƚĂŬĞŝƚ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƐ ƵĚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽĚĞƐ ?ŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚ
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representations, expressed in action as well as in imaginative forms, which people in the 
ƉĂƐƚƵƐĞĚƚŽĂƐĐƌŝďĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇůŝǀĞ ? ?82  This present thesis is in the 
tradition of the cultural turn(s) but it does not aspire to be the cultural history of the 
Spitfire.  Codes, gestures and representations, drawing on the work of Roland Barthes, have 
been the evidence base for scholarly research into the wartime myths of 1940, both in 
terms of the myths creation and post-war evolution, and it is a historiography shaped by 
media ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?'ĂƌƌǇĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?Ɛcomprehensive two-volume survey of the Battle of Britain 
and mass media, from 1940 to 1965, is the most recent example of this methodological 
approach.
83
  This thesis is not a media history, however, but instead seeks to locate the 
evolution of the war-made myth of the Battle of Britain post-war in performance.   
In terms of the historiography this study finds itself at the confluence of four 
historiographical streams.  The first is the myth-history of 1940 which had its beginnings 
ǁŝƚŚŶŐƵƐĂůĚĞƌ ?ƐThe Myth of the Blitz (1991) as noted above.  The second is the history 
ŽĨĨůŝŐŚƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ŝŶũĞĐƚĞĚŶĞǁůŝĨĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨĨůŝŐŚƚ ?dǁŽ
notable interventions were the two volume cultural history of aviation, a cross border 
general survey by RoďĞƌƚtŽŚůĂŶĚ'ŽƌĚŽŶWŝƌŝĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞƉĂƌŽĐŚŝĂůƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĐŝǀŝůĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
the British Imperial project in the inter-war years.
84
  The third historiographical stream 
draws us closer to the Spitfire.  This is the cultural turn in object history.  It has proved a 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐŽŶĞ ?ĞƌŶŚĂƌĚZŝĞŐĞƌ ?ƐdŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂƌ P'ůŽďĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞsŽůŬƐǁĂŐŽŶ
Beetle (2013) explored how a car rooted in Nazi propaganda became a hero of 1960s 
counter-culture.
85
  It was well received but when cultural historians intruded upon territory 
traditionally held by military historians, the reception was cooler.   Naval historian Geoffrey 
dŝůůǁĂƐŶŽƚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚƵŶĐĂŶZĞĚĨŽƌĚ ?ƐThe Submarine: A Cultural History from the 
Great War to Nuclear Combat  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘/ƐƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ to subjects like this a real 
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alternative to the technological determinism that the author thinks so often frames 
conventional analyses  W ŽƌƐŝŵƉůǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇŽĨůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚŝƚ ? ?86           
We now turn to the fourth and final historiographical stream that informs this study that of 
the Spitfire itself.  Little scholarly work has been done on the Spitfire.  The reason for this, as 
is invariably flagged up in the few scholarly works extant on the aircraft, is the lack of useful 
archive material.  The specific problem is a lack of material on its early development phase.  
R. J. Mitchell was notoriously allergic to the written word.  His diary failed to even note the 
first flight of the Spitfire let alone comment upon it.  Worse, his reticence seems to have 
been shared by those working under him.  Kenneth Agnew has studied this very problem.  
His conclusions were that that there was a work place culture in the 1930s design office, 
which was at odds with the idea of record keeping.  He notes it particularly impacted upon 
work in progress.
87
  It means that the closest we can get to a step by step account of the 
development of the Spitfire is in memoirs.  There are two of especial note.  The first is 
'ŽƌĚŽŶDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐR. J. Mitchell: Schooldays to Spitfire (1986).88  This is a work of homage 
from a son to a father and gathers together the recollections of many who knew R. J. 
Mitchell and worked alongside him on the Spitfire.  The second is a personal memoir, Jeffrey 
YƵŝůů ?Ɛ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ PdĞƐƚWŝůŽƚ ?Ɛ^ƚŽƌǇ (1983).89  Quill had worked beside Mitchell on the Spitfire 
prototype and on all the Spitfire Marks that followed.  His character study of Mitchell is one 
of the most insightful and valuable we have.   
Turning to the work of historians of the Spitfire, there are three popular histories worthy of 
note if only for the breadth of their research.  dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŝƐůĨƌĞĚWƌŝĐĞ ?ƐThe Spitfire Story 
(1986).
90
  This is an archive-based general narrative.  The second is more of an 
ĞŶĐǇĐůŽƉĂĞĚŝĂ ?ƌŝĐDŽƌŐĂŶĂŶĚĚǁĂƌĚ^ŚĂĐŬůĂĚǇ ?ƐSpitfire: The History (1987).91  It is an 
ĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝǀĞůǇĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?The third, a generation on 
from Price and paying more attention to the political context, ŝƐ>ĞŽDĐ<ŝŶƐƚƌǇ ?ƐSpitfire: 
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Portrait of a Legend (2008).
92
  What all three volumes have in common is what Ben Marsden 
and Crosbie Smith might consider as an unduly  ‘tŚŝŐŐŝƐŚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ‘ƚŚĞŝŶĞǆŽƌĂďůĞŵĂƌĐŚŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ
over adversity and the forces of conservatism; and the moralised life of the engineering 
 “ǀŝƐŝŽŶĂƌǇ ?, outside  W and yet ahead of  W his time ?.93  This is almost exactly what we find in 
the way in which the best of the popular histories on the Spitfire tell the story of R. J. 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ.  
There is one more important volume on the Spitfire which is neither a memoir nor a 
straightforward chronological history.  This is the published account of the proceedings of 
the Mitchell Memorial Symposium which was held at Southampton University on 6 March 
1976.  This symposium was organised by the Southampton Branch of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the first flight of the Spitfire from 
Eastleigh (now Southampton) airport.  Invited speakers that day included senior 
Supermarine alumni as well as RAF pilots, all of whom had been intimately involved in the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?^ƵĐŚĂĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ
would not likely be repeated.    
Any cultural study requires a broad range of sources and this study is no exception.  In terms 
of archive resources two have been of particular value.  The first is the Vickers Archive held 
at Cambridge University Library.  In lieu of any useful archive material on R. J. Mitchell 
himself, the best way to approach Supermarine in the 1930s is to be found here.  The 
Vickers Archive is particularly well-served with material on the takeover of Supermarine by 
Vickers in 1928.     The second archive used extensively in this study is The National Archives 
in Kew.  Dissecting the story of the Spitfire Funds is only possible in the Home Office Files, 
and those from the Air Ministry are invaluable for the establishment of the Battle of Britain 
Memorial Flight.  In terms of useful memoir and biography, notwithstanding the two 
mentioned above, there are gaps.  Leslie Howard has been well served by his children, but 
there are no major biographies on three other important personalities who appear in this 
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thesis, the film producer Harry Saltzman, the Vickers Aviation chairman Sir Robert McLean, 
and most astonishingly of all R. J. Mitchell himself.     
tŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂĂŶĚƉƌŝŶƚŵĞĚŝĂŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉŚĂƐĞŝƐ
almost a complete blank but once deliveries of the Spitfire began in 1938, its media profile 
blossomed.  The episode of the Spitfire Funds in the summer of 1940 is especially well 
covered, unsurprising perhaps as press baron Lord Beaverbrook was at its centre.  After the 
war the commemoration of the Battle of Britain saw to it that the Spitfire remained 
something of a press staple, if only from September 1953 when it finally joined the lone 
Hurricane in the air.  In terms of ephemera, there is no question of any lack.  On 9 June 
2016, I typed Spitfire into Google search.  Google responded with 16,600,000 results.  Not 
all would have been references to the aircraft but it has encouraged attention to Garry 
ĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĚŝĐƚƵŵǁŚĞŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŵǇƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ‘tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌict 
context of cultural history I suggest that any object, publication or broadcast item (TV and 
radio) which is an original representation of a theme or an event should be considered 
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐŽƵƌĐĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?94  ŐŽŽĚĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŶ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ
material source used in this study is the Airfix box art of Roy Cross. 
Before leaving the subject of sources there is a point I wish to make concerning a notable 
inclusion.  That inclusion is a local history case study, which would perhaps be more 
accurately described as a community history case study.  Geoff Eley has noted the problems 
 ‘ůŽĐĂů ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŚĂƐŚĂĚŝŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇŝŶƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵǇĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŝƚŝƐƐŚŽƌƚ
sighted.  He makes the point that there are  ‘ŶĞǁĨŝĞůĚƐŽĨĐŽŶnection between the national 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽĐĂůƚŽďĞŽƉĞŶĞĚĂŶĚǀŝĞǁĞĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ “ůŽĐĂů ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂůůƚŚĞƋƵŽƚŝĚŝĂŶƐƉĂĐĞƐ
(family, household, neighbourhood, work, schooling, play, entertainment, sexuality) far 
away from the recognized and legitimate public frames we generally use for the assigning of 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?95  Such a search for connections is the reason why in the first chapter of 
ƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ/ŚĂǀĞƵƐĞĚĂĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇƚŽŚĞůƉĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ
Funds.  On the one hand it is a demonstration of the egalitarian impulse Calder described so 
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effectively but also of how easily it could be subverted.  It is an early indication of the 
diachronic nature of one particular myth.                 
Finally we come to how this study is structured.  It is divided into four chapters.  The first 
two chapters focus on the Spitfire as a palimpsest, chapters three and four on the Spitfire in 
performance.  Chapter one will examine the nature of the Spitfire as a palimpsest, that 
multi-layered record.   Between May 1939 and August 1942 the Spitfire drew three distinctly 
different narrative texts to itself.  There were no obvious connections, no natural 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂƉĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚ ?Ă ‘ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ
where otherwise unrelated texts are involved and entangled, intricately interwoven, 
ŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶŚĂďŝƚŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?96  Chapter two will investigate why the Spitfire, 
post-war, has no one dominant cultural construction.  The lack of such has contributed 
almost more than anything else to its flexibility to be able to re-interpret the myths for new 
audiences.   Turning to the Spitfire in performance, chapter three will examine the chaotic 
circumstances that kept the Spitfire flying at the dawn of the jet age.  If the Spitfire, on 
operational retirement, had been grounded for good it is the contention of this thesis that 
the Spitfire would have lost its cultural relevance as an agent of change and would have 
disappeared from more than just the skies.  Finally, chapter four will examine the Spitfire in 
action.  We will discover the Spitfire re-interpreting the war-made myth of the Battle of 
Britain for a new audience, not once but twice.           
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  Chapter 1 - The Creation of a Palimpsest: A War-Made Capability  
This thesis argues that the Spitfire has been able to behave as a palimpsest, a vehicle for the 
transmission of texts and images.  These texts and images are necessarily ill-defined, 
overlapping and evolving.  As such, they represent narrative threads rather than complete 
stories.  It is the function of a thread to stretch in both directions as it is woven, and it is this 
Janus-like quality, of looking back and forward simultaneously, which has seen the Spitfire 
prosper post-war.  The three threads that we are concerned with have been woven about 
ideas of exceptionalism, empowerment and identity.  In tracing the origins of these three 
narrative threads what we discover is the genesis of the Spitfire ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽďĞŚĂǀĞas a 
palimpsest.   
In terms of chronology, it is the link between the Spitfire and ideas of exceptionality that 
comes first.  20 May 1939, Empire Air Day, was the occasion of the ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚmajor 
public engagement.  The few Spitfires as yet available to Fighter Command performed to 
well over a million people up and down the country.  It was all for the benefit of the RAF, a 
promotional exercise to encourage recruitment.  The tremendous reception that greeted 
the Spitfire that day, however, spoke of more than the immediate needs of the RAF.   It was 
less than four months before the outbreak of war.  What the crowds up and down the 
country were cheering at was the potential of a war-winning weapon.         
The second episode to be explored in this chapter sees the beginning of the Spitfire ?s link 
with ideas of empowerment.  In the spring of 1940, it was a Jamaican newspaper the 
Gleaner that first suggested it would be a good idea for the public to buy a fighter plane for 
the RAF.  It turned out to be a very good idea, and one soon taken up with enthusiasm 
across the United Kingdom and beyond.  What began as an opportunity to buy a fighter 
soon became the chance to buy a Spitfire.  So much money was raised in the summer of 
1940 that the matter ended up in the hands of lawyers.  Two points wanted clarification.  
Who owned the Spitfires now being purchased by public subscription and what in fact did 
ownership of a weapon of war mean in a democracy presently engaged in a war?  The 
lawyers ? answer was as elegant as it was simple.  They concluded that the raising of Spitfire 
Funds was an egalitarian impulse, a duty of citizenship, and therefore the Spitfires belonged 
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to the nation.  It may have been a duty but it was a sense of empowerment that drove this 
egalitarian impulse.  It was this sense of personal involvement in a national crisis which 
would be the legacy of the Spitfire Funds.      
The third and final narrative thread to attach itself to the Spitfire was as a result of the 
premiere of the 1942 film, The First of the Few.  Starring Leslie Howard and David Niven, the 
film told the story of R. J. Mitchell ?Ɛdevelopment of the Spitfire.  The film bore only a 
passing resemblance to real events and instead concentrated on a creation story much 
more in keeping with the mood of the times.  What cinema audiences saw, and enjoyed, 
was a fable.  It was a story of good triumphing over evil.  This was wartime, however, and 
good triumphing over evil was a national cause.  But in the hands of Leslie Howard, the 
film ?s creative force, this was less a patriotic cause and had much more to do with 
nationalism.  Howard was an ardent nationalist, he considered himself first and foremost an 
Englishman.  In his hands both Mitchell and the Spitfire were stamped with his own mark of 
Englishness.  Post-war, what could still be seen of that mark was, however, less important 
than the fact of its existence.  ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞǁĂƐƚŽ
begin a conversation about identity which continues to this day. 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that these were all fragile beginnings with no 
guarantee of survival.  However, as will be seen in the final chapter of this thesis, seventy 
years after these three narrative threads were first spun we find them strong and secure.    
  
dŚĞ/ŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ?Champion ? 
To date, there are 513 titles listed on the British Library website with the word Spitfire in the 
title.
97
  Setting aside the works of romantic fiction and Shakespearean criticism, it still leaves 
the majority as testimony to the popularity, amongst the reading public at least, of the 
Supermarine Spitfire.  In telling the story of the Spitfire there is one theme that unites 
almost all these works together, and that ŝƐ ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?dŚe business of Spitfire 
publishing has depended upon it, both as an idea to be celebrated and one to be repeatedly 
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 ‘ƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?.98  What made the Spitfire exceptional maybe the concern of so many titles housed 
at the British Library, but it is not the prime concern here.  Instead we want to trace the idea 
back to its beginning.  A palimpsest thrives on stories superimposed on stories, on narrative 
threads that combine and re-combine to form something new, but there has to be a 
beginning and for the Spitfire it all began with the idea of a champion. 
On Saturday, 20 May 1939, on a fine spring day, a correspondent from the Manchester 
Guardian visited Hendon aerodrome in North West London.  It was Empire Air Day, the 
ĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂů ‘ĂƚŚŽŵĞ ? ?^ĞǀĞŶƚǇ-eight military and civilian airfields up and 
down the country had put out the bunting in the hope of attracting a good crowd not least 
because all profits from the day were going to the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund.  The 
correspondent from the Manchester Guardian was certainly impressed by the turn out at 
Hendon,  ‘ƚhe size of the crowd was positively astonishing.  I could not guess how many 
thousands were there, but the boundary was black with masses of people as far as I could 
ƐĞĞŝŶďŽƚŚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?99  The Air League of the British ŵƉŝƌĞ ?ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂƚŚŽŵĞ ? ?
had expected a half million visitors across the country; over a million came.  Why those 
visitors came in such numbers finds us drawing out ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
thread.   
Empire Air Day had its beginnings six years before in a memorandum sent to the Executive 
Committee of the Air League of the British Empire in the late autumn of 1933.  Its author 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞŝƌ>ĞĂŐƵĞ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-General Air Commodore, J. A. Chamier.100 
The Secretary-General submitted the details of a general scheme he had devised for 
bringing the public into closer contact with aviation.  His scheme proposed the 
throwing open of all aerodromes (civil and military) on one day of the year 
(preferably Empire Day), in the course of which the public would be shown the 
working of the aerodrome and not be herded in enclosures to watch flying displays.  
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It was to be both a civilian as well as a military event, which was a reflection of Chamier ?Ɛ
own career to date.  Having served in the RAF and before taking up his appointment with 
the Air League, Chamier had moved across into the commercial sector as a member of the 
board of Vickers Aviation.  He had in fact attended the board meeting in October 1931 that 
had green-lighted the Spitfire project.  Unfortunately for Chamier, that board meeting had 
been one of his last.  Appointed by Sir Robert McLean, chairman of Vickers Aviation, to 
oversee the work of Vickers triumvirate of Chief Designers, Chamier found himself in an 
invidious position.  The problem was that triumvirate, the highly experienced Rex Pearson, 
the brilliant but obstinate Barnes Wallis, and the temperamental R. J. Mitchell, would not be 
overseen.  It cannot have been a surprise to anyone when Chamier moved on to take charge 
of the Air League.  Chamier was not replaced.  As we shall see in chapter 2, however, Sir 
Robert McLean, a railway engineer steeped in a culture of teamwork, did not learn any 
useful lesson about the individuality of his aircraft designers. 
 
Figure 1. Sir John Adrian Chamier, by Walter Stoneman, bromide print, 1931 
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ŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?ƐŶĞǁĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƚhe Air League, had been founded in 1909 as the Aerial League of 
ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? ‘ƚŽ
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐůĂĐŬŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŽŬĞĞƉǁĂƌŵƚŚĞĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝƐŵ ? ?102  The Navy League was 
particularly successful, with a membership of 21,500 in 1908 which then jumped to more 
than 125,000 by 1913.  The Aerial League of the British Empire would never be able to boast 
such figures, never more than 10,000, but lack of members was belied by its effectiveness 
and never more so than when Chamier was in charge.
103
  Chamier was soon busy.  
Most people interested in air matters will have heard that the Air League has been 
re-organised and has already set to work very actively to educate the Government, 
Members of Parliament and the public on air matters.  The press has given us every 
assistance and a large lecture programme throughout London and the Provinces for 
the Autumn and Winter is being drafted... 
dŚĞ “ƉĞĂĐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƵƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚǀŽĐĂů ?and we get 
little help from the older Services who foresee the possibility of a break-up of the 
Royal Air Force.  Other nations are jealous of our technical excellence and the 
comparative prosperity of our aircraft export trade, and of our air transport services 
in time of World depression. 
It is foolish to fold our hands and trust that all will be well, we have an immense field 




It did not take long for Chamier to present his big idea to his Executive Committee.  It was 
going to be called  ‘Empire Air Day ?.  His intention was not to establish a new event from 
scratch, a costly exercise and one always prone to failure, but to take advantage of a 
celebration that was already established in the calendar and in the public consciousness.  
What Chamier was proposing to do was to exploit Empire Day.   
                                                     
102
 Geoffrey Searle, A New England? Peace and War 1886-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), p. 512.  On 
the Navy League see Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
103
 hƌŝŝĂůĞƌ ? ‘ůŝƚĞKƉŝŶŝŽŶĂŶĚĞĨĞŶĐĞWŽůŝĐǇ PŝƌWŽǁĞƌĚǀŽĐĂĐǇĂnd British Rearmament during the 
 ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?British Journal of International Studies, 6 (1980), p. 38. 
104
  ‘dŚĞŝƌ>ĞĂŐƵĞ ? ?Aeroplane, 5 July 1933, p. 402. 
Page 31 
 
Empire Day, which originally ŵĂƌŬĞĚYƵĞĞŶsŝĐƚŽƌŝĂ ?ƐďŝƌƚŚĚĂǇŽŶ ? ?DĂǇ ?ǁĂƐwhat Eric 
Hobsbawm has identified as an  ‘invented tradition ?.  These late nineteenth century, early 
ƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĞƌĞŵŽŶŝĂůƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞ were, according to 
Hobsbawm, necessary to underpin increasingly unstable national and imperial projects.
105
  It 
was certainly a sense of unease that had driven Reginald Brabazon, the twelfth Earl of 
Meath to establish Empire Day in 1904.
106
  Brabazon was an imperialist, a zealot, who had 
been dismayed by the outcome of the South African War and the negative message he 
believed it sent to the British nation.  His response was for an annual patriotic festival to be 
held in schools.  It would, he believed, plant the seed of imperialism in the next generation.  
Empire Day was an immediate success, but not just with schoolchildren, and not entirely for 
the reason Brabazon envisaged.  Empire Day soon escaped the schoolyard because in the 
ten years before the First World War it became a public holiday, a day off work as well as an 
opportunity to demonstrate patriotism.  It was a holiday atmosphere charged by patriotic 
concerts, military parades, church services, and public lectures.       
After the First World War, ŵƉŝƌĞĂǇ ?Ɛovert jingoism and its convivial atmosphere were no 
longer deemed appropriate.   Overt celebration now turned into muted commemoration as 
Empire Day found its ƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŽĨƌĞŵĞŵďƌĂŶĐĞ ?107  Empire Day was proving a 
tradition to suit the moment and by the early 1930s this meant change once again.  
ƌĂďĂǌŽŶ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůƚƌŝƵŵƉŚǁĂƐŐŽŶĞ ?ďƵƚits legacy remained, and what 
now emerged was a vision of imperial co-operation.
108
  This was good news for the British 
aviation industry.  By 1933, opening up imperial air routes was at the top of both 
commercial and government aviation agendas.
109
  Chamier had indeed spotted his 
opportunity.  He would reach out to the air minded by fusing two ideas, Empire Day ?s re-
calibration as a celebration of imperial co-operation and ĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐƐƉŝƌŝƚ ?dŚĂƚ
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his idea fell on fertile ground is clear from this note from the Acting High Commissioner for 
Australia on the announcement of the first Empire Air Day in April 1934. 
The progress of aviation for peaceful and beneficial purposes is a matter of the 
highest interest and importance to Australia.  The advantages of rapid 
communication by air, not only with the outside World but between distant points 
within its own boundaries, have in Australia abundantly demonstrated their value.  I 
therefore wish the Air League of the British Empire the fullest measure of success in 
their endeavours to promote an Empire Air Day celebration with the object of 
encouraging flying and accelerating aerial progress imperially.
110
 
In order to successfully promote Empire Air Day Chamier needed partners.  In terms of 
military aviation that meant the RAF.  Fortunately for Chamier and the Air League, the RAF 
understood the value of positive publicity.  At the end of the First World War, the RAF had 
nearly lost its independence as the War Office and Admiralty fought to regain control of 
military aviation.  The Air Staff response to this existential threat, as well as the draconian 
budget cuts that followed the ending of the war, was a publicity campaign within and 
outside Whitehall.  The Air Staff searching for an idea to justify their continuing independent 
existence had come up with imperial policing from the air.
111
  It was an idea bound to find 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌŝŶtŚŝƚĞŚĂůů ?ƐŵŽƐƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƚŚĞdƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ ?dŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĂĨĞǁĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ
might replace the heavier financial burden of garrisoned troops.  Imperial policing from the 
air was sold somewhat differently to the public however.  It was less financial stringency and 
more fireworks.  A demonstration of the efficacy of air policing, the bombing of a cardboard 




In 1934, therefore, Chamier received a sympathetic hearing at the Air Ministry ?ŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?Ɛ
problem proved to be in the commercial sector, specifically a lack of interest from the 
Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC).         
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The Secretary-General reported the progress made in the organisation of Empire Air 
Day.  He had attended a meeting at the Air Ministry and was gratified with the 
enthusiasm shown by the flying side...He was also disappointed with the manner in 
which the Society of British Aircraft Constructors had withdrawn from the scheme 
after having given it enthusiastic welcome.
113
 
Why did the SBAC, which included all the major airframe manufacturers, pull out of the first 
Empire Air Day and then stay out as the crowds grew year on year?  The reason was 
ŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?Ɛvision, of raising awareness of British aviation amongst the general public, did not 
suit the stakeholders in the SBAC.  Its members, who included Vickers Aviation, owner of 
Supermarine, sold their wares to governments and airlines and rarely to individuals.  The 
age of the privateer was almost over.  The SBAC had its shop window in any case, an 
invitation only event held at Hatfield immediately after the RA& ?ƐHendon Air Show. There 
was also the Royal Aeronautical Society Garden Party which was held annually between 
1935 and 1939 at Harmondsworth.  In fact, the Spitfire was first put through its paces at 
Hatfield in June 1936 long before it flew for the public. 
This decision taken by the SBAC was a blow to Chamier and ƚŚĞŝƌ>ĞĂŐƵĞ ?Ɛvision to spread 
 ‘ĂŝƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?that is both civilian as well as military.  Nevertheless, the first Empire Air Day 
went ahead and was a success.  Thirty nine RAF stations opened their gates on 24 May 1934, 
and the Air Ministry counted 82,000 visitors through their gates.
114
  Charles Grey, editor of 
Aeroplane, was fulsome in his praise. 
Whoever first thought of Empire Air Day deserves the thanks of the British People.  
And no matter who thought of it, the Air League reborn to a new activity, had begun 
a great movement by stirring up all in this country who are concerned with flying, to 
organise, each in their several ways and in their several places, demonstrations to 




                                                     
113
 Air League Office, Minute Book, 10 April 1934, p. 117.  
114
  ‘ŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ ? ?Aeroplane, 30 May 1934, p. 860. 
115




Figure 2.  Poster for Empire Air Day, 1934 Shows aerodromes in England, Wales, Southern Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, all of which were open for Empire Air Day. Additional Manuscripts Collection West Sussex Record Office 
As this poster promoting that first Empire Day demonstrates, Grey was right that it was 
 ‘ĞĂĐŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƐĞǀĞƌĂůǁĂǇƐĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƐĞǀĞƌĂůƉůĂĐĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ>ŽŶĚŽŶĐĞŶƚƌŝĐ
about the new Empire Air Day.   It was a nationwide event, unlike the Hendon Air Display.    
Looking forward, though, Grey also saw the clouds on the horizon which would soon 
obscure Chamier and the Air LeaŐƵĞ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ.   
The first Empire Air Day has come at just the right moment.  Those newspapers 
which appeal to the mentally lower classes in all grades of society had worked up 
almost a panic about the awfulness of air war.  The air minded Members of 
Parliament had driven into the minds of the Cabinet the idea that the British people 
insist on strengthening the Royal Air Force.
116
 
dŚŽƐĞŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƐŽƌĂŝƐĞĚ'ƌĞǇ ?Ɛhackles included the Daily Mail, Daily Express, 
Daily Herald and Daily Mirror.
117
  What Grey was referring to was the  ‘air panic ? which had 
erupted in the winter of 1934 and would rumble on into the new-year.  It was sparked by 
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the revelation of German rearmament and fanned into flame on Fleet Street.  It was good 
news for the RAF.  It saw the beginning of the major expansion of the RAF and encouraged 
the development programme that would eventually result in the Hurricane and Spitfire.  As 
already noted Chamier lacked a counter weight to the RAF.  It was not until 1938, however, 
that the relationship between the two started to unravel, just in time to significantly impact 
upon the manner of the unveiling of the Spitfire before the British public.         
Empire Air Day was very soon established in ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞǀĞŶƚƐĐĂůĞŶĚĂƌ ?In only its second 
year Aeroplane ĐŽƵůĚƌĞƉŽƌƚ ‘ƚhere can be no doubt that Empire Air Day has become a 
national institution among all classes and all ages ?.118  In 1936, there were forty four RAF 
aerodromes open to the public, and by 1937, including civil aerodromes, that number had 
climbed to over a hundred.  Attendances were growing significantly too, from 82,000 to 
over 600,000 in 1937.
119
  Initially, the RAF appeared something of a reluctant partner for the 
Air League.  In 1936, the ministry left it a bare eleven weeks before gates were to open 
before informing the Air League of their co-operation, as this rather testy internal minute 
ƌĞǀĞĂůƐ ? ‘dŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ-General announced that the Air Ministry had finally agreed to the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZŽǇĂůŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŝŶŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?120  As for the next year, at 
Christmas 1936 when plans ought to have been wĞůůĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ‘ŝƚǁĂƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
meeting that the Air ministry had given no official notice that they were prepared to 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?121  They did participate, and the 1937 Empire Air Day 
was a tremendous success.  This lack of entŚƵƐŝĂƐŵŚĂĚŵƵĐŚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛnew rate 
of expansion.  It simply did not need the promotional platform Empire Air Day provided, but 
this was all set to change.     
In February 1938, the Air League wrote angrily to its partner.   ‘dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇshould issue 
a statement that Empire Air Day 1938 was being organised by the Air League.  In Press 
ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŵĂĚĞƐŽĨĂƌƚŚĞŝƌůĞĂŐƵĞŚĂĚŶŽƚďĞĞŶŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? ?122  The RAF had done 
a complete U-turn in its appreciation of Empire Air Day and was now proving an 
uncomfortably overbearing partner.  In 1938 the writing was on the wall and the following 
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year, Chamier understood his original vision of a celebration of both military as well as 
civilian aviation had been completely corrupted. 
The secretary General...ĂƐŬĞĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞĂƐƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŶĞǆƚǇĞĂƌƚŚĞ
League should not try and steer the day more towards a universal aviation day 
where every aerodrome would be opened to the public even if it could not put up a 
special flying display. 
The Secretary-'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĂŶ “ƚ,ŽŵĞ ?ŚĂĚƌĂƚŚĞƌďĞĞŶůŽƐƚĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞĚĂǇǁĂƐŝŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŵŝŶŝĂƚƵƌĞ “,ĞŶĚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ?123 
ŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?ƐĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĞŶůĞĂŬĞĚŽƵƚŝŶƚŽŚŝƐƉƵďůŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
I am a little disappointed that the original conception of Empire Air Day is being lost 
ƐŝŐŚƚŽĨ ?/ƚǁĂƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞƐŽĨĂŶ “ƚ,ŽŵĞ ?ƚŚĂŶĂƐĂĚŝƐƉůĂǇ W more 
of an occasion when Mr., Mrs. and the youngsters could wander around and see 
aviation from a new angle.  Flying displays have been held since aeroplanes flew, and 




Why had the RAF decided to appropriate Empire Air Day?  The reason was recruitment.  It 
found itself in need of a shop window just as it abandoned the Hendon Air Display.   The 
timing was unfortunate.  Hendon had been held for the first time in 1920, all part of the 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚŚĞZ& ?ƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?Ƶƚby the mid-1930s, as its 
rapid expansion began, the RAF had lost interest in Hendon.  It pleaded the dangers of an 
increase in housing around Hendon, the nuisance to schools and hospitals, and the cramped 
conditions of the airfield itself, even the disruption to ongoing training.
125
  All this was true 
but not the point.  In  ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ,ĞŶĚŽŶĚŝƐƉůĂǇǁĂƐŚĞůĚ ?ƚŚĞZ& ?ƐŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ
was secure and its budget the envy of the Admiralty and the War Office.  In 1937, it no 
longer needed the Hendon Air Display.   
Two years later, however, and it certainly did.  Back in 1937 the Air Council had not 
reckoned with the knock-on effect of accelerated re-armament, specifically the need for 
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recruiting to keep up.   What was intended in 1939 by the RAF therefore, was just as 
Chamier feared, a nationwide  ‘ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŵŝŶŝĂƚƵƌĞ “,ĞŶĚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ?               
     
 
Figure 3.  Poster for Empire Air Day 1939 at Warmwell near Dorchester 
Empire Air Day 1939 was going ƚŽďĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛfirst major encounter with the British 
public.  As the poster shown above from Warmwell suggests, the RAF wanted to take full 
promotional advantage of its brand new fighter squadrons even if this poster speaks more 
of a Hurricane than a Spitfire.   The fighter aeroplane in the poster has the straight wings 
and humped cockpit redolent of a Hurricane.  Note the modernist aesthetic that informs this 
1939 poster, however.  The message is reduced to essentials, the colours are vivid and a 
sense of speed is evoked.  Such an aesthetic would in fact not impress itself upon the 
Spitfire because British Modernism, as championed by Kenneth Clark, was grounded in 
conservatism.  Vivid colours were eschewed and instead the brooding qualities and 
apocalyptic vision of Neo-Romanticism was encouraged.  Nevertheless such an aesthetic at 
such a time is important for the argument here.  For many, the Spitfire on its first major 
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public engagement was being favourably compared with the products of a Fascist war 
machine, one rooted, visually at least, in a modernist aesthetic.
126
  
The Spitfire was to be the centre of attention on the day but why was the Hurricane being 
forced into a secondary role ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂƐƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛbrand new fighter squadrons were then 
stocked almost exclusively with Hurricanes?  The problem was that the Hurricane, in terms 
of publicity, was old news.  It had received its moment in the limelight fifteen months before 
with a high speed run from Edinburgh to London.  That high speed run had excited the 
national press.  They had proclaimed, misleadingly, the dawn of a new era of 400 mph 
fighters.
127
  It was no more than ĂĚĂǇ ?ƐŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ.  In terms of impact, the timing 
ŽĨƚŚĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐity stunt was unfortunate for Sydney Camm and all those involved 
in its development.  In early February 1938, there was no imminent threat of war.  In fact, 
Chamberlain and the then still lord president of the council, Lord Halifax, were exploring 
ways of improving Anglo-German relations.
128
  The Hurricane had therefore been unveiled 
in February 1938 before an indifferent public.  It would all be very different for the Spitfire.   
Officially at least, Empire Air Day ǁĂƐŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĚĞďƵƚ ?dŚĂƚŚĂĚ
taken place a long time ago at SupermarŝŶĞ ?ƐĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚďĂƐĞĂƚĂƐƚůŝĞŐŚďĞĨŽƌĞĂƐŵĂůůŝŶǀŝƚĞĚ
ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞŽŶ ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?/ƚŚĂĚĞǀĞŶŵĞƚƚŚĞƉĂǇŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐďĞĨŽƌĞĂƚƚŚĂƚǇĞĂƌ ?Ɛ,ĞŶĚŽŶ
Air Display.  But it was an unheralded debut, one prototype lost amongst many.  It took a 
ĐŽŶŶŽŝƐƐĞƵƌ ?ƐĞǇĞƚŽ appreciate it that day.  Charles Grey, editor of Aeroplane though, had 
ƐƵĐŚĂĐŽŶŶŽŝƐƐĞƵƌ ?ƐĞǇĞ ? ‘DƌDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐůŝƚƚůĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ůŝŬĞĂďĂďǇ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌ
ZĂĐĞƌǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůĚƐƵƉŝƚƐĨĞĞƚ ?ŝƐĂƐǁĞĞƚůŝƚƚůĞũŽďĂůůŽǀĞƌ ? ?129 Yet outside the specialist and 
regional press, the Spitfire made little impact and then after that brief encounter the Spitfire 
almost disappeared completely from public view.  The reason was that Sir Robert McLean 
had no need to publicise ŚŝƐ ‘ƐǁĞĞƚůŝƚƚůĞũŽď ? ?dhe first large order for the Spitfire for 310 
aircraft had been placed, a contract worth £1,860,000 plus £136,400 for spares.  In July 
1938, both Pathe and Movietone had featured the Spitfire in their newsreels, and in 
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December of that year the newsreel cameras had descended upon Southampton to see the 
progress of Spitfire production.  It was but a tantalising glimpse, however.   
Reports in the national press before the summer of 1939 were few and reliable facts about 
the Spitfire even fewer.  What was said about the new fighter was, however, distinctly 
encouraging.  Much was left to the journalistic imagination.  In March 1938, the newspapers 
ǁĞƌĞĨƵůůŽĨƚĂůŬŽĨĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŽŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚůĂŶĚƉůĂŶĞƐƉĞĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ‘dŚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ
for the 500 mph attempt is the tiny 1.054 horse-power Supermarine Spitfire single-seater 
ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?130  There was some truth to this story.  The forty eighth production Spitfire (K9834) 
ǁĂƐŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘^ƉĞĞĚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?Unfortunately, in trails it was 
unable to best the required five hundred miles per hour.  It stuck a long way short at 408 
mph, and it never did make the record attempt.  The drip feed of news stories about the 
Spitfire continued.  In July 1938 came the news of a remarkable commercial coup for Lord 
Nuffield.  It was another opportunity for speculation.   ‘dŚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞŝƐƐƚŝůůŽŶ
the semi-secret list, but it is believed to be the fastest fighter in the RAF...Incorporated are 
all the latest aids, such as flaps for slow landing and an undercarriage that folds up into the 
wŝŶŐƐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶĨůŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĚŝǀŝŶŐĂƚĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ?ŵƉŚ ? ?131     
Public sightings of the aircraft before Empire Air Day were rare.  It was only on 4 August 
1938 that the first Spitfire was delivered to a front-line squadron.  Jeffrey Quill flew K9789 
to Duxford and handed it over to Squadron Leader H.I. Cozens, CO of 19 (Fighter) Squadron.  
It was not the start of a flood of deliveries.  It would take months for other front-line 
squadrons to see their first Spitfires.  In fact, it would not be until the turn of the year that 
the RAF would have enough Spitfires to put on any kind of nationwide show at all.
132
  The 
numbers of available Spitfires in May 1939 was small but it was going to be turned to 
dramatic advantage by a very good idea.  It had been arranged for Squadron Leader 
Stainforth, of Schneider Trophy fame, to fly from aerodrome to aerodrome.  He would 
conduct high speed, low level passes affording a teasing dramatic glimpse of the new and 
still mysterious fighter.  As we shall see, reaction to this coup de thêatre was all that the RAF 
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might have hoped for.  What might have surprised the RAF was the amount of people there 
to see it.                         
The RAF had taken over Empire Air Day in order to recruit.  Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of 
State for Air, in his introduction to ƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞŝƌĂǇ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ made that quite clear.   ‘/ 
hope, too, that many of those who visit the Royal Air Force to-day will consider the 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƐ ? ?133  The need was, after five years of accelerated 
expansion, greater than ever.
134
   ‘dŚĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĨŽƌ ? ? ? ?ŝƐǀĞƌǇůĂƌŐĞĂŶĚ ?
including the Reserve and Auxiliary services, we require 75,000 officers and men this 
ǇĞĂƌ ? ?135  Recruitment, however, was noƚŽŶĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?>ĞƐƐƚŚĂŶĂŵŽŶƚŚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŽŶ
25 April, Sir John Simon had presented his second budget and the sharply rising defence 
budget was at the heart of the debates both inside and outside parliament that followed.
136
  
On 20 May 1939, for the readers of the Daily Mail setting out for their nearest aerodrome 
this meant  ‘ƚoday, Air Day, gives to the keenly air-minded public their first insight into the 
ƌĂƉŝĚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƌĞĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞůĂƐƚƚǁĞůǀĞŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?.137 There would 
certainly have been some on a personal quest, with a decision to make, just as Sir Kingsley 
Wood hoped.  There were others, however, who had already made that decision and were 
coming in hope of confirmation of a decision well made.    
As a result of the expansion of the R.A.F. and its Reserves and Auxiliaries in recent 
years, The Great British Public went to see not so much the Royal Air Force as that 
ƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞZ ? ?& ?ĂƚǁŚŝĐŚ “KƵƌŝůů ?ŝƐƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ?KĨĂůůƚŚĞŚƵŶĚƌĞĚƐŽĨƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐ
of people who went out on Empire Air Day, there were comparatively few who were 
not accompanied, throughout their tour of flight-sheds, workshops, canteens and 
barrack rooms, by some young man in uniform showing off with pride and talking a 
language already becoming familiar to those he was escorting.
138
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ThĞZ& ?ƐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƌĞĐƌƵŝƚƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĂƌĚůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐƌowds on the day.  
Chamier had anticipated a crowd of half a million, but well over a million people attended 
events nationwide on Empire Air Day 1939.  Why had Chamier, an experienced organiser by 
now got it so wrong?  The reason was all to do with timing.  The late spring early summer of 
1939 was the moment which ŝŶ&ƌĂŶŬDĐŽŶŽƵŐŚ ?ƐƚĞůůŝŶŐphrase waited upon a decision 
ĨŽƌ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞŽƌǁĂƌ ? ?139  The last twelve weeks leading up to Empire Air Day in May 1939 had 
seen the German army eŶƚĞƌWƌĂŐƵĞ ?ŚĂŵďĞƌůĂŝŶ ?ƐŽĨĨĞƌŽĨŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐƚŽWŽůĂŶĚĂŶĚ
DƵƐƐŽůŝŶŝ ?ƐƐĞŝǌƵƌĞŽĨůďĂŶŝĂ ?ŚĂŵďĞƌůĂŝŶŚĂĚŽĨĨĞƌ ĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐƚŽ,ŽůůĂŶĚ ?
Switzerland and Denmark and conscription of all men aged between twenty and twenty one 
had just been introduced.  These were not ordinary times, according to Zara Steiner 
 ‘ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞDƵŶŝĐŚĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂǁĂƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƚŽƵŐŚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨ
both official and public mood ?.140  Opinion polls conducted between September 1938 and 
July 1939 were not favourable to Chamberlain and his appeasement policy ? ‘ůůƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƚŽĂ
sea-change in feeling that ruled out an early election and made Chamberlain ever more 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƉĞĐƚĂďŽƵƚƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƌŽĂĚƚŽƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?141  In late June, 
only weeks after Empire Air Day, newspapers right across the political spectrum embarked 
ƵƉŽŶĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚŽ ‘ƐƚŝĨĨĞŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĨŝŐŚƚ ? ?142  It was a new mood 
attested to in the unexpectedly high attendance on Empire Air Day in late May.     
What the crowds expected to see that day was probably just as the Daily Mail suggested, 
 ‘ƚŚĞŝƌĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚo the rapid achievements of the ƌŝƚŝƐŚƌĞĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?143  What the 
crowds would not have expected was the perfectly staged managed sight of a Spitfire flying 
fast and low over the horizon.  We are fortunate to have a number of reports of the impact 
of this coup de thêatre.  Charles Grey, editor of Aeroplane had had the foresight to place 
correspondents at all the major aerodromes that day.  At Biggin Hill it was reported that 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ‘ĂďƌĞĂƚŚƚĂŬŝŶŐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĚŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚĂĐƌŽďĂƚŝĐƐďǇĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
dived at amazing speed and zoomed vertically so that it appeared to be drawn upwards by 
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ŵĂŐŶĞƚŝĐĨŽƌĐĞ ?.144  At Catterick ? ‘ƚhe effect of all the Spitfires in line astern all shooting hard 
one after the other and with a genuine M.G. noise was very heartening ?.145  At Manchester 
(Ringway) ?Ă^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ‘flashed over the airport several times in wide circuits, and the 
movement of the heads in the crowd below it was reminiscent of the famous Shell 
advert ?.146  ƚdĞƌŶ,ŝůů ? ‘ƚhe appearance of the Spitfire on the horizon was the signal for 
tremendous cheering ?.147  At Wyton ? ‘ŵore than nine thousand people penetrated the 
windy wilderness of Huntingdonshire ƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƌĚƌŝůůďǇƚŚƌĞĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐ ? “tŚĞǁ ?
was the crowds comment as they dived past) ?.148 
The Spitfire made quite an impression.  We must be careful not to push the evidence too far 
but such reactions suggest something more than satisfied curiosity.  What are we to make of 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŝĐŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŽƵŶĚŽĨŝƚƐŵĂĐŚŝŶĞŐƵŶƐǁĂƐ ‘ŚĞĂƌƚĞŶŝŶŐ ?for 
instance, and what of that note from Tern Hill in Shropshire?  How do we explain  ‘ƚŚĞ
appearance of the Spitfire on the horizon was the signal ĨŽƌƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐĐŚĞĞƌŝŶŐ ? ? Why 
were they cheering?  Was it perhaps relief at witnessing a potential champion?   If it was 
then it was relief fuelled by a number of misconceptions.  Even the most informed members 
of the crowd would have known little about the Spitfire.  Any information about the Spitfire 
in the public domain at the time, and in particular performance figures, was little more than 
idle speculation.  There was, however, some information in the public domain, and it does 
have a bearing on that  ‘ƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐĐŚĞĞƌŝŶŐ ?.    
Contemporary reporting of the Spitfire, for want of any real information, almost invariably 
linked the Supermarine Spitfire with ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛvictorious Schneider Trophy campaigns.  
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛsleek racers had won the Schneider Trophy outright for Britain in 1931.  Not only 
was the race won and the trophy secured that year but the world speed record was broken 
as well.  Journalistic prompting, provenance and its present mystery, may well have 
conflated Schneider racer with Spitfire in the minds of many that day, only one now with 
guns.       
                                                     
144











There is also another link to be made between the reaction of the crowds on Empire Day at 
the sight of a Spitfire and the Schneider racers of 1931.  As noted above, in late May 1939, 
questions over the need to confront Hitler were being raised.
149
  Thoughts, even within the 
conservative establishment, were turning to wĂǇƐƚŽ ‘ƐƚŝĨĨĞŶƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
determination to fight ?.150  Back in 1931 ?^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌƌĂĐĞƌƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞd a 
similar disconnection between government policy and certain well-connected 
constituencies within the public sphere.  The last Schneider campaign had been mired in 
controversy from its beginning.  After ZĂŵƐĞǇDĂĐŽŶĂůĚ ?ƐďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚ>ĂďŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
had withdrawn its support, it was the wealthy Lady Houston who had stepped in to fund 
^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌĞŶƚƌǇ ?She made no secret of her reasons why, reasons loudly 
applauded in the conservative national and specialist press at the time ? ‘/ĂŵƵƚƚĞƌůǇǁĞĂƌǇ
of the lie-down-and-kick-me attitude of the Socialist government.  It appears painful for 
them to contemplate any victory by their own countrymen in any contest, either in sport or 
ǁĂƌ ? ?151  >ĂĚǇ,ŽƵƐƚŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŵĂǇhave dimmed after the war because of her fascist 
sympathies, but it was intact in 1939.
152
  It was still intact in 1942 when Leslie Howard 
alluded to her generosity in his film about the development of the Spitfire The First of the 
Few.  What her support for the Schneider campaign in 1931 in opposition to the 
government of the time may well have done therefore, was to lend something of a radical, 
populist air to all that cheering on 20 May 1939.   
To sum up this first episode, a palimpsest has to have a beginning; the first text has to be 
written.  For the Spitfire, it began on the day of its first major public engagement.  The event 
chosen for this first major public engagement turned out to be an ideal crucible.  Empire 
Day, onto which the Air League had grafted its new Air Day, was itself something of a 
palimpsest.  A celebration of imperial conquest had been re-cast as a day of 
commemoration and by the early 1930s it had been re-cast once again as an opportunity to 
inspire imperial co-operation.  Because of the timing of the event, whatever the RAF 
expected from the day, they were never likely to be in complete charge of the agenda.  
Those that were streaming through the gates of aerodromes up and down the country in 
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huge numbers had a long enough agenda of their own.  A national conversation was going 
on about the need to confront Hitler.  Into that conversation flew the Spitfire with a 
remarkable coup de thêatre.  All that tremendous cheering was at the sight of a timely new 
champion.           
 
A Sense of Empowerment 
Turning now to the second narrative thread to be explored in this chapter, we find it has 
something in ĐŽŵŵŽŶǁŝƚŚ>ĂĚǇ,ŽƵƐƚŽŶ ?Ɛown small stamp upon the Spitfire, her  ‘ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?
appeal.  dŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘dŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ?, as applied to the home front in Britain 
during the Second World War, is obscure, and despite its contentious post-war 
historiographical career, particularly in the hands of Angus Calder, it has never been 
discarded as a useful descriptive tool.
153
  Arthur Marwick, a firm advocate of the radical 
potential of war, was prepared to use it as such and he gave four reasons why.  The first was 
that ordinary people were on the frontline.  The second was that direct participation by 
 ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁĂƐǀŝƚĂůƚŽƚŚĞ war machine.  The third was that spokesmen emerged for 
ƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇĐůĂƐƐ ?,ŝƐŽǁŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞǁĂƐ: ? ?WƌŝĞƐƚůĞǇ ?DĂƌǁŝĐŬ ?ƐĨŽƵƌƚŚƌĞĂƐŽŶǁĂƐ




Geoffrey Field situates the high tide of such popular radicalism in the early years of the war.  
He suggests that at a time of the Blitz, battlefield defeat, growing anxiety, and 
dissatisfaction over the conduct of the war  ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞǁĞƌĞƐǁĞƉƚďǇƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĞŵŽƚŝŽns  W of 
anger, fear, a sense of betrayal and of desperation ?.155  Angus Calder suggested such 
powerful emotions in the early phase of the war did turn into direct action ? ‘dŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ
increasingly led itself.  Its nameless leaders in the bombed streets, on the factory floor, in 
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the Home Guard drill hall, asserted a new and popular spŝƌŝƚ ? ?156  One example of this new 
and popular spirit, and one with direct implications for the legacy of the Spitfire, was the 
raising of the Spitfire Funds which took place in the summer of 1940.  What we are about to 
see are DĂƌǁŝĐŬ ?Ɛ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĨŝƌĞĚďǇĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵ Ŷƚ.  This left its mark 
upon the Spitfire.  In terms of the Spitfire as a multi-layered record, this is the second layer 
to follow that of champion.  In studying the raising of the Spitfire Funds, we will approach it 
from two different directions.  A top-down view, from Whitehall, will offer the wider 
political context; a bottom-up view, a selected community of concerned citizens, will locate 
for us some of those participating  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?.           
On 19 February 1941, J. Eaton Griffiths sent a note over from his office at the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production to the 10 Downing Street Annexe.  It was addressed to J.M. Martin Esq., 
secretary to the Prime Minister.  
Dear Martin, 
Lord Beaverbrook has in mind to issue a public statement on the lines of the 
attached. 
,ĞǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŚĞWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? 
The Prime Minister will, of course, appreciate that the statement has been worded 
with a view to popular appeal and that the tone is consistent with the general level 
ŽĨƚŚĞ “^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ ?ĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? 





ƐĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?ƐƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ĂƚŽŶ'ƌŝĨĨŝƚŚƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌǁŝƚŚĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛ
 ‘ŽǁŶǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?,ĞǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚƌĞĞĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚĨƌŽŵtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůƚŽ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ
orderly administration from near-chaos ?.158  Beaverbrook, on his appointment to the 
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Ministry of Aircraft Production in May 1940, had looked beyond Whitehall to assemble his 
team.  According to his first and most sympathetic biographer, A.J.P. Taylor, at least half of 
the typists in the ministry typing pool were on the payroll of the Daily Express.
159
  But Eaton 
Griffiths was not a Beaverbrook place-man, he was a career civil servant, and this explains 
the tenor of his note to his colleague in the 10 Downing Street Annexe.  He was not being 
presumptuous or patronising in translating ĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛmessage; as a career civil servant 
he would have appreciated that Prime Ministers and Private Secretaries dealt in a different 
lingua franca to men of the cut of Lord Beaverbrook.  Eaton Griffiths was probably right, 
however, to leave ĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?ƐǁĞůůƚƵƌŶĞĚƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĨůĂŵďŽǇĂŶĐǇ ?ǁĞůůĂůŽŶĞ ?
It captured the spirit behind the Spitfire Fund perfectly.  It was not suitable however for the 
public statement which Beaverbrook went on to release a week later. 
Through the generosity of the public, through the gifts we have received from warm-
hearted people at home and abroad, we have been able to carry out a splendid 
enterprise. 
The ten million pounds spontaneously given us for the aircraft fund pays for the 
replacement of all the Spitfires and all the Hurricanes lost in battle from the day the 
Churchill Government took office to the end of 1940. 
We propose therefore to devote to the Benevolent Funds of the three fighting 
services ten percent of the money sent to us after the end of March. 
It is our belief that, by doing so, we shall interpret the desire of the public to unite 
their gratitude to the valiant defenders of freedom with their determination to 
strengthen the squadrons of the Royal Air Force. 
Ministry of Aircraft Production.
160
 
This statement, released at the height of the Blitz, was good news, a publicity coup for Lord 
Beaverbrook, for his ministry, and for the war effort as a whole.  Such a good news story 
was not about to be wasted, not in Whitehall and not on Grub Street either.  Quick to spot 
ĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇǁĂƐƚŚĞũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ'ŽƌĚŽŶĞĐŬůĞƐ ?ĞĐŬůĞƐŚĂĚũŽŝŶĞĚĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?ƐDaily 
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Express in 1928, moving on to the Daily Mail ten years later, as assistant and then deputy 
editor.  His time at the Daily Mail was not a success and he would spend the war as a 
freelance journalist, writing mainly for the railway bookstall.  His living therefore depended 
on the timeliness and the speed of his pen.  If he was quick with his Dunkirk and After; he 
was quicker still with his story of the Spitfire Funds.
161
  But Beckles ?Ɛ haste was not to the 
taste of everybody, not to the obituary writer in The Times ĂĨƚĞƌĞĐŬůĞƐ ?ƐƵŶƚŝŵĞůǇĚĞĂƚŚŝŶ
1954 for instance.  However, any suggestion of slipshod scholarship was leavened by a 
grudging acknowledŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĞĐŬůĞƐǁƌŽƚĞ ‘ŝŶĂǁŚŝƚĞŚĞĂƚŽĨƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?162  
Such was his rush to print on the Spitfire Funds that Beckles did not even bother to wait 
until he had an end to his story.  His book appeared while many of the Spitfire Funds 
remained open; another £3,000,000 was going to be counted over and ĂďŽǀĞĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛ
ten million.  Beckles account may have been poor in fact but, as a seasoned journalist, it was 
rich in observation, particularly when it came to the question of motivation. 
A great pause had come in the war.  For five weeks history had been written at 
break-neck pace.  For millions in Britain the days had been punctuated by the arrival 
of newspapers and the listening to radio bulletins.  Now a curtain had descended on 
France.  And the events of the next act of the drama could only be guessed.  All very 
well for the people to shake their fists at the raiders already coming over the coasts 
in ones or twos; how much more practical to put one fist in the trousers pocket and 
actually play a part in the coming conflict!  It was a voluntary gesture, and because it 
was voluntary, it appealed to the freedom-loving British, there were taxes, taxes and 
more taxes; one had to pay those; but here was something that you could do 
because you wanted to do it.
163
   
It had all begun in June 1940 when the Ministry of Aircraft Production started receiving 
unsolicited sums of money.  Almost everyone later agreed that it was from Jamaica that the 
very first significant sum came, but soon money was pouring in from all over the empire and 
quickly thereafter from all over the British Isles too.  This money was for Spitfires, 
replacements for the aircraft being shot down over the Channel.  Hurricanes were asked for 
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too, and the more generic term of fighter or even bomber was used, but it was Spitfires that 
were requested most and hence the name of the funds was born.  It was, according to 
Beckles, Sir Harry Oakes who asked the question how much did a Spitfire cost?
164
  The back 
of a ministerial envelope was consulted, and the sum of £5,000 arrived at.        
Sir Harry Oakes was in the fortunate position of being able to write a personal cheque for 
such a large sum but it was beyond the means of most.  What began as an exercise in 
personal empowerment soon became one of collective empowerment.  Fund raising 
ingenuity knew no bounds.  There were pub quizzes, factory and farm collections, raffles 
and auctions.  Shoppers gave up their change; a hat was passed around the air raid shelter 
ĂƚƚŚĞƐŽƵŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂůůĐůĞĂƌ ?.  In Tonbridge in Kent, which saw feverish fund raising activity 
throughout the summer of 1940, its citizens only had to look up to be inspired as the Battle 
of Britain raged overhead.  But as in Jamaica, wherever the Union Jack flew in the summer 
of 1940, there was likely to be a collection tin close to hand.   It was not only where the 
Union Jack flew either.  The exiled Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands delivered his 
substantial cheque to the ministry by hand in September 1940.
165
   
But Spitfires were paid for out of general taxation.  In Tonbridge, as we will discover, this 
was common knowledge.
166
  Common knowledge too in Tonbridge, was the fact that 
increasing Spitfire production was dependent upon facilities not finance.
 167
  The raising of a 
Spitfire Fund therefore speaks of opportunity as much as of outcome.  It was an emotional 
commitment as much as a logical one.  Gordon Beckles wrote of  ‘ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚ
ĚŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽ ? ?dŽsee this idea in action we need to leave the office of Lord 
Beaverbrook behind.  The history of the Spitfire Funds has largely been examined as an 
addendum to studies of Beaverbrook for the very good reason that he claimed the spotlight, 
or at least it was claimed for him.
168
  But did he deserve it?  Did any one person deserve it or 
are we looking at a more popular movement with leaders in every community?     
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To find out we must actually begin eleven years after the events to be described, with the 
correspondence between Lt-Colonel W. Byford-Jones and the Ministry of Supply in October 
1951.  The Ministry of Supply had absorbed the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1946.  
Byford-Jones is of particular interest because he claimed, and thought he could prove, that 
the Spitfire Fund was his idea. 
Early in the war before I was sent to Africa I conceived the idea of towns, federations 
ĂŶĚĨŝƌŵƐƌĂŝƐŝŶŐŵŽŶĞǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ “ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?/ŵĂĚĞĂƐƉĞĞĐŚĂďŽƵƚŝƚ
under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Bird Bart ex. Conservative M.P. for 
Wolverhampton.  I wrote an article about it and got the blessing for the idea from 
Lord Beaverbrook by telephone.  I raised the money for the first Spitfire in the British 
Isles and four months later explained my idea to scores of people by pamphlet and 
word of mouth.  The result was that the idea caught on and when I was sent abroad 
ƚŽũŽŝŶ>ŽƌĚtĂǀĞůů ?ƐƐƚĂĨĨƐŝŵŝůĂƌĨƵŶĚƐǁĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐƌĂŝƐĞĚĂůůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?169 
But the Ministry of Supply rejected Byford-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ ? The reason was explained in a 
letter from the Minister himself, the Rt. Hon. G.R. Strauss to Captain J. Baird, M.P. for 
Wolverhampton North-East.  Baird had taken up Byford-:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ? 
I am afraid that I still cannot accept his claim.  I readily accept his claim to be the 
inaugurator of the Wolverhampton Spitfire Fund, but the fact is that a fortnight 
before he suggested in the Wolverhampton Express and Star that that a fund should 
be raised to buy Spitfires, we received £10,000 from Jamaica to buy a Spitfire.  
Incidentally, we received another £10,000 from this colony on the 7
th
 June [1940].  
These donations seem to have been the result of a letter published in the Jamaican 
 ‘'ůĞĂŶĞƌ ?ŽŶDĂǇ ? ?th, 1940.  I am told that there is doubt even the man who wrote 
this letter can claim to be the inaugurator of the various Spitfire funds.
170
 
Captain Baird was satisfied by this explanation, but Byford-Jones was not.  He tried again 
only this time appealing to higher authority, the Prime Minister himself.  Winston Churchill 
had just been returned after winning the general election in October 1951.   
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I am naturally very proud of the fact that I originated the Spitfire fund in this country 
and regard it as the outstanding feat of my career and I am equally sad that the claim 
was not acknowledged by the former Minister of Supply.
171
 
Nobody at the Ministry of Supply or the Cabinet Office wanted to hurt Byford-:ŽŶĞƐ ?Ɛ
feelings.  His claim for absolute credit could not be substantiated but there was a sense that 
a measure of credit was undoubtedly due.  dŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŝŶĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?ƐŽǁŶ
possession, a congratulatory note to Byford-Jones from Beaverbrook in June 1940, which 
can now be found along with the rest of his papers in the Parliamentary Archive.
 172
  It took 
a sƵďƚůǇƐŚĂĚĞĚƌĞƉůǇĨƌŽŵŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ? ? ?WŝƚďůĂĚŽ ?ƚŽƐĂƚŝƐĨǇǇĨŽƌĚ-
Jones, or at least bring the correspondence to a close. 
The Prime Minister is sensible of your valuable contribution to the war effort as 
originator and organiser of the Spitfire Fund in Wolverhampton in 1940.  It is quite 
clear that this gave the lead to a number of towns and organisations which raised 
money for Spitfires, and that the country is indebted to you for the inspiration which 




What we can take from this correspondence is that in 1951, in the Cabinet Office, the raising 
of Spitfire Funds was understood to have begun, if not in Wolverhampton, then certainly 
not in Whitehall.  This was despite the fact that in 1951, credit still stopped at the door of 
the Minister of Aircraft Production.   Lord Beaverbrook was appointed Minister of Aircraft 
Production in May 1940, just a week before Dunkirk.  He was to be Minister for less than 
twelve months, but at the end of the war he received the acclaim of both Winston Churchill 
and Lord Dowding as the man who made the planes that won the Battle of Britain.
174
  His 
first biographer and personal friend, A.J.P. Taylor, fully endorsed the judgement of Churchill 
and Dowding, but more recent scholarship has proved more sceptical.
175
 What has not 
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required revision, however, is Taylor ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬƌĂŶŚŝƐŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŝŶĂ
ďůĂǌĞŽĨƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇŽƌ ?ĂƐŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĐĂůůĞĚŝƚ ?ďĂůůǇŚŽŽ ? ?176   
It waƐĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ‘ďĂůůǇŚŽŽ ? ?ŶŽƚhis active leadership, which was important to the 
raising of the Spitfire Funds.
 177
  He did not take charge of the campaign but he and his 
newspaper the Daily Express did actively promote it.        
Calling Worcester and Wallasey, Gloucester and Greenock, Wigan and Wimbledon. 
And all other towns in Britain of a fifty-thousand-or-over population. 
tŚǇŶŽƚďƵǇĂ “ŚŽŵĞ-ƚŽǁŶ ?ĂŝƌƉůĂŶĞƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ŶŝƌƉůĂŶĞďƵŝůƚǁŝƚŚ
your money named after your town... 
Daily Express readers have suggested the scheme.  It would run parallel with the 
magnificent aid given by the colonies who have sent in recent weeks £1,600,000 for 
R.A.F. bombers and fighters.  Public subscription lists if opened in British towns 
would be enthusiastically supported it is argued.
178
 
Such a suggestion did fall upon fertile ground.  Maidstone has its opportunity to show its 
patriotism by adopting a proposal which comes from a local resident, Mrs. E. M. Kelly, who 
ŝŶĂůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞ “<ĞŶƚDĞƐƐĞŶŐĞƌ ?ƐĂǇƐ P-
 ‘The  ‘ĂŝůǇǆƉƌĞƐƐ ? suggests that every town of over 50,000 inhabitants should 
present a fighter plane to the nation.  Our town, though not quite so large, is not 
lacking in patriotism, and we should take great pride and satisfaction in buying an 
airplane ƚŽŚĞůƉĨŝŐŚƚĨŽƌƵƐ ? ?179 
Beaverbrook ?Ɛcontribution was not in terms of leadership but in promotion and 
endorsement.  On 24 July 1940, he broadcast to the nation on the BBC.   
We have had a flow of contributions flooding in, all of them sent to us for the 
purpose of buying aircraft.  We value the cheque for £25,000, but we value, too, the 
                                                     
176
 Taylor, Beaverbrook (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), p. 424. 
177
 See Jones, British Civilians, p. 126.  
178
  ‘tŚĂƚĂďŽƵƚ ?tŝŵďůĞĚŽŶ ? ? ?Daily Express, 3 July 1940, p. 5. 
179
  ‘&ŝŐŚƚĞƌWůĂŶĞĨŽƌƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Kent Messenger, 6 July 1940, p. 5. 
Page 52 
 
gift from the telephone operators at Winchester, who sent thirty-eight shillings to 
buy screws for a Spitfire.
180
   
Beaverbrook did take time personally to promote the Spitfire Funds and he did act as a 
figurehead. 
In October 1940, the Mayor of Tunbridge Wells forwarded a cheque of £5,716 11s. 9d. to 
the Ministry.  He got the following gracious reply. 
Dear Mr. Mayor,  
The Borough of Royal Tunbridge Wells has made a magnificent contribution towards 
the strength of our Air Force.  And I send to you and Mr. Gunnis and to all who 
subscribed to your Funds this expression of my warmest thanks. 
You have brought fresh encouragement to me and those who work with me.  And 
your gift is inƐƉŝƌŝŶŐƉƌŽŽĨŽĨǇŽƵƌŽƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƐĚĞǀŽƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇĂŶĚ
justice for which we fight.  While the spirit which inspired the contributions to your 




   
What is less clear is whether Beaverbrook was behind articles like this that promoted him as 
the actual leader and driving force behind the Spitfire Funds.   
Lord Beaverbrook has missed his vocation.  He has tried almost everything in his 
time, business, politics, newspapers, and only his own conscience knows what else. 
Let us admit that in these various occupations he has shown a moderate skill.  
Altogether he has collected a not inconsiderable sum of money, three newspapers, 
the scalp of one Prime Minister, the enmity of several more, and a vast Niagara of 
abuse from a multitude of political opponents. 
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None the less he has overlooked his true calling.  He should have been a sergeant in 
the Salvation Army.  He has all the attributes; energy, enthusiasm, faith, fanaticism, 
lungs, larynx, and most of all, the indefinable genius for transferring money from the 
pocket to the plate.
182
     
 
Figure 4.  Spitfire funded by Royal Tunbridge Wells Spitfire Fund 
ĞĂǀĞƌďƌŽŽŬ ?ƐŐĞŶŝƵƐǁĂƐperhaps to inspire copy like this, but even at the time, there were 
those in Whitehall who understood that this was not a centrally driven government 
campaign.  In June 1940, the Metropolitan Police enquired of the Home Office whether the 
Spitfire Funds were to be considered collections for charitable purposes.  Their reason for 
making this enquiry was prosaic.  If they were then they would have to be subject to 
oversight and control.  It would become the business of the Metropolitan Police.  The Home 
Office sought legal opinion.  The answer given, like that of the journalist Gordon Beckles, 
offers an interesting contemporary perspective.  According to Kenneth Macassey, one of 
two lawyers consulted by the Home Office, the matter turned on the fact that whereas 
charity could never be considered an obligation, these new Spitfire Funds were in fact 
obligatory, as acts of citizenship.     
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Is it not the correct view that in subscribing money for fighters people are 




A second opinion from a Mr. Eagleton served to confirm the matter.     
It seems ƚŽŵĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞƚŽŚŽůĚƚŚĂƚĂĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
service made from patriotic motives for the purpose of a war which H.M. is carrying 
ŽŶŝƐ “ĐŚĂƌŝƚĂďůĞ ? ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŽĨĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞƐ ?ŐƵŶƐ ?ŵƵŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŵĞĚŝĐĂů
supplies or anything else which may be useful in war...A gift from the subjects to the 
sovereign to be used for the public service springs from different motives and stands 
on quite another footing.
184
 
That sense of obligation can best be examined in a case study.  This was a nationwide 
campaign, but it was a local phenomenon.  Here is an opportunity ƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĂůĚĞƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇůĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ?/ƚƐŶĂŵĞůĞƐƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞďŽŵďĞĚƐƚƌĞĞƚƐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞ
factory floor, in the Home Guard drill hall, asserted a new ĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? ?185  No one 
case study of a nationwide campaign can hope to be definitive and the town chosen, 
Tonbridge in West Kent, did not even raise the required sum necessary to  ‘purchase ? a 
Spitfire.  Nevertheless, it is a very good example of an obligation fulfilled.            
Tonbridge, which lies on the River Medway in Kent, was a small market town in 1940.  Its 
wartime population stood at approximately 18,000.
186
  This was some way short of the 
figure the Daily Express considered appropriate for the raising of a successful Spitfire Fund 
and Tonbridge was in any case not a wealthy town.  It was a small market town and 
agricultural centre.  Every Tuesday cattle and sheep were driven lowing and bleating 
through the streets as farmers congregated to buy and sell.
187
  It did have some light 
industrial capacity, notably in the printing trade, working on government contracts for 
circulars, pamphlets and forms.  The only outstanding feature the town possessed, apart 
from its picturesque castle ruins, was its collection of highly regarded schools, not least one 
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neighbour Tunbridge Wells, or the economic vitality of the county town of Maidstone, a few 
miles downriver.  Its citizens were in no position to write out personal cheques for £5,000 
like Sir Harry Oakes, the Canadian mining millionaire.
188
      
It was having a very good war.  Between 27 May and 4 June 1940, 565 special troop trains 
had passed through its railway station bringing back the exhausted British Expeditionary 
Force from Dunkirk.  A relief operation had been launched in the town.   On the station 
platforms, chocolate, fruit, sandwiches, tea and cigarettes were all handed out by local 
volunteers.  Telegrams and letters were collected and dispatched free of charge to waiting 
loved ones.  The cost for all this was borne by the citizens of Tonbridge, who were happy to 
ƉĂǇ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƋƵĞƵĞĨŽƌŵĞĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƚŵŽŶĞǇŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐŚ
ďŽǆ ? ?189  It was a noble effort and recognised as such.  Mrs S.G.A. Collard, wife of the 
stationmaster, would later receive an OBE in recognition of her leading role in the relief 
operation.   
 
Figure 5.  The helpers at Tonbridge Station (stationmaster E G Collard) who supplied food etc to 300,000 soldiers passing 
through during the Dunkirk evacuation, 1940 
Tonbridge had shown itself well in an emergency, and it was well ahead in its more ordinary 
war work too.  It was answering every call to save.  A week after the ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ
ŽŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞTonbridge Free Press, run by long standing editor Arthur 
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Savings week in Tonbridge has been an unqualified success...Lend to defend is the new 
ƐůŽŐĂŶ ? ?190  dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞǁĂƐƉƌŽƵĚŽĨĚŽŝŶŐŝƚƐ ‘ďŝƚ ?ƐŽŚŽǁgalling must it have been for its 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐƚŽƌĞĂĚƚŚŝƐŝŶŝƚƐůŽĐĂůƉĂƉĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞ ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞŽƵŶĐŝůdƵƌŶŽǁŶWůĂŶ
dŽƵǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?191   
With one dissentient voice, Tonbridge Urban District Council at their meeting on 
Tuesday turned down a proposal that Tonbridge should raise the money to buy a 
Spitfire fighter plane as a contribution to the national cause.   
ĨĨŽƌƚƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐďůĞƐƐŝŶŐand support for this scheme, 
which had been mooted in the town, but the opinion of members generally was 
unfavourably disposed towards the proposal.
192
 
The stand taken did not reflect well on traditional authority in the town.
193
  The views of 
four members of the council are reported, three against, and one for.  The first is that of the 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶƌ ?, ?t ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞ ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞĨŽƌƚǁĞŶƚǇ
six years and like so many others in the town, made his living in the agricultural business.  
He was a committee man, secretary of the Sevenoaks Fat Stock Association and one of the 
ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů&ĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?hŶŝŽŶŝŶ<ĞŶƚ ?,ĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐĞĚƚŽŶŽƉĂƌƚǇĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚ
what Christie had to say about the proposed Spitfire Fund would have appealed to the 
pockets of the conservative dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞZĂƚĞƉĂǇĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?194  He also added a note of 
caution which was to prove prescient.   
Many People I know take the view that they are already being taxed very heavily and 
that whatever money is over goes to National Savings.  One point occurs to me, and 
that is that unless we are able to obtain sufficient  W which would be about £5,000  W it 
would be rather lamentable if we only got half way.
195
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 The detail can only be found in the account given by the Tonbridge Free Press.  The Council Minute Book 
held at Tonbridge Reference Library is a marvel of brevity.   
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Following his Chairman came Councillor L. A. Le May.  Le May, unlike Christie, did have 
visible party associations; he was vice-president of the Tonbridge Division Conservative 
Association.  He was chairman of the Tonbridge Constitutional Club, an organisation that 
supported the Conservative Party, and vice-chairman of the Association of Men of Kent and 
Kentish Men.  Founded by city businessmen in 1897 to promote the interests of the County 
of Kent, this was a conservative organisation too, though one unaffiliated with the party.   
This is what Le May is reported to have said. 
He did not want to be unpatriotic, but it seemed to him another form of voluntary 
ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘/Ĩ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚďǇƉƵƚƚŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇǁĞĐŽƵůĚŐĞƚĂŶĞǆƚƌĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞŝŶ
the air to fight the Bosche, I would put my hand up at once in favour of the plan, but 
/ĚŽŶŽƚĨŽƌŽŶĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ? ?196 
The third and final naysayer reported by editor Doody on behalf of the Tonbridge Free Press 
was Councillor J. Angell.  Angell was another with strong conservative associations, member 
of the Tonbridge Rotary Club, a Freeman of the City of London, and like Le May, a member 
of the Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men.  The reason for his reluctance to 
support the prospective Spitfire Fund was slightly different from those that had been given 
before. 
Cr. Angell said there would be another scheme going forward shortly, and this was 
the plan to raise funds for the Y.M.C.A. mobile canteen.  He would prefer to vote to 
support the canteen scheme.
197
 
There was one dissenting voice in the council chamber that evening.  Councillor W. A. J.  
Mann had been elected to the council only the year before.  He was a commercial traveller 
and ĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ ?>ĂďŽƵƌŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌDĂŶŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶƚenna that evening 
was more finely attuned than that of his conservative colleagues.  He was inclined to favour 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ‘/ƚǁŽƵůĚĂƚůĞĂƐƚƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚǁĞǁĞƌĞĂůŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŚĂǀŝŶŐŵŽƌĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞĂŝƌ ? ?198 









Reaction in the town to this decision to reject a Spitfire Fund was both swift and strong.
199
  
One of the strongest and swiftest reactions of all took place in the offices of the Tonbridge 
Free Press ?ĚŝƚŽƌŽŽĚǇŚĂĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŶŽǁŚĞǁĞŝŐŚĞĚŚŝƐ
postbag.  Whatever the reason, the following week, Doody did a spectacular editorial U-
turn.  Under the by-ůŝŶĞ ‘ƚŚĞŽŶůǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨDĂŶŶ ?, 
Doody went into battle.  He began with logic.   
What difference is there between 2s. 6d. a week going to National Savings and 2s. 
6d. a ǁĞĞŬƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂůůŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?200 
Then he moved on to the matter of civic pride. 




Finally he lost all sense of disinterest and decorum.     
I have the personal feeling that had some notable personage in the county put up 
the idea to Tonbridge, our urban fathers would have supported it at once.  It is a 
great pity that in these days names should count before schemes are put forward.  




The letters Doody now chose to publish were equally bitter, personal and to the point.   
/ƚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞDĞŶŽĨ<ĞŶƚĂŶĚ<ĞŶƚŝƐŚDĞŶ ?ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƚŽŽƉĞŶĂ
fund for this purpose.  I am wondering how many of our Councillors are members of 
this Association, and whether their attitude at the Council meeting was influenced 
by the fact that the M.O.K. & K.M. were opening such a fund.  In other words, was 
ƚŚŝƐĂĐĂƐĞŽĨ “ĨĂĐŝŶŐďŽƚŚǁĂǇƐ ? ?203 
                                                     
199
 Raising money in wartime through public subscription was not a new idea.  In terms of the Spitfire Fund, the 
closest First World War example is the Tank Bank.  See Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and 
the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 220-233.   
200






  ‘&ĂĐŝŶŐŽƚŚtĂǇƐ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 16 Aug. 1940, p. 6. 
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This barb was aimed at Councillors Le May and Angell whose wider county associations 
were well known in the town.  Councillor Le May in particular felt the damage to his 
reputation keenly.  The Spitfire Fund had become a local cause célèbre.  Its promise then 
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŚĂĚƵŶůĞĂƐŚĞĚĂƚŝĚĞŽĨƌĞĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘tŚŽĂƌĞƚŚĞŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽƐƉĞĂŬĨŽƌ
Tonbridge...It is a piece of impertinence that they should turn down such a plan without 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐƵƐ ? ?204  Here is our first true indication of a developing sense of empowerment.   
tŚĂƚǁĂƐŶĞĞĚĞĚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŽŵĞƉƵďůŝĐƐƉŝƌŝƚĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŝůůŽƉĞŶƚŚŝƐĨƵŶĚŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨŽƵƌ
ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?205  It was not long before that public spirited person stepped forward, Labour 
Councillor Mann.  With Mann now at the helm it all started optimistically enough.      
Few causes have so captured the imagination of the public of this town and district 
ĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ “dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ ? ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚŝƐĨƵŶĚǁĂƐůĂƵŶĐŚĞĚ
last week-end, offers of help have been coming from all sections of the community.  
There is now a band of many volunteers, and the subscription list is steadily 
ŵŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?EĞǆƚǁĞĞŬǁŝůůďĞ “^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞtĞĞŬ ?ŝŶdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚĂ
big effort will be made to increase the total in hand.
206
  
dŚĞ&ƵŶĚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽŽŽĚǇ ?Ɛreport, offers 
were not coming in from all sections of the community.
207
  The two big fund raising 
campaigns that had already taken place in the town, a comforts fund for Tonbridge men in 
the three services, and the National Savings Appeal, were both led by the Urban District 
Council.  Its chairman, Councillor Christie chaired the Comforts Fund and his predecessor, 
ŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌ,ĞĂƌŵŽŶ ?ĐŚĂŝƌĞĚdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ƐEĂtional Savings Committee.  The benefits of 
having such official support were considerable.   
For Savings Week the Tonbridge Urban District Council and the Tonbridge National 
Savings Committee co-operated, the former lending their electricity showroom for 
                                                     
204
  ‘ŝĂƌǇŽĨĂtĂƌƚŝŵĞ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 16 Aug. 1940, p. 2. 
205
  ‘ZŝĚŝĐƵůŽƵƐƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 16 Aug. 1940, p. 6. 
206
  ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ&ŝƌĞƐWƵďůŝĐ/ŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 30 Aug. 1940, p. 1.  
207
 Working class enthusiasm for this form of fund raising had been notable in the First World War with the 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚĂŶŬǁĞĞŬ ?^ĞĞ^ƚĞĨĂŶ'ŽĞďĞů ? ‘ǆŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝŶ:ĂǇtŝŶƚĞƌ ?:ĞĂŶ-Louis Robert (eds.), Capital Cities 
at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919, vol. II: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 160. 
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the purpose of a publicity display and for answering inquiries from the general public 
selling stamps and Savings Certificates.
208
 
But such official help would not be forthcoming for the Spitfire Fund.  Worse still, the 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ&ƵŶĚ ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐeffectively reduced the possibility of significant 
personal donations to almost nil.   dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?Ɛconservative social and financial elite turned 
their backs on the campaign.  A week into the campaign and the Tonbridge Free Press had 
already noticed what was going on.   ‘ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŵĂĚĞƐŽĨĂƌŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĂƚŚĞ
poorer people of the town have rallied splendidly to the cause.  The steady flow of pennies, 
ƐŝǆƉĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƐŚŝůůŝŶŐƐƐƉĞĂŬƐĨŽƌŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?209  So it did, but where were the pounds going to 
come from?  Significant sums would in fact be donated to a Spitfire Fund by wealthier 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŽĨdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚŽƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?Ɛown Spitfire Fund. 
The Tonbridge branch of the Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men was the largest 
branch in the county.  Its honorary secretary was Tonbridge Councillor Dudley Le May, 
ďƌŽƚŚĞƌƚŽŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌ>ĞƐůŝĞ>ĞDĂǇ ?ǁŚŽ ?ĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŶŽƚĞĚ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĐĞ-
chairman.  When Leslie Le May had stood up in the Council meeting to pour cold water on 
the idea of a Spitfire Fund his timing had been unfortunate.  Only two weeks before, the 
Association of Men of Kent and Kentish Men had, just as the letter writer to the Tonbridge 
Free Press ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚ ?ƐĞƚƵƉŝƚƐŽǁŶ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ ?/ƚǁĂƐ ‘ĂĐŽƵŶƚǇĨƵŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ purchase of 
a Spitfire fighter airplane for presentation to the R.A.F. to be known as the Kent County 
WůĂŶĞ ? ?210  ^ŝǆǁĞĞŬƐŝŶƚŽdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?Ɛ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĂĨĞǁŵŝůĞƐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞ
River Medway, a sum of £67 8s. 6d. was acknowledged by the Kent Messenger ?DĂŝĚƐƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
local newspaper.
211
  The Kent Messenger was keeping track of all donations to the county 
fund.  This particular gift was from the Tonbridge Branch of the Association of Men of Kent 
and Kentish Men.  At the head of the subscription list waƐ>ŽƌĚĚĞ> ?/ƐůĞĂŶĚƵĚůĞǇ ?
dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?,ŝƐŶĂŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĨŽƵŶĐŝůůŽƌƵĚůĞǇ>ĞDĂǇ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚĂůŵŽƐƚ
all the others on the list published in the Kent Messenger, would not appear on any one of 
the dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ&ƌĞĞWƌĞƐƐ ?Ɛown weekly subscƌŝƉƚŝŽŶůŝƐƚƐƚŽƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?ƐĨƵŶĚ ? 
                                                     
208
  ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ƐDĂŐŶŝĨŝĐĞŶƚ^ĂǀŝŶŐƐƉƉĞĂů ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 21 June 1940, p. 1. 
209
  ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ&ŝƌĞƐWƵďůŝĐ/ŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 30 Aug. 1940, p. 1. 
210
  ‘,ĞůƉƚŽƵǇĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?Kent Messenger, 10 Aug. 1940, p. 1. 
211
  ‘ŽƵŶƚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ ? ?Kent Messenger, 28 Sept. 1940, p. 5. 
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£5,000 was an almost impossible target for a penny and shilling affair, but failure to reach it 
would not be a result of any lack of effort, especially at the beginning.  Collecting boxes 
were widely distributed, local clubs and businesses all rallied round.   
 
Figure 6.  Spitfire Fund Collection Box 
WĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂĐƚŝǀĞǁĞƌĞůŽĐĂůĐŝǀŝůĚĞĨĞŶĐĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?dŚĞĨƵŶĚƌĂŝƐŝŶŐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
&^^ƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐZWtĂƌĚĞŶ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐǁĞƌĞƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇƉƌĂŝƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞTonbridge 
Free Press.  But money was scarce, and sometimes there was none at all.  Identified only as 
Ă ‘DĂŝĚŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐůĂĚǇĚŽŶĂƚĞĚ ‘ĂŶĞĐŬůĂĐĞ ?ĂƚĞĂƐƚƌĂŝŶĞƌ ?ĂƐŝůǀĞƌĐŚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚƌĞĞƐŵĂůů
mirrors, a pair of ear-rings, three silver thimbles, three keepsakes, and a number of old and 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĐŽŝŶƐ ? ?212  
What helped to inspire the campaign in the town, especially in the August and September, 
was what was going on overhead.  During the Battle of Britain, Tonbridge was on the front 
line just as Marwick had iŶƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŝŶŚŝƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ? ?dŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵ
the Tonbridge Free Press of 13 September was properly vague, but it was describing scenes 
that those reading would have recognised. 
Saturday saw air battles in the Kent sky at their zenith.  Mass after mass of enemy 
bombers and fighters passed over the countryside at a height of 20,000 feet during 
                                                     
212
  ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞtĞĞŬŝŶdŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 6 Sept. 1940, p. 4. 
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the afternoon, and Spitfires and Hurricanes could be seen zooming and diving in and 
out of them.  The machine-gun fire at one stage was particularly heavy and bullets 
sprayed the streets of a town, causing people to run for shelter.
213
    
 
Figure 7. Schoolboys' Fund Raising Event (Unknown location) 
Tonbridge was on the front line, and it fought back through its Spitfire Fund.   ‘^ŽŵĞĂƌĞ
putting a pennǇŝŶƚŚĞďŽǆĞǀĞƌǇƚŝŵĞƚŚĞ “ĂůůĐůĞĂƌ ?ŝƐƐŽƵŶĚĞĚ ? ?214  Bits and pieces of 
wrecked bombers, spent German cannon shells and even live bullets were picked up off the 
ŶĞĂƌďǇĨŝĞůĚƐĂŶĚƐƚƌĞĞƚƐĂŶĚƐŽůĚŝŶĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞ&ƵŶĚ ? ‘WĞŶŶǇĂ:ĞƌƌǇ ?ĐůƵďƐǁĞƌĞƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ?
Someone would be nominated to listen to the daily 8 a.m. BBC news, note down the count, 
and then collect the monies due.  All these contributions added up, but once all the 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŝŶƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶĞŵƉƚŝĞĚ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĂĚĚƵƉƚŽĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?/ŶKĐƚŽďĞr the 
following year, the committee led by Councillor Mann admitted defeat.  A cheque for 
£1,600 not £5,000 was sent to the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Inevitably there were 
recriminations; the fact that the Council had not given its blessing, the fact that the only 
significant individual donation was one anonymous cheque for £50.  There was, however, 
satisfaction taken in the fact that the greater part of the sum raised had been raised by the 
 ‘ƉŽŽƌĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ? 
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  ‘ŶĞŵǇĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞƐ>ŝƚƚĞƌ<ĞŶƚŽƵŶƚƌǇƐŝĚĞ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 13 Sept. 1940, p. 6. 
214
  ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŶĚ&ŝƌĞƐWƵďůŝĐ/ŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 30 Aug. 1940, p. 1. 
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We can only hope that in the near future a Spitfire will take to the air bearing the 




               
Tonbridge failed to raise the required sum but succeeded on different terms.  These were 
the terms and conditions the lawyer Kenneth Macassey described in his legal opinion for the 
,ŽŵĞKĨĨŝĐĞ ? ‘/ƐŝƚŶŽƚƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŝŶƐƵďƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŵŽŶĞǇĨŽƌfighters people are 
discharging the primary obligation of citizenship  W to exert themselves in the defence of 
their country?
216
  Exertion was much in evidence in Tonbridge.  In terms of DĂƌǁŝĐŬ ?ƐĨŽƵƌ
point exemplar of a  ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ?, the Spitfire Fund did demand the direct participation by 
 ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?What makes Tonbridge a particularly illuminating example of a 
nationwide campaign was the exclusion of the elite of the town in the fund-raising effort.  
Here were in plain view DĂƌǁŝĐŬ ?Ɛ ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ?.  
It was the raising of the Spitfire Funds that embedded a sense of empowerment into the 
legacy of the Spitfire, the second layer of a multi-layered text.  Ordinary people could do 
extraordinary things.  The third and final narrative thread whose beginnings are explored in 
this first chapter is, however, about two extraordinary men.  In 1942, the film star and 
director Leslie Howard was at the peak of both his popularity and his creative powers.  In 
what would be his last major feature film before he died a ŵĂƌƚǇƌ ?Ɛ death, he chose as his 
subject R. J. Mitchell.  The result was the third layer of a multi-ůĂǇĞƌĞĚƚĞǆƚ ?ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛ
association with the question of identity.             
 
dŚĞƵůƚŽĨ ?ŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ? 
In 2009, the British National Party (BNP), a far-right political party, was ridiculed for using a 
Polish Spitfire to front a European election campaign calling for Eastern European 
immigrants to be barred from Britain.  Much fun was had, in the media and at Westminster, 
ĂƚƚŚĞEW ?ƐĞǆƉĞŶƐĞwhen it was revealed that the particular Spitfire chosen by the BNP for 
                                                     
215
  ‘dŽŶďƌŝĚŐĞŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽ “/ŶǀŝĐƚĂ ?&ŝŐŚƚĞƌ^ƋƵĂĚƌŽŶ ? ?Tonbridge Free Press, 17 Oct. 1941, p. 1. 
216
 TNA, HO 45/25082 ? ‘Misc. Gen., Metropolitan Police Office ? ? ? ?ƵŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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their posters was actually flown by Polish airmen rescued from France shortly before Nazi 
occupation.  John Hemming, MP for Yardley, Birmingham, was one who was bemused.  
 ‘dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽƐĞŶĚWŽůŝƐŚƉĞŽƉůĞďĂĐŬƚŽWŽůĂŶĚ W yet they are fronting their latest 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƵƐŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƉůĂŶĞ ? ?217  Ridicule was heaped upon the BNP for getting their research 
wrong, but it is what Hemming said next which is of particular interest ŚĞƌĞ ? ‘/ƚŝƐĂďƐƵƌĚƚŽ
ŵĂŬĞĐůĂŝŵƐĂďŽƵƚŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŶĞƐƐĨƌŽŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚŝƐŝŵĂŐĞ ? ?218  Hemming was 
wrong; there was nothing absurd about it at all.  The Spitfire has long had an association 
with the question of identity.
219
   
It was Angus Calder who helped draw attention to the wartime contribution made by Leslie 
,ŽǁĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƐĞůůŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞǁŚŽůůǇŝŶĞĨĨĂďůĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ?.220  Calder was 
referring specifically to the twenty-ƚǁŽƚĂůŬƐŽŶƚŚĞ ?ƐEŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞHoward 
gave between 16 July 1940 and 7 August 1941.  The BBC valued his transmissions highly.  
 ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ǀĂŐƵĞůǇĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƐŚŝƐƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŵĂŐĞǁĂƐ ?ƚŽŐƌĂƐƉƚŚĞ
ƚŚŽƌŶǇƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨh^ĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚĐůĂƐƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?221  The talks came to an end in the 
summer of 1941 and one reason why was because Howard had seized upon another 
opportunity to project his  ‘ŝŶĞĨĨĂďůĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ? ? What was to be the eventual 
result was first presented to the public on 20 August 1942.
222
         
A magnificent sum was raised for the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund by the 
ďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚŐĂůĂƉƌĞŵŝĞƌĞŽĨ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ? ?>ĞƐůŝ ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƐĐƌĞĞŶďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨ
R. J. Mitchell  W the man who made the Spitfire. 
Held at the Leicester Square Theatre, the event attracted a large gathering of 
celebrities, including Mr Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, Mrs Winant, the wife of the 
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U.S. Ambassador, Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Portal, the Countess of Oxford and 
Asquith, Mr and Mrs Charles Sweeny, Lord Bennett, E. T. Carr, R. P. P. Baker, Joseph 
Friedman, Leslie Howard, David Niven, Robert Donat, Rex Harrison, Anne Firth, Clive 
Brook, Lilli Palmer and a host of others. 
Large crowds assembled outside the theatre, waiting to see celebrities arrive for the 




It would have been something of a surprise if The First of the Few had not received a 
tremendous reception.  A gala premiere was no place for the disinterested.  The great and 
the good had come to be seen but also to show their support because this gala premiere 
represented something of a statement of intent on behalf of British film makers.  Evelyn 
Russel writing in Sight and Sound recognized the possibilities.   ‘&ŝŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ ?/
understand, unstinted.  Can it be that at last somebody, somewhere, is sharing my belief 
ƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶŵĂŬĞĨŝůŵƐƚŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?224  It would have mattered to Winston 
Churchill.  It was his rhetorical flourish that had furnished the film with its title after George 
<ŝŶŐĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ŚĂĚĐĂŶŶŝůǇƐŽƵŐŚƚŽƵƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
to use it.
225
  Whether money had changed hands is unclear, but even if it did not, it did at 
least peak the greaƚŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?/ƚǁĂƐŚƵƌĐŚŝůůǁŚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƚŚĞZ&ƚŽĐŽ-operate 
with the production, which was as good as a command.  But even Prime Ministerial favour 
ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌůŝƚƚůĞŝĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚŶŽƚŵĂƚĐŚĞĚŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?Ɛ
authority.  King and Stafford were in fact only small-time players in the British film industry 
and a minor production company attempting to make a major feature film was always going 
ƚŽƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ?dŚĂƚŚĂĚĂůůĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ŽŶĐĞ>ĞƐůŝ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŚĂĚďĞĞn 
secured.
226
  His name, his reputation, even his phone call which, according to his son, had 
won the support of the Rank Organisation.
227
  There was no bigger name than Rank in 
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British film production at the time.  No wonder that first night audience was so enthusiastic: 
ǁŚĂƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŝƌƐƚŶŝŐŚƚŶĞƌǀĞƐƚŽŽ ?tŚĂƚŝĨ
the film turned out to be a flop?   
 
Figure 8.  Poster for the film Spitfire, released in 1943 in the U.S.; re-edited from the 1942 British film, The First of the 
Few 
Fortunately it was not; it was the biggest grossing British-produced picture of the year.  It 
ǁĂƐŽŶůǇďĞĂƚĞŶĂƚƚŚĞďŽǆŽĨĨŝĐĞďǇD'D ?ƐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞŚŝƚMrs. Miniver.  It was not just the 
paying customers who enjoyed The First of the Few ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƐůĂƐƚŵĂũŽƌĨŝůŵ
was met with almost universal critical acclaim in both the trade and national press.  There 
was one notable dissenting voice however.  According to the Documentary News Letter, the 
film had the wrong star.      
The documentary film maker would have made the Spitfire the centre and hero of 
his picture. First of the Few ŚĂƐĂƐŝƚƐŚĞƌŽZ ?: ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƚŚĞĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ?
and the aeroplane itself plays a secondary though important part. The interest and 
appeal of the picture mainly rely therefore on the human figure.
228
 
Such a reliance ruined the film suggested the Documentary News Letter.      
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No clear picture is given of pre-war politics and no definite line is taken. This is a loss 
to the film and one that is not likely to be overlooked by audiences who are a good 
deal more politically conscious than they used to be.
229
 
This film reviewer was being obtuse.  The film had a strong narrative theme, as we shall see, 
but the wonder was that the film had got made at all.  It must have seemed a miracle to 
many of the industry insiders who attended that gala premier.  Many would not have 
forgotten the first year of war when the fate of their industry seemed to hang in the 
balance.  As the sirens first sounded cinemas closed, seemingly for the duration.  Sense had 
prevailed as cinemas re-opened, but it was now wartime and nothing was going to be the 
same as before.  Exhibitors, the owners and managers of theatres, faced an ever growing list 
of obstacles.  Equipment broke down and could not be repaired for lack of spares, staff left 
for lucrative war work or were called up into the services, and then there were those sirens 
with their promise of disruption or worse.  As for distributors, those who supplied the films 
to the exhibitors, they had troubles of their own.  New product from Hollywood was still 
available but supply from British production houses was drying up.  This was because British 
film producers also faced difficulties at every turn.  Film stock was hard to come by, key 
technical staff were disappearing into war work and even when the cameras were loaded 
and a competent crew was to hand, where were they actually going to film?  Studio space 
vanished as more and more of it was requisitioned for storage or shadow factories.  
Between 1939 and 1942, 22 studios offering 65 sound stages had dwindled to nine studios 
and 30 soundstages.
230
   
Much of the blame for this chaos was laid not at the door of the war, but at the door of the 
Ministry of Information.
231
  Evelyn Waugh was quick to print with his own condemnation.
232
  
George King and his new partner, John Stafford, were two producers undaunted by difficult 
circumstances; they were intent upon making a major feature film.  King had grown up in 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƋƵŽƚĂ-quicŬŝĞƐ ?ĞƌĂŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƐƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŝŶĞŵĂ ?dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĨŝůŵƐŵĂĚĞŽŶĂĐŽŶǀĞǇŽƌďĞůƚ
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to satisfy a government requirement that a percentage of films shown in British cinemas 
were British made.  The problem was that with a guaranteed market, quick turn around and 
limited budgets, quality inevitably suffered.  Stafford had spent much of the 1930s 
producing English language versions of Germans films for RKO-Radio British, where again 
ƚŝŵĞĂŶĚďƵĚŐĞƚƐǁĞƌĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?,ĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƚǁŽ ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĨŝůŵƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?ďƵƚ
working together ambitions had grown.   
King and Stafford were in the market for a big prestigious project.  It came by way of Henry 
 ?:ĂŵĞƐ ?ĂũŽďďŝŶŐƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶǁƌŝƚĞƌŽĨƉůĂǇƐ ?ƚƌĂǀĞůďŽŽŬƐĂŶĚĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐĨŝĐƚŝŽŶŶŽǁďĂƐĞĚ
in England.  He had approached Florence Mitchell, widow of R. J. Mitchell, in the autumn of 
1940 with the idea of writing a life of her husband.  Whether James initially had in mind a 
book or a film, what happened next decided for him.  King and Stafford took out an option.  
For a small ĨĞĞ ?<ŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚŶŽǁŚĂĚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽƚƵƌŶ:ĂŵĞƐ ?ƐƐƚŽƌǇŝŶƚŽĂĨŝůŵ ?
But a small fee only bought exclusive rights for a limited time and King and Stafford were a 
long way away from troubling the RAF for the loan of a Spitfire. 
King and Stafford had their good story, and what was needed next was interest.   This 
meant, in practice, the interest of a major star.  King and Stafford could not finance the film 
themselves and any proposal to a production house would receive a much more 
sympathetic hearing if a star name was attached.  King and Stafford set up a production 
company, British Aviation Pictures, and set off in search.  But finding that star name was not 
easy.  King and Stafford had their network of contacts but it was not of much use now.  They 
were second-division producers used to dealing in second-division film actors.  To catch 
their star they had to charge their project, boost it.  It required an air of credibility.  It had to 
appear as if it was already a first-division project, star or not.  To do that King and Stafford 
turned to the trade press.   They made a good start.  Credibility came by way of a significant 
endorsement.
233
   
The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, through the office of the Under-Secretary of 
State and the Air Ministry, has granted George King and John Stafford permission to 
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ƵƐĞ “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĞƉŝĐĨŝůŵŽĨƚŚĞůŝĨĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨZ ?: ?
Mitchell, the genius who created the Spitfire. 
 “EĞǀĞƌŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞďĞĞŶƐŽŵƵch owed by so many to 
ƐŽĨĞǁ ? ?/ƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐƐƉŽŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞůĞĂĚĞƌŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?
ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƐƉŝƌŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ ? “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ŝƐ
described as a screen monument to the Englishmen who lived and died to make 
possible the exploits of the mighty Few.
 234
 
Shrewd operators both, Stafford and King had spotted an opportunity for some good 
publicity but the phrase, as a tribute to the Battle of Britain fighter pilots, had in fact not had 
an auspicious public debut.
235
  It had been included by Churchill in his report on the general 
war situation to the House of Commons on 20 August 1940.  Churchill had buried it, not 
featured it in his report.  It made no great impression on those who heard it in the House of 
ŽŵŵŽŶƐ ?:ŽŚŶŽůǀŝůůĞ ?ŚŝƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇǁŚŽǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ
was poor in any case, a mumbling performance, and as for the House, it was half asleep in 
the summer heat.
236
  Nevertheless, it was a phrase quickly spotted by journalists and their 
editors who were already working hard to promote the idea of the fighter pilot as hero.  It 
made for a perfect publicity storm.
237
    
It was in January 1941 that King and Stafford had gone on the publicity offensive with the 
promise to industry insiders of a major project in the offing. 
 “dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ǁŝůůďĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŽŶĂƐĐĂůĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƐƵƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ
and importance of the subject, with the full co-operation of Mrs. Mitchell, the 
widow, as well as the interested authorities Mssrs. Armstrongs-Vickers, Ltd., and the 
Air Ministry. 
Their full collaboration throughout the production has been assured to George King 
and John Stafford, who are now finalising details of the story, and dovetailing the 
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many facts ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞůŝĨĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ “Z ?: ? ?ĂƐDŝƚĐŚĞůůǁĂƐĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚĞůǇ
known to his familiars.  Important stellar assignments are now being negotiated.
238
 
The anticipated big deal, however, ƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐƚĞůůĂƌĂƐƐŝŐŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?, came to nothing.  
Henry C. :ĂŵĞƐ ?ƐƐƚŽƌǇŚĂĚďĞĞŶŚĂŶĚĞĚŽǀĞƌďǇ<ŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽDŝůĞƐDĂůůĞƐŽŶƚŽƚƵrn 
into a film scenario, a package containing a storyboard, character sketches, and initial script 
ideas.  Obtaining the services of Malleson had been a shrewd move, more industry 
credibility ? ‘DŝůĞƐDĂůůĞƐŽŶ ?ĂĐĞƐĐƌĞĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŝŐŶĞĚďǇƌŝƚŝƐŚǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ
WŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?239   DĂůůĞƐŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂŶ ‘ĂĐĞ ?ƐĐƌĞĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ŚĞǁĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƚŽŽ ?,ĞĐĂŶďĞ
seen as the affable hangman in the 1949 film Kind Hearts and Coronets measuring up his 
ducal victim, and he was also extremely well connected.  It was Malleson who introduced 
the project to Robert Donat.   
Robert Donat was precisely the calibre of film star King and Stafford needed.  He had both 
popular appeal and the respect of the critics.  Donat had won Best Actor at the 1939 
Academy Awards for Goodbye, Mr Chips, beating Clark Gable in the process.  At the time 
Malleson approached him, Donat was two pictures into a six picture deal with MGM.  As a 
consequence he was obliged to take the project to them.  Complications immediately arose.  
ĞƐƉŝƚĞŽŶĂƚ ?ƐŽďǀŝŽƵƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵ ?D'DǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĨŝůŵƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƐŽůĞ
rights, which King and Stafford were unwilling to sell.  MGM involvement would also have 
meant the film would have to have been made in Hollywood.  In 1941, MGM had neither 
the facilities nor the inclination to make films in Britain.  It would have made a mockery of 
ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŶĂŶǇĐĂƐĞ ?Seeing the Battle of Britain fought against a Los Angeles 
skyline might have suspended disbelief just that little bit too far.
240
   
Nevertheless, this was still a tremendous setback for King and Stafford.  It required another 
ƌŽƵŶĚŽĨ ‘ŽŽƐƚĞƌŝƐŵ ? ?On 27 March 1941, there was another advertisement in 
Kinematograph Weekly.     
  ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ŝƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐĨŝůŵǇĞƚĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇĂŶǇ
producer, and the production of such a film at this time cannot be measured in mere 
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terms of commercial enterprise.  Rather, and as well, it is the work of the greatest 
possible value to the national effort, because of its inspiring theme, and the 
inspiration and encouragement it will afford to every man and woman engaged in 
the war effort.
241
               
Such hyperbole denotes a hint of desperation, but now King and ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƐůƵĐŬĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ.  
ZŽďĞƌƚŽŶĂƚ ?ƐĂŐĞŶƚŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚǁĂƐĂǀŝĚ,ĞŶůĞǇ ?,ĞǁĂƐůƐŽƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚŽĨ>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?
Howard, like Robert Donat, was the calibre of star that might get this project off the ground.  
It was propitious timing; Howard was looking for a prestigious project, and more 
importantly, one to boost the war effort.  Howard, a patriot, had abandoned Hollywood in 
August 1939 to return to England.  It was a decision that cannot have been taken lightly.  It 
was one which had been met with much derision from within the English actor colony.  
 ‘Many of these friends spoke as perpetual exiles living contentedly in a place where the 
oranges were the biggest in the world and the sun shone almost every day of the year, 
summer and winter...Their allegiance lay where their bread was buttered. ?242      
,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ<ŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƐďŝŐƉƌĞƐƚŝŐŝŽƵƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚďĞŐĂŶŝŶƚŚĞƐƉƌŝŶŐŽĨ
1941 after Robert Donat had pulled out.  At the time Howard was not contractually 
committed to any one studio, which is why he was free as well as able to pick up the phone 
to set up the meeting that secured the crucial funding from J. Arthur Rank.  There was 
another reason why Howard was prepared to act so precipitously.  King and Stafford had 
finally realised their abilities could not match their ambitions and had agreed that Howard 
could buy them out of the project.  Howard wanted absolute control, as star, director and 
producer.  Once the funding was in place Howard moved quickly.  A new scenario was 
begun by Miles Malleson this time with the assistance of long time Howard collaborator 
Tolly de Grunwald.  Howard was obviously going to play Mitchell but there were two other 
ŵĂũŽƌƉĂƌƚƐƚŽĨŝůů ?dŚĂƚŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨƚĞƐƚƉŝůŽƚǁĞŶƚƚŽĂǀŝĚEŝǀĞŶǁŚŽŚĂĚĂůƐŽ
abaŶĚŽŶĞĚ ‘ůŽƚƵƐ-ůĂŶĚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
Filming began in the autumn of 1941 based at Denham studios, which was the largest 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƐƚŝůůŽƉĞŶ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞŽǁŶĞĚďǇZĂŶŬ ?<ŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌǁŽŽŝŶŐ
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of Churchill now paid off handsomely for Howard and his team.  RAF Ibsley and Warmwell 
were made available along with the use of a Blenheim bomber to act as a camera ship.  
There was also the invaluable gift of a captured Heinkel to shoot down as many times as 
necessary.
243
  Phil Samuel, production manager on the film, always carried with him a letter 
ĨƌŽŵŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ? ‘ĂŬŝŶĚŽĨlaisser passer ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚŽĨĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?244  He said it 
proved very useful.   
 
Figure 9.  David Niven and Leslie Howard on the set of The First of the Few 
Once the location shooting was finished in November 1941, everyone returned to Denham.  
It took approximately eight to twelve weeks to finish the principal photography.  Post-
production added more time and the film was finally completed in the spring of 1942.  As is 
usual with any feature film, then as now, one of the very last jobs to be done was the 
scoring of the film.  Part of that score would enter the concert hall repertoire. 
                                                     
243
 Simon MacKenzie, dŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶŽŶ^ĐƌĞĞŶ P ‘dŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŝůŵĂŶĚdĞůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƌĂŵĂ
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 32. 
244
 Howard, In Search of My Father, p. 107. 
Page 73 
 
For some reason, Leslie could not be at the running of the film with William Walton, 
so he told me beforehand very elaborately what he wanted from the music.  Walton 
ůŝƐƚĞŶĞĚƚŽŵǇǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĂůůƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐĂŝĚ ? ‘KŚ/ƐĞĞ ?>ĞƐůŝĞǁĂŶƚƐĂ
ůŽƚŽĨŶŽƚĞƐ ? ?ĂŶĚŚĞǁĞŶƚĂǁĂǇĂŶĚǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ&ƵŐƵĞ ?245    
With the film finished, it was now in the care of General Film Distributors, the distribution 
ĂƌŵŽĨ: ?ƌƚŚƵƌZĂŶŬ ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ZĂŶŬŚĂĚĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŚĞŚŝŐŚůǇƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞKĚĞŽŶ
cinema chain as well as a controlling interest in Gaumont-British.  General Film Distributors 
now had first call on over 600 cinemas nationwide.
246
  The first step was a press-book, a 
marketing package targeted specifically at the critics about to review the film and the 
exhibitors about to show it.  A press-book provided two key pieces of information to those 
with the power to influence public opinion.  It offered a basic synopsis of the plot and the 
reasons why the public would want to watch the film in question.            
dŚĞŵŽƐƚŽďǀŝŽƵƐƐĞůůŝŶŐůŝŶĞƐŽŶ ‘&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƐ ?ŶĂŵĞƐĂŶĚ ‘dŚĞ
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŚƵŵĂŶƐƚŽƌǇĞǀĞƌƚŽůĚ ? ?/ƚŝƐĂƉŚƌĂƐĞƚŚĂƚĂƉƚůǇƐƵŵƐƵƉĂŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĐĞŶƚ
screen entertainment that depicts with tremendous sincerity the career of one of 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŵĞŶ WR.J. Mitchell - the genius who sacrificed his life to give 
Britain the fastest, toughest fighter plane in the world... 
KŶĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉŽŝŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽŐĞƚǇŽƵƌĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐƚŽƌĞĂůŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ?ŝƐEKdtZ&/>D ?dĞůůƚŚĞŵŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶƐƚŽƌǇŽĨĂŐƌĞĂƚŵĂŶǁŚŽ
helped to put Britain right in the forefront of the world of aviation.  Play up his 
magnificent Schneider Trophy victories that secured the coveted award for this 
country for all time. 
Play R.J. Mitchell as the devoted husband and father- the man of simple tastes.  
Weave drama into his vision of a streamlines airplane based on the inspiration of a 
seagull.  Picture him as a man of purpose who overcame difficulties and achieved his 
object. 
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Run side by side photographs of Leslie Howard and R.J. Mitchell-the likeness is 
astounĚŝŶŐ ?^ƚƌĞƐƐ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚǁŽƌŬŚĞŚĂƐǇĞƚĚŽŶĞŽŶ
the screen.     
Tell your audiences...that such real figures as Messerschmitt and Mr. Royce (of Rolls 
Royce) all play their part in the fascinating, factual mosaic of the narrative.
247
 
There are three core messages here that the professional reader was being asked to 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝůŵǁĂƐĂƐƚĂƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?Ǉ ? ? ? ? ?>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
star had risen so high that it ǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƐƚƐƵŝƚ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŽƌe message 
requires a little context ? ‘The First of the Few ŝƐEKdtZ&/>D ?.  Two months before the 
premiere of The First of the Few,  ?D ?tŽŽůĨ ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ&ŝůŵWƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐ ?
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂĚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŚŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵeeting.  He had noted his 
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐƉƌĞĚŝůĞĐƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĨŝůŵƐǁŝƚŚĂǁĂƌƚŝŵĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚĐŝŶĞŵĂ-ŐŽĞƌƐ ?
ǁĞƌĞ ‘ĂůƌĞĂĚǇŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŝƌĞĚŽĨƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚǁĞƌĞĂƐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĨŝůŵƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŽŽŬƚŚĞŝƌ
ŵŝŶĚƐŽĨĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŐĞĚǇŶŽǁƚĂŬŝŶŐƉůĂĐĞ ? ?248  Hence The First of the Few was being promoted 
as a human drama not a war film.         
The third and final core message the press-book for The First of the Few wanted to impress 
upon its professional readership was its claims upon revealing real events, and portraying 
real people, Ă ‘ĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĨĂĐƚƵĂůŵŽƐĂŝĐ ? ?EŽǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝ ŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚŝƐ
ŝĚĞĂŵĂĚĞŵŽƌĞƌŝĚŝĐƵůŽƵƐƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨ,ŽǁĂƌĚǁŝƚŚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? ‘ZƵŶ
side by side photographs of Leslie Howard and R.J. Mitchell-ƚŚĞůŝŬĞŶĞƐƐŝƐĂƐƚŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞ
two men could hardly have been more different.  Nevertheless, the claim was one of 
verisimilitude.  It was a claim of course made more credible by the fact that the Spitfire had 
been developed away from the public gaze.       
There was no guarantee of success in trying to manage the reception of a new film but what 
followed was a vindication of the press-book.  We can begin with the reviews of the film in 
the trade press.  Monthly Film Bulletin understood that this was a stĂƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ‘KƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
is the portrait of R.J. Mitchell by Leslie Howard.  Simple and straightforward, and therefore 
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ŵŽƐƚŵŽǀŝŶŐŝŶŝƚƐĂƉƉĞĂů ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶĨŽƌŐĞƚƚĂďůĞ ? ?249  dŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŝŶĞŵĂwas 
impressed by the films sense of verisimilitude.   ‘'ƌŝŵůǇƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ
pre-war apathy in grudging money for aerial expansion, together with sincere tribute to 
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƌĞƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĚĂŶŐĞƌĂĨƚĞƌǀŝƐŝƚƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚĨƌĂƚĞƌŶŝƐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ
famous rival, Messerschmitt ? ?250  This last was all nonsense of course; Mitchell never did visit 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?/ƚǁĂƐ>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐŽǁŶƐŬŝŝŶŐŚŽůŝĚĂǇƚŽƵƐƚƌŝĂƐŚŽƌƚůǇďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŶƐĐŚůƵƐƐ
that probably inspired this particular episode in the film.
251
  The trade press had followed 
the lead of the press-book but what of the national press?  Both the Daily Mail and the 
Sunday Express recognised a star vehicle.   ‘>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚĂŶĚĂǀŝĚEŝǀĞŶŚĂǀĞŵĂĚĞƌŝĐŚ
ŚƵŵĂŶĚƌĂŵĂ ? ?252  The Daily Express accepted the film as faithful to events, a true story ? ‘Ă
ƐƵƉĞƌďƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞĂů ? ?253     
The writers of the press-book had been vindicated.  Both the specialist and national press 
had followed its lead.  Nevertheless, it could not guarantee a hit; only the box office could 
do that.  The scene ǁĂƐŶŽǁƐĞƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐƉƌĞŵŝĞƌĞ and it was a very good night for all 
ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘>ĂƌŐĞĐƌŽǁĚƐĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ?ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞ
celebrities arrive for the screening of the picture, which received a tremendous reception 
from aŶĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐŚŽƵƐĞ ? ?254  It would prove to be a satisfying few months too after the 
film opened nationwide.  The film was a box office hit. 
What had Howard now achieved beyond a satisfying box office hit?  The film critic Roger 
Manvell describes audience reaction to the film, in particular to the part played by Leslie 
Howard ? ‘>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůůďĞĐĂŵĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞ-enactment 
by a well-known star in a manner very familiar to the public  W Mitchell was Howard rather 
ƚŚĂŶ,ŽǁĂƌĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? ?255  This is an important point.  According to Manvell, an act of 
transference had taken place.  We can now take this idea to its logical conclusion on behalf 
of the Spitfire.  If Howard was Mitchell then Howard as Mitchell created the Spitfire in the 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ.  This being so then it is but a small step to take to suggest that what 
                                                     
249
  ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ? ?Monthly Film Bulletin, Sept. 1942, p. 111. 
250
  ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ? ?dŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŝŶĞŵĂ, 21 Aug. 1942, p. 9. 
251
 Aldgate and Richards, Britain Can Take It, p. 56. 
252
  ‘dŚĞDĂŶtŚŽDĂĚĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?Daily Mail, 21 Aug. 1942, p. 2. 
253
  ‘dŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&Ğǁ ? ?Daily Express, 22 Aug. 1942, p. 2. 
254
  ‘WƌĞŵŝĞƌĞŝĚƐZ ? ?& ?&ƵŶĚ ? ?Kinematograph Weekly, 27 Aug. 1942, p. 6. 
255
 Roger Manvell, Films and the Second World War (London: J. M. Dent, 1974), p. 107. 
Page 76 
 
Howard personified would now be personified by the Howard/Mitchell creation, the 
Spitfire, too.      
Evidence to support DĂŶǀĞůů ?Ɛidea of an act of transference, during the first run of the film 
at least, can be found in the Mass Observation Archive.
256
  This engineering student from 
Wallington said he had watched  ‘ĂĐůĞĂƌƐŝŵƉůĞĚƌĂŵĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŽƉŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞďǇ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?.257  How could this student have 
possibly known it was an accurate portrayal without special knowledge and access?  This 
social science student from Edinburgh was convinced too of an accurate portrayal ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?WŚŽƚŽƐŽĨĨůǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞƐƐƵƉĞƌď ?ĂŶĚŐŽŽĚĂĐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?258  
In the mind of this correspondent from Llangollen this act of transference had literally taken 
place.  For her, Leslie Howard and Reginald Mitchell had become one and the same person.  
It was a  ‘>ĞƐůŝĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? she referred to in her report.259  It was of course probably only a slip 
of the pen, but a Freudian slip is evidence too.  This young female typist from Tottenham 
was sure  ‘>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚƐĞĞŵĞĚǀĞƌǇĨŝƚƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƌƚ ? ?260  The question we would like to 
ask of this young female typist is exactly why?  Being unable to do so, we must therefore 
pose a different question.  If Mitchell was Howard than who was Howard?   
Howard was a patriot.  For much of the 1920s and 1930s, Howard had lived the life of an 
exile in America as he established himself first on Broadway and then in Hollywood but he 
was quick to return to England at the beginning of the war.  He seems to have had no 
compunction about leaving tŚĞůĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŽƌĂŶŐĞƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞƐƵŶƐŚŽŶĞĂůŵŽƐƚĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇŽĨƚŚĞǇĞĂƌ ?ƐƵŵŵĞƌĂŶĚǁŝŶƚĞƌ ? ?261  Howard was a patriot 
but he was also a nationalist.  His own sense of identity was rooted in that  ‘ǁŚŽůůǇŝŶĞĨĨĂďůĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ?.262  Howard was the son of immigrants, third generation on his 
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐŝĚĞĂŶĚĨŝƌƐƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?,ŝƐŵŽƚŚĞƌ>ŝůůŝĂŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƚŚĞ
ůƵŵďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ?ŚĂĚĂƌƌŝǀĞĚŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?from Courland in Russia.  They had landed as a 
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Jewish household, but by two generations on many of the extended family including Lillian 
ŚĞƌƐĞůĨǁĞƌĞŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?&ĞƌĚŝŶĂŶĚZĂƉŚ Ğů^ƚĞŝŶĞƌ ?ǁĂƐďŽƌŶŝŶ^ǌŝŐĞƚǀĂƌŝŶ
Hungary.  His family was Jewish but he himself was not a strict observer.  Leslie Howard, 
though a deeply spiritual man, professed no faith at all.  The decision Howard took, and 
precisely when is unclear, was to abandon his cultural inheritance for a new one.  His was 
the fervour of the convert. 
Howard the man, his sense of identity, would never be separated from Howard the actor, 
the character he portrayed up on the silver-screen.  Howard understood perfectly well his 
ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŽƌ ? ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂĐƚŽƌ W one who relied not on emotion but on 
technique to carry the part.  I can never remember him living a role at home for five seconds 
ĂĨƚĞƌŚĞƐƚĞƉƉĞĚŽĨĨƚŚĞƐƚĂŐĞŽƌĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĂŵĞƌĂ ? ?263 What Howard understood was 
that his success was based upon a projection of ŚŝƐŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ‘,ŽǁĂƌĚŶĞǀĞƌƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ
ďĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ ? ?264  It was a projection very familiar to British audiences.  Historians 
of British wartime cinema often bracket Pimpernel Smith and The First of the Few 
together.
265
  They do so for good reason.  Both are propaganda pieces, both were in 
production in 1941, both were the artistic vision of one man, produced, directed and 
starring Leslie Howard, and in both that vision is identical, a projection of his own 
personality.     
In Pimpernel Smith Howard played a Cambridge archaeology professor, Horatio Smith, who 
takes his students to Nazi Germany to help on his excavations.  He has a secret agenda, 
which is to free inmates from German concentration camps. In First of the Few Howard 
plays Mitchell who visits Nazi Germany and returns with an agenda too, to save his country.  
The two characters, Smith and Mitchell, are similarly drawn by Howard, a cultured speaking 
voice, an absent minded air, a dry wit.  Both Smith and Mitchell, as played by Howard, show 
restraint, are possessed of an ironic, understated humour, and have a sense of proportion 
as well as compassion.   ‘,ĞƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚĂŐĂŝŶĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů
humanized, brought down from the heights of academe to discover personal commitment 
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ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?266  There was Professor Higgins in Pygmalion (1938), Ashley Wilkes in 
Gone with the Wind (1939), Horatio Smith in Pimpernel Smith (1941) and finally R. J. Mitchell 
in The First of the Few (1942).  Ashley Wilkes in Gone with the Wind, can perhaps best be 
described as an American cousin.  Taken together, this is what Roger Manvell is referring to 
when he describes a manner familiar to the public.  What that manner was, is summed up 
by Anthony Aldgate and Jeffrey Richards.   ‘What he represented to wartime audiences was 
that visionary aspect of Englishness, that fey, mystical quality, that striving after the secrets 
ŽĨƚŚĞĞƚĞƌŶĂů ?ƚŚĂƚĐƌŽƉƐƵƉƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐĂůůǇŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŶŐůŝƐŚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?267     
It was such a representation that greeted cinema audiences in The First of the Few.  Howard 
ƐĞƚĂƐŝĚĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛactual personality and replaced it with his own.  In one of the most 
ĨĂŵŽƵƐƐĐĞŶĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐƌĞ-invention of Mitchell rooted in  ‘ƚŚat visionary aspect 
ŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ? reaches an apotheosis.         
In a long sequence he was shown dreamily, romantically and almost spiritually 
studying at length the seagulls flying around the cliff-top.  The implication was only 
too clear, namely that he was dreaming of his future designs for aircraft based on 




So unhappy was Gordon Mitchell ?Z ?: ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƐŽŶ ? that he later took it up with Jeffrey 
YƵŝůů ?ĂƚĞƐƚƉŝůŽƚǁŚŽŚĂĚŬŶŽǁŶDŝƚĐŚĞůůǁĞůůŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚǇĞĂƌƐŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐůŝĨĞ ? ‘zŽƵƌ
father was a hard-headed, highly practical man and, in my opinion, the last thing he would 
have done when he had any problems or was seeking inspiration, was to hang around 
ǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐďůŽŽĚǇƐĞĂŐƵůůƐ ? ?269 
In 1942 the cinema audience would have known nothing of this.  Mitchell was a name that 
had touched upon the public consciousness, the Schneider victories had seen to that.  But 
the last Schneider victory had taken place ten years before, in 1932.  Mitchell never courted 
publicity; he was not a man comfortable in the spotlight.  His death in June 1937 had been 
acknowledged in both the specialist and national press but that was all.   What little 
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audiences knew of R. J. Mitchell in 1942, they knew less about the Spitfire.    As noted 
above, right up until 1938, public sightings of the Spitfire were minimal and even then they 
were fleeting at best.  What information the press was able to offer was never better than 
speculation.   
Such a mystery gave Leslie Howard his artistic freedom.  Instead of the roll call of test pilots 
ƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌHoward only gives us ŽŶĞ ?ĂǀŝĚEŝǀĞŶ ?ƐƉŝůŽƚ ?ĚŽǁŶƚŽ
earth, practical, comedic, bears little relation to any actual Mitchell test pilot.  Howard 
wanted light relief to better reflect his own more studied depiction of Mitchell.  Three 
Schneider victories are effectively concertinaed into one, the 1927 race in Venice.  Howard 
does this to better display bumptious authority in contrast to his own more considered 
Englishman.  Howard has Mitchell visit Germany to see the Fascist danger for himself.  In 
fact, the Spitfire project was given the green light in October 1932.  Hitler had not yet been 
appointed Chancellor of Germany.  Howard did play fast and loose with the facts, and with 
consummate skill.  Ill-informed cinema audiences were likely ůƵůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
verisimilitude.  Almost all the reviews had said here was a film based on fact, and the look of 
the film was convincing.  Production values were high, unusual for a British film at this time, 
and Howard had the full co-operation of the Air Ministry.
270
   
Howard had now added Mitchell to his book of Englishmen.  We now return to that young 
female typist from Tottenham who ǁĂƐƐƵƌĞ ‘>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚƐĞĞŵĞĚǀĞƌǇĨŝƚƚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌƚ ? ?271  A conservative patriotism had been a feature of the commercial cinematic 
experience up to this point and fŝůŵƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽ ‘ƉƵƌǀĞǇƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽnal image of 
gallant officers doing heroic deeds or to project the traditional image of the nation as a 
class-ďŽƵŶĚ ?ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůůǇƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?272  The First of the Few fitted comfortably 
into such tropes.  What made it more exceptional was its overt nationalism, ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶĞĨĨĂďůĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ?.273 We must be careful, however, not to mix up intention with 
reception.  Howard may have professed himself to be an Englishman in Britain, but 
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patriotism in the Second World War had a British focus not an English one.
274
  The 
correspondents from Mass Observation who reported on The First of the Few make this 
distinction perfectly clear.  The housewife from Huddersfield was not the only one who 
enjoyed the film the more  ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚǁĂƐƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? ?275   
What did this all mean for the Spitfire in terms of transference?  Howard had made a film 
about an Englishman.  That housewife from Huddersfield had enjoyed the film  ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ
ǁĂƐƌŝƚŝƐŚ ? ?276  The point of contact between the two is of course a sense of identity.  The 
question was which one represented the Spitfire?  The answer, moving forward, would 
depend entirely on the perspective of the questioner.  It was the start of a conversation 
about identity which has been a ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇƐŝŶĐĞ ?               
To sum up this first chapter, a palimpsest is a multi-layered record, and for the Spitfire the 
accumulation of those layers began on 20 May 1939 Empire Air Day.  The RAF opened the 
gates to its bases nationwide and pulled out all the stops to put on a good show; they were 
urgently in need of new recruits after five years of accelerated expansion.  The Spitfire, as its 
latest fighter to go operational, was its recruitment sergeant on the day.  What those large 
crowds witnessed, as the Spitfire swooped low and fast over the horizon, was more than a 
recruitment drive, however.  In May 1939 war clouds were gathering.  The Spitfire, shown 
off to its best advantage, appeared to the assembled crowds to possess the reassuring 
qualities of a champion, a potential war-winning weapon.  A year before the Battle of 
Britain, there was already a distinct mark of difference between the public perception of the 
Spitfire and that of the Hurricane which had little to do with technology. 
The second layer was the only one actually deposited during the summer of 1940.   As the 
Battle of Britain raged overhead what could the non-combatant man, woman and child do 
to fight back?  The answer turned out to be heard in the rattle of collecting tins.  The raising 
of the Spitfire Funds was a phenomenon because it was a chance to make a personal 
contribution to a national crisis.  How effective it was in terms of making war planes is highly 
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debatable but it did offer a sense of empowerment.  At the cost of a penny there was a way 
for everyone to be involved.   
In the autumn of 1942, came the third and final layer to make up the multi-layered record.  
What Leslie Howard produced in his cinematic tribute to Mitchell and the Spitfire, First of 
the Few, was a fairy story.  Good triumphed over evil.  This was wartime, however, and good 
became the national cause and its champion, Mitchell, an ardent patriot and nationalist.  
The Spitfire, according to Howard, was the product of one man and that one man, Mitchell, 
represented the genius of a nation.  What Howard set out to achieve in his propaganda 
piece was to stamp the Spitfire with the mark of English identity and the last layer in what 
was now a multi-layered record. 
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Chapter 2 - dŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐConstruction: A Question of Provenance 
We have discovered the multi-layered record of the Spitfire.  However, for it to be able to 
behave as a palimpsest after the war required the Spitfire to have one more special feature.  
It required a lack of provenance.  It had to be free to be claimed by a new generation.  It 
could not be bound to the mores and strictures of the generation of 1940.  Leslie Howard in 
his own telling of the story of the development of the Spitfire in The First of the Few (1942) 
had actually worked hard to negate a sense of time, of chronology, in his narrative.  It was 
necessary to help him draw out one of the central themes of the film, that of a timeless 
English genius.  He was as vague about dates as he was about ƉůĂĐĞ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌ
Trophy victories were blurred and homogenised.  He was uninterested in the Spitfire as a 
technical achievement.  Perhaps the most famous scene in the film is not Mitchell at the 
drawing board but watching ŐƵůůƐŝŶĨůŝŐŚƚ ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽŚŝƐĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽƚďŽƌŶŽĨĂŶǇƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞǁŝƚŚĂ1930s slide rule but was instead 
rooted in something more elemental.  Howard also avoided the business of design almost 
altogether and by so doing ignored the contributions made by key stakeholders in the  ‘ƌĞĂů ?
story of the development of the Spitfire.  Vickers, Supermarine and the Air Ministry are all 
periphĞƌĂůƚŽ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ZŽůůƐ-Royce only enjoyed a moment in the spotlight because 
it suited Howard ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ.  When Mitchell visited Rolls-Royce in search of an engine, it was 
to meet another personification of timeless English genius, Sir Henry Royce.   
Today, we might admire how artfully this was all done, but in 1942 his audience was being 
ĚĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐďĞŐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĂƚĂďŽƵƚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?^ƵƌĞůǇƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ƐƚŽƌǇ
ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĞŵĞƌŐĞĚƚŽƐŚĂƚƚĞƌ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĂƌƚĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ
ĐŽŶĐĞŝƚ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚĞŵĞƌŐĞ ?DŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ ?,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛconceits actually 
received authoritative confirmation.  In 1949, HMSO began publishing its official histories of 
the war, but there were always more questions than answers on the development of the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ĞŶŝƐZŝĐŚĂƌĚƐĂŶĚ,ŝůĂƌǇ^ƚ'ĞŽƌŐĞ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?Ɛmagisterial three-volume account 
ŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐǁĂƌƚŝŵĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?-4 was all but silent on the origins of the 
Spitfire.
277
  ĂƐŝůŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐThe Defence of the United Kingdom (1957) offered a bare half 
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paragraph and even then managed to get MiƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŶĂŵĞǁƌŽŶŐ ?278  Michael Postan, Denys 
,ĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶ^ĐŽƚƚ ?Ɛ ?Design and Development of Weapons: Studies in Government and 
Industrial Organisation  ? ? ? ? ? )ǁĂƐĂůĞƌƚƚŽƚŚĞůĞŐĂĐǇůĞĨƚďĞŚŝŶĚďǇ>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ? ‘/ƚŝƐ
doubtful whether the popular version pays sufficient attention to the less personal and 
ƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?279  Unfortunately they were unable to offer much by way of a 
corrective.  They even got some of their facts wrong.
280
 
Such evidential mishap was a surprise considering the involvement of John Scott.  He was a 
historian better placed than most to tell the story of the development of the Spitfire.  In the 
late 1950s, the board of Vickers had invited Scott to write a history of the company.  It was 
published in 1962, two years before Design and Development of Weapons.
281
  Scott was 
ŐŝǀĞŶĨƵůůĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?,ĞƚŽŽŬ
his commission seriously and nowhere more so than in his research on the Spitfire.   As is 
revealed in the Vickers archive, Scott interviewed or corresponded with almost every 
ƐƵƌǀŝǀŝŶŐƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƚĞĂŵ ?ƵƚĞǀĞŶĂĨƚĞƌĂůů^ĐŽƚƚ ?ƐŚĂƌĚǁŽƌŬ ?Ă
credible account of the development of the Spitfire remained elusive.  A clue as to why can 
be found in ƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĂĐĞŚĞǁƌŽƚĞƚŽŚŝƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨsŝĐŬĞƌƐ ?/ƚƌĞĂĚƐůŝŬĞĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ƐůĂŵĞŶƚ ?
ƐƌĞŐĂƌĚƐǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽǁďĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŚŝŐŚ-ůĞǀĞů ?ƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ
discussion by memoranda, and of the keeping of records of what was said, by whom, 
on particular occasions, which is second nature to civil servants and people in public 
life, is very much a product of the answerability of ministers to Parliament, and does 
not necessarily have any counterpart in private business.  It is hardly surprising 
therefore if no record is now available of the discussions which led to some of the 
most important decisions in this history.  The record may have been destroyed; or 
the discussions may never have reached paper at all.
282
 
Scott was talking about the Vickers archive, of which a subset was the Supermarine archive.  
Kenneth Agnew, who searched in the same archive thirty years later, was much more 
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Spitfire.  In preparing a case-history lecture for engineers, he had wanted to use the story 
ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĞůůŝƉƚŝĐĂůǁŝŶŐ ?tŚĂƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ŚĂǀĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚ:ŽŚŶ^ĐŽƚƚ ?,ĞĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂďŽƵƚ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌƐ
to document in any way their early work...explained by the historic and persisting  confusion 
of draughting with designing, and the consequent office culture of destroying any 
paperwork which is not a numbered and checked orthographic drawing with a border round 
ŝƚ ? ?283  Agnew was perhaps being a little naive.  What he was railing against was a typical 
work place culture, familiar even today, which does discourage the documentation of 
process as opposed to outcome.   
Both John Scott and Kenneth Agnew had been frustrated, but so too had the Ministry of 
Aviation when it made its own enquiries into the origins of the Spitfire in 1958.  The Ministry 
had commissioned John Jewkes, Fellow of Merton College and Professor of Economic 
Organisation, University of Oxford, to write a short developmental history of the Spitfire.  
Jewkes was an obvious choice.  He had recently published to critical acclaim The Sources of 
Invention, an examination of commercial innovation evidenced by fifty different case 
studies.
284
  The Spitfire would make fifty one.  Researchers working for, or, on behalf of 
Jewkes, sifted the Air Ministry files for clues as to the origins of the Spitfire.  The result of 
their efforts was the compilation of one single large file which can still be viewed at the 
National ArchiveƐƚŽĚĂǇ ?ĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ:ĞǁŬĞƐ ?ƚǁĞŶƚǇ-page manuscript.285  Unfortunately, 
sifting also seems to have meant sorting, a tidy up which has left its own problems for 
ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐŝƚƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚ:ĞǁŬĞƐ ?ŵĂŶƵƐĐƌŝƉƚǁĂƐŽŶůǇĂŵŽĚĞƐƚĂĨĨĂŝƌ ?ďĂĚůǇ
hampered by its narrow Air Ministry perspective.  This may have simply been a consequence 
of his brief but it does mean that today, interest lies more in the reason why he was 
commissioned than what he actually wrote.          
Jewkes, Scott and later Agnew were all hampered by a dearth of documentation on the 
Spitfire.  What this meant, and still means, is that for the story behind the development of 
the Spitfire, anecdotal evidence, the memories of those that were primarily involved there, 
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is of prime importance.  Of course we must exclude Mitchell himself who died on 11 June 
1937 leaving no written legacy.  There is a work diary, but Mitchell was no Samuel Pepys.  
He failed to even mention the first flight of the Spitfire.  As noted above, Scott, for his 
chapter on the Spitfire in his Vickers history, interviewed almost all of the surviving 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƚĞĂŵŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞĞǀŝĚ ŶĐĞŚĞŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨ
that work.  There was one person he interviewed, however, whose evidence he took but did 
not use.     
In November 1959, Scott travelled up to Galashiels to interview a frail but still mentally vital 
Sir Robert McLean, the former chairman of Vickers Aviation.  It was McLean who had 
persuaded the Board of Vickers to buy Supermarine in 1928 and it was McLean who four 
years later commissioned the Spitfire from Mitchell.  If anyone alive in 1959 could shatter 
>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĂƌƚĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞŝƚŝƚǁĂƐDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?EŽ-one was closer to the 
source.  He knew its ƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞhaving commissioned the Spitfire from Mitchell.  As 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ?ĂŶĚĂƚƌĂŝŶĞĚĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚďǇDŝƚĐŚĞůůĂƚ
ĂůŵŽƐƚĞǀĞƌǇƐƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĚevelopment.  McLean had insisted upon it.  From 
drawing board to prototype, from prototype to first flight, from first flight to production, it 
was McLean that held the ultimate authority and responsibility for the Spitfire.  Mitchell 
may have designed the Spitfire but McLean was in charge.   
What McLean had to say to Scott in November 1959 was controversial, but then that would 
have come as no surprise to the Vickers historian.  McLean was only repeating what he had 
already said in The Times in August 1957.
286
  Scott would probably have been surprised if 
McLean had said anything else having interviewed others who had known and worked for 
McLean at Supermarine.  What Scott was hoping to achieve by visiting McLean is not 
entirely clear.  Presumably he was intent on taking the measure of the man and his 
controversial story himself.
287
  In his finished chapter on the Spitfire in his Vickers history, 
Scott put considerable effort into trying to explain, if not excuse, McLean to his readers.  
Scott was obviously impressed by the man he met in Galashiels and recognised his 
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importance to the Spitfire story.   What Scott did not do, though, was pass on to his readers 
ǁŚĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶƚŽůĚŚŝŵ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƌĞŵŝŶŝƐĐĞŶĐĞƐǁĞƌĞŽĨĂŶŝŶĐĞŶĚŝĂƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?tŚĞŶŚĞ
had been given a public platform, in The Times two years before, what he had said had 
effectively scuppered any hope of a post-war consensus view emerging on the creation of 
the Spitfire.  It meant there would be nothing to replace the imaginary tale told by Leslie 
Howard.      
The Controversy is Born 
What appeared in The Times in August 1957 was actually an epistolary spat between 
McLean and Sir Edward Ellington, Marshall of the Royal Air Force.  Ellington had no personal 
animus toward McLean and was in fact going into battle on behalf of his ex-colleague and 
friend Lord Dowding ?dŚĞƐƉĂƚǁĂƐƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐŝůŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ
biography of Lord Dowding in the summer of 1957 which had just been serialised in the 
Sunday Times.  Collier had impeccable credentials for such a biography.  He was an 
intelligence ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŝŶŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ
its Air Historical Officer at its end.  On leaving the RAF in 1948 he had joined the Cabinet 
Office as a member of the team working on the official histories.
288
  It was two paragraphs 
in particular from the new biography that seemed to have goaded McLean into picking up 
his pen.                        
dŚĞƚǁŽƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
support for a replacement for the Schneider Trophy after Mitchell had won it outright for 
Britain with his third Supermarine victory in 1931.  Dowding was, at the time, a year into his 
new job as Air Member for Supply and Research.  This is what McLean read.                
He recommended that, instead of spending any of its scanty funds on further racing, 
the Air Ministry should give aircraft manufacturers and designers an opportunity of 
putting this experience to good use in the national interest, by ordering two 
landplanes built to give the highest performance compatible with a practical landing-
speed on such aerodromes as were available. 
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This recommendation was accepted.  Manufacturers likely to be interested were 
invited to submit designs, and a number did so.  Those submitted by Hawker Aircraft 
Limited and Supermarine Limited seemed most suitable.  In due course prototypes 
built to those designs were ordered.  Thus were born the Hurricane and the Spitfire.  
Only after this step had been taken was the potential value of these machines as 
high performance fighters recognized.  Appropriate specifications were then drawn 
up... The popular impression that their designers conceived them from the outset as 
a means of saving Britain from the onslaught of a militant Germany is a 
misconception fostered by writers and film-directors doubtless unaware that both 





Figure 10.  Cover of Leader of the Few Authorised Biography of Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory    
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Collier is of course referring to Leslie HoǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƐƵŵŵĞƌďŽǆŽĨĨŝĐĞŚŝƚThe First of the 
Few ?ŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĨŽƌDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?,ĞƉŝĐŬĞĚƵƉŚŝƐ
pen and composed a letter to the Sunday Times.  It was in The Times, however, which had 
quickly jumped on the story that the spat now proceeded for two weeks in August 1957.        
 ŶŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽƌĚĞƌĨŽƌĂŶĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĨŝŐŚƚĞƌĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ‘ƐŽĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůƚŚĂƚ
ŶŽďŽĚǇǁĂŶƚĞĚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚŝƚ ?ůĞĚƚŚĞsŝĐŬĞƌƐĂŝƌĐƌĂft company to design 
and build a fighter aircraft of their own, which later became the Spitfire, Sir Robert 
McLean, formally Managing Director of Vickers (Aviation) Ltd., said yesterday... 
 ‘tĞǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŐƌĞĂƚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĞŝr Ministry would 
pick on my company to do anything like build a new fighter; they gave us this crazy 
thing and called it an experimental machine.  It was so experimental nobody wanted 
anything to do with it...The only thing to do was to build one ourselves.  We had a 
ůĂƌŐĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĨƵŶĚĂŶĚ/ƵƐĞĚŵǇŽǁŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞǁĞƌĞŽŶŽƵƌŽǁŶ ? ?290 
The Times then added some useful context for its readers.  
In a letter to the Sunday Times yesterday Sir Robert McLean commented on Mr. 
ŽůůŝĞƌƐ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŝŶĂŶĞǆƚƌĂĐƚŽĨ>ŽƌĚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚůĂƐƚǁĞĞŬ ?
that both the Hurricane and the Spitfire were ordered by the Air Ministry as an 
experiment from designs submitted by Hawker Aircraft and Supermarine 
respectively.  Sir Robert McLean said that the two companies were each chosen to 
build an experimental machine, but the one allotted to Supermarine seemed in the 
ĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝĞĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ?Dƌ ?Z ?: ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ? ‘ƚŽŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŵĂŶǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ
hostile to the very basis of fighter efficiency, speed, and agŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? 
...Sir Robert McLean...felt that Mitchell and Dr. Barnes Wallis would do better by 
devoting their qualities not to the official experimental fighter but to a real killer 
fighter which was eventually to become the Spitfire.  After unfruitful discussions with 
the Air Ministry, he and his opposite number in Rolls-Royce, the late A. F. Sidgreaves, 
decided that the two companies should themselves finance the building of such an 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ? ‘dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁĂƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞƌĞƚŽld that in no 
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circumstances would any technical member of the Air Ministry be consulted or 
ĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ? ?291 
DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶĂĚĚĞĚĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŚĞŶThe Times now went in search 
of corroboration.   
Sir George Edwards, Managing director of Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd., said 
that it was the accepted legend in the company that the Spitfire came about in spite 
of everything the Air Ministry could do.  There was a specification for an aircraft, but 
ŝŶDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛopinion it would not have been any good. 
 ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚŝĐŵĂŶ ?ĂƐďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌƐŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ ?ǁŚŽƐĂŝĚŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ
going to be tied down to an Air-Ministry inspired and dictated aeroplane, and could 
ĚŽŵƵĐŚďĞƚƚĞƌŝĨŚĞǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶĂĨƌĞĞŚĂŶĚ ? ? Sir George Edwards said.292 
Lord Dowding was asked for his comment too.  What he said to the reporter from The 
Times, however, ĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐĂƚĂůů ? 
Lord Dowding said his recollections was clear that the prototypes of the Hurricane 
and Spitfire were ordered, not to a specification as fighters but as experimental 
machines which would take advantage of the aerodynamic and engine knowledge 
gained in winning the Schneider Trophy, to fly as fast as possible and with no 
limitations except for landing and take-off...
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It was now that Sir Edward Ellington, a member alongside Dowding of the Air Council in 
 ? ? ? ? ?ůĂƚĞƌƚŽďĞŚŝĞĨŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ^ƚĂĨĨŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŽŶŚŝƐŽůĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ?Ɛ
behalf. 
/ĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ>ŽƌĚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐƐƚatement that what eventually became the prototype 
of the Hurricane and the Spitfire were ordered as experimental aircraft pure and 
simple, with the only restriction that they could be used from existing landing 
grounds and flown by the average fully trained fighter pilots.  As Air Member for 
Supply and Research, Lord Dowding had at his disposal a sum of money which he 









could use at his sole discretion for experimental orders, and he wisely devoted the 
money to this object. 
The Hawker Aircraft Company and Supermarine Company received these orders and 
both, foreseeing that no production orders could follow even success, decided so to 
design the aircraft that, with a change of wing, they could become fighters.  The Air 
Ministry, knowing this, arranged that the wings should be designed to contain eight 
.303 machine guns, since the experiments conducted at Northolt under the 
supervision of the Fighter Committee had shown that no smaller number would 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐĂůůĞĚĂ ‘ůĞƚŚĂůĚĞŶƐŝƚǇ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶ the time an 
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞƉŝůŽƚĐŽƵůĚŚŽůĚŚŝƐƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚ ? ? ? ?/ĐĂŶŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŬŝůůĞƌ
ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽďǇ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?294 
ŽƵůĚĂŶǇŽŶĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŬŝůůĞƌĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽďǇDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?tĂƐDĐ>ĞĂŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐ
in falsehoods as Ellington seemed to be implying?  Looking for adjudication on the matter, 
The Times asked the Air Ministry for its view, but received nothing useful by way of a reply.     
The Air Ministry official said that at this stage they did not wish to cross swords with 
Vickers or to deny the genius of the late Mr. Mitchell, the designer of the Spitfire.
295
 
The Air Ministry was probably wise to maintain a diplomatic silence because its own Air 
Historical Branch was implicated in the affair.  In 1955, Collier had approached J. C. Nerney, 
leader of the Air Historical Branch, asking for permission to consult official documents for 
his biography of Dowding then in development.  Nerney agreed on two conditions.  The first 
was that he or at least his department would be able to inspect the manuscript before 
publication.  The second was that it had to be clear to the reader that the biography was not 
an official history.
296
  Dealing with the personalities of senior commanders, ensuring a 
balanced portrayal, was a sensitive issue for the Official Historians.
297
  ŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚĞƌŵ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ ?ŝŶŚŝƐƚŝƚůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐĂƚďĞƐƚ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚŽŶůǇŝŶƚŚĞ
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 TNA, AIR 2/17032, J.C. Nerney to B. Humphrey Davis, 3 Aug. 1955. 
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sense that Lord Dowding had co-operated in its preparation.  As we shall see, this was not 
what McLean took it to mean.      




  Nerney demanded very few revisions but he did want one which had a 
significant bearing here.  In the galley proofs, Collier had ended the paragraph that so 
ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞĚDĐ>ĞĂŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐ ‘ŽƌĚĞƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞĂƐĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĐƌĂĨƚ ? ?299  
EĞƌŶĞǇŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĐƌĂĨƚ ?ƚŽ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƐEĞƌŶĞǇ
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ? ‘ƐƵƌĞůǇ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĐƌĂĨƚ ?ŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚĨŽƌǁĂƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?
KƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐůŝƚƚůĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝŶƚŚĞZ ? ?&ĨŽƐƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ? ?300  This was no mere 
quibbling over semantics.  Nerney wanted Collier to imply that the Spitfire was ordered as a 
war machine fully-formed, an experiment perhaps, but war-ready nevertheless.   Dowding 
only ever said, and he said it once again when asked by The Times, that the Spitfire was 
ordered as part of an experimental programme.  The change of emphasis insisted upon by 
Nerney suggested that Dowding and the Air Ministry had in fact specified the high 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚďǇŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ ? 
Who was telling the truth?  It ought to be repeated, in terms of the development of the 
Spitfire, with no step by step documentation and no Mitchell, it was McLean that was in 
effect, the primary source.  Here he was being given the perfect opportunity to set the 
record straight, to disavow HŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞĂŶĚƌĞƉůĂĐĞŝƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨǁŚĂƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?/ĨŚĞŚĂĚ ?ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƐĂƉĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞůŽŽŬĞĚǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?
It might even have ground to halt then and there.  McLean, however, did not to set the 
record straigŚƚ ?,ĞĚŝĚŶŽƚĚŝƐĂǀŽǁ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞ ?ŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůůǇǁĞŶƚƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƚŽ
confirming it.  The question for the rest of this chapter is why did he do such a thing?    
dŚĞƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞƚǁŽƉĂƚŚƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŚĂƐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
wŽƌĚ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ ? ?ƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƉƌĞƐƐ ?
 ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚ ?ŵĞĂŶƚŽŶůǇŽŶĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŽDĐ>ĞĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞƵŶƐĞĞŶŚĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
Ministry.  He says as much in yet another letter to The Times which they ignored having 
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finally grown tired of the story.
301
  As we shall see, for McLean, such an idea would have 
been a red rag to a bull.  The second reason is to do with his own role in the creation of the 
Spitfire.  There is an argument to be made that Mitchell designed the Spitfire not because of 
McLean but in spite of him.  McLean may have been an obstructive rather than a 
constructive presence for Mitchell.  The explosion of claim and counter claim in August 1957 
ĚŝĚŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌĂĐůĞĂƌĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽ>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞwhich was left, if anything, even 
more secure.  Added security was now a cloaking miasma of misinformation.  In tracing the 
troubled career of Sir Robert McLean as chairman of Vickers Aviation, and exploring his 
working relationship with Mitchell, we may hope to find out why he misled readers in The 
Times ĂŶĚŝŶĨĂĐƚĂůůƚŚŽƐĞƐĞĞŬŝŶŐĂŶƐǁĞƌƐƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǀĞŶĂŶĐĞ ?          
The First Mistake by Sir Robert McLean 
A vital ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌǇĨĂĐƚŽƌĨŽƌDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŽƵƚďƵƌƐƚŝŶThe Times in 1957 was his belief that the 
ŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁĂƐďĞŚŝŶĚĂƐŝůŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐŶĞǁďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨ>ŽƌĚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?/ƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂůŽŶŐ
ƐŝŵŵĞƌŝŶŐŚĂƚƌĞĚ ?ŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚŝƚƐƌŽŽƚƐŝŶDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ
almost three years before the Spitfire project was first mooted.  It was to a degree his own 
fault, a consequence of a mistaken decision he took right at the beginning of his tenure as 
chairman of Vickers Aviation.  In February 1928, Anthony Vickers, scion of the great 
armament house of Vickers, wrote to ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨĂŶĂĚŝĂŶsŝĐŬĞƌƐ>ƚĚ ? ‘ƚůŽŶŐůĂƐƚǁĞ
are beginning to put our Aviation house in order.  A separate Company is being formed, the 
Chairman Sir Robert McLean  W a most excellent fellow who has come into the business 
lately, a good engineer, ĂĨŝŶĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƌ ?ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚůǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇǁŚŝƚĞ ? ?302  The 
ŶĞǁŵĂŶ ?Ɛcurriculum vitae was certainly impressive.  McLean had been educated at 
Edinburgh Academy and Edinburgh University, where he had taken a degree in engineering.  
In 1905, he became an Assistant Engineer in the Indian Public Works Department working 
on the maintenance and operation of the railways and the survey and construction of new 
railways in India and Burma.  He had a good war record.  He had served with the British 
Expeditionary Force in Aden and Mesopotamia and in France.  In 1920, he had become 
Secretary to the Railway Board, Government of India.  His services were loaned in 1921 to 
the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Co., of which he was first Deputy General Manager and, 
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later, General Manager.  Such a fine record of public service was rewarded with a 
knighthood in 1926 and the apogee of his Indian career was reached with his tenure from 
1923 till 1927 as a Trustee of the Port of Bombay.
303
  It was a record of achievement but 
ǁŚĂƚŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŶƚŚŽŶǇsŝĐŬĞƌƐĂůůƵĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚĞŶŚĞĐĂůůĞĚDĐ>ĞĂŶ
 ‘ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇǁŚŝƚĞ ? ? 
 
 
Figure 11. Sir Robert McLean 
 
The most illuminating analysis of McLean the man is to be found in the official history of 
Vickers written by John Scott and published in 1962.
304
  ^ĐŽƚƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚDĐ>ĞĂŶĂƐ ‘ĂŵĂŶŽĨ
granite integrity and austere independence of mind, McLean accepted authority as 
something which his character was bound to bring him, and the loneliness of high 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂƐŚŝƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůŚĂďŝƚĂƚ ? ?305  The key to understanding his character according to 
Scott was his vice-regal attitude.  This had consequences for all those who had to deal with 
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Śŝŵ ? ‘DĞŶĐĂƐƚŝŶĂůĞƐƐĂƵŐƵƐƚŵŽƵůĚǁĞƌĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƉƚƚŽĨŝŶĚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ
ƵŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƚƌǇŝŶŐŽƌĞǀĞŶƵŶŶĞƌǀŝŶŐ ? ?306   
Mclean had been handed a golden opportunity at Vickers Aviation.  He had arrived at 
Vickers in February 1927 in the middle of the negotiations for the merger of Vickers with 
ƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐtŚŝƚǁŽƌƚŚ ?sŝĐŬĞƌƐŵĂŝŶďŽĂƌĚǁĂƐĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĂŶĚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ
seems to have been waved through on the nod.  Whether McLean was promised an 
independent command, the opportunity to build an empire of his own, we do not know, but 
ŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇŚĞǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶ ? ‘DĐ>ĞĂŶǁĂƐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ
responsible to the Board of Vickers Limited and there was no intermediary control.  He was 
tŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?307  In practice, McLean 
had only to report to General Sir Herbert Lawrence, very soon to be chairman of the Vickers 
ŽĂƌĚ ?>ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀĞĂƐƚĂƵŶĐŚĂůůǇŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ /ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ>Ăǁƌence who would 
protect him when that Augustan character began to betray itself.  It was a matter of 
ĞŵƉĂƚŚǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ĐŽƚƚ ?>ĂǁƌĞŶĐĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚĂŬŝŶĚƌĞĚƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĨƚĞƌĂůůƉƌŽ-
ĐŽŶƐƵůĂƌďůŽŽĚŝŶŚŝƐŽǁŶǀĞŝŶƐ ? ?308   
When McLean sat down in his office at Vickers House in London for the first time in 
&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝŶŐƐŶĞĞĚĞĚƐŚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉ ?sŝĐŬĞƌƐ ?ĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ
interests had been in the care of a rising star at Vickers, Sir Charles Craven, but he was an 
ex-naval officer and a ƐŚŝƉŵĂŶ ? ‘ƌĂǀĞŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞ ?ďƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐŶŽŝƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŽƌ
knowledge of aviation, he had been doing nothing except allow the company to run on in 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ? ?309  How was McLean to proceed?  He 
quickly discovered he had three choices.  The first was to expand the military side of the 
business upon which Vickers Aviation had been built.   
The Great War had not so much as encouraged a growth of the British aviation industry as 
caused one.  In 1914, the combined efforts of the entire industry built ten aircraft a month.  
By 1918, this figure had risen to 2,688 and would not stop climbing until it reached 4000 a 
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  Vickers enjoyed more than its fair share of this bounty.  In 1918, the newly 
expanded Vickers plaŶƚĂƚƌŽŽŬůĂŶĚƐĂůŽŶĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĞĚĨŽƌŽŶĞƚĞŶƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
monthly production quota.
311
  Such prodigious output had grown a new military giant.  By 
ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌƚŚĞZ& ?ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŽŶ ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚĂŝƌ
force.  It possessed 22,647 aircraft and 103 airships and had over 26,000 trained pilots and a 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞŶ ?^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐŐŝĂŶƚ ǁĂƐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ
manufacturing industry employing approximately 177, 000 men and women.
312
  But such 
ŐŽŽĚƚŝŵĞƐǁĞƌĞƚŽĐŽŵĞƚŽĂŶĂďƌƵƉƚŚĂůƚ ? ‘/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞĂƚƌĂŝƚŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌ
ĂǀŝĐƚŽƌŝŽƵƐǁĂƌƚŚĞŝƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĨŽƌĐĞƐĚŽŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇĚĞŵŽďŝůŝǌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ? ?313  This is 
what happened to the RAF, a complement of over 22,000 aircraft in November 1918, was by 
March 1919 reduced to a bare 200.
314
   
Although the military market collapsed, it did not disappear altogether.  David Edgerton has 
argued that talk of the period 1920- ? ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ůĞĂŶǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŝƐŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?315  It was certainly 
true that prospects brightened as early as 1923, when the government announced it would 
create a 52 squadron home defence force.  Vickers, in the first years after the war, was 
actually doing rather well out of the Air Ministry and certainly better than anyone else.
316
  
This was largely down to Rex Pierson its chief designer.  He was a good designer but a better 
ƐĂůĞƐŵĂŶ ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶŚĂĚƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĂ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ǁŝƚŚƐĞŶŝŽƌZŽǇĂůŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?
ǇƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ‘WŝĞƌƐŽŶǁĂƐƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ?ĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐ
ĂŶZ&ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ? ?317  McLean was not minded to interfere.  His second option was the 
lighter than air business, airships.  Vickers was already building the R100 under contract for 
the government but there were precious few other customers, even worldwide, for a half 
million-pound airship.  This left McLean with one last option, the civilian market, and it was 
here that his gaze settled.     
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McLean was not interested in the private flyer.
318
  What he was interested in was the 
potential of the airline market, bigger craft and bigger profits.  Imperial Airways had been 
incorporated by the government, three years before in 1924, with capital of one million 
pounds and a further subsidy of another one million pounds.
319
  One of the stipulations the 
government had made to Imperial Airways in consideration of that sum, was the 
requirement to buy from British manufacturers.  British aircraft were going to open up the 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ? ‘/ŶƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚǁĞƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƋƵŝĐŬĞr personal travel and 
document exchange); cheaper and more effective aerial survey and management of natural 
resources; quicker trade in small, light and precious commodities; less alienating (semi) 
permanent overseas settlement; more rapid receipt of letters and news; easier social 
ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶďǇŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĞůŝƚĞƐ ? ?320  /ƚǁĂƐĂůŽŶŐĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞůŝƐƚ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ
was made up.   
In 1927, there was no mystery as to what sort of aircraft would be required to satisfy 
Imperial Airways.  Infrastructure or rather the lack of it dictated that.
321
  There were no 
airfields along the routes now being planned to crisscross the Empire only water-ways.  This 
meant flying boats.  In the Vickers Archive there survives a memorandum written by McLean 
to the VickeƌƐŽĂƌĚĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ‘&ůǇŝŶŐŽĂƚƐ ? ?322       
The Board are aware that we have been looking into flying boat business to see if we 
could usefully acquire a holding in one of them.  The reason is that there is virtual 
unanimity that as aircraft increases in size they must take the form of boats, as land 
aerodromes, except at prohibitive first cost, cannot take heavy land machines in all 
conditions of weather.  Orders given by the Air Ministry for flying boats are restricted 
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Figure 12.  Aerial view of the Supermarine Factory, Woolston, (1919) 
 
McLean was new to the aviation business but he was already aware of its guarded 
perimeter.  At the end of the First World War, the Air Ministry in anticipation of the financial 
ƚƐƵŶĂŵŝĂďŽƵƚƚŽƐǁĞĞƉƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŚĂĚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂ ‘ůŝƐƚ ? ?
 ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?Žƌ ‘ƌŝŶŐ ? ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĂůůĞĚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ )ŽĨĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌƐƚŽǁŚŽŵŝƚ
would parcel out its much reduced peacetime orders.  By so doing it hoped to maintain a 
core capacity upon which it might build in any future emergency.  It was not just a matter of 
rationing orders.  The Air Ministry wanted to maintain capability as well as capacity.  It 
therefore decided only to feed individual design departments with the type of projects it 
wished them to specialise in.  Rex Pierson at Weybridge for instance built bombers for the 
Air Ministry not flying boats.
324
  This meant McLean had to buy a company from which the 
Air Ministry would be prepared to buy flying boats, that is to say Blackburns, Saunders, 
Shorts or Supermarine.           
/ŚĂǀĞŝŶƐƉĞĐƚĞĚůĂĐŬďƵƌŶ ?ƐtŽƌŬƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŶĂĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
though I have not seen Shorts, their aviation is so intermixed with other activities 
that the business would not be what we are seeking.  In May last I had a 
conversation with Mr. Saunders, but they were broken off as he asked an 
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unreasonable sum for his properties while his business has little or no goodwill.  In 
August, I heard that Commander Bird, who owns Supermarine, would not be 
unwilling to dispose of his interests.
325
 
McLean then goes on to extol the virtues of Supermarine to his board.   
The chief designer of Supermarine is Mr. Mitchell, who produced the winner of the 
last Schneider Cup, the machine on which the attempt on the speed record is about 
to be made, and has now in hand two machines for the next Schneider Cup.  He is 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘^ŽƵƚŚĂŵƉƚŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂǁŽƌůĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂĨƚer its recent 
flights, and moreover is the only military flying boat which has ever been produced 
in quantity.  Mr Mitchell is bound to the company for a further 7 years and in him 





Figure 13. R. J. Mitchell with plans in the drawing office at Supermarine 








dŚŽƐĞ ‘ƌĞĐĞŶƚĨůŝŐŚƚƐ ?ǁĞƌĞƉĂƚŚ-finding journeys to Australia, which had impressed the 
industry just as much as they had impressed the public.   ‘dŚĞũŽƵƌŶĞǇŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƌĞĂƐƚĨůŝŐŚƚ ?
Z& ?ŝŶĨŽƵƌĂůůŵĞƚĂů^ŽƵƚŚĂŵƉƚŽŶ ?ƐƚŽ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ƌŽƵŶĚƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂďĂĐŬƚŽ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŶĐĞƚŽ,ŽŶŐ<ŽŶŐĂŶĚďĂĐŬŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ
the greatest performance put up by ĨůǇŝŶŐďŽĂƚƐ ? ?327  Finally, McLean confirmed his strategy 
to his board and the tactics he meant to employ to succeed.   
Hitherto Supermarine has concentrated on military craft.  They have done little or 
nothing in the commercial field and that, both flying boat and amphibian remains to 
be developed.  The Air Ministry are now taking the first steps towards the 
development of big boats by calling for tenders for the construction of a boat up to 
60,000 lbs.  From that, it is their intention to proceed by substantial increases in 
weight to larger craft.  One essential step in the development will be the application 
of steel, and especially stainless steel, to hull and superstructure construction.  No 
organisation in the Industry is so well qualified as Vickers to study and try out such 
development, and as size increases and the boats become more seaworthy, the field 
for civil craft will undoubtedly expand.
328
 
The Vickers Board was persuaded and an offer of £390,000 was sent to Commander Bird on 
the 31 October 1928 and accepted.  There were, as is the way of these things, a number of 
conditions attached to the offer.  Almost all of them were coincidental, pension provisions, 
ƚŚĞƐĂůĞŽĨƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ďƵƚŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƉŽŬĞǀŽůƵŵĞƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘Dƌ ? 
R.J. Mitchell is bound to the company without option of terminating his agreement before 
5
th
 ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?329   hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚƚĂŬĞůŽŶŐĨŽƌDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽƐŚŽǁ
signs of stress and it was all because of Imperial Airways. 
The civil aviation market in Britain had been monopolised on behalf of the government by 
Imperial Airways in the mid-1920s, but it must have seemed a monopoly to very little 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ‘ŽƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚǇƉĞĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ?/ŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƌǁĂǇƐǁĂƐŶŽƚ
able to offer the stimulus to the British aircraft industry that would enable its many gifted 
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designers to produce path-ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐůĂƌŐĞĐŝǀŝůĂŝƌůŝŶĞƌƐ ? ?330  To make matters worse for 
McLean, Mitchell and Supermarine, what flying boat work was being done in Britain was 
being done increasingly on the Medway, not the Solent.  Shorts of Rochester had stolen a 
march on Supermarine with their pioneering use of metal structures.  McLean had told the 
Vickers Main Board that the future of aviation laid in stainless steel, but in 1931 
Supermarine was still shaping in wood.   
The worst blow was yet to fall.  In May 1929, only seven months into the new regime, 
Supermarine had received Air Ministry specification R.20/28.  This was for a forty-seat civil 
flying-boat.  It was a big contract and a feather in the cap for the new team of McLean, 
Mitchell and Supermarine.  This six-engine 185 foot wide wingspan flying boat monster was 
precisely the type and scale of contract McLean had envisaged when he had persuaded the 
Vickers Board to buy Supermarine.  The contract was cancelled in February 1932.  It was not 
just McLean or Mitchell that were left dumbfounded, consternation rippled across the 
industry.  Questions were raised in the House of Commons.  Charles Grey, editor of 
Aeroplane, mĂĚĞŚŝƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇĐůĞĂƌ ? ‘ƚŚĞĐĂŶĐĞůůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞŝƐƚŚĞ
falsest of the false economy.  A Chancellor who understood the difference between false 
economy and efficient expenditure and had sufficient intellect to keep in touch with the 
great developments of the day, of which air transport is perhaps the most important to the 
ǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞ ? ?331   
tŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƚĨŽƌ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ǁĂƐƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶĐŝĞƐ ? ‘dŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞďŽǇĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ? ?ƚŝŵĞƐĨƌŽŵ
:ŽĞ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞƚŽƚĞůůĚƌĂƵŐŚƚƐŵĞŶƚŚĂƚ:ŽĞǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽ ƐĞĞƚŚĞŵ ? ?332  :ŽĞ^ŵŝƚŚǁĂƐDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ
right-hand man and chief draughtsman.  As for Mitchell himself, this calamity was neither 
forgotten nor forgiven.  A year later and it still rankled.  In an article written for the Daily 
Mirror in October 1934 commenting on the Macpherson Robertson England-Air Race he 
ǁƌŽƚĞƚŚŝƐ ? ‘KƵƌŵƉŝƌĞŝƐƐŽǁŝĚĞůǇƐƉƌĞĂĚƚŚĂƚĨĂƐƚĂĞƌŝĂůƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ
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vital necessity of our existence.  Why are we so slow in the development of our big air-
liners, and why are we bĞŝŶŐůĞĨƚďĞŚŝŶĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ?333     
DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚĂǀŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŚĂĚŶŽƚŐŽŶĞ
ǁĞůů ?/ŶĨĂĐƚŝƚŚĂĚƉƌŽǀĞĚĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŵŝƐĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚǁĂƐŶŽƚŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ
fault but that was not the point, it was his responsibility.  What it did not do was deter him 
from bidding for government contracts.  On the contrary, in the winter of 1931 he had a 
new plan.  What it did do, though, was clarify for him the nature of the beast he was dealing 
with.  It was another mistake.  He judged, and was never to waver in his judgement, that the 
Air Ministry was a deeply conservative organisation, and proceeded to act accordingly.  He 
held the Air Ministry in contempt right up to the point of his departure from Vickers 
Aviation in October 1938.      
The Second Mistake by Sir Robert McLean 
 On 7 October
 
1931, almost three years to the day since Supermarine had been acquired; a 
board meeting of Vickers Aviation was called.  Present at that meeting were McLean, his 
three cŚŝĞĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌƐ ?WŝĞƌƐŽŶ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚĂƌŶĞƐtĂůůŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨƚĞƐƚƉŝůŽƚ
Mutt Summers, and Air Commodore Chamier, poached by McLean from his post as Director 
of Technical Developments at the Air Ministry to co-ordinate the work of Pierson, Mitchell 
and Barnes Wallis.  It was a management arrangement that was in fact about to end.  This 
was almost the last board meeting Chamier attended.  McLean had mismanaged the 
integration of Supermarine into Vickers Aviation.  The first mistake he had made was with 
ƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĂƐŶŽƚŝŶŚĂŵŝĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƐŽŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
position he now found himself in. 
Air Commodore J. A. Chamier has been appointed Head of the Design Department of 
the combined Vickers and Supermarine works. With Mr Mitchell of the Supermarine 
works, and Mr Pierson of the Vickers Weybridge works working as a team there is 
little doubt that the new Vickers product will go far towards putting this country in 
front of the world in the development of practical air transport.
334
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It never did properly work as a team, neither Pierson nor Mitchell appreciated Chamier 
looking over their shoulders.  The success of the arrangement can be judged by its longevity, 
just over two years.  Chamier resigned from his position to become Secretary-General of the 
Air League.  McLean next interfered on the Supermarine shop floor which had been 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĚŽŵĂŝŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌ ?,ĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŚŝƐŽǁŶŵĂŶ ?dƌĞǀŽƌ
tĞƐƚďƌŽŽŬ ? ‘ƚŽŐŝŶŐĞƌƵƉƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?335  Westbrook ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚ
ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ?,ĞƌĞŝƐĂǀŝĞǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŚŽƉĨůŽŽƌ ?dŚĞǀŝĞǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?
however, was very different.
336
  tĞƐƚďƌŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ‘ƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞ ?ŵĂŶŶĞƌǁŽƵůĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƐĞĞŚŝŵ
seconded to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.      
Trevor Westbrook [the Superintendent appointed by Vickers Weybridge on taking 
over Supermarines] was making his presence felt in a rather unpleasant 
fashion...Many of his decisions were far too hasty and caused considerable 
resentment amongst the staff on top of that already generated by the take-
over....We, rather naturally, considered that we built better aircraft than Vickers and 
the idea of being bossed about by them did not appeal to us at all.  A rather crude 
joke went round the Workshops in the form of a question and answer.  The question 
 W  ‘tŚǇĂƌĞǁĞůŝŬĞĂĐƌŽǁĚŽĨĐŚŽŝƌďŽǇƐ ? ?dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌ ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐ
ďƵŐŐĞƌĞĚďǇsŝĐŬĞƌƐ ? ?337 
McLean then almost brought complete calamity down on his head.  He informed Mitchell 
that Barnes Wallis, assistant to RĞǆWŝĞƌƐŽŶĂƚtĞǇďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŶĞǁ
ĚĞƐŝŐŶƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĂƚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?:ĂĐŬDŽƌƉƵƌŐŽ ?ĂƌŶĞƐtĂůůŝƐ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ ?ƚĂŬĞƐƵƉƚŚĞ
ƐƚŽƌǇ ? ‘tŚĞŶƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇƐĞůĚŽŵƐƉŽŬĞ ?ďƵƚĂĨƚĞƌĂĨĞǁǁĞĞŬƐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ
seldom together in the office they were supposed to share, for one or other of them was up 
ŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞ ? ?338  Mitchell won 
this battle.  Barnes Wallis was recalled to Weybridge.  But it was indicative of wider 
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problems at SupĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨǁŽƌŬŐŽŝŶŐŽŶŝŶƚŚŽƐĞĚĂǇƐĂŶĚŝŶ
about 1930- ? ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇƐŚŽƌƚ ? ?339   
Those summoned to the Board meeting that October day in 1931 would have known very 
well which way the financial winds were blowing.
340
  It was not just Supermarine that was in 
the doldrums, it was the group as a whole.  Mitchell, Pierson and Barnes Wallis, as co-chief 
designers were all paid the same by McLean.  In 1929 they had each received a handsome 
bonus of £1,105, but it was a figure not to be repeated anytime soon.  The bonus for the 
coming year was to be a more modest £691.
341
  As for their basic salary, a generous £2,500 
ƉĞƌĂŶŶƵŵ ?ĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĐŚŝĞĨĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚƐŚŽƌƚůǇďĞĂŐƌĞĞŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞĐƵƚŽĨ ?A?
enforced tŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉŝŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ? ? ?342  The Vickers group was struggling, 1930 
was a poor year, and 1931 was even worse.
343
  As for 1932, it turned out to be the worst 
year of the Depression.
344
  No-one was immune to these poor trading conditions but it was 
the travails on the South coast that were the main concern that day.  The meeting began 
with a summation of the problems facing Supermarine.                  
The object of this meeting was to discuss the present position of unfilled types in the 
services and the possibility of selecting a civil or military type or types, which might 
be designed and built at Southampton with a view to filling a possible gap if boat 
business diminishes. 
There was general agreement that in the present state of world economics, a civil 
type, however successful, was not likely to bring a substantial volume of work to the 
factory, and it was felt that it was better, at the risk of a gap of some extent, to try to 
win a competition for an Air Ministry type, with the assurance of satisfactory orders 
over a period should we be successful.
345
 
McLean was intent on a strategic U-turn and he had come prepared.  He had a proposal to 
put before his Vickers Aviation Board that October day.  He had intelligence, perhaps via 
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Page 104 
 
Chamier, that the Air Ministry would shortly be in the market for a new Day-Night Fighter.  
This was understood to be a replacement for the 178 mph fighter bi-plane, the Bristol 
Bulldog.  Over four hundred Bulldogs had been delivered to the RAF equipping ten out of 
the thirteen home fighter squadrons which made it the standard RAF fighter of the early 
1930s.  Any firm supplying its replacement might therefore expect considerable and 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?dŚĞďŽĂƌĚǁĂƐƚŽůĚ ‘ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŝƐĚƵĞŽƵƚƐŚŽƌƚůǇ ?/ƚ
seemed, so far as known, a specification that would lend itself to a low wing monoplane or a 
ƉƵƐŚĞƌ ? ?346  The issuing of a specification was the first stage in a competitive tendering 
process.  As it was to be a competition the discussion quickly turned to the matter of 
competitive advantage.  
It was thought that the Schneider atmosphere could be reproduced in a Supermarine 
prototype, carrying prestige with the Air Ministry and with possible foreign 
purchasers.  It was agreed, therefore, that Supermarine would enter for this 





was only the week before, on 29 September, that Flight-Lieutenant Stainforth piloting 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?Ɛ^ ? ?ŚĂĚďƌŽŬĞŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƐƉĞĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚ ?dŚĞƌĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐpublic 
interest generated by these events.   
We now come to that specification.  In The Times DĐ>ĞĂŶŚĂĚƐĂŝĚ ‘ƚŚĞǇŐĂǀĞƵƐƚŚŝƐĐƌĂǌǇ
thing and called it an experimental machine.  It was so experimental nobody wanted 
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ?348  Sir George Edwards, the managing director of Vickers-Armstrongs 
 ?ŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ )>ƚĚ ? ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĂŐƌĞĞ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ďƵƚŝŶ
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂŶǇŐŽŽĚ ? ?349  It seems quite clear therefore that 
ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨŽƌĂ ‘ĐƌĂǌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚDŝƚĐŚĞůůŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇĚŝƐĂǀŽǁĞĚ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐŚŝŵ
free to get on with his own Spitfire design.  This was nonsense, a misrepresentation of the 
facts and a misrepresentation too of DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĂƚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŽĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ











what actually happened we have to start in 1930, with a new appointment in that 
organisation which McLean already held in suspicion if not yet quite contempt.   
Air-sŝĐĞDĂƌƐŚĂůů, ? ? ? ‘^ƚƵĨĨǇ ?Žǁding joined the Air Council of the Air Ministry as Air 




  ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐŶĞǁƚŝƚůĞ
was Air Member for Supply and Research, he was not actually in total command of the Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ.  He had to work with and through Operational 
Requirements, a small section directly responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.  Its 
remit was to take soundings and identify the qualities necessary for any new aircraft type.  
Once requirements were identified, the responsibility for its delivery was handed over to 
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?dŚŽƐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŽŶĞƌŽƵƐ ? 
This meant deciding what technical features were required to meet the new 
operational demands, what modifications, if any, were needed in the existing types 
and whether types should be ordered from the industry.  If a new type was to be 
ordered, its broad technical characteristics, or what would be usually termed its 
specification, had to be formulated.  This also involved inviting designs from firms; 
ũƵĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌŵƐ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
Government Specifications or as private ventures); ordering prototypes; watching 
over the successes or failures of the prototype tests and development, and finally 
recommending the new aircraft or the modification of the established aircraft for 
quantity production.
351
    
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŝƚƐĞůĨƐƉůŝƚŝŶƚŽƚǁŽĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞƐ ?dŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
development worked closely with operational requirements and the directorate of scientific 
research took the task of overseeing basic aeronautical research.  This more strategic 
directorate was primarily a funding body, the work itself carried out by the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment at Farnborough, the universities, and within industry itself.  Financing air 
frame manufacturers to undertake basic research could on occasion blur the line between 
innovation and implementation, between experimental prototype and commercial 
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opportunity.  We will return to this pŽŝŶƚ ?ǁŚĂƚǁĂƐĂŶĚǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚĂů ?ǁĂƐ
ŐĞƌŵĂŶĞƚŽDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? 
^ŝƚƚŝŶŐŽŶŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĚĞƐŬĂǁĂŝƚŝŶŐŚŝƐĂƌƌŝǀĂůĂƚŚŝƐŶĞǁƉŽƐƚŝŶ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐĂĚƌĂĨƚ
specification for a new day and night-zone fighter, specification F7/30.  The specification 
number was broken down as follows, F identified the type of aircraft, in this case fighter, the 
number 7 referred to the seventh specification issued in a particular year, and the year itself 
was the last number, in this case 1930.  This specification had begun life in October 1929 in 
response, as noted above, to a requirement to replace the 178 mph fighter bi-plane the 
Bristol Bulldog.  The specification had, however, run into problems.  It had fallen victim to a 
loss of confidence at the Air Ministry.  This is how Charles Grey, editor of Aeroplane, 
interpreted the problem. 
Precisely what use the high-altitude interceptor fighters would be against an enemy 
well equipped with modern machines is rather difficult to see.  If the enemy had 
high-speed day-bombers of the class of the De Havilland Hound and the Fairey 111.F 
with the special Napier engine, the high-altitude machines could never catch them 
on the level.  And the bombers would be so far below the best height of the fighters 
that unless they happened to fly right under a fighter formation the fighters would 
never even catch them by diving on them.
352
  
'ƌĞǇ ?ƐǁĂƐŶŽǀŽŝĐĞĐƌǇŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŝůĚĞƌŶĞƐƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?tŚĂƚŚĞƐĂŝĚǁĂƐŶŽƚĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?353   
ŽůŝŶ^ŝŶŶŽƚƚ ?ƐWŚƚŚĞƐŝƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞZ& ?ƐƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ? 
Fighters of class (a) were stationed in the Aircraft Fighting zone.  They were to take-
off at the first sign of an attack and climb to pre-determined patrol lines, from which 
they would be directed by radio to intercept incoming aircraft.  This was the main 
system for the defence of London.  Interception fighters (class (b)) would operate by 
day only.  They were not required to carry radio equipment and had less endurance 
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When Dowding assumed his new role as Air Member for Supply and Research in 1930, in an 
effort to overcome this lack of speed the RAF recognised two types of fighter, zone and 
interceptor.  It was to be the Spitfire and Hurricane which would merge these two roles into 
one, but it was going to be a five year journey to get there.  Peering into the future in 1930 
almost no-one saw a 300 mph fighter, not even Charles Grey at Aeroplane.  It meant that 
when Dowding picked up the draft specification in September 1930, it was in trouble.  The 
Air Staff wanted a 215 mph maximum speed, a useful improvement on the outgoing 
Bulldog, but performance assessments indicated that this increased speed was incompatible 
with a landing speed of 55 mph, the figure deemed acceptable for night-time operations.  
tĞŵŝŐŚƚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽThe Times ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƚŽĨůǇĂƐĨĂƐƚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
and with no limitations except for landing and take-ŽĨĨ ? ?355  Much that was said in 1957 by all 
parties was correct but out of context.    
ZĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŽǁĚŝŶŐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚŽŶĚĞůĂǇ ? ‘/ƐŚŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽŐŽĂůŝƚƚůĞƐůŽǁŝŶ
ƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƚƌŽŶŐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?356  There were strong 
objections, and from within his department on the grounds that the financial window would 
close and the specification would be lost altogether.  The matter was settled by the 
intervention of Sir John Salmond, the Chief of the Air Staff.  He demanded a six months 
postponement of his own.  The reasons given for the postponement do not suggest that 
ƐƉĞĞĚǁĂƐĂƐǇĞƚŚŝŐŚŽŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ‘dŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉŽƐƚƉŽŶĞĚĨŽƌ ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐĨƌŽŵ
November 1930 to May 1931 to allow for progress in certain items to be incorporated in the 
ŶĞǁŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŶĞǁŐƵŶƐ ?ŚĞĂƚĞĚĐŽĐŬƉŝƚ ?ŶĞǁZ ?d ?ĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐ ?ĞƚĐ ? ?357 
If the Air Ministry in 1931 had not yet found its appetite for speed, the same could not be 
said of influential voices within the wider industry.  The Air Ministry did not take 
manufacturers into its confidence, treating them as dependents not partners, but some 
were keener than others to peer into the future especially if they thought the Air Ministry 
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might be listening.  It was during the time of the six-month postponement of specification 
F7/30, on 11 February 1931, that Dowding chaired a lecture at the Royal United Services 
Institute.  The lecture was given by C. R. Fairey, of Fairey Aviation.  Throughout the 1920s, 
&ĂŝƌĞǇǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůe airframe manufacturer and by 1930 
ŝƚƐŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŚĂƌĞǁĂƐŽǀĞƌĚŽƵďůĞƚŚĂƚŽĨsŝĐŬĞƌƐǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨ&ĂŝƌĞǇ ?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ
ĞǀĞŶŝŶŐǁĂƐ ‘dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞĞƐŝŐŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĞ^ƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?ĨƚĞƌĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ
remarks he turned to the matter of ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨĐŽ-
operation between the Air Ministry and the RAF on the one hand, and the manufacture and 
designer on the other hand, was working fairly well there was still a tendency for 
specifications to be too restrictŝǀĞ ? ?358   
What he meant was that the technology was already available to take a big if not a giant 
step forward.  He went on to demonstrate exactly what he meant.   ‘He said that the present 
tŽƌůĚ ?ƐZĞĐŽƌĚ-breakers might be assumed to represent the utmost the designer could do 
when unhampered by any restrictions, and it might be interesting to devolve these 
backwards, taking their existing performances and adding by stages the various practical or 
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?359 He put up a slide of the S6, Mitchell ?Ɛ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌǁŝŶŶŝŶŐĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨ
 ? ? ? ? ?&ĂŝƌĞǇƚŚĞŶǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽůŽĂĚƵƉƚŚĞ^ ?ǁŝƚŚĞǀĞƌŵŽƌĞ ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƵŶƚŝů
he had reduced that 400 mph record breaking aircraft into a still swift 250 mph fighter 
aircraft.  It was fifty miles an hour faster than any fighter the RAF was then flying or 
contemplating flying.     
&ĂŝƌĞǇ ?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞŝƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŚĞƌĞŽŶƚǁŽĐŽƵŶƚƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚŝƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ
industry, in 1931, there was a conversation taking place about the restrictiveness of Air 
MinisƚƌǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?&ĂŝƌĞǇ ?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƉĞĞĚĂŶĚ
fighter efficacy, had been or at least was being, made by manufacturers, and being 
promoted to the Air Ministry.  Was the Air Ministry listening?  The evidence is suggestive.  In 
May 1931, three months after the lecture, speed is not a primary concern for those re-
ĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ ?d ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨdĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂǇƐƚŚĞƌĞ-draft of 
specification should specify that the aircraft is for day and night use, to climb to 15,000 feet 
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ŝŶ ? ? ?ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐĂŶĚƐƉĞĞĚƚŽďĞŶŽƚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ? ? ?ŵƉŚĂƚƚŚĂƚŚĞŝŐŚƚ ? ?360  By October 1931, 
ƐƉĞĞĚŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŽŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂ ? ‘ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŽĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨĨĞƌĞĚďǇ
low wing monoplane or pusher.  The main requirements are:-Speed/rate of 
Đůŝŵď ?ŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĞĂƐĞŽĨƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?361  There it was, 
speed, right at the front of the queue.     
Bi-plane versus monoplane was an unresolved question in 1931 but it does appear that 
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƚƌŝƵmphs with low-wing monoplanes in the Schneider Trophy were a trump card 
in any discussion.  Fairey in his lecture had predicted the future from the cockpit of an S6 
ĂŶĚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂƐŝůŽůůŝĞƌ ?ǁĂƐĂǁĂƌĞďŽƚŚŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĂŶĚits 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŽǁĚŝŶŐǁĂƐĂĚǀŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚďŝ-plane construction was better since it offered 
more lift for a given weight.  Bi-planes, he was told, were therefore inherently lighter and 
stronger than monoplanes.  Admittedly the monoplane offered a lower head-resistance, but 
the experts made light of that advantage.  Dowding asked laconically why, in that case, bi-
ƉůĂŶĞƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚĞŶƚĞƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌdƌŽƉŚǇĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ? ?362  It is a good story but is it 
nothing more than hindsight?  How forward looking was specification F7/30?   
For almost twenty years after the war, historians were not disposed to be kind to 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ& ? ? ? ? ?WŽƐƚĂŶ ?,ĂǇĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚ ?ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ƐĂǁĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶůǇ ‘ŵŽĚĞƐƚ
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?363  Time has leavened this view somewhat however.  Eric Morgan and Edward 
^ŚĂĐŬůĂĚǇƚĂŬĞĂǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǀŝĞǁ ?ƉƌĂŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ? ‘ĂďŽůĚ
ŵŽǀĞ ? ?364  ZĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ& ? ? ? ?ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ŝƚŝƐŚĂƌĚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ
ĐŚĂƌŐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞǀĞƌǇďĂƐŝƐŽĨĨŝŐŚƚĞƌĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?365  On the contrary, for all 
its detail F7/30 does offer precisely the degree of latitude that Fairey was asking for in his 
 ? ? ? ?ůĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?/ƚƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶĂƉŽǁĞƌƵŶŝƚŝƐĂŐŽŽĚĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ‘ŶǇĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚƌŝƚŝƐŚĞŶŐŝŶĞ
ŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚ ? ?366     
A strait jacket may have been the model for Air Ministry specifications in the 1920s, as 
Fairey suggested in his lecture, but it does seem the ministry was intent on doing something 
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about it at the dawn of the 1930s, or at least with this one particular specification.  Reading 
through the internal correspondence on F7/30 today, there does seem to have been a spirit 
of innovation informing the discussions.  It reached right up to the top.  In July 1931, after its 
postponement but before its final approval, the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir John Salmond, 
ŵĂĚĞŚŝƐŽǁŶǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌƋƵŝƚĞĐůĞĂƌ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞ ŵĂŝŶƐŽŶĞƉŽŝŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ/ĂƚƚĂĐŚ
importance: that is encouraging novel types so as to get away from the tractor biplane... If 
we are to get serious attempts at novel types to meet this specification, we shall have to 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ? ?367  The incentive was of course a budget for a prototype with the 
prospect of a major order to follow.  Let the final word on specification F7/30 be that of R. J. 
Mitchell hiŵƐĞůĨ ?KŶĞŽĨŚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐƚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ůĂŶůŝĨƚŽŶ ?ŚĞĂĚŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘/ŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇĚĂǇƐĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?
the F7/30 design seemed to Mitchell quite reasonable, and even quite forward  W for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌĂĐĞŝůŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?368   
The anticipated specification F7/30 arrived at Supermarine a few weeks after the Vickers 
ǀŝĂƚŝŽŶďŽĂƌĚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚǁĂƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶĂŶĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƌĞƐponse in the 
tender document they returned to the Air Ministry was conservative.  It boasted of the fact.  
 ‘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚǇƉĞĨƌŽŵĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĨŝŐŚƚĞƌĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǀĞƌǇ
experimental.  It embodies the experience gained by the Supermarine firm in the 
construction of high speed monoplanes, and other monoplane types of varying 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ?369  McLean was stepping warily around his potential customer.  A bold 
vision was no longer the order of the day.  How we reconcile this conservative tender 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽƌŶƵƉƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ĞŵďĂƌŬĞĚƵƉŽŶ ‘ĂƌĞĂůŬŝůůĞƌĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞƌĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ ?ďƵƚ
Supermarine won the contract for a prototype nevertheless.  As it turned out, they were 
that bit less conservative than the competition.   
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view of promising new ideas.  Supermarines the most attractive design modelled on racing 
aircrafƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁŝƚŚĂƐƉĞĞĚŽĨ ? ?ŵ ?Ɖ ?Ś ?ĨĂƐƚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ ǇƉĞ ? ?370   
 
 
Figure 14. Spitfire Type 224 
 
Supermarine did win the contract and a prototype was built, but the result, the Spitfire Type 
224, was a disappointment.  Jeffrey Quill, chief test pilot on the Spitfire project, was not the 
only one unimpressed.  Is own list of faults include a lack of speed, a slow rate of climb, a 
ĐŽŽůŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚĚƌĂŐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƉĂƚĞŶƚůǇƚŽŽŚŝŐŚ ? ?371  Quill even had the 
temerity to joke of it in the ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ? ‘dŚĞĞǀĂƉŽƌĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŽůŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐĂƌĞĂů
pain in the backside, with the red (warning) lights flashing on all the time.  I once made a 
jocular remark to Mitchell about the system.  I said that with the red lights flashing on all 
ovĞƌƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞ ?ŽŶĞŚĂĚƚŽďĞĂƉůƵŵďĞƌƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶ ?,ĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐĂǇ
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anything, he just looked very sour.  He was rather sensitive about the aeroplane and 
ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ/ŚĂĚƚƌŽĚĚĞŶŽŶŚŝƐƚŽĞƐ ? ?372    
What had gone wrong, and how does this failƵƌĞĨŝƚŝŶƚŽDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?DĂŶǇŽĨ
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐůĂƚĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂůůƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
prototype boiled down to an over-cautious approach which began with that conservative 
tender document.  This was the view oĨůĂŶůŝĨƚŽŶ ? ‘/ƚǁĂƐŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞŝŶŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵƉĂŶǇǁĂƐǀĞƌǇĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŽďƌĞĂŬŝŶƚŽƚŚŝƐĨŝĞůĚ ? ?373  ůŝĨƚŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ
ŚĞůƉĞǆƉůĂŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐƌǇƉƚŝĐƌĞŵĂƌŬŵĂĚĞďǇDĐ>ĞĂŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘DŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚƌ ?
Barnes Wallis would do better by devoting their qualities not to the official experimental 
ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌďƵƚƚŽĂƌĞĂůŬŝůůĞƌĨŝŐŚƚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?374  No-one, 
and certainly not Barnes Wallis, ever denied Mitchell the credit for designing the Spitfire.  It 




  Barnes Wallis did sit on that committee, along with Rex Pierson and chief pilot 
 ‘DƵƚƚ ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?dŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞǁĂƐĐŚĂŝƌĞĚďǇDĐ>ĞĂŶŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ŝƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ?ǁĂƐ
on a short leash when it came to the first prototype.        
dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐZĞƐŝĚĞŶƚdĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůKĨĨŝĐĞƌĂƚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŽŶ ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ?
 ‘ƚŚĂƚ F7/30 (Type 224) flew for the first time in the morning.  Aircraft and engine functioned 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝůǇ ? ?376  Satisfactory was about all that could be said of Type 224.  Trevor 
tĞƐƚďƌŽŽŬ ?ƚŚĞtŽƌŬƐDĂŶĂŐĞƌŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĞŐůŽŽŵƚŚĂƚĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĞĚƵƉŽŶ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ? ‘For 
two or three months after the first flight of the F7/30(Type 224)...everyone was feeling 
ĚŝƐŚĞĂƌƚĞŶĞĚ ? ?377  For McLean this was more than disheartening, it was a disaster.  There 
would be few Supermarine flying boats crisscrossing the Empire and it must have appeared 
that there would be no squadrons of Supermarine fighters either.   
What he did next, how he came to terms with the failure and responded, would find its 
apotheosis in his 1957 spat in The Times.  His reaction was threefold.  First there was the 
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matter of responsibility.  Commendably, he refused to blame Mitchell, and he refused to 
ďůĂŵĞƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŚĂƚŚĞĐŚĂŝƌĞĚǁŚŝĐŚŽǀĞƌƐĂǁDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŚĞƚƵƌŶĞĚŚŝƐ
ire upon the Air Ministry and their specification F7/30.  Immediately after the first flight of 
the disappointing Type 224, in April 1934, Rex Pierson, Trevor Westbrook, Mutt Summers 
and Beverley Shenstone went on a fact-finding mission to America.  Appended to their 
report on their return to England is this pertinent note by McLean.                  
In one direction, particularly, the policy adopted in this country seems to have been 
short sighted, and that is to regard the Air Ministry specification as the final 
objective, a prototype machine being dropped or scrapped if it did not succeed in 
winning a competition.  I feel certain that this is a wrong policy.  If a machine is of a 
type basically sound, there are many occasions on which it would pay the 
constructor to buy his machine back from the Ministry, if unsuccessful, and proceed 
with his own developments in order to perfect his machine, to the great advantage 
ŽĨůĂƚĞƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?DƌWŝĞƌƐŽŶƉŽŝŶƚƐŽƵƚƚŚĂƚĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƐĞǀĞŶŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ĨůǇŝŶŐǁĂƐ
done on the Douglas machine before she was passed out to the air line, and the 
Martin Bomber, far from satisfactory when first built, was steadily persevered with 




1934 at the annual dinner of contractors hosted by the Officers of the Aeroplane and 
Armament Experimental Establishment at Martlesham Heath.  Charles Grey, editor of 
Aeroplane, was at the dinner and was suitably impressed by what McLean had to say.   
He made the sound suggestion that when aeroplanes came up for test and are found 
to embody promising ideas which are not fully developed, and unfortunately show 
certain defects as well, they should not just be turned down as bad aeroplane.  He 
suggested that they should be still further tested for the sake of the good ideas that 
are in them, and that those ideas should be developed.  He reminded us that the 
success of to-morrow is often the failure of to-day.
379
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^ŽŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚǁĂƐŚĂƌůĞƐ'ƌĞǇŝŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞŵĂĚĞƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƌĞmarks the 
comic centrepiece of his Christmas message to his readers that year.          
The Air Force of a Dream 
 ?tŝƚŚƉŽůŽŐŝĞƐƚŽZƵĚǇĂƌĚ<ŝƉůŝŶŐ ? )&ĂŶƚĂƐǇďǇ ‘ĂƌĂŵĂũŽ ? 
Dear Sirs,-In pursuance of the Policy of my Department, and in accordance with the 
Manifest Desire of the Country that our Air Force shall be Modern and Effective, I 
hereby request you to submit, within the period of four months, a Tender for the 
Supply of a Minimum Number of 100 Single Seater Fighters, the performance figures 
for which shall be based on the following rough lines... 
There will be no interference whatsoever by the Air Ministry or by any of the 
Departments under the control of the Air Ministry.  Machines will be designed and 
built entirely in accordance with your own ideas, and the prototype will be expected 
to come up to, if not exceed, the performance figures stated in your tender.
380
 
ZŝŐŚƚŽƌǁƌŽŶŐ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŚĂĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞ ?ZĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƐƵĐŚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇ
have helped to confirm McLean in his own opinions.  McLean never changed his mind about 
specification F7/30.     
ƐŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞdǇƉĞ ? ? ?ǁĂƐƚŚƌĞĞĨŽůĚ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐ
divested himself of responsibility, he next identified a new cause to promote.  Something in 
the workshops aƚtĞǇďƌŝĚŐĞĐĂƵŐŚƚŚŝƐĞǇĞ ?ĂƐDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĂĞƌŽĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŝƐƚĞǀĞƌůǇ^ŚĞŶƐƚŽŶĞ
ƌĞĐĂůůĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞsĞŶŽŵǁĂƐ ?ĂƐĨĂƌĂƐǁĞĐŽƵůĚƐĞĞĂƚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇĂ
desire on the part of Weybridge to see what they could do in competition with 
Supermarine, so what they did was to take the basic aerodynamics and dimensions of the 
Jockey and re-design it completely with a smooth skinned wing, cowled engine, retractable 
ƵŶĚĞƌĐĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĂŶĚůĂŶĚŝŶŐĨůĂƉƐ ? ?381  So impressed was McLean that his enthusiasm for the 
Venom ĞǀĞŶƐƵƌǀŝǀĞĚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨůŝŐŚƚŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂŶĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚĂ
Spitfire.  Here is McLean writing to the newly appointed chairman of Vickers, Sir Archibald 
:ĂŵŝĞƐŽŶ ?ŝŶ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂǇĞĂƌĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĨůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ‘The pilots also 
say that as a single fighter she is probably a better bit of equipment than either our Spitfire 
ŽƌƚŚĞ,ĂǁŬĞƌ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ? ?382  The pilot, who was supposed to have said this, Jeffrey Quill, 
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actually denied he ever did which does say something aďŽƵƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛmodus operandi.383  
Here was a man comfortable in that liminal space between fact and fiction.  The Venom did 
ŶŽƚƉƌŽƐƉĞƌĚƵĞƚŽĞŶŐŝŶĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐďƵƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƐǁŝƚĐŚŽĨĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞĚŝĚĂƚůĞĂƐƚŵĞĂŶ
ƚŚĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨthe Type 224 was to leave Mitchell alone.  The 
design committee that Mitchell had had to report to went into abeyance.                
We have now reached May 1934, two months after the disappointing first flight of the Type 
224.  What happened next in the drawing office at Supermarine, according to Trevor 
tĞƐƚďƌŽŽŬ ?ǁĂƐĚŽǁŶƚŽsŝĐŬĞƌƐǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨƚĞƐƚƉŝůŽƚDƵƚƚ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? ‘^ƵŵŵĞƌƐǁĞŶƚ
ĂƌŽƵŶĚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐƚĞĂŵĞĚƵƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĂƌĞĂůůǇƚĞƌƌŝĨŝĐƉƌŝǀĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?384  
This brings us to anothĞƌƉŽŝŶƚŝŶDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞŽŶůǇƚŚŝŐ ŽĚŽǁĂƐƚŽ
ďƵŝůĚŽŶĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?385  We need to refer to the minutes of the board of Vickers Aviation in 
October 1931 which had green lighted the Spitfire project and which Mutt Summers 
ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ ? ‘/t was agreed, therefore, that Supermarine would enter for this competition 
ŚŽƉŝŶŐƚŽŐĞƚĂƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞŽƌĚĞƌ ?ďƵƚŝĨŶŽƚ ?ƉƌŽďĂďůǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ?386  
ZĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌĞǁĞƐƵƌĞ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐ
after all Westbrook remembering the words of Summers after the fact.  Summers had died 
in 1954.  It does seem plausible none the less.  As we know Summers had attended that 
critical board meeting in October 1931 where such an approach had been mooted.  He 
therefore also understood the vital importance of winning a military contract to revive the 
fortunes of Supermarine.   
What exactly was a private venture?  Let Dowding himself explain.   
dŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƐĂŝĚŝŶĞĨĨĞct this is 
what we want but it was always open to a firm to say we know what you want better 
than you do yourselves.  We are going to enter this competition with our own 
experts and when you see our product you will agree that we are right and you will 
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have to give us the production order.  If they fail in the attempt they have lost their 
money.
387
   
Dowding was being a little disingenuous by suggesting that the door was always open.  
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂǀŝĚĚŐĞƌƚŽŶ ? ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞĂƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐǁŚǇƚŚĞǇ were given a 
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŶĂŵĞ ? ?388  There is no doubt that in May 1934, after the failure of the Type 224, 
McLean was in a position to finance a private venture.  He had been careful to negotiate a 
substantial development fund on his appointment as chairman of Vickers Aviation as he 
ůĂƚĞƌƚŽůĚ^ĐŽƚƚ ? ‘/ĂƐŬĞĚ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚĂďŽƵƚĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĨŽƌĂůůƚŚŝƐĚĞƐŝŐŶǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚŚĞƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚŝŶ
or about 1929 General Lawrence agreed to a request that Vickers should pay up a quarter of 
a million pounds...Sir Robert had no furtheƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůǁŽƌƌŝĞƐĂƚĂůů ? ?389  The question is, 
though, was the development programme beginning in May 1934 really a private venture?  
Was McLean telling the truth on this point in his interview with The Times in 1957?   
The answer has to be no.  What began in May 1934, out of sight of McLean whose head had 
been turned by the Venom, was a design exercise.  Summers may have been calling for a 
private venture but he was in no position himself to authorise one.  Only McLean could have 
done that and there is no evidence to suggest that he ever did.  On the contrary, what 
evidence does survive suggests the opposite.  Jeffrey Quill interviewed by Scott was 
adamant on the point.  The F37/34 he is referring to in the interview is the second 
ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ‘dŚĞ& ? ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐďƵŝůƚƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? “EŽƚŝŶǁĂƐďĞŶƚ ?ƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞ
Company got a contract from the Air Ministry, and it was therefore incorrect to call this 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ? ?390                  
Let us now turn to that design exercise.  For want of an Air Ministry specification, 
^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨĨŝĐĞŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ ?WƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
direction of Mitchell, it also entered into correspondence with a distinctly unsympathetic Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĨŝŶŐĞƌƉƌŝŶƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŽďe found on any of the documents that survive in 
ƚŚĞsŝĐŬĞƌƐĂƌĐŚŝǀĞŽŶƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?:ĂĐŬĂǀŝƐƚŽŽŬƵƉƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞƐĞƋƵĞůƚŽ
ƚŚĞƐĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐǁĂƐĂŶŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶEŽ ? ? ? ? ? ‘/ƚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ
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modify the existing machine by building a new set of wings of reduced area with a retracting 
chassis and dispensing with the negative dihedral...Now the Spitfire was designated Type 
300...The Air Ministry showed no interest in the new proposal so the design exercise 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ? ?391  The Air Ministry was unsympathetic for good reason.  This was not the way it 
dealt with its suppliers in the spring of 1934.   
A typical procurement project saw a specification drawn up which was then put out to 
tender.  Having received the tenders a conference was held at the Air Ministry and the most 
promising proposals ordered as prototypes.  Once these prototypes had taken to the air a 
competition was held between the prototypes and the winner was duly ordered into 
production.  In the case of specification F7/30 three prototypes had been ordered from 
Supermarine, Blackburn and Westland.  Under the circumstances, which were at this stage 
wholly unexceptional, the Air Ministry was unwilling to make any special allowance for 
Supermarine.  It would have been unfair to Blackburn and Westland.  No-one at the Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŵŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĞ
ƐƉĞĞĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞďƵƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ ? ‘ ?Z ?Dƌ'ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ )
agrees with Supermarines ?ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨ ? ? ?ŵƉŚ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ& ? ? ? ? ?,ĞƚŚŝŶŬƐĨŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
estimate of six months optimistic and unwise to have alterations before F7/30 competition 
ƚŽƐĞĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŝƐŐŽŽĚĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽďĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ? ?392  At this point in time there was 
no reason not to follow normal procedure.   
All the while the Air Ministry deliberated in the late spring and early summer of 1934, 
DŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚŚŝƐƚĞĂŵŬĞƉƚŽŶǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ‘ǇƚŚĞĂƵƚƵŵŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŝŶŐŚĂĚ
changed.  It was thinner and of lower aspect ratio ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƉĂŶƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŽ ? ? ?-  ?ĂŶĚƐƚŝůů
straight tapered.  Some final Spitfire characteristics showing were the cockpit faired back to 
the fin, the simple chassis retraction and thin ailerons.  The estimated top speed was 280 
mph, an increase of 12 mph.  The engine was still the Rolls-Royce Goshawk with evaporative 
ĐŽŽůŝŶŐ ? ?393  Two things now needed to happen to expedite the process from drawing board 
to Spitfire of enduring fame.  What was required was a change of engine and a change of 
attitude at the Air Ministry.  It was the second that came first.     
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/Ŷ:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ũƵƐƚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐƚŽŵŽĚŝĨǇƚŚĞĨĂŝůĞĚdǇƉĞ ? ? ?
was being decided in favour of holding the usual competition between the three prototypes, 
unsettling memos began circulating around the Air Ministry.  They concerned recent 
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŐĂƚŚĞƌĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂŶĚ/ƚĂůŝĂŶĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐ ? ‘ ? ?d ? ? ?Dƌ
Buchanan) points out to D.T.D. that foreign fighters (notably U.S. and Italian) have 
overhauled us in performance.  He suggests that special steps should be taken to produce 
ŚŝŐŚƐƉĞĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐ ? ?394  The Americans were talking about speeds of over 500 mph, on the 
drawing board at least.
395
  The Italians, however, had got beyond the drawing board.  They 
might not have had a 500 mph aircraft but they did now have the world speed record.  The 
Italian team had not been able to contest the 1931 Schneider Trophy due to technical 
problems and this was seen as a blow to the prestige of the Italian aircraft industry.  
MuƐƐŽůŝŶŝ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽƉŽƵƌƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŚŝŐŚ-speed programme with the 
result of a new world record time of 440 mph set in October 1934.  This time would remain 
unbeaten until the eve of war.
396
   
ƵĐŚĂŶĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁĞƌĞƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇŚŝƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƐ ? ‘ ?d ? ?ƚĞůůƐK ?Z ?ƚŚĂƚŶĞǁ
specification (i.e. F.5/34) should be hurried along as other fighter specifications F.7/30, 
F.5/33 and F.22/33 all sacrifice performance for other operational characteristics.  D.T.D. is 
afraid our fighters ŵĂǇĚƌŽƉďĞŚŝŶĚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŽŶĞƐ ? ?397  A minor panic now set in at the Air 
Ministry.  A completely new fighter specification was required whose operational 
characteristics were subjugated to this new priority, speed.  Speed, though, was a problem.  
 ‘tĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŶĞĞĚƐĞǀĞŶǇĞĂƌƐƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞĂŶŽďƐŽůĞƐĐĞŶƚƚǇƉĞďǇĂŶĞǁƚǇƉĞ ? ?398  
Charles Grey was ruminating in his bunker at Aeroplane at precisely the time this minor 
panic had set in.  Perhaps he had heard whispers?   
How was the Air Ministry going to proceed?  On 23 August 1934, Dowding received a 
ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨdĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ‘ ?d ? ?ŝƌŽŵ PĂǀĞ )ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ
new F7/30 design from Supermarines and Interceptor Fighter design from Hawkers should 
be considered quite apart from F7/30 competition... He therefore recommends ordering a 
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new aeroplane from Supermarine to modified F7/30 as performance is higher than any 
existing F7/30 (265 mph) and it will be a useful machine to overcome problems of 8 gun 
Interceptor I.E. guns in wings, steam cŽŽůŝŶŐ ?ƌĞƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞƵŶĚĞƌĐĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĞƚĐ ? ?399  Hawkers had 
indeed been quietly busy all the while Mitchell had been struggling with his first Spitfire 
ƉƌŽƚŽƚǇƉĞ ?dŚĞŝƌƚĞŶĚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞ& ? ? ? ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵŶůŝŬĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚƵƌŶĞĚĚŽǁŶ ?
They had then proceeded to do precisely what Sir Robert McLean later claimed for 
Supermarine, that is, self fund a prototype as a private venture.
400
     
The situation facing Dowding was this.  Of the three prototypes commissioned under the 
F7/30 specification only one ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚǁŝƚŚŝƚƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨƐƉĞĞĚ ?^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ?dŚĞ
Blackburn and the Westland prototypes were bi-plane designs.  The year before, in 1933, 
another round of tendering had taken place on a new fighter specification, but the resulting 
prototypes were at least two years behind those accepted for the F7/30 specification.  It 
meant that in the summer of 1934 only the Supermarine Spitfire and the private venture 
Hawker Hurricane, were available to the Air Ministry for anything approaching a high speed 
development programme.  What Air Commodore Cave was actually proposing to Dowding 
was less a programme and more an expedient.  The Supermarine and Hawker prototypes 
could not be paid for as part of specification F7/30.  The Hawker prototype had already 
been turned down for that specification and the modifications Supermarine were proposing, 
and upon which the Air Ministry now smiled after the reports from America and Italy, were 
outside the remit of specification F7/30 too.   As a brand new specification was out of the 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŽĚŝƉŝŶƚŽŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƐƚ
fund for long-term primary research.  A year later, in 1935, Dowding described the purpose 
ŽĨƚŚŝƐĨƵŶĚ ? ‘^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶǁĞǁŽŶ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌdƌŽƉŚǇŽƵƚƌŝŐŚƚwe have ceased to 
seek after extreme speeds involving very high landing speeds and vast landing areas, but it 
has been policy to have one or two machines under construction which will be considerably 
ĂŚĞĂĚŽĨůĂƚĞƐƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƚǇƉĞƐŝŶƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?401  Dowding was describing an experimental 
programme but it was being used now, thanks to Air Commodore Cave, as an expedient.      
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 dE ?s/ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘dǇƉĞŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?23 Aug. 1934. 
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 See Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray, 2010). 
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The money had been found, but neither Dowding nor his Director of Technical 
Development, Air Commodore Cave, fully appreciated what it was they were finding the 
money for.  They thought they were buying a new aeroplane, one based upon the Type 224, 
with a proposed top speed of 265 mph.  This was in fact what they now asked for.  On 4 
September, the Air Ministry wrote to Supermarine to say that the proposed modifications 
were not to be applied to the existing Type 224, but were to apply instead to a new machine 
(not a completely new design) for which they were now anticipating a quote.
402
  Had they 
known that Mitchell and his team had already moved on from the failed Type 224, it might 
have given them pause for thought.               
But then who did actually know what was going on?  If Dowding and the Air Ministry were in 
ƚŚĞĚĂƌŬĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶŝŶDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚƌĂǁŝŶŐŽĨĨŝĐĞĂƐ^ĞƉƚĞŵber turned to 
October 1934, so was McLean.  The minutes of the Vickers Aviation board meeting in 
KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŝůĞĚdǇƉĞ ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞŚĂŝƌŵĂŶƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ
position regarding the development of this aircraft.  It was not yet ready for delivery to the 
Air Ministry; but in view of the fact that the advance performances in foreign countries far 
exceeded the probable performance of machines in the F7/30 class, a proposal had been 
made to the Air Ministry for a modified machine of iŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?403  It appears 
the intelligence which had goaded the Air Ministry into action had reached Supermarine 
too.  The Minutes from this board meeting then reveal that Mitchell was not being 
completely open and honest with either McLean or the rest of the board of Supermarine.  
The Spitfire Mitchell is referring to here is the failed Type 224.  The name of Spitfire had 
been settled upon months before, in December 1933.  McLean had been in the habit of 
referring to his daughter Annie by the soubriquet, and it does appear that the name for the 
ŶĞǁĨŝŐŚƚĞƌǁĂƐDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂůŽŶĞ ?404      
/ŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽďĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ ?DƌDŝƚĐŚĞůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
that it was important, as an aid to the development of high performance aircraft, 
that some extra research and development work should be carried out on the 
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 dE ?s/ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘dǇƉĞŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?4 Sept. 1934. 
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 h> ?s ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶtŽƌŬƐ ?sŝĐŬĞƌƐ )>dDŝŶƵƚĞƐ ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? WDĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?KĐƚ ?
1934. 
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 This is certainly what he said to Scott ƐĞĞh> ?s ? ? ? ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁŝƚŚ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚDĐ>ĞĂŶĂƚ'ĂůĂƐŚŝĞůƐŽŶ ?
ĂŶĚ ?EŽǀ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ŚĂƐĂůŽŶŐƉĞĚŝŐƌĞĞ ?dŚĞOxford English Dictionary dates its first reference to 
1600.  See McKinstry, Spitfire, p. 55. 
Page 121 
 
 “^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƐŚĞǁĂƐŚĂŶĚĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĨŽƌƚƌŝĂů ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
experimental features of the machine were generally satisfactory, there were certain 
refinements whose value should be explored in the interests of both Companies.
405
 
Mitchell was playing for time.  He was implying that he was still busy on the Type 224.  
There is nothing in the minutes from this meeting to suggest that anyone in the room knew 
what Mitchell was actually up to.  On the contrary, the impression given is of complete 
ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? ‘ĨƚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚƚŽĂĚŚĞƌĞƚŽƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ
Company should, if possible, enter into the classes of high performance land machines, and 
that, subject to the Air Ministry being still prepared to place an order for a second modified 
machine, the order should be taken on the best price obtainable, the negotiations being left 
ŝŶƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ? ?406  ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐďŽĂrd, just like the Air Ministry, was still 
thinking in terms of modified machines, not a completely new design.   
Nevertheless, the pace being set by Mitchell in the Supermarine design office in October 
1934 was dramatic.  There were four factors behind this burst of creative energy.  The first 
was that Mitchell and his team were aware that the Air Ministry was becoming increasingly 
interested in what they were up to even if the Air Ministry did not fully appreciate as yet 
just exactly what that was.  The second was that Mitchell and his team had learnt lessons 
from the failed Type 224 and now sensed an opportunity to put things right.  Mitchell was 
notorious for his sense of frustration at the end of a design project, even if that project had 
turned out to be successful.  Referring to the failed Type 224 Alan Clifton makes the point, 
 ‘ŝĨŚĞǁĂƐǀĞƌǇĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚǁŝƚŚŝƚďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŝƚĨůĞǁ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŶĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?
It was normal for designers to be dissatisfied with aircraft by the time they flew and to be 
looking forward to a new one.  And it was especially a characteristic of Mitchell to be like 
ƚŚŝƐ ? ?407  Mitchell had sensed an opportunity and taken it.       
The third and fourth factors both have to do with the actions of McLean.  As noted above, 
McLean became very interested in a project being developed at Weybridge as a private 
venture, the Venom.  His switch of attention, we might put it a little stronger, his loss of 
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 CUL, VD 701, Note of an Interview with Mr A. N. Clifton, MBE, BSc, FrAeS, Chief Designer Aircraft, 
Supermarine Works, At Weybridge, 13 Oct. 1959. 
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confidence was not lost on those in the drawing office at Supermarine.  This is what Spitfire 
ĂĞƌŽĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŝƐƚĞǀĞƌůĞǇ^ŚĞŶƐƚŽŶĞƐĂŝĚƚŽ^ĐŽƚƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞŝŶƚĞƌ-action between 
Weybridge and Supermarine might also be of interest.  In several instances, activity in one 
branch was a reaction against the other, or an action inspiƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?408  Was 
^ŚĞŶƐƚŽŶĞƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽtĞǇďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ƐsĞŶŽŵĂŶĚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞƐĨĂŝůĞĚdǇƉĞ ? ? ? ?
Probably so, because it is in the same correspondence that Shenstone tells Scott the story of 
the Venom.  Clearly Mitchell and his team had competitive instincts and here was a 
competition.   
The fourth and final factor, however, was the most important, especially with regard to the 
inspiration behind the new design.  Mitchell no longer had to answer to a design committee 
chaired by McLean.  Right up to the point the Spitfire was given its elliptical wings, that is 
right at the end of the design process, McLean was only barely aware of what Mitchell and 
ŚŝƐƚĞĂŵǁĞƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ?,ĞƌĞŝƐĞǀĞƌůĞǇ^ŚĞŶƐƚŽŶĞŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ? ‘tŝƚŚŽƵƚƐĞĞŵŝŶŐƚŽůĂĐŬ
respect for ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĞŶĞƌŐǇ ?ŝŶŵǇŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞ
been born if Mitchell had not been willing to stand up to McLean, particularly in the era 
when McLean quite clearly preferred the Venom concept to the Spitfire concept because it 
ǁĂƐĐŚĞĂƉĞƌĂŶĚůŝŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?409  Mitchell and McLean were clearly following different paths in 
the late autumn of 1934 but now we find the paths coming back together.         
It was all a matter of the Rolls-Royce Merlin engine.  In September and October 1934 
Mitchell and his team, so almost everyone believed, were working on a modified Type 224.  
In November McLean and the Air Ministry were still in correspondence about it, in particular 
about its engine.   
The Chairman [McLean] reported the position of this matter and the arrangements 
he had made with Mssrs. Rolls-Royce Limited regarding the development of the new 
single-seater fighter  W F7/30- ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘'ŽƐŚĂǁŬ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞ ?,ĞĂůƐŽƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁĞƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞEĂƉŝĞƌ ‘ĂŐŐĞƌ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǁ
single-seater fighter, and had asked the Company to investigate performance and 
ŽƚŚĞƌĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ?^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĂŐŐĞƌ ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƐŽŵĞ ? ?ŵŝůĞƐ
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ƐůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘'ŽƐŚĂǁŬ ? ?ŝƚǁĂƐĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽuld take up the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƚŝŵĞƚŽůŝƚƚůĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůŝŶĞŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
along which the Company were now working, and it was resolved that the Chairman 




The original proposal was of course to accept or at least pay for the first failed prototype, 
the Type 224.  This minute has more to tell us though.  It seems that McLean has at last 
ƐŽŵĞŝŶŬůŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚDŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚŚŝƐƚĞĂŵǁĂƐƵƉƚŽ ? ‘the line of development along which 
ƚŚĞŽŵƉĂŶǇǁĞƌĞŶŽǁǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?tĞŵƵƐƚŶŽƚĞƚŽŽ ?ƚŚĞďƵůůŝƐŚƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵŝŶƵƚĞ ?/ƚ
ƐƉĞĂŬƐŽĨĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐŶŽŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ?DĐ>ĞĂŶƐĂŝĚƚŚŝƐ ? ‘ĨƚĞƌƵŶĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ
with the Air Ministry, he and his opposite number in Rolls-Royce, the late A. F. Sidgreaves, 
decided that the two companies should themselves finance the building of such an aircraft.  
 ‘dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁĂƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁĞƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚŝŶŶŽĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ
would any technical member of the Air Ministry be consulted or allowed to interfere with 
ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ? ?411  /ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŝƚŝƐƚŽŽŵƵĐŚƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŚŝŐŚůǇ
imaginative 1957 narrative was rooted in what he probably, and the Air Ministry definitely, 
understood to be happening in the design office at Supermarine in October/November 
1934.  The Air Ministry did try to interfere, but only in what they understood to be a re-
engine of the failed Type 224 which McLean was intent on stopping.  His motive was simply 
to make the Air Ministry pay for what they contracted to pay, namely the original Goshawk 
engine Type 224, failure or not.     
Mitchell did have an engine choice to make, not for the Type 224, but for the new design.  
Hawker with their Hurricane fighter, which because of the time Mitchell had spent on the 
failed Type 224 was a full year ahead in development, had decided upon their engine.  They 
had chosen the brand new Rolls-Royce PV12 (Merlin), and now Mitchell was determined to 
have it too.  It is in fact only now that McLean becomes visible in any material concerning 
the new design which I have seen either at the National Archives in Kew or the Vickers 
ĂƌĐŚŝǀĞŝŶĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ?KŶ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚDĐ>ĞĂŶƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚƚŽ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ? ‘EŽƚĞƐ
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on conference at Air Ministry attended by representatives of Supermarines regarding 
ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽƵƐĞWs ? ?ĞŶŐŝŶĞ ? ?412  We should note that the Air 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ŶŽƚĂŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐ
nothing in the Air Ministry files which I have found that makes this distinction any clearer, 
but all talk of modified prototypes, any reference in fact to the failed Type 224, does now 
cease.     
dŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁĞŶŐŝŶĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĂŶeasy one to make.  
Mitchell would have been persuaded by the performance figures Rolls-Royce was quoting 
for its new design just as Camm had been over at Hawker the year before.  But what of 
DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂďŽƵƚĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶZŽůůƐ-Royce aŶĚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ? ‘ĨƚĞƌ
unfruitful discussions with the Air Ministry, he and his opposite number in Rolls-Royce, the 
late A. F. Sidgreaves, decided that the two companies should themselves finance the 
ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŽĨƐƵĐŚĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ? ?413  What appears to actually have happened is this.  A. F. 
Sidgreaves, managing director of Rolls-Royce, bought into the Spitfire project at a very late 
stage simply to insure selection of the Merlin.
414
  It made sound commercial sense for Rolls-
Royce.  By November 1934, Sidgreaves would have known which way the procurement wind 
ǁĂƐďůŽǁŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?ƐŶĞǁ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ǁĂƐ
becoming obvious to all.  Rolls-ZŽǇĐĞ ?ƐďƵǇŝŶ ?ĂƚĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŵŽĚĞƐƚƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƵůĚ
eventually appear in the Supermarine books in May 1935, long after the new design had 
been settled.
415
   
We return to the drawing boards at Supermarine for the final piece of the puzzle.  In the 
autumn of 1934 the aeroplane which was on those drawing boards bore no resemblance to 
the failed first prototype, the Type 224.  But it bore very little resemblance to the Spitfire of 
enduring fame either.  Specifically, there was no sign of its signature feature the elliptical 
wing.  It was not until the second half of November and the beginning of December, that it 
did finally emerge.  We know this because of dated technical drawings but also because we 
have the word of the man who apart from Mitchell himself is most closely associated with 
the elliptical wing, aerodynamicist Beverly Shenstone ? ‘ǇƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĞůůŝƉƚŝĐĂů
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wing Spitfire with four wing guns outside the propeller disc had settled down and this still 
retained the D-shaped nose section of the wing as a steam condenser, the only difference 
being that it was smooth skinned insƚĞĂĚŽĨĐŽƌƌƵŐĂƚĞĚ ? ?416 
Why was Shenstone not able to be more specific about the date?  The reason appears to be 
that there was no eureka moment for the elliptical wing, it did only emerge, that is settle 
down.
417
  We do not know precisely when  W the technical drawings are ambiguous  W but we 
do know why which does help with the chronology.  It was all a matter of practicalities.   
DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶƐŝŐŶĂƚƵƌĞǁĂƐĂƚŚŝŶǁŝŶŐ ?/ƚǁĂƐǁŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚŐŝǀĞŶŚŝƐ^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌdƌŽƉŚǇ
winners and it was what he was determined to use now, being at last free to make his own 
decisions.  It was in fact the new engine from Rolls-Royce which drove the design of the 
elliptically shaped wing.
418
  The Merlin was heavier than the Goshawk engine which 
powered the Type 224.  So to accommodate the added weight the thin straight tapered 
wing of October, designed with the Goshawk engine in mind, had either to be fattened in 
ƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌŽĨ,ĂǁŬĞƌ ?Ɛ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ?ŽƌŝĨŬĞƉƚƚŚŝŶ ?ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝŶƚŽĂŶĞůůŝƉƐĞ ?
Mitchell demanded a thin wing and so the ellipse it was.     
 
 
Figure 15. Beverley Shenstone 
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&ƌŽŵŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ ? ? ? ? ?ďŽƚŚ,ĂǁŬĞƌ ?Ɛ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞĂŶĚ^ƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ǁĞƌĞ
set on a developmental path which would see them enter RAF frontline squadrons in 1938 
and 1939 respectively.  Mitchell did not live to see that day, and McLean was gone by then 
too, resigning in October 1938.  Mitchell did live to see the first flight of K5054, the second 
and successful Spitfire prototype, on 5 March 1936.  He died just over a year later on 11 
June 1937, aged only forty two.  He left behind designs for a four engine bomber whose 
load, range and speed estimates far exceeded those of the Stirling and Halifax which were 
being conceived about the same time.  As for the Lancaster, conceived later and Bomber 
ŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĂŶĚĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞĚĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ŝƚƚŽŽĨĞůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇƐŚŽƌƚŝŶĂůůƚŚƌĞĞ
categories.  Arguably, had Mitchell lived, Bomber Command might have looked very 
different and Supermarine might have been busier still. 
 
 
Figure 16. The Spitfire Prototype K5054 in 1936 
 
The Problem with the Truth 
The question this chapter has set out to answer is whĂƚůŝĞƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨ
provenance?  Why does the creation story told by Leslie Howard in 1942 still stand?  It 
matters here because upon its answer rests to a considerable ĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛpost-war 
career, its use and re-use to configure the myth of the Battle of Britain to suit contemporary 
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audiences.  In terms of provenance, >ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƌǇmade no room for what 
David Edgerton has identified as a British military-industrial complex in the interwar 
years.
419
  The lesson to be taken from ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞǁĂƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŚĂƚthe Spitfire was the 
creation of timeless English genius as personified by Mitchell.  That lesson has left the 
Spitfire unattached.  It has been free to be used by each new post-war generation safe in 
the knowledge that it was not subject to one dominant cultural construction, specifically not 
beholden to the generation of 1940.  ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞŚĂƐnever been successfully disavowed 
and it has been the contention of this chapter that there was a moment when it might have 
been held up to ridicule, but that moment passed.  In fact, that moment, the intervention by 
Sir Robert McLean in 1957, gave it a new breath of life.   
dŚĞƚŝŵŝŶŐŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƐĞƌĞŶĚŝƉŝƚŽƵƐ ?/ƚĐĂŵĞĂƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů
reflection on the war was arguably at its most conspicuous.  HMSO was busy.  Readers were 
getting used to authoritative reflection.  In terms of authoritative if not official reflection on 
the Spitfire, there was no-one better placed in 1957 than McLean.  This was no doubt why 
The Times was prepared to publish his recollections, along with the fact that he was 
ĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?DĐ>ĞĂŶĚŝĚŶŽƚ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ?
ďƵƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛrequirement for a lack of provenance, 
he did not have to.  All that was necessary was that he, from his position of authority, 
offered no alternative.  As it turned out his intervention was such a tangle of truths and half 
truths that it stymied any hope of a consensus forming on the origin of the Spitfire for at 
least another thirty years, if it ever has.  Having examined DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĚŝƐŝŶŐĞŶƵŽƵƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ
of 1957, the final part of this chapter now seeks to understand the motive behind it.     
The best place to begin is actually two years after the spat took place in The Times.  When 
Scott interviewed McLean in November 1959, he found McLean infirm of body but not of 
ŵŝŶĚ ?dŚŝƐƌƵůĞĚŽƵƚĂŶǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŵƵĚĚůĞĚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĞŝŶŐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ
muddled wits.  Scott made copious notes of those interviews, now in the Vickers Archive at 
Cambridge University Library, and in them we find McLean holding firm to his story.
420
  Scott 
ĚŝĚŶŽƚƌĞƉĞĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĐĂůƵŵŶŝĞƐŝŶŚŝƐsŝĐŬĞƌƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?tŚĂƚ^ĐŽƚƚdid instead was tread 
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carefully around them, neither dismissing them nor confirming them.  Remember Scott was 
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞƐƉĂƚŚĂĚƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐǁĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĚŽŵĂŝŶ ?
^ĐŽƚƚĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽŶĚŽŶĞDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƐƚŽƌǇďƵƚŚĞĚŝĚƚƌǇƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝƚƚŽŚŝƐƌĞĂĚĞƌƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂ
ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ‘tĂƌǁŝƚŚ'ĞƌŵĂny, in his view, was inevitable: and that it 
would be won by the Wellington and the Spitfire was his doctrine, which he preached in and 
out of season, particularly to the Air Staff.  His preaching was like that of John Knox to Mary 
Queen of Scots, and was ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚŝŶƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇ ? ?421   
Scott tried to be fair to both sides.  He did not want to portray a martyr, but he did show a 
great deal of sympathy for McLean.  Scott obviously believed in the integrity of the man if 
not his story.  He was not alone in his admiration for McLean.  A month before travelling up 
to Galashiels, Scott had interviewed Barnes Wallis.  He found in Barnes Wallis a great 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ? ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂŶǆŝŽƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚƉĂƌƚƉůĂǇĞĚďǇ^ŝƌZŽďĞƌƚDĐ>ĞĂŶ
should be acknowledgeĚŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?422  Nevertheless Barnes Wallis 
ƉĂŝŶƚĞĚŶŽƌŽƐǇƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶŚŝƐůĂƐƚ
ŵŽŶƚŚƐĂƐĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶŽĨsŝĐŬĞƌƐǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌŶĞƐtĂůůŝƐƚŽůĚ^ĐŽƚƚƚŚĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶƚŽŽŬĂ ‘ǀĞƌǇ
argumentatŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌ^ƚĂĨĨ ? ?423  What Barnes Wallis said 
ŶĞǆƚƚŽ^ĐŽƚƚŶĞǀĞƌŵĂĚĞŝƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŝŶƚŽ^ĐŽƚƚ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨsŝĐŬĞƌƐ ? 
The crises came, since the Air Ministry had to decide between it and the Hamden.  In 
tĂůůŝƐ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ&ƌĞĞŵan was obsessed by Handley Page, partly at least because of the 
expansive personality and lavish hospitality of Sir Frederick Handley Page.  Freeman 
ŵƵĐŚƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ^ŝƌ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ ?ƐĨŽƌŵŽĨĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇƚŽDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƉƵŐŶĂĐŝƚǇ ?
and the result of this was that McLean began to conduct a campaign inside the Air 
Ministry for the Wellington.  Freeman of course greatly resented this and in the end 
went to Craven and said that either McLean must stop it or go.  If McLean did not go 
Vickers would get no orders as the Air Ministry had no confidence in McLean.
424
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Sir Wilfrid Freeman was at the time Air Member for Research and Development and Sir 
ŚĂƌůĞƐƌĂǀĞŶĂƐĞŶŝŽƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂƚsŝĐŬĞƌƐ ?^ĐŽƚƚŝŶŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĚĞŵŝƐĞ
avoided the libellous but took on board the message Barnes Wallis had given him.   
The Vickers aircraft companies, or at least Sir Robert McLean as their head, were 
acting in the belief that the Air Ministry was, in matters of design, development and 
strategic planning, reactionary and inept; and the heads of design and development 
in the Air Ministry were acting in the belief that the Vickers aircraft companies, or at 
least Sir Robert McLean as their head, were obstinate, over-bold and intrusive.
425
  
McLean resigned in October 1938, forced out, according to Scott and Barnes Wallis, by a 
Vickers Board intent on protecting their relationship with the Air Ministry.  Scott and Barnes 
tĂůůŝƐ ?ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶďŽƌŶŽĨĂďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚDĐ>ĞĂŶŚĂĚĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƚ
Vickers Aviation, at Weybridge and Supermarine, which had nurtured innovation and 
ĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ ?/ƚŚĂĚĂĨƚĞƌĂůůƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞtĞůůŝŶŐƚŽŶĂŶĚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ‘WĞƌŚĂƉƐŝƚǁĂƐǁĞůůƚŚĂƚ
when Craven assumed control of the aircraft companies the supreme creative effort had 
already been ƉƵƚĨŽƌƚŚ ? ?426  Scott was alluding here to the fact that Sir Charles Craven was a 
ship man.  It was what the ex-works manager at Supermarine, Trevor Westbrook, had told 
Śŝŵ ? ‘,ĞŬŶĞǁŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŶĚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŝĚĂŶǇŽĨ ŚŝƐsŝĐŬĞƌƐƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐƐƚĂĨĨ ?In fact 
in the winter of 1939, he was of the opinion that aircraft were more or less a waste of time 
ĂŶĚƚŽůĚŵĞƐŽ ? ?427     
Whether Scott and Barnes Wallis were right or wrong, the point of interest for us must be 
the fact that McLean never forgot the disintegration of that relationship, nor forgave.  
McLean, in retirement, was a bitter old man.  It was such bitterness that suggests the first of 
the two reasons reason why I think McLean said what he said in 1957.  McLean had to 
create a narrative, no matter how rickety, that excluded the Air Ministry.  He could not 
countenance any credit being given to his nemesis for the creation of the Spitfire.  There is 
even a small piece of evidence from 1957 to support this hypothesis.  It comes by way of a 
copy of a letter dated 25
 
August 1957, sent to The Times by McLean but never published, 
ĂŶĚŶŽǁŝŶƚŚĞsŝĐŬĞƌƐƌĐŚŝǀĞ ?/ƚŝƐĂŶŶŽƚĂƚĞĚŝŶĂƐŚĂŬǇŚĂŶĚ ?ĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?Ɛ
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ŽǁŶ ? ‘The Times ƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽƉƌŝŶƚƚŚŝƐůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ĂƌĞĨƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ŝƌ ?ůůŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐǁŚŽŐĂve the 
official reply.  Once again The Times prefers to suppress the truth and defend 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĚŽŵ ? ?428  By officialdom McLean can only have meant the Air Ministry.   
What about that claim of a suppression of the truth?  Scott was alert to the danger of 
belieǀŝŶŐDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƐŽĂƌĞǁĞ now, but what of McLean himself?  Did he 
knowingly and deliberately lie in 1957 and again to Scott in 1959?  Such an idea simply does 
ŶŽƚĨŝƚƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶ^ĐŽƚƚŵĞƚŝŶ'ĂůĂƐŚŝĞůƐ ? ‘ĂŵĂŶŽĨŐƌĂŶŝƚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇĂnd 
ĂƵƐƚĞƌĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŵŝŶĚ ? ?429  What appears much more likely was that McLean 
believed what he said.  The lengths to which he went to twist facts and re-arrange 
chronology spoke of a man creative in his analysis, immune to self criticism, and a little 
lacking in insight ?ƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶDĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞǁĂƐ
ambiguous at best.  He commissioned the Spitfire but commanded a committee that 
shackled Mitchell to a conservative design which ended in failure.  Success only came when 
McLean stopped interfering.           
tŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŝƚĂůůĂĚĚƵƉƚŽ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐĨĂďůĞŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?or to 
offer a coherent alternative, merely served to confirm it.  We must not forget either the 
contributions in 1957 of those drawn into the spat.  dŚĞƐĞƚŽŽƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ
fable.   ‘,ĞǁĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐƚŝĐŵĂŶ ?ĂƐďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌƐŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ ?ǁŚŽƐĂŝĚŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚ
going to be tied down to an Air-Ministry inspired and dictated aeroplane, and could do 
ŵƵĐŚďĞƚƚĞƌŝĨŚĞǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶĂĨƌĞĞŚĂŶĚ ? ?dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨ^ŝƌ'ĞŽƌŐĞĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?
Managing director of Vickers-Armstrongs (Aircraft) Ltd.  WŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞŝƌ
Ministry official said that at this stage they did not wish to cross swords with Vickers or to 
ĚĞŶǇƚŚĞŐĞŶŝƵƐŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚĞDƌ ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?430   Without a 
coherent alternative from McLean here was the familiar trope inspired by Leslie Howard, 
the idea of timeless  ‘ŶŐůŝƐŚ ?ŐĞŶŝƵƐ ?/ĨĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĚŝĚƌĞŝŐŶŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚƐŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƌĞĂĚ
what Sir Robert McLean had to say in the summer of 1957, confusion was in the end all that 
mattered.  /ƚůĞĨƚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇat liberty to be used in the evolution of the myth of the 
Battle of Britain.   
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  ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐKƌŝŐŝŶŝŶĂŶ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          Chapter 3 - dŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐWĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ P>ŝǀŝŶŐ ?ƌĞĂƚŚŝŶŐ ?&ůǇŝŶŐ
Museum 
In just over three years beginning in May 1939, the Spitfire accumulated a multi-layered 
record which enabled it to act as a palimpsest and formed the basis of its future appeal to 
post-war audiences.  Moreover the Spitfire was not subject to one dominant cultural 
construction, in particular, the mores and strictures of the wartime generation.  This made 
the Spitfire able to support new readings of the wartime myths.  Now we will look at the 
Spitfire in performance.  We will first examine what performance is in terms of a cultural 
production, and then we will look at the performance characteristics of the Spitfire itself.  
What was the engine ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞŶĞǁƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚŽĨthe 
Battle of Britain post-war?   
The answer to this question begins with something which would have been very familiar to 
anyone with an interest in the Battle of Britain, the Spitfire in action.  As Angus Calder 
explains, the Spitfire had always been defined in action.         
Several generations in Britain remembered, or grew up with, two indelible visions of 
ƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?KŶĞŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŝůŽƚ ?ƐĐŽĐŬƉŝƚ ?&ilm camera or prose 
description gives us the image of the Messerschmitt attacking, as it were, ourselves 
ůŝŬĞĂŶŝŵŵĞŶƐĞǁĂƐƉ ?KƵƌƉĂƌĂŶŽŝĂŝƐƚŚĞƉŝůŽƚ ?Ɛ ?KƵƌƌĞůŝĞĨĂƐƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŚƵƌƚůĞƐ
blazing groundwards is his.  Or, from the ground, we saw, we still see, we still 
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĞ ?ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚĂĐůĞŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌďŽǇƐ ?ĚƵĞůůŝŶŐ ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚĞƋƵĂůůǇŵĂƚĐŚĞĚĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĞƐ
above our rooftops: a gallant show, perhaps leaving behind some of those vapour 
trails across clear blue skies which still haunt many people whose memory falsely 




ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƚŚĞƉŝůŽƚ ?ƐĐŽĐŬƉŝƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ?
was always that of a Spitfire, the gallant show always put on by Spitfires duelling 
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closely we soon discover he is right.  We begin with the view from the Spitfire cockpit.  In 
1940, good quality combat footage was rare.  What little there was, and especially from the 
ƉŝůŽƚ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ǁĂƐĨƌŽŵĂƐŝŶŐůĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐŐƌĂŝŶǇŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞĚŐƵŶ-
camera footage.  RAF fighters carried a 16-mm G42 cine-camera which only operated when 
the gun-button was depressed.
432
  What this limited functionality meant was that images so 
captured were almost invariably of close order combat and necessarily visceral.  An 
attacking Messerschmitt did indeed look like an immense wasp.   
As there was nothing else to describe the fighting, such images soon became common 
currency.  Stills from the gun camera footage appeared in popular magazines such as War 
Illustrated on 21 June 1940.  Newsreels as well as the Ministry of Information in their 
 ‘ƐŚŽƌƚƐ ?ǁĞƌĞŚĂƉƉǇƚŽŵĂŬĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌƐƵĐŚƚŚƌŝůůŝŶŐŵŽǀŝŶŐŝŵĂŐĞƐ ?433  Movietone was so 
pleased with the footage in its The Tactics of Air Supremacy released in July 1940 that it 
ƵƐĞĚƵƉĂŝƌƚŝŵĞƚŽďŽĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ ? ‘tĞƐŚŽǁĞĚǇŽƵƐŚŽƚƐďǇĐĂŵĞƌĂŐƵŶ ?ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ in a 
ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŝŶƚŚĞĂŝƌ ? ?434  The makers of 
wartime feature films were not to be left out, eventually catching up with their more nimble 
media colleagues.  Gun-camera footage featured in Dangerous Moonlight (1941) and, of 
more pertinence here, The First of the Few (1942).   
Gun camera footage was common currency during the war and so it was to remain after the 
ǁĂƌǁĂƐŽǀĞƌ ?ĂůĚĞƌ ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵƌĞůǇŚĂĚŝŶŵŝŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞƚƵƌŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŵŵĞŶƐĞǁĂƐƉ ?
in 1969.  It was a return on a grand scale, in widescreen Technicolor, and right from within 
the cockpit this time.   ‘ĞŝŶŐĨůŽǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĂĐŬƐĞĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚĂĐĂŵĞƌĂŵŽƵŶƚĞĚŝŶ ƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚ
ĐŽĐŬƉŝƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐƚǁŽ-ƐĞĂƚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂƉŝůŽƚ ?ƐĞǇĞǀŝĞǁĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ? ?435  The poor 
grainy image of 1940 was at last consigned to the small screen, used by the makers of 
television documentaries.  The American financed big budget film Battle of Britain may well 
have been a critical as well as commercial failure but its forty minutes of authentic combat 
sequences, authentic in the sense that they took their visual cue from the original gun-
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camera footage of 1940, was well received.  Such was its positive reception impact at the 
time that the legacy of those forty minutes is something we will be returning to in the next 
chapter.   
What was true of combat footage in 1940, a limited repertoire widely disseminated, was 
also true of first-ŚĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĂĞƌŝĂůďĂƚƚůĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞŽŶůǇƐĞǀĞŶƉŝůŽƚƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ
of the Battle of Britain published during the war.  In them, the view from the cockpit rarely 
ǀĂƌŝĞĚ ?,ĞƌĞŝƐ&ůŝŐŚƚ>ŝĞƵƚĞŶĂŶƚĂǀŝĚƌŽŽŬƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? ‘/ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĨƌŽŵ
the cloud going at very high speed  W probably over 400 mph, and saw a Ju. 87 just ahead of 
ŵĞ ?/ŽƉĞŶĞĚĨŝƌĞĂŶĚŚĞƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽĨůǇƌŝŐŚƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵǇƚƌĂĐĞƌďƵůůĞƚƐ ? ?436  Richard Hilliary 
saw the same thing ƚŽŽ ? ‘,ĞĐĂŵĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵǇƐŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ/ƐĂǁƚŚĞƚƌĂĐĞƌĨƌŽŵĂůůĞŝŐŚƚ
guns thud home.  For a second he seemed to hang motionless; then a jet of red flame shot 
ƵƉǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĚŚĞƐƉƵŶŽƵƚŽĨƐŝŐŚƚ ? ?437  Most pilot memoirs published after the war did not 
veer too far from this established narrative trope.  Freed from the constraints of 
propaganda and censorship, criticism emerged over the conduct of the battle, but the view 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŽĐŬƉŝƚƐƚĂǇĞĚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?, ?Z ? ‘ŝǌǌǇ ?ůůĞŶŚĂĚŚŝƐŽǁŶĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞ
ǁĂƐƉƐƚŽŽ ? ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶďŽŵďĞƌǁŚŝǌǌĞĚƉĂƐƚŵǇŚĞĂĚĂĨĞǁĨĞĞƚĂǁĂǇ ?/ĐŽƵůĚƐĞĞƚŚĞ
bomb-aimer in the Perspex nose of the Heinkel.  A few yards away a couple of Me. 109s 
ǁŝƚŚĚŝƌƚǇŐƌĞĂƚǇĞůůŽǁŶŽƐĞƐĨůĂƐŚĞĚƉĂƐƚ ? ?438                            
Ubiquitous gun-camera footage and familiar tropes in pilot memoirs did produce an 
indelible vision just as Calder suggests and so what of the view from the ground?  Calder is 
correct here too, and for the same reason, the nature of the source material.  Although the 
Battle of Britain was fought over southern England, in plain view, what people saw proved 
hard to contextualise.  H. E. Bates tried his considerable best to describe what he saw when 
ŚĞůŽŽŬĞĚƵƉŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ<ĞŶƚƐŬǇŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ? ‘dŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞĂĨĨĂŝƌǁĂƐƐƚƌĂŶŐĞůǇ ?
uncannily, weirdly unreal...Now and then a splutter of machine-gun fire cracked the heavens 
open, leaving an ominous silence behind.  Now and then a parachute opened and fell 
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lazily...But for the most part it all had a remoteness so unreal that the spectator over and 
ŽǀĞƌĂŐĂŝŶǁŽŶĚĞƌĞĚŝĨŝƚǁĂƐƚĂŬŝŶŐƉůĂĐĞĂƚĂůů ? ?439   
It was this remoteness, the missing physical cues of combat, which led to a symbolic 
representation coming to define the view from the ground.  Arguably its most famous 
ǁĂƌƚŝŵĞĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐWĂƵůEĂƐŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ŽŝůŽŶĐĂŶǀĂƐBattle of Britain.440   In answer to 
those, who like H. E. Bates, were confused by what they sĂǁ ? ‘EĂƐŚƐĞƚŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŽĨŝŶĚĂŶ
ĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐŽƌƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐŚĞĞƌƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶǁĂƌ ? ?441  What he 
found, and what he painted was combat without the combatants.  Set against a brilliant 
blue summer sky, he painted instead gently spiralling vapour trails which mirrored the 
winding River Thames below.   ‘/ƚŝƐĐŚŝĞĨůǇƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞĂŶĂƌƚŝƐƚŚĂƐ
managed to extract real pictorial drama out of the tortuous white that make a kind of living 
graph of a battle in the uppeƌĂŝƌ ? ?442  General interest, a certain fascination even, in those 
vapour trails, contrails, had been a feature of the summer of 1940.
443
  Nash even painted his 
interpretation from a Ministry of Information supplied photograph.
444
  Fascination with the 
vapour trails had focused on their aesthetic quality, their beauty, and what Nash had 
painted was undoubtedly beautiful.  It was a point seized upon in the enthusiastic press 
reviews of the work at its unveiling.  Jan Gordon in the Observer became quite lyrical over 
ƚŚĞǁĂǇ ‘ƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚĞƌƚƌĂŝůƐĂƌĂďĞƐƋƵĞŽŶďůƵĞƐŬǇĂŶĚŽĐŚƌĞŽƵƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉůŝƚďǇĂƐŝŶƵŽƵƐ
ƌŝǀĞƌ ? ?445   
It was, however, a beautiful image of deadly combat, a paradox.  It was one Nash himself 
ǁĂƐƉĞƌĨĞĐƚůǇĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ ? ‘ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚĞƌƌŝĨǇŝŶŐůǇŐĂǇĂŶĚ decorative war and 
especially war in the air, can look, I would like to give a feeling of dreadful fantasy, 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƵĂǀĞďƵƚĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐ ?/ƚ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ?446 It was difficult and it left Nash a little 
ƉĞƌƉůĞǆĞĚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐǀĞǆĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ, particularly by those critics like Jan 
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patterns of exhaust trails to express the progress of the contest I meant to appeal to the 
only visible evidence of commonsense ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚĞĚ ? ?447  Kenneth Clark, chairman 
ŽĨƚŚĞtĂƌƌƚŝƐƚƐ ?ĚǀŝƐŽƌǇĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?t ) ? ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĨŽŽůĞĚďǇƐƵĐŚƐƉĞĐŝĂůƉůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ? ‘zŽƵŚĂǀĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚĂŶĞǁĨŽƌŵŽĨĂůůĞŐŽƌŝĐĂůƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐ ?/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƉĂŝŶƚ
great events without allegory...and you have discovered a way of making the symbols out of 
ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?448  Whether symbol or common sense, suave or fantastic, its 
ĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽŶůǇƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚEĂƐŚŚĂĚƉĂŝŶƚĞĚǁĂƐ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ?
view from the grouŶĚ ? ‘ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐƚĂĐůĞŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌďŽǇƐ ?ĚƵĞůůŝŶŐ ? ?449     
 
 
Figure 17.  Paul Nash Battle of Britain, 1941.  
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Calder is correct in his analysis; the view from the cockpit and the view from the ground are 
ƚǁŽŝŶĚĞůŝďůĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ďƵƚǁŚĂƚŚĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ
to do with the Spitfire in performance post-war?  The answer lies in the way that the Spitfire 
in performance was able to effect change to the World War II myth while satisfying 
audience expectations.   Audiences were accustomed to seeing the Spitfire in action and this 
was how they would still see the Spitfire post-war.  What was different of course was that in 
wartime the Spitfire in action was fighting, whereas post-war it was performing when any 
 ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐĨƌĂŵĞĚ ?ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ?ŽƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚŝƐĂƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?450     
By performance, we do not mean the artifice of a theatrical production, but instead a 
cultural production as John MacAůŽŽŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ P ‘ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ
didactic or persuasive formulations, and more than cathartic indulgences.  They are 
occasions in which as a culture or society we reflect upon and define ourselves, dramatize 
our collective myths and histoƌŝĞƐ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐǁŝƚŚĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?451  It is important to 
note the double purpose here, the looking forward as well as looking back.  It is what 
Richard Bauman makes clear in his definition of performance as a cultural production as 
rendered by Henry Bial ? ‘ůůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨĚŽƵďůĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
to which the actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, 
ĂŶŝĚĞĂů ?ŽƌĂƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?452  /ĨǁĞĂƉƉůǇĂƵŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚion 
to a present day Spitfire flypast, what we see is not a re-enactment of the past, a theatrical 
production, but a re-examination of the past from a contemporary perspective.  This is the 
 ‘consciousness of doubleness ? ?the past in the present ǁŚĞŶǁĞ ‘reflect upon and define 
ourselves ?.453    
A cultural production is not the same thing as a theatrical production but there are elements 
in common.  The most important is a sense of drama.  A cultural production has emotional 
as well as intellectual content.  Returning to our Spitfire flypast, this emotional content was 
very familiar to a man who has organised more Spitfire flypasts than most, David Ogilvy, one 
of the pioneers of historic air displays in Britain.  He planned for ŝƚ ? ‘dŚĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌŵƵƐƚ
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know ǁŚĞŶƚŽƐŚƵƚƵƉĂŶĚůĞƚƚŚĞĐƌŽǁĚĞŶũŽǇƚŚĞƐŽƵŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?454  What Ogilvy 
meant by enjoy, was for the audience to experience a moment of emotional release.  Such a 
moment has been seen many times by ƚŚĞƵŬĞŽĨĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĨĞǁƐŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚ 
sounds that evoke a more emotional response than a display or flypast by the iconic aircraft 
of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight.  They tug at the heart strings, bringing many to 
ƚĞĂƌƐ ? ?455   
What is happening here?  The answer is that when the commentator falls silent, the crowd 
enters a privileged space, a  ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚƐŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉůĂŶĞĨƌŽŵ “ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?456  The hushed crowd is inculcated perhaps even tearfully overcome by an 
 ‘ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƐŽŵĞ “ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĚŝƐƚĂŶƚor corrupted by myths or 
ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?457  Richard Schechner describes this awareness ĂƐ ‘ƌĞƐƚŽƌĞĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ?458  
Restore is an appropriate word in this context for although it means bring back, or return, it 
also means refurbish, renovate.  What is actually happening in the moment of a Spitfire 
flypast, is both ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ?ƉĂƐƚappears in the shape of the Spitfire but it is 
contextualised in the present.  Subject to an emotional charge, the myth of the Battle of 
Britain changes form.   
It does, however, require a Spitfire to fly over.  It was Walter Benjamin who drew attention 
ƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ? ? ‘dŚĞĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐŝƚǇŽĨĂƚŚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂůů
that is transmissible from its beginning...its testimony to the history it has experienced.  
Since the historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is jeopardized by 
reproduction...What is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ? ?459  Squadron Leader ůWŝŶŶĞƌŝŶŚŝƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ:ĞƌƌŽĚŽƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
2007 history of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight (BBMF) wrote of  ‘a living, breathing, 
flying museum of priceless pieces of national heritage ?.460  What Pinner was referring to was 
ƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ?.  Every Spitfire flying today in a British air show, and not just 
those of the BBMF, will almost certainly be a restored original, manufactured between 1936 
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  Let us retƵƌŶƚŽĂƵŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ P ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered 
ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĂƚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?462  ,ŽǁŵƵĐŚĐůĞĂƌĞƌŝƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
the Spitfire flypast in our example, is carried out by an original not a reproduction, an 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ??    
The survival of some fifty airworthy original Spitfires worldwide today is undoubtedly a 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨ
Britain.  For at least thirty years after the war only the RAF and its working partners, 
principally Rolls-Royce, had the resources to maintain airworthy Spitfires.
463
  The fact that 
the RAF did, though, turns out, on closer inspection, to be something of a surprise.  In fact 
for aůŵŽƐƚƚǁĞŶƚǇǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌƐƵĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ
even go so far as to say disenchantment, with the events of 1940 that it almost gave up on 
its flying heritage.  It took a long time for the Air Council to fully appreciate the value of its 
stock of airworthy Second World War aircraft in performance.  As this chapter will now 
demonstrate, it was more luck than judgement that kept the Spitfire flying in the hands of 
the RAF before the BBMF was finally established in 1969.              
               
The Greatest Day 
/ƚǁĂƐŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĞĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-operational flying career were first 
sown.  Sir Richard Peck had begun his career in the Royal Flying Corps in 1916 and had 
secured one of the few permanent commissions available after the First World War as 
manpower was slashed to the bone.  A successful career was capped with promotion to Air 
Marshall in July 1941.  His wartime service was spent as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff 
(General).  Assistant Chiefs were specialist advisers and the lieutenants of the Vice Chief of 
the Air Staff who administered the RAF and the Chief of Air Staff who directed its military 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?WĞĐŬŝŶĨĂĐƚŚĂĚĂƋƵŝƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌŽůĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?,ĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĂŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐ ‘ŝƌ
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RAF public relations.  That was why, in June 1942, he was writing to R. H. Melville, Private 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĨŽƌŝƌ ?^ŝƌƌĐŚŝďĂůĚ^ŝŶĐůĂŝƌ ? ‘I think it is important that 
this year, and in the future, we should commemorate on September 15
th
, our victory, and 
our deliveries, in the Battle of Britain. ? 464 
The previous year, the first anniversary of the Battle of Britain, the RAF had done nothing.  
Worse, the RAF had been embarrassed by the Archbishop of Canterbury.  National Day of 
Prayer events had taken place on 7 September 1941, just as they had the year before, but 
these events were not specifically related to the RAF or to the Battle of Britain.  Two weeks 
later, however, on Sunday 21 September, the Archbishop did lead prayers specifically for 
deliverance in the Battle of Britain and instructed that church collections up and down the 
country that Sunday should be donated to the RAF Benevolent Fund.
465
  Returning to the 
summer of 1942 therefore and Peck, as head of public relations, was all for an RAF show of 
commemoration but what sort of show that was the question.    
First ideas I have are:-a church parade of the A.T.C. on the Sunday nearest to the 
chosen date; and an article summarising the Battle of Britain and any new points we 
can dig out on it as a hand out; a broadcast; some little reminder note on the news 
reels; a Thanksgiving Service, and a Special prayers at all our own RAF Services, on 
the nearest Sunday; a colour hoisting parade on the 15
th
 at all units.
466
 
The choice of commemorative date, 15 September, was not his.  In fact it had not been 
made by anyone in the RAF at all.  If anyone had a strong claim it was Hilary Aiden St George 
Saunders.  Saunders was a writer of popular detective fiction before the war and after the 
war he would co-author, with Denis Richards, the official history of the RAF.  It is his work 
during the war that is of interest here, however.  For the sum of £50, the ŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
Historical Branch had commissioned him in the late summer of 1940 to write a short 
popular account of the Battle of Britain.  It was never intended for the university library.
467
  
Published the following year in March 1941 under the title The Battle of Britain: An Air 
                                                     
464
 TNA, AIR 20/4200, R. Peck to R. Melville, 11 July 1942. 
465




 See Campion, The Good Fight, pp. 280-288. 
Page 140 
 




 October 1940, Saunders had singled 
out 15 September as a day for special attention.  He did so, though, purely as a narrative 
device, concentrating on a particular day to help explain the ebb and flow of combat.  He 
even said so in the text.
468
  Yet his caveats were lost in the noise generated by the 
ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨŚŝƐůŝƚƚůĞ,D^KƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚ ?/ƚǁĂƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ'ĂƌƌǇĂŵƉŝŽŶ ? ‘Ă
ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂŵĂƐƚĞƌƐƚƌŽŬĞ ? ?469  Measured in terms of sales, then so it was.  Exact figures are 
elusive, even to the nearest million such was the phenomenon, but on its first day of 
publication it sold over 300,000 copies.  Saunders, unfortunately for him, was not on 
royalties.  He had, however, taken his £50 commission seriously.  He had been given access 
to Air Ministry files and took full advantage.  But such academic rigour rarely translates into 
ĂƌƵŶĂǁĂǇďĞƐƚƐĞůůĞƌ ?ŶŽƌĚŽĞƐŝƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶZŝĐŚĂƌĚKǀĞƌǇ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƐƐŚŽƌƚ
pamphlet has shaped the myth of the Battle of Britain ever since.
470
   
Beginning with the extraordinary sales, they were down to a combination of good writing 
and good timing.  In March 1941, with the Blitz already months old, a good news story was 
very welcome.  Overy ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽĨĂůĂƐƚŝŶŐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŚĂƐŵƵĐŚďƵƚŶŽƚ
everything to do with the fact that Saunders was in that privileged position of being first 
ŝŶƚŽƉƌŝŶƚ ?ŽĨƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?,ŝƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶ ‘ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ? ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶt.  
It had credibility from the outset.  It received more from the pen of Churchill himself.  
ŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶŚŝƐFinest Hour volume was greatly influenced 
ďǇ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƐƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĂǀŝĚZĞǇŶŽůĚƐ ?471  But why has it not been supplanted 
by the work of later historians?  The reason can only be that with the help of his primary 
researcher Albert Goodwin, and the access he was granted to Air Ministry files, he was able 
to get most things right.  It was fifty pounds well ƐƉĞŶƚďǇƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
Branch. 
Saunders nevertheless made a number of editorial decisions which would probably not have 
been taken today.  For instance, in his account of the Battle of Britain he decided, quite 
arbitrarily, that it had had taken place between 8 August and 31 October.  In Stephen 
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ƵŶŐĂǇ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ŚĞŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚŚĂůĨǁĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚŝƐĞŶƚŝƌĞŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞďĞĨŽƌĞŚĞƌĞĂĐŚĞƐ ?
August.
472
  Bungay, unlike Saunders, includes the air fighting over the channel in July and 
early August in his history of the Battle of Britain.   There was also the matter of 15 
September.            
The battle took place too recently for a full account to be written...almost three 
months of continuous air fighting.  The better to comprehend its nature it is 
necesƐĂƌǇƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞŝŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƚĂŝůĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĚĂǇ ?ƐĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ?^ƵŶĚĂǇ ? ? ?th 
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌŝƐĂƐŐŽŽĚĂĚĂǇĂƐĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ ?/ƚǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĚĂǇƐ ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ
come to be called and the actions then fought were described by the Prime Minister 
in the HŽƵƐĞŽĨŽŵŵŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚĂŶĚĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůŽĨĂŶǇĨŽƵŐŚƚƵƉŽŶĂ
ůĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞƵƉƚŽƚŚĂƚĚĂƚĞďǇƚŚĞĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞZŽǇĂůŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞ ? ?dŚĞĞŶĞŵǇůŽƐƚ
one hundred and eighty-five aircraft.
473
          
 ‘ƐŐŽŽĚĂĚĂǇĂƐĂŶǇ ?^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐǁƌŽƚĞĂƐĂĐĂǀĞĂƚďƵƚŝƚǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘dŚĞ
'ƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĂǇ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŶŽƚƚŚĞĐĂǀĞĂƚ ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ
reason why the Archbishop had led prayers of deliverance on 21 September 1941, the 
nearest convenient Sunday, and why Sir Richard Peck was so exercised by that date in 1942.  
tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐǁĂƐ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƐŽǁŶŽƌŚŝƐĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐǁĞǁŝůůƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶĞǀĞƌŬŶŽǁ ?dŚĞ
Air Ministry files tell us nothing useful about the commissioning of the pamphlet.  In any 
case, as we can see from the quotation above, Saunders is being a little duplicitous because 
ŚĞŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽŵĂŬĞĂĐĂƐĞĨŽƌ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌďĞŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĂǇ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ĂƐ
ŐŽŽĚĂĚĂǇĂƐĂŶǇ ? ?  
He does so with false information.  The best modern estimate for Luftwaffe losses that day 
are fifty six aircraft lost, not one hundred and eighty-five.
474
  Saunders, however, was 
probably playing a little fast and loose with the facts, all the better no doubt to suit his tale.  
He was no fool.  Claims of enemy losses were controversial at the Air Ministry, and in 
particular that figure for that day of one hundred and eight-five.
475
  But Saunders had other 
reasons to highlight this particular day besides the score.  His choice did have the 
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imprimatur of the prime minister.  Churchill had indeed stood up in the House of Commons 
ŽŶdƵĞƐĚĂǇ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌƚŽƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵ ‘^ƵŶĚĂǇ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚĂŶĚĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůŽĨ
ĂŶǇĨŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?476  Whether it was or not, Churchill had witnessed it first-hand.  Having looked 
out of his Sunday morning window and seen perfect flying weather, he had decided to visit 
the underground operations room at RAF Uxbridge.  He was watching on as the scale of the 
battle that Sunday grew inexorably.  He saw and later reported Air-Vice Marshall Keith Park 
commit the last of his reserves to the fight.  Ever the journalist, Churchill recognised a good 
story.  Ever the politician, he put himself right at the heart of it when he stood up in the 
House of Commons.  According to Richard Toye, Churchill was juggling in his speeches at this 
time the demands of different audiences both at home and abroad, but all would have 
appreciated this good news.
477
    
Saunders also knew where to turn for a compelling phrase.  In an address to the nation on 
 ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ŚƵƌĐŚŝůůŚĂĚƐĂŝĚ ‘ƚŚŝƐŚĂƐ been a great week for the Royal Air Force, and for 
Fighter Command.  They have shot down more than five to one of the German aircraft 
ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞƚƌŝĞĚƚŽŵŽůĞƐƚŽƵƌĐŽŶǀŽǇƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŶĞů ? ?478  It is not hard to imagine 
^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŬĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚǁĞĞŬ ?ĂŶĚƚǇƉĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĚĂǇ ? ?tŚĂƚŝƚǁ ƐƚǇƉŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǁŝŶƚĞƌŽĨ
1940 and into 1941 may well have defined the story of the Battle of Britain for future 
generations, but modern scholars do take him to task for concentrating on this particular 
date.  Stephen Bungay is bordering on the defiant ǁŚĞŶŚĞĨŝŶĂůůǇƌĞĂĐŚĞƐ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚ
ĚĂǇŝŶŚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞ ? ‘ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌǁĂƐƚŚĞĚĂǇǁŚĞŶƐŽŵĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚĂůů ?ŽĨ
the people who mattered realised what had been going on, and acted accordingly.  This 
began a slow process of enlightenment.  It is for that reason it has become known as Battle 
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂǇ ? ?479  EŽŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚ ?ďƵƚĞǀĞŶ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐŚĂĚŶĞǀĞƌŵĞĂŶƚŚŝƐĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶ
quite so literally. 
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Sir Richard Peck, ŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ did just that, though, in his note to R. H. 
Melville, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair.
480
  Why did 
ŚĞ ?ŵĂŶŝŶWĞĐŬ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶprobably knew better.  Perhaps he was simply doing his job.  
Saunders had written a bestseller after all.  The Archbishop had also already sanctified what 
Saunders had written.  It was a golden opportunity any public relations man worth his salt 
would have relished.  The problem Peck faced, however, was that what was obvious to him 
was less obvious to those whose approval he now needed.  Peck took his proposal directly 
to the Office of the Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair.  If Sinclair approved then clearly 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌŚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ďƵƚ^ŝŶĐůĂŝƌ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂůŽŶĞǁĂs 
not enough.  What Peck needed was the support of the Air Council.  The Air Council was the 
Z& ?ƐŵĂŝŶďŽĂƌĚ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŝƚƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ
approval depended upon its three senior members, Sinclair as Air Minister, Sir Charles Portal 
as Chief of Air Staff and Sir Wilfrid Freeman as Vice-Chief of Air Staff.  These three men, the 
political, operational, and administrative heads of the RAF each held an unofficial but 
effective veto on any Air Council decision.  It was Sir Wilfrid Freeman who voiced his 
displeasure.    
The historical precedents for self-congratulatory celebrations in the middle of a war 
are not very happy.  Belshazzar held a banquet whilst the enemy were outside his 
gates; he lost his throne the same night. 
I do not suggest that any such consequences would necessarily follow from a church 
ƉĂƌĂĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ?d ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞďĞŚŝŶĚ ? ? ?^ ' ) ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĞĞŵƚŽŵĞǀĞƌǇ
questionable.  The so-called Battle of Britain consisted of a series of successful 
defensive operations by Fighter Command.  It is true that the R.A.F. then saved this 
country from defeat, but in my view it is a misuse of words to refer to our victory or 
our deliverance.  Victories are only won by offensive action; and deliverance must be 
permanent to give much cause for junketing.
481
 
dŚĞŬĞǇƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞŚĞƌĞŝƐǁŽƌƚŚƌĞƉĞĂƚŝŶŐ ? ‘dŚĞƐŽ-called Battle of Britain consisted of a 
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚ ? ?Freeman was giving an 
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early airing to an argument wŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚŚĂŵƉĞƌƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞŵŽƌǇŽĨ
the Battle of Britain for the next twenty years.  During the war, at the highest levels of RAF 
command, tensions existed over the credit, and publicity, given to Fighter Command for the 
victory in the Battle of Britain.
482
  A whole generation of RAF officers, now senior 
commanders, had been schooled in the offensive spirit of Lord Trenchard.  Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, objections were raised to the idea of credit being given to the defensive battle 
fought by Fighter Command.
483
  As a result, Fighter Command and more especially Dowding, 
ŚĂĚĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůĂĐŬŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?EŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?Ɛ,D^KƉĂŵƉŚůĞƚ
The Battle of Britain, ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĂŶĐŚ ?ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚŽĞǀĞn 
mention Dowding at all.  It was as if the Battle of Trafalgar had been fought without Nelson.   
&ƌĞĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǀĞƚŽƐƚŽƉƉĞĚWĞĐŬ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŝŶŝƚƐƚƌĂĐŬƐ ?tŚǇĚŝĚWĞĐŬŶŽƚĨŝŐŚƚ&ƌĞĞŵĂŶ ?/ƚ
can only be that he realised it was a fight he could not win.
484
  The 1942 commemoration 
like that of 1941 was a distinctly minor affair as reported in The Times ? ‘Z&ƵŶŝƚƐŽĨĂůů
ŽŵŵĂŶĚƐĂƚŚŽŵĞĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐǇĞƐƚĞƌĚĂǇŚĞůĚƉĂƌĂĚĞƐĂŶĚƐŚŽƌƚĐĞƌĞŵŽŶŝĞƐ ? ?485  What 
was significant, however, was the very fact that any parades and ceremonies were held at 
all.  It was a coded message to the Air Council from the rank and file and one a sharp eared 
correspondent from The Times certainly ŚĞĂƌĚ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
throughout the RAF to observe September 15 each year as Air Trafalgar Day, and members 
ŽĨƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐĂƌĞŚŽƉŝŶŐƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůďĂĐŬŝŶŐ ? ?486  Such spontaneity may 
have been ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ ?ƐďŝŐƐƵŵŵĞƌŚŝƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŝŶĞŵĂƐ ?Lady 
Hamilton.  This patriotic tale of derring-do waƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇŚƵƌĐŚŝůů ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚĞĨŝůŵĚƵƌŝŶŐ
the war.
487
  The provenance of such an association more likely lies in the campaign launched 
ƚŽƌĞƐƚŽƌĞEĞůƐŽŶ ?ƐĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉVictory on Trafalgar Day 1922.  According to Don Leggett, it 
ŵĂĚĞ ‘ƚŚĞVictory an important part of the commemorative landscape in early twentieth-
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  Such an association with the Battle of Trafalgar actually gave the lie to 
&ƌĞĞŵĂŶ ?ƐŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŵŝƐƵƐĞŽĨǁŽƌĚƐƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽŽƵƌǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽƌŽƵƌĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂŶĐĞ ? ?at 
least away from the highest councils within the RAF.  The Battle of Trafalgar represented 
everything Freeman was trying to deny. Its annual celebration on Trafalgar Day was about 
 ‘ĞƋƵĂƚŝŶŐƌŝƚŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƌŵƐǁŝƚŚƚƌŝƵŵƉŚĂŶĚƌŝƚŝƐŚŚĞƌŽĞƐǁŝƚŚŶĂƚŝŽŶal 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ?489  Freeman was out of step with his own command but he was soon gone.       
Only a few weeks after that desultory second commemoration, Freeman retired from the 
RAF to take up a new appointment as chief executive of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.  
&ƌĞĞŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŽŶůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉ ?^ŝƌĞƌƚŝŶĞ^ƵƚƚŽŶũŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŝƌ
Council as Air Member for Personnel.  He was the responsible for RAF recruitment, 
promotions and personnel welfare.  He would have been lax indeed in his new duty if he 
ŚĂĚŶŽƚďĞĞŶǁŝƐĞƚŽĂ ‘ƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞZ& ? ?ůŵŽƐƚŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚ
initiative in his new job, his first request of the Air Council, concerned 15 September.   
We recently had the opportunity to celebrate fittingly to its importance the 
anniversary of the Battle of Britain (15
th
 Sept. 1940 on which the greatest number of 
victories were won); to impress thereby on the public and on Parliament the urge to 
maintain air superiority as its absolute necessary shield in defence and weapon in 
attack; and within the R.A.F. itself to trumpet the inspiration it should give to the 
qualities of determination, discipline and leadership upon which success in battle 




Sir Bertine Sutton had put on record his position and his position would not change.  Events 
now move onto June 1943 and the office of Harold Balfour, Under-Secretary of State for Air.  
Sutton was about to receive a sympathetic ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ?ƐƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽDŽŶƚŐŽŵĞƌǇ ?Ɛ
victory at El Alamein in late 1942 had finally persuaded enough at the Air Ministry that a 
celebration of a victory of their own was required.
491
  The question was what form would it 
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take?  Sutton made his case for a strictly RAF show but it was Sir Arthur William Street, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Air, who made the most telling intervention at the 
meeting.   
P.U.S. suggested that the Civil Defence Services should be brought into the 
celebrations.  The Battle of Britain was fought over our own country...It was a victory 
of the RAF in the air supported by the civil defence forces on the ground, and he 
thought that would be a more inspiring theme than to confine the celebrations to 
those by the RAF alone.
492
 
Two weeks after that meeting in the office of Harold Balfour came the next Air Council 
meeting.  Sutton had to listen as Sir Douglas Evill, the new Vice-Chief of Air Staff, voiced his 
ĚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůĨŽƌĂƉƵƌĞůǇZ&ƐŚŽǁ ? ‘V.C.A.S. suggested that it would be premature at this 
stage of the war to establish a purely Royal Air Force day as would be the case if September 
15
th
 were celebrated as proposed. ?493  The Air Ministry had accepted the necessity for a 
celebration but it was only a grudging acceptance.  Political considerations, and the need to 
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĂƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁĂƌ ?ŚĂĚĐůĞĂƌůǇďĞĞŶǁĞŝŐŚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŽĨ^ŝƌƌƚŚƵƌ
William Street.  Reservations, first voiced by Sir Wilfrid Freeman the previous summer, 
preyed on the minds of those on the Air Council.  Such reservations are caught here in the 
DŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞ^ŝƌŽƵŐůĂƐǀŝůůŚĂĚǀŽŝĐĞĚŚŝƐĚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ? ‘The 
point was made in discussion that too great an emphasis on the part played by Fighter 
Command in the Battle of Britain was to be avoided ? ?494  Once it became clear there was 
going to be a celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Britain in September 1943 every 
effort was made to sideline Dowding.  It was an effort that was to continue after the war.
495
  
HeƌĞŝƐĂŶŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇďƌŝĞĨŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ ? ‘/t was agreed that R.A.F. interest should not be 
confined solely to the fighter aspect but should embrace the part played by other 
commands; notably Bomber Command, Coastal Command and Maintenance Command ? ?496  
What it meant was that in September 1943, the Air Council had already given up sole 
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ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?  ǇƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂ ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ?
were culturally implanted.
497
   
By this joint celebration, in which the Minister of Aircraft Production will co-operate, 
it is intended to commemorate tŚĞĂŝƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?,
the prolonged series of night attacks that followed and the services of all those, 
whether members of the Royal Air Force, the Anti-Aircraft Gunners, The Civil 
Defence Services, the Police, the Royal Observer Corps, the aircraft workers or 
members of the general public, who by their skill, fortitude or devotion to duty 
contributed to the defeat of the whole of the attacks, which were aimed first at the 




Celebrations were muted in 1944 on account of the on-going D-Day operations and the next 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĚĂǇ ?ǁould have to wait until the end of the war.   
On 6 November 1945, the Air Council adopted the recommendations of a special 
committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Peck.  This was the same Sir Richard Peck 
who had seen his proposals vetoed by Sir WŝůĨƌŝĚ&ƌĞĞŵĂŶ ?WĞĐŬ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŚĂĚŐƌŽǁŶ
considerably since his tentative but still unacceptable proposals of June 1942.  What the Air 
Council now confirmed was a cornucopia of separate events collected together under the 
banner of Battle of Britain Week.  Highlights would be Battle of Britain Day observed on the 
 ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĚĂǇ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ?Battle of Britain Sunday in acknowledgement of the 
ƌĐŚďŝƐŚŽƉ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚĂŶZ& ‘ƚ,ŽŵĞ Day ?ďĞŝŶŐthe Saturday immediately 
preceding Battle of Britain Sunday.  It was a programme designed to please all interested 
parties.  This did bring with it a certain lack of focus.  Both the church services on Battle of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ^ƵŶĚĂǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƚ,ŽŵĞĂǇ ?ǁĞƌĞŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞƚŚĞZ&ĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞĂŶĚ
not just Fighter Command.  Nevertheless, Fighter Command and the Battle of Britain were 
given pride of place.  The Air Council had perhaps taken note of the growing political 
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498
 TNA, HO 207/214, Home Security Circular No. 138, 1943. 
Page 148 
 
squeamishness over the results of the strategic air campaign carried out by Bomber 
Command.
499
     
The new programme had its first airing the following year.  Unfortunately, in 1946, 15 
^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌĨĞůůŽŶĂ^ƵŶĚĂǇǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƚWĞĐŬ ?ƐĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶtĞĞŬ ?ǁĂƐƐƋƵĞĞǌĞĚŝŶƚŽ
one soggy weekend.  Nevertheless, it had taken place and it did culminate in an impressive 
service at Westminster Abbey.  But the Spitfire was not yet a feature of the activities, and 
ƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶDĞŵŽƌŝĂů&ůŝŐŚƚǁĂƐƐƚŝůůǇĞĂƌƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?WĞĐŬ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?
his week-long package of events was not yet secure either.  E. Colston Shepherd in the 
Sunday Times ŐĂǀĞĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĂƚĚĂŵƉǁĞĞŬĞŶĚ ?ƐƌŽůůĐĂůůŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƌŝŐŚƚĂƚ
ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨŚŝƐƌĞƉŽƌƚŶŽƚĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐĂŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ‘ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůŝŶĂĐŚĂƉĞůŝŶ
Westminster Abbey to those who fell in the Battle of Britain is now being prepared.  The 
ŬŝŶŐŚĂƐĐŽŶƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽƵŶǀĞŝůŝƚŽŶ:ƵůǇ ? ?ŶĞǆƚǇĞĂƌ ? ?500  What was also being prepared, 
however, was the first great crisis in the history of the commemoration of the Battle of 
Britain.     
Lambeth Palace unlike the Air Council had been quick to recognise the anniversary of the 
Battle of Britain.   Quick too was its progression from parish Sunday service to grand state 
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĚĞĨƚĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚĚĂǇ ?ďǇ>ĂŵďĞƚŚWĂůĂĐĞ ?^uch special 
acts of worship were not new.  As Philip Williamson has pointed out, they helped to 
ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĞŚƵƌĐŚŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐůŝĨĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?501  On only 
ƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ ?ƚŚĞďĞůůƐŽĨ^ƚWĂƵů ?ƐĂƚŚĞĚƌĂůŚĂĚǁƌƵŶŐŽƵt to herald the arrival of 
the King and Queen for its special service of thanks giving.  The following year this new state 
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶŚĂĚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌďďĞǇǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŐƌĞĂƚƚŽǁĞƌƐŽĨ
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐďďĞǇƐŚƌŝŶĞĂƚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ flew yesterday the light blue and roundel 
ensign of the Royal Air Force.  In the Abbey a vast multitude had assembled and outside an 
even greater one to give thanks to God for the victory of the Few in the September days of 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?502  But in the winter of 1946 all was not well at Lambeth Palace.  It had many calls 
upon its purse and it had had enough of passing round the plate on behalf of the RAF 
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Benevolent Fund.  What made Lambeth Palace even more aggrieved was that it could not 
get the co-operation it required to organise the next Battle of Britain Sunday service in the 
Abbey to be held in September 1947.  It thought either its efforts were being taken for 
granted, notwithstanding the fact that it had initiated the service in the first place, or that 
the RAF was losing interest.  The National Archives at Kew holds a number of increasingly 
ĂŐŝƚĂƚĞĚůĞƚƚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵ>ĂŵďĞƚŚWĂůĂĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?^ƵĐŚǁĂƐ>ĂŵďĞƚŚWĂůĂĐĞ ?Ɛ
dissatisfaction with the whole situation, and presumably satisfaction at a job well done, it 
wondered whether it were not time to scrap the whole idea.   
Context is important here; Lambeth Palace had just secured the shift of the principle war 
commemoration from Armistice Day to Remembrance Sunday.  The official announcement 
was made in the House of Commons on 19 June 1946.  Whether this was a cynical political 
move, a land grab, or as Adrian Gregory suggests a laudable desire to simply place the 
commemoration on a sound doctrinal footing, the decision may have coloured negotiations 
now between Lambeth Palace and the Air Ministry.
503
  The link between desire and need 
ǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐ ?>ĂŵďĞƚŚWĂůĂĐĞ ?ƐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛ
commitment were well founded.  &ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐĨĞůƚŽŶĐĞ
more. 
In March 1945 Air Marshall Sir John Slessor had been appointed Air Member for Personnel 
(AMP) with a seat on the Air Council.  Peace had brought with it a shift in the balance of 
power on the Air Council.  Tasked with overseeing demobilisation, AMP was now one of its 
ďŝŐŐĞƐƚũŽďƐĂƐ^ůĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ?ŚĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŵĂŶ ?/Ŷ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
after a short interregnum as Commandant of the Imperial Defence College, he would 
become Chief of Air Staff.   Slessor was no friend of Dowding or Fighter Command.   Max 
,ĂƐƚŝŶŐƐŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚŚĞǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ>ŽƌĚdƌĞŶĐŚĂƌĚĂŶĚŚŝƐ
theories of strategic air power as a war-ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐǁĞĂƉŽŶ ? ?504  Dowding and Slessor were not 
only at opposite ends of the RAF spectrum in terms of their strategic vision, there was little 
empathy between them either.
505
  Slessor now got the agreement of his Chief of Air Staff, 
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Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder to cancel the 1947 commemoration in the Abbey.  The 
trigger for this decision takes us back to the subject of that passing note by E. Colston 
Shepherd in the Sunday Times.  This interdepartmental memo from the Director General of 
Personal Services (DGPS) Air-Vice Marshall John D. Baker to the Director of Personal Services 
(1) (DPS1) Air Commodore A. S. Ellerton explains the who and what of the matter, but 
tactfully leaves out the why.    
I have discussed your proposals in Minute 1 for the commemoration of the Battle of 
Britain this year with AMP.  He decided that we should not hold another service in 
Westminster Abbey on Sunday, 21
st
 September this year as it will follow so closely on 
the Dedication Service of the new memorial chapel to be held on the 10
th
 July... 
AMP would like arrangements made for your alternative suggestion that a brief 
service at the RAF Memorial on the embankment should be held on the afternoon of 
Sunday 21
st




laying ceremony in a London street was hardly the stuff of state occasion.  If this had gone 
ahead, as the parent of RAF Sunday, an already irritated Lambeth Palace would no doubt 
have been affronted.  It may have even called into question the survival of Battle of Britain 
Sunday altogether.  Had Battle of Britain Sunday been lost what damage would that have 
ĚŽŶĞƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶtĞĞŬŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐĞƌĞŵŽŶŝĂůĐĂůĞŶĚĂƌ ?/ŶĂůůƚŚŝƐ
we must bear in mind that the survival of airworthy Spitfires would ultimately come to 
depend upon the survival of that Sunday service.  It was not a cleric or an air marshal who 
spotted the danger but a Labour politician and peer William Watson Henderson, 1
st
 Baron 
Henderson.  He had been elevated to the House of Lords in 1945 by Clement Attlee for 
services rendered to the party with a seat on the Air Council.  Crucially, considering the 
nature of the crisis brewing here, ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐĂŶĚ
publicity department.  He would have been alert to any potential publicity pratfalls.   He 
spotted one now.     
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1. I recognise the strength of the views expressed by CAS and AMP regarding a 
tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌďďĞǇ “ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? service in September so soon after the 
Dedication in July. 
2. Personally I would be most reluctant to see the established commemoration on 
Battle of Britain Day not maintained.  Whatever may be said about V. E. and V. J. 
ĂǇƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘Battle of Britain Day ? has an intimate significance all of its own for the 
people of this country, and more especially for the citizens of London and the South, 
and it does afford them an opportunity of spontaneously paying a tribute of 
gratitude, thankfulness and remembrance to the Service to which we all recognise 
that we owe so much. 
3. It is also the one day of the year which I think should be regarded and preserved as 
exclusively the RAF Day.  Continuity in the form of commemoration is surely, 
therefore, of very great importance.  Even if the change were only for one year, a 
rainy day would seriously affect an open-air service at the RAF Memorial, and in any 
case continuity would be broken. 
4. Moreover, I believe that the RAF itself stands to gain as a service by the public 
rĞŵĞŵďƌĂŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶDay ? as the day on which we commemorate the 
sacrifice, the gallantry and the achievement of the men who thwarted the enemy in 
its design to conquer our homeland.  A national day of remembrance and dedication 
will help to make the spiritual appeal which is so necessary to attracting the right 
ƚǇƉĞŽĨǇŽƵŶŐŵĂŶƚŽŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚůŝne of defence.507 
dǁŽƉŽŝŶƚƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐůĞĂƌďǇ,ĞŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚĂƚƚůĞ
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂǇďĞůŽŶŐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?as a day of remembrance.  This 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĚƌŝĂŶ'ƌĞŐŽƌǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌĐŽŵŵĞŵŽration in the post-war 
years concentrated on the veterans of the armed forces.
 508
  The second point being that it 
was an excellent shop window for the RAF.   These two points would now be held in tension 
until the next great crises came in 1959, a crisis once again occasioned by the myopia of the 
ŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?&ŽƌŶŽǁ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,ĞŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐǁŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?^ůĞƐƐŽƌĚŝĚŶŽƚƉƵƚƵƉ
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a fight and Lambeth Palace was duly mollified.  This crisis was over and it is now time to 




11 August 1943.  It was made by a Mr Mash, a public relations officer at the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production.  He made it in a meeting at the Air Ministry of the newly constituted 
Committee on Battle of Britain Celebrations.   
Mr. Mash suggested that it would demonstrate the quality of our aircraft if some 
aircraft which had actually been produced during the Battle of Britain period could 
fly over the parade.  After discussion it was agreed that any ceremonial flying was 
undesirable.  Group Captain Ardley stated that air cover would as a matter of course 
be provided for the parade.
509
 
Undesirable it may have been in 1943 but the idea had been registered.  In 1944 
celebrations were muted on account of the D-Day landings but in September 1945, with the 
ǁĂƌŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁĂƐƌŝƉĞƚŽƌĞǀŝƐŝƚDƌDĂƐŚ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŐĞƚƚŚĞ
credit. 
The first Battle of Britain Fly-Past took place on 15 Sept. 1945, following a suggestion 
by the then AMP that such a demonstration might be appropriate in conjunction 
with the celebration of Battle of Britain Sunday, which was that year observed on 
16
th
 September.  It was felt that this would meet a popular demand for a public 
manifestation by the Royal Air Force and that, at least as far as Fighter Command 
was concerned, the training involved would fit in with normal operational training.  
The idea was favoured by members of the Air Council, and subsequently approved 
by the Prime Minister.
510
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This report was actually written in 1951 by Sir Arthur Sanders as part of a paper for the Air 
Council reviewing flypast policy.  Unfortunately, the record of the decision making process 
ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇĨŝƌƐƚĨůǇƉĂƐƚŝƐƚŚŝŶ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂŬĞƌ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĚŽĞƐŽĨĨĞƌƐŽŵĞƵƐĞĨƵů
insights.  The then AMP was none other than a newly appointed Sir John Slessor, who as we 
ŚĂǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐĞĞŶǁĂƐŶŽĨƌŝĞŶĚƚŽŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵand.  Sir John Baker gives the 
ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ^ůĞƐƐŽƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂƐĨŽƌĂƐƚƌŝĐƚůǇŽŶĞŽĨĨĞǀĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŚŝŶƚŽĨ
continuance.  It was as if Slessor was attempting a commemorative full stop.  It was a 
ƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ ? ‘dŚƌĞĞŚƵŶĚƌĞĚƉůĂŶĞƐƚŚƵŶĚĞƌĞĚŽǀĞƌ>ŽŶĚŽŶǇĞƐƚĞƌĚĂǇŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ “ĨůǇ-ƉĂƐƚ ?to 
commemorate the Battle of Britain.  As they swooped over Trafalgar Square they were 
watched by 10,000 people...In perfect formation the squadrons were led by Group-Captain 
Douglas Bader, the legless pilot who ǁĂƐƐŚŽƚĚŽǁŶĂŶĚƚĂŬĞŶƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?511  
There would be no full stop, but such a spectacle, and such a success, did not register with 
the Air Council, not yet. 
 
 
Figure 18. Douglas Bader  
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The next great military jamboree was the Victory Day Celebration planned for 8 June 1946.  
d ?E ?DĐǀŽǇ ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨ^ƚĂĨĨƵƚŝĞƐ ?^ )ǁĂƐĂĐƚŝŶŐĂƐƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐůŝĂŝƐŽŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?
Here is McEvoy keeping his political master William Wedgewood Benn, 1
st
 Viscount 
Stansgate, Secretary of State for Air informed about preparations but also trying to manage 
ŚŝƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŬŶŽǁŝŶŐĨƵůůǁĞůůƚŚĞŵŝŶĚŽĨŚŝƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵĂƐƚĞƌƐ ? 
I understand from the Home Office representative on the Victory Celebrations 
Lighting Display Working Party (on which I represent the Air Ministry) that the 
Ministers are expecting a far more spectacular contribution from the Royal Air Force 
than will be practicable.  Flares, illuminated aircraft and formation flying have been 
suggested. 
A flypast by day has been spoken of, but Bomber Command could not spare the time 
to train for this, and the Air Staff considers that a flypast limited to Fighter Command 




Very soon it did become desirable.  Here is Sir Albert Durston DCAS to Sir Douglas Evill VCAS. 
zŽƵǁŝůůŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶĨƌŽŵǇŽƵƌĐŽƉǇŽĨ ?^ ? ?ƐŵŝŶƵƚĞŶŽǁŽŶƚŚŝƐĨŽůĚĞƌĂƚĞŶĐůŽƐƵƌĞ
2A that the staff endeavoured to discourage any idea of Royal Air Force flying 
participation in the Victory celebrations on 8
th
 June next.  Nevertheless the Prime 
Minister subsequently (Hansard 18
th
 Feb. 1946 page 787) stated in connection with 
ƚŚĞĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ ‘TŚĞZ ? ?& ?ǁŝůůƐƚĂŐĞĂĨůǇƉĂƐƚ ?.  I can find no trace in the files, 
or the minutes of the main ViĐƚŽƌǇĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞŝƌ^ƚĂĨĨ ?Ɛ
opinion came to be overruled.
513
 
But there was no gainsaying the Prime Minister not even by CAS.     
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽĨĂ ‘ĨůǇWĂƐƚ ? on June 8th has been given in the House we must, 
presumably, do our best to implement it.  You will be aware however from Min. 6 
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As it turned out it was fully appreciated; the Victory Day flypast was another tremendous 
sucĐĞƐƐ ? ‘EŽƌǁĂƐĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚůĂĐŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚŝƐŐƌĞĂƚĚĂǇ ?ĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
somewhat late, had passed a lone Hurricane, symbolising the Battle of Britain, led in three 
Sunderland flying-boats...first of a fly-ƉĂƐƚŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ? ? ?ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐ ? ?515  That lone 
Hurricane is important to our story but not just yet.  First the Air Council had to be 
reconciled with the idea of the efficacy of a flypast, any type of flypast.     
dŚĞŝƌ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ƐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞsŝĐƚŽƌǇĂǇĨůǇƉĂƐƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŽŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŐƌŽunds, the 
problem of staffing, of training, even of available aircraft.
 516
  There were no perceived 
benefits to outweigh the inconvenience.  But perceptions were about to change.  It was 
time to weigh the benefits.  In November 1948 the newly installed VCAS, Sir Arthur Sanders, 
ƐĞŶƚĂŶŽƚĞƚŽ^ůĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌĂƐDW^ŝƌ,ƵŐŚ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ? 
We spoke the other day about devising some form of R.A.F ceremonial to mark 
occasions of national importance, particularly those connected with the Royal 
Family.  Colour hoisting parades at R.A.F. Stations are all right from an internal and 
domestic point of view, but they do practically nothing to indicate to the general 
public that our service is taking its proper share in such celebrations, as do the firing 
of a salute in Hyde Park by the Royal Troop, R.H.A and the firing of salutes and 
dressing with flags by H.M. Ships. The action most appropriate to our Service would, 
of course, be formation flights, preferably over London.
517
 
Sanders, though was loathe to follow his own advice.  It was the vagaries of the British 
weather which appeared to him an insurmountable problem.  Instead, he suggested rather 
lamely, a salute by the Bofors guns of the RAF Regiment Light A.A. Squadron.  Sir Hugh 
Saunders as AMP was not impressed by this suggestion and took it upon himself to go 
ďĞŚŝŶĚŚŝƐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ?ƐďĂĐŬ ?^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐŶŽǁǁƌŽƚĞƚŽĂůůƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ?&ŝŐŚƚĞƌ ?
Bomber, Coastal, Flying Training, Maintenance, Technical Training, Transport and Reserve.  
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It was what he wrote, or rather the manner in which it was couched that was clever.  
Saunders knew the answer he required. 
1. I am directed to state that consideration is being given to devising a form of 
R.A.F. ceremonial appropriate to occasions of national importance... 
2. It has been suggested that the action most appropriate to the R.A.F. would be 
formation flights over London.  An objection to this form of ceremonial is the 
uncertainty of the climate, but against this it is thought that, even if the aircraft 
could not be seen, they could be heard and the public would thus be made 
aware that the R.A.F. was taking part in the celebrations. 
3. A substitute for formation flights might be the firing of an appropriate salute by 
the Bofors guns of an R.A.F. Regiment Light A.A. Squadron.  Such a ceremony, 
however, could only be an imitation of Army practice without the dignity of 
tradition, and there would be little to identify the ceremony with the primary 
function of the R.A.F.
518
                
In his note to the commands, Saunders had forgot to mention the seniority of the objector 
and so no-one in any of the commands felt themselves brave enough to disagree with what 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂǀĞů ?^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ
behind him, now took his case to the Air Council.  It was persuaded, but it was not yet 
ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?/Ĩ^ĂƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?ŚĂĚƉƵůůĞĚŽĨĨĂĐŽƵƉƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝůŶŽǁƉůĂǇĞĚĂ
masterstroke.  To establish the flypast, ĂŶǇĨůǇƉĂƐƚ ?ĂƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨ ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐŝƚƐƉƌŽƉĞƌ share in 
ƐƵĐŚŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ?ƐĂŶĞǁŝŶǀĞƚŝŽŶŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇůĂĐŬƚŚĞŐƌĂǀŝƚĂƐ
of an established tradition, the salute in Hyde Park by the Royal Troop for instance, or the 
dressing of flags on H. M. ships.
 519
  The Air Council therefore decided what was required 
was the imprimatur of royalty.  Only a direct royal connection would lend the flypast the 
solemnity to successfully compete with army and navy ceremonial.  The Air Council wanted 
the general public as well as its rival services to understand that the flypast, any flypast, had 
the dignity of royal association.   
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The problem was how to sell the idea to the palace; a royal occasion was one thing, but 
what about all other occasions?  Here is part of the memorandum the Air Council sent for 
ƚŚĞ<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛapproval and signature.            
Most humbly submitted to your MĂũĞƐƚǇďǇǇŽƵƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?ƐŵŽƐƚhumble and most 
devoted servant that your Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve the 
introduction of Royal Air Force Ceremonial in the manner and on the occasions 
shown in the attached memorandum. 
The Air Council recently considered the form in which the Royal Air Force should 
mark occasions of National importance, particularly those connected with the Royal 
Family. 
After careful consideration the Council have come to the conclusion that a 
ceremonial Fly-Past is the only form of celebration which is appropriate to the Royal 
Air Force and are of the opinion that the following occasions of national importance 
are suitable for recognition by a ceremonial Fly-Past:- 
1. The actual date of the accession, coronation and wedding of the Sovereign 
2. The day announced in the London Gazette as the official anniversary of the 
^ŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƐďŝƌƚŚ 
3. The wedding of the children of the Sovereign 
4. The birth of a Royal Prince or Princess.
520
 
These four examples of national importance were of course all royal occasions.  The King 
ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶůĞĚƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞ ‘ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŶational importance ?ŵĞĂŶƚŽŶůǇƌŽǇĂů
occasions.  It was presumably what he was supposed to think.  The Air Council was trying 
very hard not to imply royal favour at the expense of the other two services.  In an earlier 
draft of this memorandum the list of four examples is in fact a more revealing list of six.  
Example number five on that draft list was Battle of Britain Day, certainly not a royal 
occasion, but it was number six which the Air Council probably feared may have caused the 
ƌŽǇĂůƉĞŶƚŽŚĞƐŝƚĂƚĞ ?/ƚƐĂŝĚƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ŽŶƐƵĐŚŽƚŚĞƌŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐĂƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌ
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ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?521  These last two were blƵĞƉĞŶĐŝůůĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ? ‘KŵŝƚĨƌŽŵ
ƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶďƵƚďĞĐĂƌĞĨƵůƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞŝŶĂŶǇŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇKƌĚĞƌďǇƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ? ?522  It was 
devious, the King did sign, and a list of six not four appeared in the Air Ministry Order 
 ‘Introduction of Ceremonial Fly-pasts by the Royal Air Force to Mark occasions of National 
Importance ? dated September 3 1950.  Royal association for any flypast had been 
confirmed.   
&ůǇƉĂƐƚƐǁĞƌĞŶŽǁƚŽďĞƉĂƌƚĂŶĚƉĂƌĐĞůŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐĞƌĞŵŽŶŝĂůƌĞƉĞƌƚŽŝƌĞďƵƚŚŽǁĚŝĚ
they impact upon Battle of Britain Week?  Are we getting any closer to the saving of the 
airworthy Spitfire?  In November 1951, Sir Arthur Sanders, now DCAS, having moved from 
his positions of VCAS, was invited to submit to the Air Council a paper summarising the 
arguments for and against mounting a fly past over London during Battle of Britain Week.  
We might remember that back in 1948, Sanders had been a naysayer, worried specifically 
about the weather.  It had taken the intrigues of Sir Hugh Saunders to bypass him.  But now 
three years on and he was a firm advocate.   
The fly-past, as a single event in the many activities in Battle of Britain Week, has 
from the outset produced a very considerable amount of beneficial publicity in 
various forms; in fact interest in the fly-past, as reflected in press notices, has 
increased over the years since 1945...There is no doubt that the Press has come to 
regard it as the main feature of the Week  W it has frequently been referred to as the 
 ‘ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐůŝŵĂǆ ? of Battle of Britain Week.  There has been no 
diminution of the volume of Press publicity during the past two years, in spite of the 
two successive complete cancellations.
523
        
Bad weather had forced the cancellations of the anniversary flypast in 1950 and again 1951 
but it did not dampen the enthusiasm of Sanders now.      
It seems certain that to discontinue the fly-past in Battle of Britain Week would 
result in a considerable loss of prestige and publicity, which has been greatly 
enhanced by the association of the fly-past with Battle of Britain activities during the 
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past seven yĞĂƌƐ ?ĂŶĚďǇƐƵĐŚŝĚĞĂƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŶĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ? leading the formations of 
the modern types.  It has been contended that the publicity for Battle of Britain 
Week as a whole would suffer considerably by the elimination of the fly-past.  This 
might well lead, in time, to a dimming of the present lively public interest in the 
annual commemoration, which has by now become, not only a valuable source of 
publicity, but a recognisable tradition of the Royal Air Force.   
It mĂǇďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƐƚŚĞZ ? ?& ? ?s sphere of activities is in the air it would be 
considered strange if the R.A.F. did not show itself in the air by way of a fly-past 
during Battle of Britain Week  W the one week in the year when the R.A.F. is 





Figure 19.  Battle of Britain Display Rehearsal August 1950 
 





What was not considered strange, not yet, was the complete absence of the Spitfire in the 
fly-pasts that accompanied Battle of Britain Week.  In the first Battle of Britain flypast, 
authorised by Sir John Slessor in 1945, Douglas Bader led in a Spitfire which was not his 
usual mount and his fellow aces had accompanied him in Spitfires too.  This may simply 
have been a matter of availability, a lack of airworthy Hurricanes.  Eight months later, for 
the sŝĐƚŽƌǇĂǇĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŝŶŐƐŚĂĚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?dŚĞĨůǇƉĂƐƚǁĂƐůĞĚ ‘ďǇƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ
ǁĂƌƌŝŽƌŽĨƚŚĞĂŝƌ ?ŝŶŚŝƐĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ? ?525  Who suggested this change is 
unclear.  The Air Ministry files are full of signed objections to participation in the Victory Day 
flypast but give no hint as to the provenance of the idea of using a single Hurricane to lead.   
tŚŽĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŝĚĞĂŝƚǁĂƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂŐŽŽĚŽŶĞ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽ ‘ůŽŶĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?
Battle of Britain flypast but there it was again in 194 ? ? ‘dŚĞůŽŶĞůŝŶĞƐƐŽĨĂƐŝŶŐůĞ,ĂǁŬĞƌ
,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞŽĨ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐƐƵŶŶǇĂĨƚĞƌŶŽŶƐŬǇǇĞƐƚĞƌĚĂǇǁĂƐƐǇŵďŽůŝĐŽĨ
ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŶĞĞĚĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?526   By 1949, it had become tradition.  
 ‘KƵƚŽĨƚŚĞŵƵƌŬŽĨƚŚĞƐŬǇƚŽƚŚĞeast yesterday afternoon a speck resolved itself into that 
solitary Hurricane fighter which always leads the flight of the stately squadrons of military 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞƐŽƵƚŚŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚŽŶĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂǇ ? ?527  Owing to bad weather there 
were no flypasts in 1950 and 1951 but in 1952, this new tradition seemed set to run and 
ƌƵŶ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞůĂǇƚŚĞĂƉƚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĂƐƵƐƵĂů ?ĨůĞǁĨƌŽŵĂŶƵŶŶĂŵĞĚ
ĂĞƌŽĚƌŽŵĞǁŝƚŚĂŶƵŶŶĂŵĞĚĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶƉŝůŽƚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ? ?528   
Sometimes, something that turns out to be culturally significant occurs as a result of a single 
casual decision.   
I think it is timĞǁĞƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂ ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ ‘,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ? in the lead for a 
change.  Both are ŶŽǁŽďƐŽůĞƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? was even more the traditional 
battle-winner of the period.
529
 
Air Chief Marshal Sir John Baker was a friend of the Spitfire.  He had finished the war as Air 
Officer Commanding, No 12 Group, and had used a Spitfire as his personal transport.  In the 
                                                     
525
  ‘^ĞĐƌĞƚŽĨ&ůǇ-WĂƐƚ ? ?Daily Mail, 10 June 1946, p. 3. 
526
  ‘&ůǇ-WĂƐƚ>ĞĚǇKůĚ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?The Times, 16 Sept. 1947, p. 2. 
527
  ‘dŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?The Times, 16 Sept. 1949, p. 4. 
528
  ‘Z ? ?& ?,ŽŵĂŐĞƚŽdŚĞ&Ğǁ ? ?The Times, 16 Sept. 1952, p. 3. 
529
 TNA, AIR 20/7550, Sir James Baker to Sir William Dickson, 9 July 1953. 
Page 161 
 
summer of 1953, he was now Vice-Chief of the Air Staff.  We must remember that by 1953 
there was little reason to preserve airworthy Spitfires.  Operationally, they were obsolete 
and there was very little in the way of a safety net for any aircraft considered by the Air 
Historical Branch worthy of preservation. In 1931 the Air Council had approved a proposal 
for the establishment of an RAF Aeronautical Museum.  Nothing had been done.  In 1940, 
the Air Council mindful of its responsibilities had approved a proposal that material of 
historical significance should be selected and preserved for the sake of such a future 
establishment but in 1940, naturally, its attention was elsewhere.  At the beginning of the 
 ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƐƐŵĂůůĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌĐĂůĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ƚǁĞŶƚǇƚŚƌĞĞ plus a wreck or 
two, was stored at RAF Wroughton in Wiltshire in the care of No. 15 Maintenance Unit.  In 
1954, 1955 and again in 1956 a five plane Battle of Britain display made up of a Hurricane, a 
Spitfire, an ME 109, a Junkers 88 and a Heinkel 111 left Wroughton every September for 
Horse Guards Parade and the inspection of the public.   By the third year, 1956, their 
increasing state of dilapidation had not gone unnoticed.   
/ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŚŽŶŽƵƌƚŽďƌŝŶŐƚŽŶŽƚŝĐĞƚŚĂƚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚŝƐǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ Display of 
Historical aircraft, comments are alleged to have been made regarding the tawdry 
appearance of both British and German aircraft, and of the incompleteness of their 
equipment. 
It is agreed that the general condition and appearance of these old aircraft leaves 
much to be desired, and considerable refurbishing would be necessary to bring them 
up to a satisfactory standard for future exhibition purposes.  This work could not be 
done except at the expense of the normal commitments of No. 15 M.U., Wroughton 
at which the aircraft are stored.  Moreover, so far as concerns restoration of aircraft 
of foreign origin it would not be possible to refurbish them to anything approaching 
their original condition, nor is it considered that the cost of the work involved in 
making even some improvement is warranted.
530
  
The fact that even its choice display aircraft were being allowed to deteriorate is 
ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ^ƚĂĨĨ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŝƚƐŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?,ŽǁĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞ
then was it that Sir John Baker had made his seemingly casual decision to substitute the 
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Hurricane for a Spitfire.   An airworthy Spitfire did have to be maintained.  The task fell upon 
Fighter Command who between 1953 and 1959 kept one Hurricane and a small shifting 
roster of Spitfires.  It was never more than six.  It is fair to say that the reappearance of the 
Spitfire at the head of the flypast column for Battle of Britain Week in 1953 made very little 
impact on the press and public however.  Admiration that year was reserved for the modern 
ũĞƚƐ ? ‘&ůǇŝŶŐŝŶƉĞƌĨĞĐƚĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?DĞƚĞŽƌƐ ?^ĞĂ,ĂǁŬƐ ?ĂŶĚĂŶďĞƌƌĂƐǁĞƌĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇ
^ĂďƌĞƐ ? ?531               
In 1951, when the impact of the ceremonial flypast had first come up for review, 
enthusiasm was at its zenith that is enthusiasm for the Battle of Britain flypast in particular.   
From 1947 onwards plans have, wherever possible, provided for subsidiary fly-pasts 
over a number of provincial towns by components of the main fly-past over London.  
During recent years the Participation Committee has arranged that the fly-past is, 
within practical limitations, a full scale representative effort by all Royal Air Force 
Commands at Home, and includes token contingents of the Royal Navy and United 
States Air Force...In 1948 the Secretary of State directed that the fly-past should be 
ŽŶ “ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƐĐĂůĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?532 
dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƐĐĂůĞ ?ǁĂƐĂŶŝ ƚŽůĞƌĂďůĞĚƌĂŝŶŽŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?/ƚ
did not take long for enthusiasm amongst the Commands to begin to wane.  Reserve 
ŽŵŵĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚďŽĂƐƚĞĚƚŚĞZ& ?ƐůĂƐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐƋƵĂĚƌŽŶƐƐƚŽƉƉĞĚ
taking part in the Battle of Britain flypast as early as 1949.  Transport Command stopped in 
the same year too.  Flying Training Command gave up in 1952, Coastal Command in 1953 
and Bomber Command in 1954.  It meant that by 1955, the vintage Hurricane and Spitfire 
were followed by 48 Hunters of Fighter Command, 12 Seahawks of the Fleet Air Arm and 12 
Sabres of the United States Air Force.  There was no more talk of a representative effort.  In 
1954, the year after the Spitfire had returned to the head of the Battle of Britain flypast, the 
burden placed upon the Commands weighed heavily.      
Current Approved Policy for the Mounting of R.A.F. Fly-Pasts on Ceremonial and Public 
Occasions 
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(a) Royal Occasions 
(b) Battle of Britain Day 
(c) State Occasions 
(d) Miscellaneous 
(i) Important Service Events (e.g. R.A.F. Display Farnborough, 1950; Coronation 
Review of the R.A.F. by Her Majesty The Queen, Odiham,1953) 
(ii) Important International Events (e.g. 10
th
 Anniversary of the Liberation of 
France, 1954; N.A.T.O. Air Displays, etc.
533
 
Such an immense effort was unsustainable.  It led to another policy review which reported 
to the Air Council in December 1954.  It raised a number of problematic practical issues, 
many of which Sanders back in 1951 had chosen to ignore. 
(a) Fundamental changes in operational techniques and, in particular, the waning 
importance of formation flying. 
(b) The increase of operational speeds and heights 
(c) The increase in interference with civil air traffic, particularly in the London area, 
caused by flypasts 
(d) Noise and nuisance factors. 
(e) Need to keep the new bomber force rigidly on its training programme if it is to 
reach full operational capability within the minimum time.
534
 
The Air Council wanted to cut back.  After all the Air Council had done to secure royal 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĞǀĞŶĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŐŶŽƌĞ,ĞƌDĂũĞƐƚǇ ?ƐďŝƌƚŚĚĂǇ ?Just as in 1947 
when the Air Council was in danger of falling out with Lambeth Palace, it was warned 
against any precipitous action.  The Secretary of State for Air, William Sidney, 1
st
 Viscount 
Ğ> ?/ƐůĞ ?ƌĞŵŝŶĚĞĚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨůǇƉĂƐƚ ?ŝƚƐƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĂƐŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚŝƚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞďĂůĂŶĐĞd against the views of Commander-in- 
Chief regarding the disturbance facƚŽƌŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ? ?535  Nevertheless, 
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flypasts on a grand scale were at the beginning of a long slow diminuendo.  But there was 
one particular flypast whose scale was immediately compromised.       
Ostensibly it was a great success that now threatened the Battle of Britain flypast and 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂŶǇŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ůŽŶĞ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ ? ?  ‘The 
Air Council should have in mind the ever-increasing public interest in Battle of Britain Week 
which would seem to show that we are gradually becoming less dependent upon 
spectacular flights over London as a means of keeping our name in front of the public. ?536  
The decision was taken to reduce the aircraft involved in the Battle of Britain flypast from 
over a hundred to about thirty.  All would be provided by Fighter Command.  The Hurricane 
and Spitfire would still lead the parade.  The scene was set to trial this new arrangement in 
1956, yet unfortunately it rained.  The flypast over central London did not take place but it 
ĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƚŽƉƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĂƚŚŽŵĞƐ ? ?&ŝŐƵƌĞƐǁĞƌĞƵƉŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵŽƌĞ
than the previous year.  The biggest attendance was at Biggin Hill where it exceeded the 
200,000 mark.
537
  This increasing footfall encouraged the Air Council to take even more 
drastic action the following year.  The fact that Battle of Britain Day in 1957 fell on a Sunday 
offered the perfect excuse.  The plan was to use a single Hurricane and Spitfire timed to 
pass over Westminster Abbey during the Thanksgiving Service.  It would be explained 
ƉƵďůŝĐůǇďǇƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂǇĨĂůůŝŶŐŽŶĂ^ƵŶĚĂǇĂŶĚ ‘the fly past in future 
years should be reviewed in the light of the reactions to the 1957 change ?.538 
Why did Fighter Command not object to this diminution?  It appears the reason was that 
Fighter Command was driving the bus.   ‘In August 1954, the Air Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, Fighter Command, suggested that the fly-past on Battle of Britain Day be discontinued 
and substituted by a small fly-past over Westminster Abbey during the Thanksgiving 
service ? ?539  The reason, as with the other Commands that had dropped out one by one, was 
overstretch.   ‘/n laying on this salute we have always looked to the public prestige angle by 
making it as spectacular as possible.  This latter point has had its influence on the size of the 
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝĨǁĞĂůůŽǁƚŚĞ “ƐƉĞĐƚĂĐůĞ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞǁĞƐŚĂůůŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞ
years have to go on increasing the size of the stream since, with increasing speeds, the time 
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to pass a given spot tends to become momentary. ?540  Here was a problem specific to the jet 
age but there was also one looming with regard to the piston engines of the Spitfire and 
Hurricane.           
George Ward, the Secretary of State for Air, was unhappy about continuing to fly single-
engined vintage aircraft over London because of the risk of engine failure and  ‘the adverse 
publicity which any ƵŶƚŽǁĂƌĚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞ ? ?541  Ministerial unease however was 
not enough to stop the flypast altogether.  In 1957, a severely denuded flypast took place 
and the Air Ministry waited upon the consequence.  Only the Daily Express seemed to 
ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ? ‘ŽƚŚŽƐĞŝŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇǁĂŶƚƚŽǁŝƉĞŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ ?dŚĞǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨ
the British people whŽǁŝůůŶĞǀĞƌĨŽƌŐĞƚƚŚĞĚĞďƚƚŚĞǇŽǁĞ ? ?542  Was the Daily Express right?  
The Air Staff decided to do a little better in 1958 when nine Javelins accompanied the two 
 ‘ǀŝŶƚĂŐĞ ?ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?Ƶƚ ? ? ? ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚďǇĂŝƌĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚƐŶŽƚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞƐƚ
increase but for a disaster.  On 20 September a Vulcan jet bomber crashed and burst into 





The Memorial Flight 
This disaster concentrated minds.  The question of safety now became paramount.  It threw 
into sharp relief the organisation, or rather the lack of it, behind the maintenance of the 
lone Hurricane and the few remaining airworthy Spitfires.  Difficult decisions were going to 
have to be made.  In May 1959, Sir Dermot Boyle, formally of Fighter Command, and now 
Chief of the Air Staff, received this memorandum from Sir Edmund Hudleston, Vice Chief of 
the Air Staff. 
As you know the annual fly past of Battle of Britain Sunday is led by a Hurricane and 
a Spitfire.  These aircraft have been maintained up to now in Fighter Command by a 
 ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?&ůŝŐŚƚĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŚĞůĚŽŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐ ?  The 
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rundown of Fighter Command and an increasing maintenance problem has led them 




Figure 20.  Wing Commander Peter Thompson 
 
Boyle, previously Air Officer Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command, would have known 
ĂůůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ǀŝŶƚĂŐĞ ?,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞĂŶĚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?,Ğ
would have understood better than almost anyone else the precarious hand to mouth 
existence of this ad hoc Battle of Britain Flight.  Air Clues, a respected in-house RAF house 
ŵĂŐĂǌŝŶĞ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĨůŝŐŚƚŝŶŝƚƐEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚĂďŽƵƚ
this time [1957] the famous RAF Fighter Command station at Biggin Hill, Kent, was given the 
task of maintaining a small Battle of Britain Flight, composed of a Hurricane and several 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞĨůŽǁŶŽŶĐĞƌĞŵŽŶŝĂůĂŶĚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?545  What Air Clues does 
not mention is a name.  It all appears to have beeŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨŝŐŐŝŶ,ŝůů ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚŝŽŶ
Commander at the time, Wing Commander Peter Thompson, as his widow Mimi Thompson 
ƌĞĐĂůůƐ ? ‘/ŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂƐ
                                                     
544
 TNA, AIR 2/15690, Sir E. Huddlestone to Sir D. Boyle, 20 May 1959.  
545
 Cited in Cotter, Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, p. 42. 
Page 167 
 
a Memorial Flight.  He always used to refer to it as the Battle of Britain Flight.  To him I think 
it was a very deep feeling.  He never liked to discuss too much the war years, I think he lost 
ƚŽŽŵĂŶǇǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵůƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŐŽŽĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? ?546  Thompson had fought in the Battle of Britain 
as a Hurricane pilot.
547
 
The last three Spitfires in flying service, operated by the THUM Flight for meteorological 
work, were about to be stood down.  It was agreed that these three Spitfires would be 
ŚĂŶĚĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŽdŚŽŵƉƐŽŶĂƚŝŐŐŝŶ,ŝůů ? ‘ƚ ? ? P ? ?ŚŽƵƌƐŽŶƚŚĞ ? ?th of July 1957, three 
Spitfire aircraft were flown into Biggin Hill as the first move towards the formation of a 
 “ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?&ůŝŐŚƚ ?dŚĞĞǀĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƚƌĞĂĞĚǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞĐĞƌĞŵŽŶǇ ?ǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶ
much publicity and aroused considerable public interest. ?548   
 
  
Public interest was all well and good but it did not pay the bills.  Thompson had his three 
Spitfires but no funds for maintenance and fuel, and as for manpower that would have to be 
engaged on a voluntary basis only.  What was a frugal existence very soon became a 
peripatetic one as Fighter Command continued to contract.  Biggin Hill was closed only 
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Figure 20.  1957, the three remaining airworthy Spitfires available to the RAF being flown by the Temperature and Humidity 
Monitoring (THUM) Flight at RAF Woodvale 
Page 168 
 
months after the three Spitfires had flown in.  In January 1958 ƚŚĞŶĞǁĂŶĚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ‘ĂƚƚůĞ
ŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ&ůŝŐŚƚ ? was moved to North Weald.  In May it moved again, this time to 
Martlesham Heath, gaining the more familiar name ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘Battle of Britain Memorial Flight ?
in the process.  But this peripatetic existence as well as a crippling lack of funds took its toll.  
In an effort to boost numbers three static display Spitfires had been acquired in 1957 but 
efforts to make them airworthy were ŶŽƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? ‘The Spitfire XVI gave a lot of 
trouble, two having crashed since joining the Flight. ?549    
It was an unhappy safety record, and no doubt a major reason why in May 1959 there was a 
call for the formal establishment of the flight  ‘to look after these aircraft ? ?550  Unfortunately, 
the timing of this call could hardly have been worse.  The Air Staffs commitment to the 
ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇĨůǇƉĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞĨŽƌĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂBattle of Britain 
Memorial Flight, was faltering.  All that seems to have been required was a good reason to 
stop.  It appears the request for formal establishment, a request for money, was that 
reason.      
The fact is that these aircraft can be regarded as having reached the end of their 
practical flying life.  Spares are increasingly difficult to obtain and the aircraft require 
more and more work to keep them in safe flying condition.  There is little doubt that 
they could be kept flying a year or two longer, but the time is rapidly approaching  W if 
it is not already with us  W when a decision must be taken to abandon the traditional 
leaders of the Fly Past formation. 
/ĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?&ůŝŐŚƚĐĂŶƌĞƐŽůǀĞ
the difficulties we are now encountering.  I therefore recommend that this year 
should be the last formal appearance of the Hurricane and Spitfire.
551
 
So wrote Sir Edmund Hudleston to all the members of the Air Council.  As bad luck would 
have it, on 28 May just as the fate of Wing Commander Peter dŚŽŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐMemorial Flight 
was being decided, one of its Spitfires, SL574, suffered a serious flying accident at 
Martlesham Heath.  This was an ill-timed incident.   
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dŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŽďĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŽŶ ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ
certain amount of nervousness over its likely reception.     
I have consulted C.I.O [Chief Information Officer] who...say[s] there will inevitably be 
comments on sentimental grounds following an announcement to discontinue the 
Hurricane and Spitfire in the Fly Past...If it is possible for the announcement to 
include something about the cost in money and manpower of continuing to maintain 
these aircraft in flying condition, and that at a time when Fighter Command is 
running down, that would, C.I.O thinks, help to shield us from criticism; and, of 




In the end it was decided to be brief, and to the point, thus avoiding any potential hostages 
to fortune. 
The Hurricane and Spitfire, which traditionally lead the Fly-past will make their last 
flight in the Battle of Britain ceremonies this year.  Both aircraft are now nearly 20 
years old, and the Air Council have concluded with great regret that it will not be 
practicable to maintain them in a sufficiently high state of serviceability to permit 
their continued inclusion in future years in a fly-past over London.
553
 
How was this news received?  The Daily Express was unimpressed. 
On Sunday a Hurricane and a Spitfire will lead the Battle of Britain fly-past over 
London.  And that this is the last the people of London will see of the planes that 
saved their city  W and Britain.  For this is to be the final fly-past. And no 
arrangements have been made for a permanent public memorial of a Hurricane or a 
Spitfire in London.  This idea was put forward last month.  The Air Ministry has not 
even considered it.  The Few who won the Battle of Britain were possessed of spirit 
and imagination.  Not so the Many at the Air Ministry today.
554
 
The Air Ministry must have feared the worst, but come the day and the reaction on Fleet 
Street, even in the offices of the Daily Express, was muted, and a little distracted.  What 
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actually happened on the day was a gift of a story for feature writers up and down Fleet 
Street.  The last flight of Spitfire SL574, just as George Ward, Secretary of State for Air, had 
feared, was subject to engine failure.  Spitfire SL574 was something of a Jonah.  It was SL574 
that had suffered the untimely flying accident at Martlesham Heath just as the fate of the 
 ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ&ůŝŐŚƚ ?ǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĂƚĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐĞŶƚƚŽ ? ?
Maintenance Unit at Bicester, Oxfordshire, for repair.  It had returned to Martlesham Heath 
on 1 July.  It now took to the air on 20 September with its partnering Hurricane, LF363, to 
lead the Battle of Britain anniversary Flypast for the last time.  Both vintage aircraft 
successfully completed their mission, flying over Horse Guards Parade as Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan watched on.  It was when Spitfire SL574 turned for home that its trouble 
began.  Its pilot, Air Vice-Marshal Harold Maguire, explained. 
I was near the Crystal Palace when my engine suddenly cut out.  I was dropping 
down at the rate of more than 500ft. a minute and had little time to do anything.  I 
realised I could not reach Biggin Hill when suddenly I saw a cricket pitch in front of 
me.  It was deserted and by the grace of God the players were in the pavilion.  I 
narrowly missed houses and an oak tree before pulling up just short of a garden.
555
  
It was a gift of a story.   
Sugar Love was pushed over the boundary the propeller, undercarriage, and one 
wing broken.  Its last Battle of Britain mission was over.  So was the tea interval on 
the Bromley ground.  One British tradition may have been broken.  But in accordance 
with another older tradition play was resumed between Oxo and the Old 
Hollingtonians.  Round the boundary now were the fire engines, some police cars, 
and several hundred extra spectators whom the cricket had failed to attract.  The 
ǁŝĐŬĞƚ ?ƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ^ƵŐĂƌ>ŽǀĞ ?ƐůĂƐƚůĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐƚĂŬŝŶŐƐƉŝŶ ?556 
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This reporter from the Daily Express was perhaps offering a gentle pastiche of Neville 
Cardus.  Cardus was famous for his nostalgic accounts of a by-gone English age as seen from 
the side of a cricket pitch.
557
     
 
This was not of course the end.  We know that airworthy Spitfires and the odd Hurricane 
continued to be maintained by the RAF.  We know too that in 1969 The Battle of Britain 
Memorial Flight would be officially established.  Nevertheless, between 1959 and 1969, the 
fate of the very few airworthy Spitfires and that lone Hurricane hung by a thread.  As early 
as July 1959 plans were being made to ground and disperse the flight.  Here is Air-Vice 
Marshall R.B. Lees writing from Bentley Priory the headquarters of Fighter Command, to Air-
Vice Marshall A. Foord-Kelsey at Martlesham Heath, from where the flight would take off 
for its last mission.    
No decision has yet been made on the ultimate disposal of these aircraft, and this is 
my purpose of writing to you as I should like to have your bids.  I know there are 
                                                     
557
 See Judy Giles and Tim Middleton (eds.), Writing Englishness 1900-1950: An Introductory Sourcebook on 
National Identity (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 152. 
Figure 22  Crashed Spitfire, Bromley Cricket Ground, 1959 
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several stations in the Command with no positive reminder of the Battle of Britain, 





regard for its own heritage was well known.  Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter Merton, Air 
Member for Supply and Organisation (AMSO) was feeling the pressure.  
Since the war and particularly since the decision to withdraw the Spitfire from the 
annual Battle of Britain Fly-Past was publicised, members of the public and the 
authorities connected with museums and collections have displayed an increasing 
interest in measures which are being taken to preserve those Spitfires still in 
existence. We regularly receive enquiries from all kinds of people ranging from ex-
RAF personnel to representatives of Institutions with international reputations, all of 
whom are anxious that the few remaining aircraft should not be allowed to 
disappear on the scrap heap.  The numbers of these aircraft still available are limited 
and we need to ensure their continued preservation. 
For those Spitfires which are at present held for display purposes on Stations in your 
command, it would be helpful therefore if you were to follow a policy of allocating 
them to long-term fighter stations wherever this possible.  As you will appreciate 
every move of one of these aircraft gives rise to undue wear and tear and 
furthermore sparks off a spate of enquiries from local bodies and would-be 





seriously.  The problem was that there was still no safe haven, still no RAF Museum.  
DĞƌƚŽŶ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌĂƐD^K ?^ŝƌ:ŽŚŶĂǀŝƐ ?ŚĂĚŚŝƐŽǁŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ǁŽƵůĚ-be 
ƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ? ? 
                                                     
558
 TNA, AIR 20/9737, AVM Lees to AVM Foord-Kelsey, 29 July 1959. 
559
 TNA, AIR 20/10593, ACM Merton to AM Kyle, 29 Nov. 1961. 
Page 173 
 
A wide interest continues to be displayed by official bodies, private organisations 
and individuals in the acquisition of surplus Spitfire aircraft, and there has been a 
renewal of enquiries concerning the prospect of their presentation loan or sale. 
There is a total of 41 Spitfires held in the Royal Air Force.  This includes three aircraft 
in flying condition and twĞůǀĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?.  Two aircraft are on 
indefinite loan to the Imperial War Museum and the Science Museum respectively.  
The remaining aircraft are held as display pieces at RAF stations.
560
 
What Sir John Davis does noƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐ ? ?^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐ ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?ŵĞĂŶƚ
those aircraft selected for preservation under the almost moribund preservation scheme of 
1931 and display pieces were those aircraft saved from the scrapheap on an ad hoc basis by 
individual RAF stations.  In 1965, J. A. Millson head of S4, part of the Air Ministry secretariat, 
visited RAF Henlow where a number of the historical aircraft were looked after.  What had 
prompted his visit was the fact that the four technicians who did that looking after were 
ĐŽŵŝŶŐƵƉĨŽƌƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?DŝůůƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝůǁĂƐĂsad indictment of the 
Z& ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŝƚƐŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ? 
In 1957 a Working Party was set up to make recommendations about historic 
aircraft.  The only significant decision which resulted from this was one to distribute 
the historic aircraft which had been collected to various RAF units.  Commands were 
told that responsibility for care, maintenance and display would rest with the 




 Jan. 1963 Sir Dermot Boyle wrote to the then PUS, Air Ministry (Sir 
Maurice Dean) suggesting that a start should be made with the formation of a 
Historic Aircraft Museum  (as a separate project from the Royal Air Force museum 
which is not itself intended to display complete aircraft) by collecting certain historic 
aircraft together at Henlow. 
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No precise directions seem to have been issued as to exactly what the scope and size 
of this collection should be.
561
 
The situation was a mess.  Languishing on RAF stations up and down the country were 
vintage aircraft in various states of dilapidation.  The majority were Spitfires because of that 
ad hoc station by station method of collecting.  Essentially, at the end of the war the only 
aircraft with a Battle of Britain pedigree available for parade duty was a Spitfire.  The Air 
ŽƵŶĐŝůĚŝŐĞƐƚĞĚDŝůůƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚĂŶĚĚŝĚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ‘Spitfires issued to RAF units remain 
ƵŶĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞŝƚŚĞƌĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚƐƵƌƉůƵƐƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽƌďĞĐŽŵĞ
available on the closure of the unit...As and when further Spitfires become available, 
consideration should be given to presenting them to suitable public organisations who ask 
for them, but not to private individuals or unofficial organisations unless very exceptional 
circumstances arise. ?562  ƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞŶŽƵŶƐĞĞŵůǇŐŝǀĞĂǁĂǇƚŽ ‘private 
individuals or unofficial organisations ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĐůĂŵŽƵƌĨƌŽŵ
collectors who were keen to cash in on the public appetite for the Spitfire by opening 
private museums.   
/ƚƚŽŽŬǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚŚƌĞĞĂŶĚĂŚĂůĨǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌDŝůůƐŽŶ ?ƐǀŝƐit to RAF Henlow, and his 
negative report, for the Air Council to do something.  The 41 surviving Spitfires then in the 
Z& ?ƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶĨĞůůŝŶƚŽƚŚƌĞĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇĂĐůƵĞƚŽĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ state of 
preservation.  These categories were airworthy, display and historic.  The four airworthy 
Spitfires and those classified as historic, about fifteen altogether, were in a reasonable to 
good state of repair while the rest, the display Spitfires were not.  Things were now about to 
change and all for the better. 
A small committee chaired by E38 (RAF) with representatives from S4 (AIR), the RAF 
Museum, Inspector of Recruiting (Publicity) and the Air Historical Branch has discussed 
the future disposition of these aircraft.  They suggest that the various claims can be 
divided into five categories and priorities as follows. 
Priority 1  W RAF Memorial Flight 
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The committee considered the RAF Memorial Flight at RAF Coltishall is of prime 
importance and recommends that all four Spitfires in flying condition should be 
allocated to the Flight. 
Priority 2  W RAF Museum 
The RAF Museum has asked for 13 aircraft  W although it seems likely they will be able 
to display only four at a time.   
Priority 3  W RAF Exhibition Flight 
There is a continuing need for two aircraft for general exhibition purposes under the 
direction of the Inspector of Recruiting (Publicity).   
Priority 4   
There are three prime claimants to whom allocation of an aircraft has in the past 
been agreed by the Air Force Board.  
Priority 5  W RAF Stations 
The rotation arrangement with the RAF Museum would provide aircraft for seven 
stations in the immediate future and ultimately for nine stations when two of the 
RAF Memorial Flight aircraft are withdrawn.
563
 
This life saving document, a preservation plan designed specifically for the Spitfire, is dated 
1 October 1968.  How had it come about?  First and foremost the establishment of an RAF 
Museum was at last going ahead.  Back in 1954, the Royal Aeronautical Society had 
approached the RAF with plans to set up National Air Museum at Hendon.  The approach 
was unceremoniously batted away.  Air-Vice Marshal Richard Jordan, Director General of 
RAF Organisation, was one influential voice who took a dim view.   ‘ hangar in the winter, 
unless enormous expense is involved, is a cold, damp and draughty place, and I cannot see 
crowds of people trooping out to this type of hangar at Hendon to view a National 
Aeronautical Collection of Historical Aircraft. ?564  But what he could not see back then others 
could now.   A committee under the chairmanship of Sir Dermot Boyle had been set up by 
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the Air Force Board in 1962 to make recommendations on the establishment of such a 
National Aeronautical Collection of Historical Aircraft.  Millson, sitting in his S4 office may 
have been fuming over what he had discovered at RAF Henlow in March 1965, but it was in 
1965 that the RAF had begun acquiring rather than disposing of objects of interest to a 
putative RAF Museum.
565
  Cold, damp and draughty a hangar at Hendon might be, but the 
RAF Museum was opened at Hendon by the Queen, wearing a thick coat and gloves, on 15 
November 1972.      
dŚĞZ& ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŶŽǁŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞĚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĞĚďƵƚŽĨŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ
interest here ŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ? ?ŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐ ?ŶŝŶĞǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞinterrupted cricket 
ŵĂƚĐŚ ?ǁĞƌĞďĂĐŬŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐƌĂĚĂƌ ?dŚĞŵĂŶǁŚŽĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝƚĨŽƌ
that was not on the Air Council in fact he was not in the RAF at all.  He was not even British; 
he was Canadian.  Harry Saltzman had started his career in the circus, worked as a talent 
scout, a casting agent and finally had made his fortune as a film producer.  It was he, along 
with his partner Cubby Broccoli, who had brought James Bond to the big screen.  In October 
 ? ? ? ? ?ũƵƐƚĂƐ'ŽŽĚŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚwas set before the Air Council, Saltzman was putting the 
finishing touches to his latest and most expensive side project, the epic Battle of Britain.  
This film will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  Suffice to say now that it had used an 
armada oĨĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚƐŽŐƌĞĂƚƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌŵĂĚĂǁĂƐ ‘ƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƐŝǌĞĂƐƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ? ?th ůĂƌŐĞƐƚĂŝƌĨůĞĞƚ ? ?566  Whether it was or was not, what was certainly true was that 
in preparation for the film the world had been scoured for airworthy Spitfires, and not only 
Spitfires but Hurricanes, Messerschsmitts and Heinkels too.  Group Captain Hamish 
Mahaddie was the man tasked by Saltzman with recruiting this air armada, and one of the 
first call he put through had been to the Air Ministry.  The Air Ministry could not have been 
more co-operative, offering its facilities at RAF Henlow for repair and restoration as well as 
ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐŵŽĚĞƐƚǀŝŶƚĂŐĞĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇĨůĞĞƚ ? ‘The Battle of Britain film will take 
approximately 6 weeks in April  W June.  It will consume up to 50 hrs life on Hurricane and 
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Spitfire V AB 910, and 25 hours on each Spitfire PR XIX. ?567  dŚŝƐǁĂƐǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĞŶƚŝƌĞ
airworthy vintage aircraft fleet.      
/ƚĚŽĞƐďĞŐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞůĂƐƚĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ&ůǇƉĂƐƚďǇƚŚĞZ& ?Ɛ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĂŶĚ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞ
had taken place in September 1959.  We know that even before that final flypast moves 
were afoot to disband the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight.  Its aircraft were destined for 
various RAF stations up and down the country after a bidding process.  We also know that 
each successful RAF station would not have been expected to keep its new prize vintage 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇ ?dŚĞďŝĚĚŝŶŐǁĂƐĨŽƌĂ ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
was code for low maintenance, probably no maintenance static display.   But whatever the 
intention of the Air Council in the summer of 1959, the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight 
survived, just.  From almost the moment the fate of the Battle of Britain Flypast had been 
decided in the summer of 1959, there were those in Fighter Command who had striven to 
save what could be saved.  In June 1960, the New Zealander Sir Hector McGregor, head of 
Fighter Command appealed directly to Sir Edmund Hudleston.  It was Hudleston who had 
overseen the withdrawal of the vintage aircraft from the Battle of Britain anniversary flypast 
the previous year. 
You will remember our earlier correspondence about the Spitfires and Hurricane we 
have which are still in a flyable condition, (Spitfires Mk.19 PM631 and PS853 and 
Hurricane Mk.2c LF 363). 
The problem of the ultimate disposal of these aircraft has been shuttling back and 
forth between Air Ministry and my Headquarters for a long time, and recently I have 
been under pressure to send them to 41 Group for dismantling. 
I have looked once more at the sorties flown by these aircraft in the last few months 
and the servicing effort and maintenance costs we have expended to keep them 
serviceable.  The salient points that have emerged from this investigation are as 
follows:- 
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A.  The utilisation rate of these aircraft is very low as it has purposely been 
kept to a minimum and, in consequence, they have some years of safe flyable 
life left in them. 
B.  Under the present arrangements the servicing and maintenance costs are 
almost negligible. 
C.  Removal and dismantling by 41 Group would almost certainly mean that 
the aircraft would never fly again. 
D.  There is a continuing demand for these historic aircraft to be flown before 
the public.  The occasions on which these aircraft are flown are always 
carefully supervised.  Such flights as are made are restricted to accord with 
the spirit of the Air Council ruling that they were not to be flown in future 
Battle of Britain fly pasts and the aircraft are not now flown over large 
densely populated areas such as London. 
A great deal of public interest and publicity can still be gained from the display of 
these historic aircraft, and I am sure you would agree that the decision to scrap them 
now would result in the complete wastage of a still valuable asset.
568
   
It was a good case and the Air Council gave Fighter Command permission but it gave nothing 
else.  There would be no material help beyond the absolutely necessary and no guarantee 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌŽƵŶĐŝů ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƌĞƐĐŝŶĚĞĚ ? ‘WĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨŽƌĂƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ
one year in the first instance and that the position should then be reviewed.  They agreed 
that costs would have to be watched carefully and, needless to say, we could not spare any 
extra manpower to look after the aircraft. ?569  The next five years were difficult ones for 
what was now known as the Historic Aircraft Flight.  It had almost no funds, no permanent 
staff, no guarantee of survival, and because of the ongoing contraction of Fighter Command, 
no permanent base.  In December 1960 the flight moved from Martlesham Heath to 
Horsham St Faith near Norwich.  In 1963, another move proved necessary this time to RAF 
ŽůƚŝƐŚĂůů ?dŚĞĨůŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƉĞƌŝƉĂƚĞƚŝĐĞǆistence was not conducive to the care and maintenance 
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especially on a virtually non-existent budget.  The Flight was soon down to one airworthy 
Spitfire and one Hurricane.  It was one accident away from oblivion.   
The move to Coltishall, however, signalled a change in fortune for the Flight.  Its last 
airworthy Spitfire was joined by others including a Spitfire which had actually seen war 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ĂŐŝĨƚĨƌŽŵsŝĐŬĞƌƐƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?WĞƚĞƌdŚŽŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝĚĞĂŚĂĚĂůǁĂǇƐ
been to use combat veterans, all the better to commemorate the lives of the pilots lost.  The 
ĨůŝŐŚƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶŐŝǀĞŶĂǁĂƌŵǁĞůĐŽŵĞĂƚZ&ŽůƚŝƐŚĂůů ? ‘A tremendous spirit exists 
amongst the ground crew, all of whom have great pride in their work.  The job entails a lot 
of weekend work in the summer ? ?570  /ƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƚŽƐƚŽƉ ? ‘The appeal of the Flight 
seems to have increased, particularly in the last three years, with increasing numbers of 
requests for displays and enquiries from enthusiasts. ?571  tŝŶŐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ?, ?d ?WĞŶŶĂů ?Ɛ
enthusiastic note, whether he knew or not, was all part of the case building for the formal 
establishment of the Flight.  In October 1968, as we have already seen, came the report that 
ƐĞƚƚůĞĚƚŚĞĨĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌƚǇŽŶĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐĂƌĞ ?/ƚŐĂǀĞƚŚe Flight at RAF 
Coltishall its number one priority.  That report had landed on the desk of the newly 
appointed Air Member for Supply and Organisation, Air Chief Marshall Sir Thomas O. 
Prickett.  Two months later, on 30 of December, Prickett circulated a paper to his colleagues 
on the Air Force Board Standing Committee.        
Battle of Britain Memorial Flight 
1. In February, 1968, I obtained your agreement to the retention of the Hurricane 
and three Spitfire aircraft of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight in flying 
condition for a further year. 
2. From its inception, in its present form in 1960, the demand on the Memorial 
Flight has steadily increased and the number of displays undertaken by the Flight 
has averaged 58, involving about 90 hours total flying per year.  During 1968, the 
Flight flew 220 hours, excluding 205 hours devoted to flying for the Battle of 
Britain Film. 
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3. Because of the many displays performed by the Flight during 1968, and the wide 
publicity given to the production of the Battle of Britain film, it is possible that 
the total flying hours during 1969 would be as much as 130 hours, if all requests 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞ&ůŝŐŚƚ ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞĂƌĞĂŐƌĞĞĚ ? 
4. When the Standing Committee gave permission for the formation of the Flight in 
1960, it was the understanding that extra manpower should not be provided for 
the aircraft.  RAF Coltishall has maintained these historic aircraft in flying 
condition by diversion of manpower and considerable extra work beyond normal 
duty which has only been made possible by the keen interest and good will of the 
servicing personnel.  The Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Strike Command 
considers that if we wish to continue to derive the publicity and recruiting 
benefits from the Flight in the future, we should establish the necessary servicing 
man power and accept the costs as a charge against MOD funds... 
5. To date we have relied on the goodwill of industry to support the aircraft by the 
free provision of spares...It is doubtful that we can continue to rely on this free 
support from industry.  Engine overhauls for the Spitfires will become due in the 
near future and assuming, in the worst case, that we receive no free support 
from industry each engine overhaul might cost up to £10,000 
6. I support both the proposals for the future of the Battle of Britain Memorial 
Flight and for the Lancaster aircraft.  Whilst it is not possible to quantify the 
recruiting value of this type of publicity, recent experience gained during the 50
th
 
Anniversary year clearly indicates that the more we keep the RAF in the front line 
of the public the better our recruiting achievements.  With the 50
th
 Anniversary 
year behind us we need to maintain the impetus on publicity in every possible 
way.I should be grateful for your agreement that:- 
a. The Battle of Britain Memorial Flight should be added to the policy statement 
for RAF Coltishall, and that the necessary servicing personnel should be 
established. 
b. The Flight should consist of one Hurricane and four Spitfire aircraft, subject to 
a possible case being made for an additional Spitfire. 
c. The estimated average annual cost of £11,500 for the Flight (one Hurricane 
and four Spitfires) are accepted as a charge to Air Votes. 
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The Flight need no longer be authorised each year but should continue in existence 
until circumstances warrant a review.
572
 
It was a compelling case.  Prickett understood his audience perfectly.  He begins by 
personalising the request.  For the Air Board, which had replaced the Air Council in 1964, to 
deny it would be to snub one of its own members.  Prickett wants to accentuate the 
positive.  The Flight is struggling to manage the volume of requests for appearances.  The Air 
Board would want to be associated with success.  Prickett then links thaƚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞ
ǁŝĚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇŐŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶĨŝůŵ ? ?tŝƚŚŽŶĞĞǇĞĂůǁĂǇƐŽŶ
recruitment, publicity was a currency the Air Board liked to deal in.  Prickett then states that 
 ‘ƚŚĞ^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŐĂǀĞƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ&ůŝŐŚƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ
ƵŶƚƌƵĞ ?ůůŝƚĚŝĚĚŽǁĂƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƚŚĂƚWĞƚĞƌdŚŽŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ɛ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ&ůŝŐŚƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
be scrapped.  Prickett is intent on his own agenda.  What he is in fact doing is asking the Air 
Board not to undo the work of its predecessor the Air Council.  This was clever.  Service 
careers, especially at this stratospheric level, were made or thwarted on personal 
recommendation.  Air Board members would have been chary of upsetting distinguished 
and no doubt still highly influential predecessors.   
Prickett is also at pains to stress a positive decision would be a popular decision.  He notes 
 ‘ƚŚĞŬĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂŶĚŐŽŽĚǁŝůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?ĂƚŽůƚŝƐŚĂůů ?^ĞƌǀŝĐŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů
would have represented a large constituency in the mind of any service member of the Air 
Board.  Every RAF station had servicing personnel.  When Prickett finally calls upon an 
endorsement, his is a clever choice.  He has the support of Sir Denis Spotswood.  Spotswood 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐŽŵing man.  He had just been appointed Air Officer Commanding in Chief, 
Strike Command, and promoted to Air Chief Marshall.  It was unlikely to be his last 
promotion either.  The Air Board was not willing to upset such a rising star.     
The Air Force Board Standing Committee has agreed that the Memorial Flight should 
be added to the Policy Statement for RAF Coltishall, that the necessary servicing 
personnel should be established, and that the Flight should continue in existence as 
a charge to Air Votes until circumstances warrant a review.
573
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There was one more crisis to be faced.  In February 1974, the Heath government had been 
ĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚĂƚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĐĂůůĞĚŝŶĨĂĐĞŽĨĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽĂůƐƚƌŝŬĞ ?tŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐŶĞǁ>ĂďŽƵƌ
government was confronted with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation which had 
begun with the decision by the OPEC countries to start raising oil prices in the autumn of 
1973.   In the spring and summer of 1976 came the sterling crisis when financial markets lost 
confidence in the pound.  As the economic crisis accelerated a Defence Review was 
launched in December 1974 and a Defence White Paper followed in March 1975.  Savings of 
£4.75 billion were anticipated over a ten year period.
574
  The navy was to bear the brunt of 
the cuts in terms of equipment and the army in terms of manpower.  The RAF however 
would not escape entirely.    
I have just seen a copy of US of S. (RAF) dated 14 Jan 77 and have learned only this 
morning, that the Air Force Board Standing Committee is to debate the possible 
ĞĂƌůǇĚŝƐďĂŶĚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶDĞŵŽƌŝĂů&ůŝŐŚƚĂƚƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?/
am very surprised that, as Chairman of the Participation Committee, I have not been 
consulted but I also understand that the matter has not been staffed in the usual 
manner.  Although I have not been asked to provide a brief, AMP may wish to take 
note of my views.
575
  
Air Commodore J.F. Langer, Chairman of the Participation Committee, was clearly very 
angry.  It was his job to match RAF resources to requests made for RAF participation in 
events over the course of the year.  His two prime assets were the Red Arrows, formed in 
1964 when the RAF amalgamated its display teams into one, and the Battle of Britain 
Memorial Flight.  He was not minded to lose either one.  His timely intervention had the 
required effect.  The Air Force Board Standing Committee did not take an immediate 
decision to disband the Flight at their next January meeting.  The decision was deferred until 
May.  This gave Langer and other like minded officers time to prepare their defence which 
was duly delivered to the Air Force Board in May by Air Marshal Sir Alisdair Steedman, Air 
Member for Supply and Organization.  In his paper he resurrected all the arguments that 
had saved airworthy vintage aircraft in the past.  He said the general public needed to be 
constantly reminded of the service and its achievements.  He said that the Battle of Britain 
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ǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚďĂƚƚůĞŚŽŶŽƵƌƐ ?ŝĨŶŽƚƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ?,ĞƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚhe 
BBMF is a crowd-puller second only to the Red Arrows and in 1976 it was estimated that the 
total audience watching BBMF displays was 2.5-3 million. ?576  But of course all the while the 
financial markets played with the pound, it was the financial implications that mattered 
above all else.   
The BBMF provides a cheap and extremely effective form of RAF presence with the 
least detriment to front-line operations.  The direct operating cost of the Spitfire is 
only £100 per hour, if the agreed hours (295) were flown by a Phantom instead, the 




intervention in January, causing the deferral of any decision until May, which gave time for a 
defence to be mustered, had saved the Battle of Britain Flight once again.   
Pounds shillings and pence was one thing, vital even to the Air Force Board Standing 
Committee in 1977, but for a man like Air Commodore J.F. Langer it was the wrong measure 
of value for the BBMF.   ?I have no wish to liken the BBMF to the ravens of the Tower of 
London, but so long as a single Spitfire remains flying there is some hope that the old Battle 
of Britain Spirit and tradition will continue ? ?578  Air Commodore J.F. Langer, perhaps 
unknowingly, was referring to the Spitfire in the air as performance, a cultural production, a 
means of making meaning.  Langer spoke of his hope of continuity, but what that spirit and 
tradition looked like moving forward, encouraged by the Spitfire in performance, may well 
have surprised him and will be discussed in the next chapter.      
The RAF very nearly grounded the Spitfire for good after the war.  It was Lambeth Palace 
that turned the celebration/commemoration of the Battle of Britain into a state occasion.  It 
was the Air Council who wanted to downgrade it to a brief wreath laying ceremony on a 
London street.  It was also the Air Council that engineered the successful introduction of the 
ĨůǇƉĂƐƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐĞƌĞŵŽnial repertoire, which guaranteed the continuation of the 
Battle of Britain annual flypast into the 1950s, even if they were not thinking primarily in 
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terms of the Spitfire or the commemoration of the Battle of Britain at the time.   As for the 
Air Council ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞŽĨŝƚƐŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ?especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
it was grudging ĂƚďĞƐƚ ?tĞŵŝŐŚƚƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ƚĂǁĚƌǇĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?ŽĨŝƚƐĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ
survivors on Horse Guards Parade in 1956.  It is fair to say that right up until 1969 and the 
establishment of the BBMF, Spitfires were kept airworthy by interested service volunteers in 
spite of the Air Council. 
What was at the root of this lack of official enthusiasm?  After the war, there were those 
senior commanders schooled in the offensive spirit of Lord Trenchard who would very likely 
have agreed with what ACM Sir W. R. Freeman said of the Battle of Britain back in 1942.  
 ?The so-called Battle of Britain consisted of a series of successful defensive operations by 
Fighter Command... Victories are only won by offensive action; and deliverance must be 
permanent to give much cause for junketing.
579
  Worse, the offensive action the RAF did 
take, the bombing campaigns over Germany, were not to be celebrated.
580
  Recognition for 
those that had served in Bomber Command came only in 2013, and then in the form of a 
clasp not a medal.  This meant that senior commanders like Sir John Slessor showed a 
distinct lack of interest in the Battle of Britain after the war, with consequences for the 
preservation of airworthy Spitfires.   
Fortunately, this lack of interest was not shared by all senior commanders and certainly not 
by junior commanders and many in the rank and file.  The survival of the airworthy 
authentic Spitfire owed ŵƵĐŚƚŽƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨŵĞŶůŝŬĞŝŐŐŝŶ,ŝůů ?Ɛƚ^ĂƚŝŽŶŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ
Wing Commander Peter Thompson, and Sir Hector McGregor, head of Fighter Command in 
1960, both of whom fought not just to save the Spitfire but specifically to save airworthy 
examples of the Spitfire.  It was the Spitfire in action, in the air, in performance that 
motivated men like Thompson, McGregor and of course Air Commodore J.F. Langer.  Langer, 
Thompson and McGregor may not have fully appreciated the impact even a single Spitfire 
flying would have on the old Battle of Britain Spirit and tradition post-war.     
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Chapter 4  ? The War-Made Myth: From War Stories to Toy Stories          
In his introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Material Culture in 2011 on identity, 
ChrisƚŽƉŚĞƌdŝůůĞǇŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƐĞŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ
on his own discipline of anthropology.
581
  Beginning in the late 1980s, attention amongst 
anthropologists and ethnographers turned to the practices and politics of cultural heritage 
and museums.  What happened in the first wave of criticism, was a rejection of what was 
seen as a shallow portrayal of a commodified past.  The heritage industry was accused of an 
act of vandalism, of disconnecting the past from the present, of making the past 
irrelevant.
582
  Soon, however, according to Tilley, a different approach emerged, a 
perception of heritage as possessing an ontological and moral significance, even of having 
agency.
583
  What objects were able to do was construct and reproduce individual and social 
identities.
584
  /ƚǁĂƐŽŶůǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ‘ĂůůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ůŝŬĞĂůůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂƌĞŶŽƚĞƋƵĂů ? ?585         
One such certain object, this thesis suggests, has been the Spitfire.  Air Commodore J.F. 
Langer hoped ƚŚĂƚ ‘Ɛo long as a single Spitfire remains flying ...the old Battle of Britain spirit 
and tradition will continue ? ?586  What Langer was referring to in terms of spirit and tradition 
was the myth of the Battle of Britain represented by the Spitfire in performance.  The myth 
meant something quite specific to Langer but what it meant to him was not necessarily 
what it was required to mean to others post-war.  What Langer hoped for above all was a 
stable mythological reading, continuity.  Perhaps the fact that he merely expressed a hope, 
rather than a certainty, meant that he realised that myths evolve.  What he perhaps did not 
realise was that the Spitfire itself would be part of that process.           
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Identity formation has been central to the role the Spitfire in helping the myth of the Battle 
of Britain to evolve post-war.  dŝůůĞǇ ?Ɛrecognition of a heightened period of anthropological 
interest in the link between heritage and identity formation beginning in the late 1980s does 
in fact coincide with the re-emergence of the Spitfire into the air, which it had been missing 
from for almost twenty-five years.  As we will discover, this was the beginning of the second 
major episode in the evolution of the myth of the Battle of Britain, assisted by the Spitfire.  
But why had it been missing from the air?  These were the years of underfunding and of 
ǁĂŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞD& ?ƐŚŽŵĞďĂƐĞĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĐĞĨƌŽŵƵŶĚĞƌŝƚƐĨĞĞƚĂƐ
Fighter Command contracted then disappeared altogether.  It meant that during the 1960s 
and 1970s, BBMF operations were low-key, and ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?Ɛ appearances before the public 
were typically 50-60 appearances per season.
587
  Contrast that with the summer of 2016 
when the BBMF, with its fleet of six Spitfires, two Hurricanes and a solitary Lancaster, took 
part in almost a thousand events across Britain, performing before an estimated seven 
million people.
588
   
    
 
Figure 23.  Battle of Britain Memorial Flight over Buckingham Palace, July 2005 
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These were numbers unimaginable ƚŽƚŚŽƐĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĨůǇŝŶŐŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞin the 
1960s, 1970s and on into the early 1980s, which brings us to the first episode in the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-war performance career.  If the Spitfire virtually disappeared from the air 
after its withdrawal from the annual Battle of Britain flypast in 1959, how did it continue to 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵ ?,ŽǁĚŝĚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĞƉŝƐŽĚĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-war career actually take place?  
The answer lies in the hands of thousands upon thousands of twelve-year old boys.
 589
  
Thanks to a company that made plastic model kits, and their chosen marketing strategy, 
there was in fact no performance void left by the disappearance of the Spitfire from the 
British skies for almost twenty-five years.        
 
The Spitfire Remodelled 
In 2012 Ralph Ehrmann, the former chairman of Airfix Industries, was interviewed on behalf 
of the Museum of Childhood.  Near the end of a wide ranging interview he told a story from 
his time as chairman of Airfix in the mid 1970s.
590
  This was a golden time for Airfix, when 
the company could barely keep up with demand for its products.    
There was a youngster who sent us a half a crown or something like that, and said 
ŚĞ ?ƐŚĂĚƐƵĐŚĂǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵůƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƵŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝs to help you 
build more kits and so on.  And so we immediately sent him a large parcel of kits and 
so he obviously started this correspondence a bit further.  And at a Toy Fair, 
probably Nuremburg, sitting there drinking late at night with other people, I told the 
ƐƚŽƌǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐǇŽƵŶŐďŽǇǁŚŽ ?ĚƐĞŶƚŚŝƐƉŽĐŬĞƚŵŽŶĞǇƚŽƵƐĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ
ůĂƵŐŚŝŶŐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞ ?ĚĚŽŶĞŝƚƚŽĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇĞůƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ĚĂůůƐĞŶƚŚŝŵĨƌĞĞďŝĞƐ ?591 
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 &Žƌ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ĂƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐĞĞDĂƌŬZŽƐĞŵĂŶ ?ĞĚ ? ) ?
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History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 150-165.  
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That boy was called James May, a self-appointed construction-kit connoisseur, who would 
grow up to become a chronicler of British toys.  He would even go on to make a television 
documentary about the Airfix Spitfire in 2009 with the co-operation of the Royal Air Force 
Museum, Cosford.
592
   ‘/ƚŚĂĚƚŽďĞĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ? ?ƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ was the first plane that 
Airfix modelled and it is still the best-ƐĞůůŝŶŐŝƌĨŝǆŬŝƚŽĨĂůůƚŝŵĞ ? ?593  May was correct.594  At 
its sales peak in the late 1960s and early to mid 1970s, Airfix sold approximately 350,000 
model Spitfire kits a year, a colossal figure put into perspective when today a successful kit 
is counted in four not six figures.
595
  It was a golden period for British toy manufacturers and 
ŝƌĨŝǆǁĂƐĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞŵĂŶǁŚŽŚĂĚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚDĂǇ ?ƐĐĂŶŶǇ
adolescent letter, Ralph Ehrmann.
596
   
Ralph Ehrmann was born in Leipzig in 1925 into a moderately well-to-do Jewish household.  
His father was a businessman who had worked apparently in the German secret service 
during the First World War and it was contacts made in that secret service world that saw 
his father bring his family over to England in 1932.  Ehrmann attended school in London 
followed by college in Leeds.  After his war service he joined the newly constituted 
merchant bank, S. G. Warburg & Co., as a management trainee.  Siegmund Warburg, his 
new employer, farmed him out to a number of businesses the bank held interests in, both to 
aid his business education and to watch over and report back on that interest.  It was while 
on secondment to the British Division of the famous German toy train manufacturer Bing 
that the twenty-five year old Ehrmann was appointed assistant manager to Nicholas Kove, 
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  ‘ŝƌĨŝǆ ? ?WůƵŵWŝĐƚƵƌĞƐ, 27 October 2009. 
593
  ‘:ĂŵĞƐDĂǇ ?ƐŝƌĨŝǆ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ PĂĐŬďǇWŽƉƵůĂƌĞŵĂŶĚ ? ?
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 ƌƚŚƵƌtĂƌĚŝƐŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?,ĞŚĂƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚĂůůƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƉůĂǇĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĨix story apart 
from Nicholas Kove.  According to Sarah Frame, Brand Manager Hornby Hobbies Ltd, the Airfix archive is 
incomplete and what remains is presently closed to scholars.  This does not mean there are no archives to 
view.  As a listed company Airfiǆ ?ƐĂŶŶƵĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇƐĂůĞƐ
and marketing reports.  Of particular note is a cache of internal reports from the 1970s held at the Surrey 
History Centre (SHC). 
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 Arthur Ward, dŚĞŽǇƐ ?ŽŽŬŽĨŝƌĨŝǆ PtŚŽ^ays You Ever Have To Grow Up (London: Ebury, 2009), p. 7. 
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 ŝƌĨŝǆŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ?ƐŚĂĚƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞh<ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŬŝƚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?^ĞĞĞĂŵŝƐŚ ?K ?<ĞůůǇ ?
Review of the United Kingdom Toy Industry  ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ PĞĂŵŝƐŚ ?K ?<ĞůůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?dŚĞbest single volume 
study of the British toy industry remains Kenneth Brown, The British Toy Business: A History since 1700 




problematic and Siegmund Warburg suspected bad management.
597
   
Kove had set up premises in Hampstead Road, London NW1, acquired a moulding machine 
on credit and had begun stamping out plastic injection moulded combs.  Combs were soon 
followed by another useful item for the pocket, cigarette lighters.  Kove prospered and more 
injection moulding machines were acquired.  When ZĂůƉŚŚƌŵĂŶŶĂƌƌŝǀĞĚĂƐ<ŽǀĞ ?Ɛ
assistant in 1950, Airfix were still stamping out combs and lighters but was increasingly 
turning to toys such as baby soothers, tricycles and a new line, plastic toy soldiers.  In 1950 
these new lines were beginning to turn a useful profit but not yet useful enough to replace 
the faltering performance of old lines, specifically, the plastic comb.
598
        
On joining the company, Ehrmann found it had seven moulding machines but only two were 
actually working.  The other five were being cannibalised to keep the two running as there 
was no money for spares.  What was urgently needed was new product, something to 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĐĂƐŚĨůŽǁ ?:ŝŵZƵƐƐŽŶ ?ĂtŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐ ?ďƵǇĞƌ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŽŚƌŵĂŶŶƚŚĂƚŝƌĨŝǆ
should produce something in kit ĨŽƌŵǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƐŽůĚĂƚĂtŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐ ?ƉƌŝĐĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ
a bargain not a premium price.  Russon suggested a miniature ship.  He knew that 
tŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐ ?h^ƐƚŽƌĞƐǁĞƌĞĚŽŝŶŐŐŽŽĚďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐǁŝƚŚĂƐŚŝƉ-in-a-bottle version of Sir 
&ƌĂŶĐŝƐƌĂŬĞ ?ƐĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉƚŚĞGolden Hind.  Why not have Airfix manufacture this, minus the 
bottle, as a kit? 
Designing the product was straightforward compared to agreeing upon a suitable retail 
ƉƌŝĐĞ ?/ƚƚŽŽŬůĂƚĞƌĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨ<ŽǀĞ ?:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂǇ ?ŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨďƵǇĞƌĂŶĚŚƌŵann 
ƚŽƐĂƚŝƐĨǇZƵƐƐŽŶĂŶĚtŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐ ? ‘/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐĂďŽǆĂƌŽƵŶĚŝƚǁŝƚŚĂƉŽůǇƚŚĞŶĞďĂŐ
inside, we thought of a polythene bag with a coloured header which also had the drawings 
of the assembly in it.  And that allowed us to reduce it to about three shillings or three and 
ĞůĞǀĞŶ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?599  It was still not low enough.  The retail price had to be set at two shillings.  
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 ‘ǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞtŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚƐŚĂĚĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƉƌŽĨŝƚŝŶŝƚ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ǁĞŚĂĚƚŽǁƌŝƚĞŽĨĨ
the tool practically and no amortisatioŶŽŶŽƵƌƚŽŽůŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĞƌĞĂůůǇŚĂĚŶŽŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?600   
What saved Ehrmann was a combination of three factors.  Firstly, the new kit was popular, 
which meant re-orders.  Secondly, the polystyrene powder they were using to make the kit 
suddenly switched turned from shortage to surplus with a commensurate impact on its 
ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƉƌŝĐĞ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂǇ ?ƐĞǇĞĨŽƌ ĂŐŽŽĚĚĞĂů ?ŚĞ ‘ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚǀĞƌǇǁĞůů
on printing, on the paper headers and so on, and suddenly we had a real profit which I 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƚĞůůtŽŽůǁŽrths, and we ended up with a net profit of thirty per cent and that is a real 
ůŝĨĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌĂďĂŶŬƌƵƉƚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?601  Very soon the Airfix Collectors Fleet of Classic Ships 
had set sail.  Production batches which had begun at 10,000 units rose to a 100,000 units, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŶŽǁŵĂĚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŵĂůůŵĂƌŐŝŶƐtŽŽůǁŽƌƚŚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŝƚƐƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐ
worked to.  The question soon became what to do next?  The answer was not another ship 
but a fighter plane, the Spitfire.    
The origin of the very first Spitfire kit released in 1953 is shrouded in mystery but the fact of 
its poor quality is not.  What appears to have happened is that this first Spitfire kit was a 
direct copy, errors and all, of a Spitfire kit already being produced by American firm Aurora.  
Neitheƌ:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐďǇƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƌƚŚƵƌtĂƌĚ ?
nor Ralph Ehrmann, when interviewed in 2012 by Juliana Vandegrift for the Museum of 
Childhood, remembered any specific deal having being struck, no licence drawn up.  The 
inĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚĂůůďƵƚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇ:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂǇ ? ‘WůĂŐŝĂƌŝƐŵǁĂƐŶŽƚƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ
1940s and 50s.  Rival manufacturers regularly copied the hard work of competitors by 
ƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŬŝƚƐŝŶƐŝǌĞ ?ƐĐĂůĞ )ĂŶĚĐƵƚƚŝŶŐĂŵŽƵůĚƚŽŽůĨŽƌĂsmaller, 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝĚĞŶƚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞů ? ?602   The upshot of this first flawed model was a flood of complaints 
including several from ex-RAF fitters who had worked on the Spitfire during the war.
603
  It 
was both embarrassing and damaging to a company trying to establish itself in a new 
market.   
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 Ward, ŽǇƐ ?ŽŽŬŽĨŝƌĨŝǆ, p. 48. 
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What Airfix required was a team of skilled draughtsman of their own.   The man they turned 
to was twenty two year old John Edwards.  Edwards was a passionate modeller.  He had 
been employed as an engineering draughtsman at the Crittal Metal window Company 
ďĞĨŽƌĞďĞŝŶŐĐĂůůĞĚƵƉĨŽƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ĚǁĂƌĚƐǁĂƐƚŽĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨĨŝĐĞ
until his untimely death in 1970.  One of his first tasks was to address the problem of the 
flawed Spitfire.  This he now did with a thoroughly convincing design.  It was so convincing 
in fact that it would remain in the Airfix catalogue for the next fifty years.  This 1955 Spitfire 
design established his reputation and it was another Spitfire design he masterminded that 
sealed it.  In 1970 Airfix released its 1:24 scale Spitfire Mk 1A, an ambitious project, the first 
1:24 scale model to be produced by any manufacturer in the world.   It set a new benchmark 
for kit manufacturers.
604
    
Before the Golden Hind kit was released by Airfix in 1952, models on the British market 
were almost invariably made from acetate.  It was not a satisfactory material for the 
purpose.  Acetate is hygroscopic which means it attracts water.  Over time components 
made of acetate will twist which is incompatible witŚĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚǁŚŽƐĞǀĞƌǇƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞ ?ĂƐ
a kit, was components fitting together accurately.   Airfix were not offering kits made of 
acetate but of polystyrene which is not hygroscopic.  Polystyrene, was a new consumer 
material after the war, and would benefit from constant development throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s.
605
  The level of accuracy afforded by the new material was very attractive to 
John Edwards and his team.   ‘tĞďĞĐĂŵĞ ?ƋƵŝƚĞƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ?ǀĞƌǇƉĞƌŶŝĐŬĞƚǇĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ? ? ?ĂƐ:ŽŚŶ
built up the design teams behind us, the designers themselves who were half mad about 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŬŝƚƐŬĞƉƚŽŶĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŚŝŐŚĞƌƋƵĂůŝƚǇĨŽƌƵƐƚŽŐŽĨŽƌ ? ?606  This culture of relentless 
self-improvement at Airfix, is well illustrated by its Spitfire kits.  In 1960, Airfix released a 
modŝĨŝĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨ:ŽŚŶĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞDŬ/y ? It did not have to.  The original 
design was still very popular.     
Quality alone, however, was not enough to generate, let alone guarantee, sales for Airfix.  It 
was but one link in a chain.  The next link was distribution.   ‘KƵƌŬŝƚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
were successful, were in universal high streets.  They would have toys in Woolworths, in W. 
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Page 192 
 
H. Smith  W not toys, kits.  W. H. Smith, Boots, British Home Stores...where you could buy a 
fairly good ƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŬŝƚƐ ? ?607  It was even possible to buy an Airfix kit in the local Post Office.  
The reason why was explained by sales director Peter Mason in 1980.  It speaks volumes 
about the scale and sophistication of the Airfix sales and marketing operation in its pomp.   
In times of economic recession, people do not tend to wander into a toyshop in case 
they feel obliged to purchase an item  W therefore the consumer traffic flow through 
3,000 of our accounts is restricted perhaps nine months of the year.  So we have to 
have our merchandise on sale in outlets where there is a virtually guaranteed 
consumer flow.
608
   
Such availability was of course complemented by an attractive price.  Airfix kits were not 
ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐŐŝĨƚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ďŝƌƚŚĚĂǇƐĂŶĚŚƌŝƐƚŵĂƐ ? ?ďƵƚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƉĞĂƚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?
This demanded pocket-money prices.  The first Spitfire model sold for just two shillings like 
the Golden Hind.  But whose pocket money was it?  Airfix knew precisely who their 
ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌǁĂƐ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŚĂůĨĂŵŝůůŝŽŶďŽǇƐĂyear who move into the 9-14 year age group 
ǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞƐĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŝǌĞŽĨ ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐŐŝƌůƐ ? ?609  They also 
understood that an Airfix kit was not an essential purchase.  Schoolboys had to be 
persuaded to part with their pocket money; a need had to be created.
610
  To do that showed 
more lateral thinking on behalf of Ehrmann and Gray.  With so many individual products to 
promote, they eschewed expensive national advertising and decided to let the product 
advertise itself.   
At its most ƉƌŽƐĂŝĐďŽǆĂƌƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐĂŶŝŶŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐĐĂƐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂďĞůŚĞĂĚĞƌ ?ŝƐĂŶ
illustration of the constructed kit whose component parts the customer is holding in his or 
her hands.  In the early 1980s, after Palitoy had taken over Airfix, US legislators insisted that 
this concept had to be taken literally, that is, box art had to be a photographic record of a 
ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚŵŽĚĞů ?ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐůĞƐƐ ? ‘ŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇŚĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƉĂĐŬĂŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ
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ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ?611  The reason why is that good box art aspires to be so much more than mere 
record.    
The doyen of Airfix box art was Roy Cross.  Between 1964 and 1974, when kit sales were at 
their peak, he painted over 200 illustrations for Airfix, not least those for the Airfix Spitfire.  
Cross was born on London in 1924, the son of a plumber.  After the war he joined a 
commercial studio where his training to become a commercial illustrator really began.  
Throughout the 1950s, he worked as a freelance but he was always drawn towards 
illustrating aircraft.  He was commissioned by The Air Training Corps Gazette, the industry 
journals Flight and Aeroplane and illustrated a set of album cards for Brooke-Bond on the 
history of aviation.  In 1964, Cross, always on the look-out for new work, spotted an 
opportunity.   ‘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐ in Woolworths one day, I espied the Airfix plastic kits, packed in 
transparent bags with an illustrated titled header, mostly of aircraft models.  The headers 
ŚĂĚĐŽůŽƵƌĞĚůŝŶĞĂƌƚǁŽƌŬ ?/ŬŶĞǁ/ĐŽƵůĚĚŽďĞƚƚĞƌĂŶĚǁƌŽƚĞƚŽŝƌĨŝǆƚŽƚĞůůƚŚĞŵƐŽ ? ?612  
His first commission was for a Dornier DO 217. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Roy Cross, Box Art Illustrator 
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What are the technical demands box art places upon the artist?  Roy Cross himself explains.  
 ‘WĂŝŶƚŝŶŐĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŚĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ on the most attractive 
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞĨŽƌĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŝŶĨůŝŐŚƚŚĂƐƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐǁŝƚŚƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŽĨĨĂƐŝƚƚĞƌ ?ƐďĞƐƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?613  
Recording the finer features of an Airfix kit accurately was, however, mandatory.  There 
would have been few commissions for the illustraƚŽƌǁŚŽĨŽƌŐŽƚƚŚĂƚŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞƐƚĞĚƵƉŽŶƐĐƌƵƉƵůŽƵƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞƚĂŝů ?ZŽǇƌŽƐƐǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌŶŽŝůůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ‘ŝĨ:ŽŚŶ'ƌĂǇ
ǁĂŶƚĞĚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞƚŝŶŝĞƐƚĚĞƚĂŝůĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?ĂŵĞŶĚŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞ ? ?614  This imperative to 
be precise, made demands of the meĚŝƵŵĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĂƌƚŝƐƚ ?ƌŽƐƐ ?ƐŽǁŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŝƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ
one much favoured by commercial artists of the time, was Gouache, a form of watercolour 
but thicker and opaque rather than transparent.  One of its key attributes is that light does 
not bleed through from the white paper ground but is provided instead by the white 
pigment in the paint instead.  As a result Gouache offers a much more brilliant and intense 
light than can be achieved with traditional watercolour.  Like any watercolour Gouache 
accepts detail and just as important, bearing in mind a client like John Gray, allows it to be 
removed with a little dampening of the surface.  When these qualities were combined in the 
hands of a master like Roy Cross box art took on a sense not of record, of something 
approaching Photorealism but of Hyperrealism.  Textures, surfaces, lighting effects and 
shadows all appeared that much clearer than was possible in any photograph. 
tĞŶŽǁĐŽŵĞƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƚŚĂƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĨƌŽŵ
the air for twenty-five years after its withdrawal from the annual Battle of Britain flypast in 
1959.  It was because of the outstanding performance characteristics of the Spitfire in the 
hands of our notional twelve year old boy.  It will be useful to examine these in three ways.  
First, where does play stop and performance begin?  How do we separate the two?  Second, 
performance is defined by an examination and re-configuration ŽĨĂ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ, 
for our purposes, the myth of the Battle of Britain.  Can we see it taking place?  Finally, and 
perhaps most intriguingly, how can a plastic toy possibly be an authentic airworthy Spitfire?  
How might it possess the  ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ ? ? 
                                                     
613
 Arthur Ward, Celebration of Flight: The Aviation Art of Roy Cross (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 2002), p. 26. 
614
 Ward, BoǇƐ ?ŽŽŬŽĨŝƌĨŝǆ, p. 107. 
Page 195 
 
We ďĞŐŝŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞďŽǇŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?tŚĂƚŝƐŚĞĚŽŝŶŐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ĐŚĞĐŚŶĞƌ ? ‘ƉůĂǇ
ĂŶĚƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂƌĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?615  What Schechner means is that play and 
performance share a common base.  Play like performance, is defined in action.
616
   ‘WůĂǇŝƐ
often an orderly sequence of actions performed in specified places for known durations of 
ƚŝŵĞ ? ?617  This might be a description of a Spitfire flypast, a rehearsed sequence along a 
defined flight line over a set time.  Play like performance is also a form of instruction, a way 
ŽĨŵĂŬŝŶŐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?WůĂǇ ‘ŽĨƚĞŶƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐĂĐƌƵĐŝďůĞŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůǁĞƵƚŝůŝǌĞŝŶƚŚĞ
 “ƌĞĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚŽĨ “ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĨŽƵŶĚ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ Ě ?ĂŶĚĐĂƐƚŝŶƚŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŶĞǁ
ĨŽƌŵƐ ? ?618  This is a familiar trope too.  Roger Caillois illustrates how closely related play and 
performance are ? ‘ŐĂŵĞƚŚĂƚŝƐĞƐƚĞĞŵĞĚďǇĂƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂǇĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞďĞƵƚŝůŝǌĞĚƚŽ
ĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůŽƌŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƉƌŽŽĨŽĨŝƚƐƉƌĞĐŝse meaning, 
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽŝƚƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞďǇĂĐĐĞŶƚƵĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?619    
It is when Caillois identifies another property common to play and performance that a 
dividing line appears.  Play and performance each takes the participant somewhere else 
from his or her everyday reality.  Where they go, however, is a mark of difference between 
play and performance.  Caillois describes play as taking place in an imaginary, illusory, make-
believe world.
620
  This is not the world of performance.  On the contrary, it is not a conjured 
world, but ĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĂĐĞ ? ‘ĂƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚƐŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌŶƚƉůĂŶĞ ? ?621  A successful 
performance has nothing to do with the world of make-believe.  It is real.  We might 
remember the hushed crowd at the sight and sound of a Spitfire flypast.  What they were 
experiencing was not born of an illusion.      
Play and performance share a common base and our notional twelve year old is clearly 
ƉůĂǇŝŶŐďƵƚŝƐŚĞĂůƐŽĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞďŽǇ ?ƐŵĞntal landscape.   Is it 
possible to perceive an act of re-ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ?ŝŶŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ
with his Spitfire Airfix model?  It cannot be his actual memory of course, not for a twelve 
year old boy in 1953 when the first Airfix Spitfire was introduced.  To help us reveal that 
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mental landscape we can turn to the work of cultural historians Graham Dawson and 
Michael Paris.   
Graham Dawson would probably be more interested in the mind of the boy than the model 
of the Spitfire.  In his Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of 
Masculinities  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂǁƐŽŶǁĂŶƚƐƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĨĂƐcination and excitement 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚĨŽƌŵĞŶĂŶĚďŽǇƐďǇƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐŝĚĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?622  His is a gendered approach.  He 
ŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉĞĂůŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽůĚŝĞƌŚĞƌŽ ?ĂƐƉĞƌƐŽŶŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞůŝŬĞƐŽĨ^ŝƌ,ĞŶƌǇ
Havelock and T. E. Lawrence.  It is a thought-provŽŬŝŶŐĐŚŽŝĐĞŐŝǀĞŶĂǁƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ‘/ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞŚĞƌŽĞƐŵĞĞƚƐ ŚĞǁŝƐŚƚŽĨŝǆŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶ
ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ?/ƚŽĨĨĞƌƐƚŚĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞŽĨĂĐůĞĂƌůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĂďůĞŐĞŶĚĞƌŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?623  Such a 
conclusion applies to our notional young man too ĂƐŚĞ ‘ĨůŝĞƐ ?ŚŝƐƉůĂƐƚŝĐ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ.  DaǁƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
central argument, the relationship between hero and acolyte, finds its corroboration in 
DĂƌƚŝŶ&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ ?The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 (2008).624  But 
ĂǁƐŽŶ ?Ɛ central argument tells us little about any re-ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?/ƚŝƐŚŝƐ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝǀĞƉŚƌĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ and excitement ? ?ǁŚĂƚŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐĂ
 ‘ŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶĞƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ-ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƉŽŝŶƚƐƵƐŝŶƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?625     
This is where the work of Michael Paris begins.  Paris is not interested specifically in gender.  
/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?WĂƌŝƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇƵŶŚŝƚĐŚĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƐĐƵůŝŶĞĨƌŽŵĂǁƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝǀĞƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?WĂƌŝƐ
wants to work only within the parameters of what he now describes as an un-hyphenated 
 ‘ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?626  According to Paris this is a culture that has transformed war 
into entertaining spectacle, an exciting adventure narrative fit for popular mass 
entertainment.
627
  Paris ranges from the age of Victoria to the turn of the millennium but it 
is what he has to say about the Second World War which is of direct relevance here.         
Paris explains that it was not until the early to mid-1950s that the events of 1939-45 were 
finally considered a suitable vehicle for popular entertainment.  A lingering war-weariness 
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had seen to that.
628
  It was in the 1950s, ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽWĂƌŝƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĂĨĂĚŝŶŐ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ŚŽƌƌŝĨŝĐĞǀĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌůĞĨƚĂƌĞƐŝĚƵĞŽĨ ‘ĨŝŶĞƐƚŚŽƵƌŶŽƐƚĂůŐŝĂ ?which collided with the 
formation of a lucrative new market for leisure and entertainment tailored towards the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐǇŽƵƚŚ ?629  tŚĂƚĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁĂƐƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŝŶĞƐƚŚŽƵƌŶŽƐƚĂůŐŝĂ ?which proved so appealing 
to the young?  According to Paris, it was a war that had been depoliticized and sanitised.
630
  
Gone was any discussion of the causes of the war.  Gone too were the uncomfortable 
realities of war, the evils of Nazism and what it had taken to destroy it.  What was also 
ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ ‘ĨŝŶĞƐƚŚŽƵƌŶŽƐƚĂůŐŝĂ ?ǁĂƐany ŝĚĞĂŽĨĂ ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ? ?631 This general 
shift of emphasis was most obvious at the cinema.  War films in the 1950s were very 
different from war films in the 1940s.  Gone was the united nation in the fight against 
EĂǌŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚďĂĐŬǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞĐůĂƐƐ ‘ƐŽůĚŝĞƌŚĞƌŽ ?ůĂƐƚƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?632  In films like 
The Dam Busters (1955), Reach for the Sky (1956), and Ill Met by Moonlight (1957), our 
impressionable young boy would have watched Richard Todd, Kenneth More and Dirk 
Bogarde winning the war in well-modulated tones.           
How do we link this new pleasure culture of war in the 1950s directly to the Airfix Spitfire?  
Specifically, how do we tell the difference between a performance act and an act of play?  
There is a common base supporting play and performance but the biggest difference 
between the two is one of perception, of awareness.  Play exists in a world of make-believe, 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ?/ƚŝŶŚĂďŝƚƐĂ ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚƐŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉůĂŶĞĨƌŽŵ “ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?633  Is this  ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?where our Airfix Spitfire takes our young man?    
To find out we need to think about the Airfix Spitfire in terms of what it signifies.  These 
messages are sent as signs.  Signs are made up of two components, the signifier, an image, 
sound or word, our clothes for instance and the signified, the concept or meaning it 
ĞŵďŽĚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽƵƌǁĞĂůƚŚĂŶĚƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ ? ‘^ĞŵŝŽůŽŐǇƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŽĨ
conventions and distinctions that enable a group of objects to have particular meanings for 
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social members  W ĂƐƐŝŐŶƐ ? ?634  Signs always have a referent, in our example above, the coat 
or jacket we put on in the morning.  It was Jean Baudrillard who suggested a radical shift in 
semiology.  This was the disappearance of the referent.  According to Baudrillard, such is the 
dominance of signs in his modern world of 1981, that they no longer refer to an original.  
ĂƵĚƌŝůůĂƌĚŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚǁĞůŝǀĞŝŶĂǁŽƌůĚŽĨƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďǇŵŽĚĞůƐŽĨĂƌĞĂů
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽƌŝŐŝŶŽƌƌĞĂůŝƚǇ PĂŚǇƉĞƌƌĞĂů ? ?635   
The hyperreal world is not one of copy and imitation.  In his famous example, an illness 
imitated can be detected.  An illness simulated, a psychosomatic illness for instance, will 
ŚĂǀĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƐǇŵƉƚŽŵƐ ?ĂƵĚƌŝůůĂƌĚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂŶŝůůŶĞƐǁŝƚŚƐǇŵƉƚŽŵƐŵƵƐƚďĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ?
whether the result of simulation or a pathological condition.  Baudrillard takes us into a 
world of artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, of cloning and virtual reality.  It is a 
world where the original, the referent, has become obsolete.  Not everyone agrees.  
BaudriůůĂƌĚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚƐĂůůĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĚŽĞƐŚĂǀĞŝƚƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?ƵůƚƵƌĂů
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ^ĂůůǇĂŶĞƐŝƐŽŶĞ ? ‘EŽƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞǁŚŽĂŶĂůǇǌĞƐĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŽĚĂǇ-including myself-may 
go as far as Baudrillard in declaring all experience nothing more than a form of hyperreality 
generated by a forest of signs.  After all, my passport photos do have a referent, even if 
ƉŚŽƚŽƐŽĨDŝĐŬĞǇDŽƵƐĞĚŽŶŽƚ ? ?636   
ĂŶĞƐ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŽĨDŝĐŬĞǇDŽƵƐĞŝƐĂƉƉŽƐŝƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŚǇƉĞƌƌĞĂůĚŽĞƐ
mainly find its representation today as an image.  We are beginning our journey back to the 
box art of Roy Cross.  Hyperrealism as a term of reference for a work of art was probably 
first coined as late as 1973 by Isy Brachot.
637
  He chose it as the title of a major exhibition at 
his gallery in Brussels which was actually an exhibition dominated by American Photorealists 
like Chuck Close, Robert Bechtle, Ralph Gorings and Don Eddy.  Nevertheless, he had 
identified, and labelled, something new.  What was new was the addition of elements of 
narrative and emotion to the strictly imitative approach of the Photorealists.  Hyperrealist 
art sought to describe a wholly new reality, one, as suggested by Baudrillard, without 
referents.          
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 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 
1994), p. 21. 
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 Ibid., p. 1. 
636
 ^ĂůůǇĂŶĞƐ ? ‘tŝůůƚŚĞZĞĂů ? ? ?WůĞĂƐĞ^ƚĂŶĚƵƉ ? PŶ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ/ƐƐƵĞ ? ?Drama Review, 34 (1990), p. 21. 
637
 Žď>ĂŶƐƌŽƚŚ ? ‘,ǇƉĞƌƌĞĂůŝƐŵŝŶƌƚ PhůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ŝƐŝƚƌƚŽƌ^Ŭŝůů ? ?AMwww.widewalls.ch/hyperrealismart-
style.com> [accessed 12 August 2017]. 
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tĞĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŽƐƚƵĚǇ ‘ŚŝŐŚ ?ĂƌƚƚŽƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŽthis world of simulation nor do we have to 
wait until 1973.  All we have to do is study the box art of Roy Cross.  An outstanding 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝƐŚŝƐ ? ? ? ?ƉĂŝŶƚŝŶŐŽĨĂ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĨŽƌŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐŶĞǁƐƵƉĞƌŬŝƚ ?dŽƐĞĞŝƚĂƐŽƵƌŶŽƚŝŽŶĂů
twelve-year old boy saw it, as a simulation, not an imitation of a Spitfire, is to begin with its 
textures, surfaces, shadows and lighting effects.  Such is their sharpness that together they 
offer a level of definition impossible to capture in any photograph.  In 1970, the BBMF 
certainly had no Spitfire that looked quite like this.  In fact, there never had been a Spitfire 
that looked like this.  Roy Cross has also added that element of emotion and drama that 
ƚĂŬĞƐŚŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶďĞǇŽŶĚŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽƉǇ ?/ŶZŽǇƌŽƐƐ ?ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞthere is a story 
unfolding which is being offered up to the viewer.  Art historian, Theodore Schenk, explains 
that the viewer of a hyperreal painting is being asked not to interpret the image, but to 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƚ ? ‘&ŽĐƵƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞƐƵƌĨĂĐĞ ?ŶŽƚŽŶǁŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞŝŵƉůŝĞĚ ? ?638  There is no 
requirement for interpretation.  Adam Tooby, a modern master of the genre, underscores 
ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ ? ‘/ƚůĞƚƐŵǇŵŝŶĚǁĂŶĚĞƌŽĨĨĂŶĚďĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĐĂƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞŝŶ
ĨƌŽŶƚŽĨŵĞ ? ?639                     
Is this Hyperreal painting by Roy Cross (Figure 25) an image of an alternative reality?  It 
might just be for an imaginative twelve-year old boy.  It was deliberately designed to 
confound him.  In this alternative space, we also find that re-ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? so 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĂĐƚ ?dŚĞŶĞǁ ‘ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĂǁ
ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƉƵƚŽƵƌǇŽƵŶŐŵĂŶŝŶƚŽ
uniform.  It was to be his war, his heroics, his adventure and of course his Spitfire.  Roy Cross 
in his box art made this act of transference very easy. 
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 dŚĞŽĚŽƌĞ^ĐŚĞŶŬ ? ‘ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂŽŽů ? ?Performing Arts Journal, 4 (1980), p. 73. 
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Figure 25.  Box Art for the Airfix 1:24 scale Spitfire 'Superkit' 
 
Box art as hyperreal painting is a narrative art form but it was one born out of a 
representational genre.
640
  Roy Cross was always ready to cite the influence upon him of 
war artist Frank Wootton.
641
  Wootton, a commercial artist before the war, was never 
employed or commissioned by the WAAC.  Official recognition only came in 1944, when he 
was created a Special Duties Officer by Air Chief Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, with a 
roving commission.  Wootton, like Cross, understood the requirements of his paymaster.  
,ĞĚĞƉŝĐƚĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞZŽǇĂůŝƌ&ŽƌĐĞĂƐŝƚǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽďĞƐĞŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞĂůůŝĨĞĂĐĐƵƌĂĐǇƵŶƚĂŝŶƚĞĚďǇ
ƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůǀŝĞǁƐŽĨƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐŝĂůtĂƌƌƚŝƐƚƐ ? ?tŽŽƚƚŽŶǁĂƐĂŵĂƐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
representational genre, but unlike Cross, he painted specific events with identifiable actors.  
In 1978, for instance, he painted a picture of Douglas Bader called Bader Bale Out.  Paul 
ƌŝĐŬŚŝůů ?ĂĚĞƌ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂĐƚŵŽŵĞŶƚtŽŽƚƚŽŶĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐŽŶĐĂŶǀĂƐ ? ‘,Ğ
                                                     
640
 ^ĞĞ>ƵƚŚĞƌ'ŽƌĞ ? ‘dŚĞtŝŶŐĞĚWĂŝŶƚďƌƵƐŚ PǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ'ĞŶƌĞƌƚ ? ?Leonardo, 21 (1988), pp. 71-75.  
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 Cross, More Vintage Years, p. 10. 
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struggled madly to get his head above the windscreen and suddenly felt he was being 
sucked out as the tearing wind caught him.  Top half out.  He was out!  No, something had 
him by the leg, holding him.  Then the nightmare took his exposed body and beat him and 
screamed and roared in his ears as the broken fighter dragging him by the leg plunged down 
ĂŶĚƐƉƵŶĂŶĚďĂƚƚĞƌĞĚŚŝŵ ? ?642  What Wootton made of this moment is emotive, dramatic, 
but Roy Cross could never have painted it for Airfix.  It would have been rejected by 
Ehrmann and Gray.  They understood just as Roy Cross understood that a small boy did not 
want to imagine Douglas Bader struggling to escape from his stricken Spitfire.  He wanted to 
imagine himself.  Box art, in all its deliberate anonymity, gave him that opportunity.   
There is one more point to consider about that hyperreal Spitfire as depicted by Roy Cross.   
ƐŽƵƌŶŽƚŝŽŶĂůďŽǇƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚŝƚƚŽďĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ?ƐŽŝƚǁĂƐĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐ ?/ƚŚĂĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚ ? ?/ƚƐƚŽod testimony to the history it experienced.  What that testimony was, was the 
suitably re-adjusted myth of 1940, an adjustment ŶŽǁĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŝƚƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶĂ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ‘ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĨŽƌƵƐďǇ'ƌĂŚĂŵĂǁƐŽŶĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞůWĂƌŝƐ ?ŽǆĂƌƚŝŶƚŚe 
hands of a master like Roy Cross did offer a ride in an authentic Spitfire in a world fit for 
heroes.  Perhaps one of the greatest public ĐŽŵƉůŝŵĞŶƚƐƉĂŝĚƚŽZŽǇƌŽƐƐ ?ƐŬŝůůĂƐĂ
hyperreal painter was by the toy chronicler and film-maker James May.  May was 
commissioned by the BBC in 2009 to make a series of films on the history of post-war toys.  
 ‘dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŚŝŶŐ/ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞToy Stories series was to build an Airfix model the size of a 
ƌĞĂůĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚ/ ?ĚĂůǁĂǇƐŝŵĂŐŝŶĞĚĚŽŝŶŐ ĂƐĂĐŚŝůĚ ? ?643  What the 
viewers saw on 27 October 2009 was a film about the construction of a Spitfire kit, a 
fibreglass model Spitfire to a scale of 1:1.  James May, in an act of intellectual bravado, had 
created an imitation, a copy, of a Baudrillard simulacrum. 
In 1969, Airfix was at the start of what was to be a golden period in its short independent 
history.  Turnover and pre-tax profit for the year 1968-69 were £6,418,000 and £725,000 
respectively.
644
  Five years later and the figures for 1973-74 were an impressive £17,756,000 
and £2,059,000.
645
  /Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ZĂůƉŚŚƌŵĂŶŶ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐŚŝƐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĂƌĞůǇ
ĐŽŶĐĞĂůŚŝƐĚĞůŝŐŚƚ ? ‘/ĨŝŶĚŝƚŚĂƌĚŶŽƚƚŽďĞĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚŝĐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?/ŶĂůů
                                                     
642
 Paul Brickhill, Reach for the Sky: The Story of Douglas Bader (London: W. W. Norton, 1958), p. 221. 
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 May, The Airfix Handbook, p. 6. 
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  ‘ŝƌĨŝǆ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ>ŝŵŝƚĞĚ ? ?The Times, 8 July 1970, p. 22. 
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  ‘ŝƌĨŝǆWƌŽĨŝƚhƉ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Financial Times, 12 July 1974, p. 26. 
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sections of the business, new products are creating exciting prospects and mounting order 
ďŽŽŬƐ ? ?646  It was not a new product that was leading the way however.  Between 1969 and 
1974 sales of the Spitfire kit were at their absolute peak.  ŚƌŵĂŶŶ ?ƐďƵůůŝƐŚŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
report would soon come back to haunt him. 
The Christmas selling season of 1977 was not a good one for the British toy industry.  
Ehrmann described it as a disaster and for Airfix it was; profits fell from £4.03 million to 
£2.69 million.
647
  These were difficult trading conditions for everyone.  High interest rates 
had dramatically increased the cost of borrowing.  The strength of sterling meant that 
British exports were as expensive as imports were cheap.  The British toy industry simply 
ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŽŶƉƌŝĐĞĂŶĚ ?ǁŽƌƐĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůŝŶ to compete on new products too.648  
ǀĞŶŝƌĨŝǆ ?Ɛ^ĞƌŝĞƐKŶĞŬŝƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƉŽĐŬĞƚŵŽŶĞǇƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďƵŝůƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ǁĞƌĞ
ŶŽƚƐĞůůŝŶŐĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ? ‘dŚĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨĂůů^Ğƌŝ ƐKŶĞŬŝƚƐŝƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƌĞĂŽĨ
concern...particularly aircraft and military vehicles over the three year period with an overall 
ĚƌŽƉŽĨ ? ?A? ? ?649  The cheap imports now flooding in from Asia were in fact harbingers of a 
new electronic age in the world of toys, and British manufacturers were being left behind.  It 
did not end well for Airfix.  At Christmas 1980, Ehrmann went to the banks with a proposal.  
 ‘/ĨŝƌĨŝǆǁĂƐƚŽƐƵƌǀŝǀĞŝƚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďĂŶŬƐŚĂĚƚŽďĞĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚ
buy directly into the company by converting some of its debt to equity  W e.g. swapping their 
ůŽĂŶƐĨŽƌƐŚĂƌĞƐ ?dŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂƐŬĞĚ ?ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŽƚĂŬĞĂŶĞǀĞŶďŝŐŐĞƌƐƚĂŬĞŝŶŝƌĨŝǆ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?
tŚĂƚĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƐŬĞĚ ?ŶĚƚŚĞǇƌĞĨƵƐĞĚ ? ?650     
The banks were, as it turned out, justifiably concerned about the future.  In 1978 a new 
video arcade game was released by Taito Corporation of Japan.  Three years later it arrived 
in Britain.  Writing in the Observer only a week after the collapse of Airfix, journalist Jane 
McLoughlin looked forward to the toy fair which was about to open at LondoŶ ?ƐĂƌůƐŽƵƌƚ ?
 ‘KŶĞƐĂĚĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞdŽǇ&ĂŝƌŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞdŽǇŽĨzĞĂƌŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞŚŽŵĞ-produced: 
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  ‘ŝƌĨŝǆ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐ>ƚĚ ? ? ?The Times, 19 Sept. 1974, p. 22. 
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  ‘dƌŽƵďůĞŝŶdŽǇƚŽǁŶĂƐŝƌĨŝǆŝĞƐ ? ?Guardian, 30 Jan. 1981, p. 23. 
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the Japanese-ŵĂĚĞ “^ƉĂĐĞ/ŶǀĂĚĞƌƐ ?ŝƐƚŝƉƉĞĚƚŽǁŝŶ ? ?651  The toy market was on the move 
in the late 1970s and Airfix had been left behind.      
The Airfix Spitfire did crash land on the eve of 1981 but there was another Spitfire in 
performance ready to take its place.  An important strand to the Airfix marketing strategy in 
the 1960s was Airfix Magazine.  It was established in 1960 and was subsidised by the 
company throughout its life.  At its peak, in the early 1970s, it sold a healthy 100,000 copies 
a month.
652
  In its February 1969 edition, features writer Michael Bowyer previewed the 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĞǁĨŝůŵĨŽƌŚŝƐǇŽƵŶŐƌĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ‘^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŚŽuld see the premiere of 
what may well be the most exciting aviation film of them all, The Battle of Britain.  For 
enthusiast and modeller alike it will certainly be a star attraction.  Its subject is such that the 
film will doubtless be one of the most eagĞƌůǇĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇĂĚĂǇ ? ?653  He was quite 
wrong about that but in terms of the next Spitfire performance it hardly mattered.   
 
The Fighter Redisplayed 
/ƚǁĂƐĂůŵŽƐƚĞǆĂĐƚůǇĂǇĞĂƌďĞĨŽƌĞDŝĐŚĂĞůŽǁǇĞƌ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŝŶAirfix Mgazine that 
the press got confirmation that a film about the Battle of Britain was going to go ahead. 
The Battle of Britain Begins on Sunday 
The Battle of Britain is on. After the postponement of the £4,000,000 epic last year  W 
and with United Artists now releasing the film-producer Harry Saltzman will set the 
cameras turning in Spain on Sunday. 
S. Benjamin Fisz will be the co-producer and Guy Hamilton will direct. Freddie Young, 
twice Academy Award winner, will photograph the film. 
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 ‘dŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ǁŝůůďĞŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚĨŝůŵƐĞǀĞƌŵĂĚĞ ? ‘>ŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇŝƚŝƐ




During the weeks of summer shooting in 1968, as Christopher Plummer, Robert Shaw and 
Michael Caine climbed in and out of their Spitfires and Hurricanes, a strange phenomenon 
could be observed.   ‘'ƵĂƌĚĚŽŐƐŚĂĚƚŽďĞĐĂůůĞĚŝŶƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞƉůĂŶĞƐĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĚĂƚ
Duxford airfield for location shooting of The Battle of Britain.  Protection was needed 
because at weekends hundreds of sightseers trampled nearby cornfields to get a look at the 
ƉůĂŶĞƐ ? ?655  Michael Bowyer, writing his article on the film production for his young Airfix 
Magazine readers, understood exactly ǁŚĂƚƚŚŽƐĞƐŝŐŚƚƐĞĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŚŽƉŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞ ? ‘^ĞǀĞŶ
Spitfires repeatedly peeling off for the cameraman in the helicopter one afternoon was a 
ƐŝŐŚƚƚŽďĞŚŽůĚĂŶĚƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĚĂǇĂŶĚĂŐĞ ? ?656   
For the aviation enthusiast, multiple Spitfires in the air were indeed a sight to treasure.   This 
especially after twelve years in which the BBMF had struggled to fly even one.  Peter Arnold, 
Spitfire researcher and air photographer, explains the significance of the film in terms of his 
own developing interest as well as that of a nascent warbird community. 
By the mid-1950s the aircraft of World War Two were my main interest and I was 
first in line to buy the new Airfix Spitfire for a couple of shillings (10p) at Woolworths 
in 1955.  Move the clock forward to 2009 and I joined the team compiling the new 
Spitfire Survivors  W Then and Now book.  This major reference work details the 
Spitfires, Seafires or substantial parts thereof that had made it past January 1, 
1970...The 1970 date was set as it was shortly after the London premiere of the film 
Battle of Britain, a semiŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ‘ǁĂƌďŝƌĚ ?ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŚŝĐŚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽ
flourish after this potent stimulus.
657
     
What exactly is a warbird?  A warbird is a vintage military aircraft, jet or piston.  The warbird 
movement, to which Peter Arnold refers to, is a self-regulating community which grew out 
of recognition by three disparate groups that self interest was better served together.  This 
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mutually supportive coalition today consists of the Historic Aircraft Association, private 
owners and operators and the RAF, specifically the BBMF.  What they did better together, 
was and remains the organisation and regulation of airshows.    
Peter Teichman, the owner of the Hangar 11 Collection which today operates a Spitfire, a 
Hurri Bomber (the bomber version of a Hurricane), a Kittyhawk and a Mustang likes to make 
ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽƵĚďŽĂƐƚ ? ‘ŝƌƐŚŽǁƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚůĂƌŐĞƐƚƐƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌƐƉŽƌƚŝŶƚŚĞh<ĂĨƚĞƌ
ĨŽŽƚďĂůů ? ?658  Certainly air shows today attract crowds that would fill all but the largest 
Premier League grounds and while precise figures are elusive the Civil Aviation Authority 
counts spectator numbers in the millions.  The BBMF itself estimates that today it performs 
before over seven million people annually.
659
  As we have already seen air displays in Britain 
have had a long and distinguished history.   
 
Figure 26.  Flying Legends Air Show 2015 
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 It was at the Empire Air Day displays up and down the country in May 1939, as discussed in 
chapter 1, that the Spitfire met its public for the first time.  Before the war, major air 
displays were usually run by or with the full co-operation of the RAF and immediately after 
the war the RAF did re-enter the display arena in style.  Its Farnborough show in July 1950 
ǁĂƐ ‘ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐĂĞƌŝĂůŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐĞǀĞƌƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?660  This was the very cusp of the jet age when Spitfires in reserve flew in displays 
with frontline Meteor and Vampire jets.  But such grand affairs soon became the exception 
rather than the norm.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, the RAFs diminishing 
peacetime resources were soon stretched far too thin to accommodate the display season 
in any style.  There were always exceptions, however.  The summer of 1968 was one such 
exception, it being the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the RAF.  As spectators strode 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐŽƌŶĨŝĞůĚƐĂƚƵǆĨŽƌĚƚŽĐĂƚĐŚĂŐůŝŵƉƐĞŽĨ&ŝƐǌĂŶĚ^ĂůƚǌŵĂŶ ?ƐǀŝŶƚĂŐĞĂŝƌĨŽƌĐĞ ?
at Abingdon in Oxfordshire the RAF put on a jet age celebration.  It was not a success.  The 
ĨůǇŝŶŐĚŝƐƉůĂǇǁĂƐĂƐƉĞƌĨƵŶĐƚŽƌǇĂƐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨĨĞƌ ? ‘ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ
Ěƌŝůů ?ŐǇŵŶĂƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐĞĚŽŐĚŝƐƉůĂǇ ?ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŝƚ ? ?661  The retreat of the RAF from the 
display arena was an opportunity but it had to be grasped which was why the film Battle of 
Britain was a  ‘ƐĞŵŝŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ‘ǁĂƌďŝƌĚ ?ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?662 
This new cinematic epic had its genesis in an untimely disappointment suffered by film 
producer S. Benjamin Fisz.  Fisz had been born and brought up in Poland before coming to 
Britain.  He was only seventeen years old at the outbreak of war.  Demobbed in 1945, Fisz 
decided to stay in Britain, excited by the prospect of working in the British film industry.  His 
progress was steady, and unspectacular but always upward.  By 1965, he was a fully fledged 
ƌŝƚŝƐŚĨŝůŵƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌ ?ďƵƚŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚǇĞƚĂŶ ‘ ?ůĞĂŐƵĞĨŝůŵƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌǁŝƚŚĂƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
Hollywood.    He was, for instance, in no position to command the financial resources that 
would eventually be consumed by the film Battle of Britain. 
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Figure 27.  Battle of Britain Film Poster, 1969 
 
In September 1965, Fisz had just finished the production of The Heroes of Telemark, a story 
of resistance fighters in German occupied Norway.  His next project was to be a long 
cherished one, a film about the life of General Orde Wingate.  Fisz already held the rights to 
two major works on Wingate and all he needed before going ahead was the consent of 
tŝŶŐĂƚĞ ?ƐƐƵƌǀŝǀŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?tŝŶŐĂƚĞŚĂd died in an air crash in 1944.  It was on 13 
September 1965 that he found out that that consent would not be forthcoming.  It was a 
blow not least because The Heroes of Telemark was showing signs of a box-office success.  It 
meant that Fisz needed a new project quickly.  Timing is critical in any creative industry 
where the light of success shines brightly but not for long.  As told by Leonard Mosley, 
author of the authorised and therefore sanitised history of the making of the film Battle of 




heard the drone of engines flying overhead  W piston engines, not jets  W and looked up at a 
sound which was only too familiar.  A Spitfire and a Hurricane fighter were flying over the 
park.  He noticed that other people were looking up too, and the younger ones among them 
ǁĞƌĞƉƵǌǌůĞĚ ? “tŚĂƚŬŝŶĚŽĨƉůĂŶĞƐĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĂƐŬŝŶŐ ? ?663  
It is a fine story and, apocryphal or not, Fisz did take his new idea to Freddy Thomas, head of 
the production division of the Rank Organisation.  His pitch to Thomas was a simple one.  It 
was based upon the idea behind the film the Longest Day which had been a notable box 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽŶůǇƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ?dŚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞǁĂƐ ‘ďŽƚŚƐŝĚĞƐŐŝǀĞŶĨĂŝƌƉůĂǇŝŶƚŚĞ
ƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?664  Thomas was interested in the project but not, bearing in mind the financial risk, 
&ŝƐǌĂƐŝƚƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌ ? ‘zŽƵĂƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌmy project.  At the risk of parting company 
ǁŝƚŚǇŽƵŽŶƚŚŝƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?/ƌĞĨƵƐĞƚŽďĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌ ? ?665  The stalemate 
was only broken when Fisz was asked to lunch by Harry Saltzman.  Saltzman was everything 
&ŝƐǌǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽďĞ ?ĂŶ ‘ ?ůĞĂŐƵĞ producer.   
A new deal was struck but not as it turned out with Rank.  Initially enthusiastic on hearing of 
^ĂůƚǌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?&ƌĞĚĚǇdŚŽŵĂƐĂŶĚŚŝƐZĂŶŬďŽĂƌĚĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇďĂĐŬĞĚĂǁĂǇ ?
Industry suspicion, which surfaced after the film was released, was that Rank was 
intimidated by the size of the project.
666
  Saltzman eventually sold the film to United Artists.  
/ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇǁĂƐƚŚĞǁĂƚĐŚǁŽƌĚĨŽƌďŽƚŚ&ŝƐǌĂŶĚ^ĂůƚǌŵĂŶ ? ‘tĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶ ? ? ?ĂůŽƚŽĨĨĂŝƚŚĂŶĚ
tried through three long years to keep the basic integrity of our idea intact.  We wanted to 
ďĞƚƌƵƚŚĨƵůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŝŵĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?667  This was 
not quite the vision of 'ƵǇ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐŶĞǁůǇĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ? 
We are going to keep to the facts ŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞ QĂŶĚƐŚŽǁŝƚƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚǁĂƐ W really 
was, I mean, with real human beings flying those machines instead of starry-eyed 
knights of the air doing daring deeds to the sound of soulful music...But we are also 
going to have people with whom audiences, particularly young audiences, can 
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communicate and connect  W fliers, airmen, their girlfriends and wives  W and they 
ŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƵƌĨŝůŵ ?dŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŵŽƐƚŽĨǁŚŽŵĚŽŶ ?ƚĐĂƌĞĂ
damn about the Battle of Britain as such, will have to ache, yearn, love, and be 
scared out of their pants and miniskirts by what they see these people doing.  And 
ƚŚĂƚĂŝŶ ?ƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ?ŝƚƐĚƌĂŵĂ ?ĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽŐĞƚŝŶƚŽŽƵƌƐĐƌŝƉƚ ?668 
 
 
Figure 28.  Harry Saltzman on the set of Battle of Britain, 1968 
 
Hamilton perhaps understood something that Fisz and Saltzman did not, how to portray a 
factual war story as mass entertainment.  Some 3,000 people would eventually be involved 
in the making of Battle of Britain.
669
  Such an army was necessary because this was a time 
before digital effects.  Five separate film units worked quite often simultaneously in Spain, 
ŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ? ‘,ŽƵƐĞƐƌĞĂůůǇĚŽƚƵŵďůĞĚŽǁŶŝŶ Battle of Britain; hangers are 
destroyed, and great infĞƌŶŽƐĚŽĚĞǀĂƐƚĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐĚŽĐŬůĂŶĚ ? ?670  John Palmer, who 
had worked as production supervisor on such epics as Lawrence of Arabia and Doctor 
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Zhivago, was as surprised as he was ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ‘ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐŝƚǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŬĞǇ
word.  Everything had to be done right.  It was the most astonishing film I have worked 
ŽŶ ? ?671  Fisz and Saltzman shooting in the summer of 1968 were fortunate in their timing.  
The Greater London Council was in the middle of a slum clearance scheme in the docklands.  
It did not matter to them who pulled down the old warehouses or how.     
 
Figure 29.  Director Guy Hamilton and co-producer Ben Fisz, at Hawkinge Airfield, 1968  
 
Large fires and dramatic explosions on the docks were all very well, but the heart of the film 
was ĂůǁĂǇƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƚŚĞĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂŝƌďĂƚƚůĞƐ ?>ĞŽŶĂƌĚDŽƐůĞǇ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?Ɛ
ĐŚƌŽŶŝĐůĞƌ ?ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽďĞĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇƐƵƌĞŚŝƐƌĞĂĚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĞŵŽǀŝĞ ?ƐƵŶŝƋƵĞƐĞůůŝŶŐ
point. 
Since Battle of Britain was to be a widescreen production shot in colour, clips from 
the actual Battle of Britain were unusable, a fact which did not, however, trouble 
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^ĂůƚǌŵĂŶŽƌ&ŝƐǌ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƉůĂŶŶĞĚƚŽ ‘ƌĞ-ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ?ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƚŚĞ ? ?
minutes of air battles which would be the spectacular offered high-point of the film, 
using the same planes and simulating the same clashes which had once fought over 
the English Channel and the Thames Estuary.
672
   
Right back at the beginning of the project, as Fisz wooed Freddy Thomas at Rank, he was 
already in negotiation with the RAF.   ‘dŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇǁŝůůĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂŶĚǁŝůůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƵƐ
with nine Spitfires.  They will also provide a number of German aircraft up to the amount we 
will need, and will put pilots and crew at our disposal to fly them.  They will also put Duxford 
airfield aƚŽƵƌĚŝƐƉŽƐĂů ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚŚĂƐŶŽƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?673  &ŝƐǌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ
at the Air Ministry, now part of the Ministry of Defence, was Air Commodore James Wallace, 
ƚŚĞZ& ?ƐŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨWƵďůŝĐZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?tĂůůĂĐĞ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚ ĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĨŝůŵǁĂƐabsolute.  
,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐĨŝǀĞĨŝůŵƵŶŝƚƐǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞǁĞůĐŽŵĞĂƚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŽůĚ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚďĂƐĞƐ
including Duxford, Hawkinge, North Weald, and Northolt and Debden.  Wallace also made 
ƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĐƌĞǁƐŚĂĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶsive repair and 
maintenance facilities at RAF Henlow.   
Fisz had been assured of full RAF co-operation, but it was always intended to be something 
of a reciprocal affair.  In the early 1960s, as we know, what was to become the BBMF was in 
dire straits.  ThŝƐŵĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵĨƌŽŵtŝŶŐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ, ?, ?ĞŶƚƚŽ&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
ƐĞŶŝŽƌĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌtŝŶŐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ' ?ƵŶƉŚǇ ?ŝŶůĂƚĞ ? ? ?  ?ŵĂŬĞƐŝƚĂůůƚŽŽĐůĞĂƌ ? ‘tĞ
would have been unable to have flown our Spitfire in the last Battle of Britain display but for 
the generosity of Rolls-ZŽǇĐĞ>ƚĚŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐƵƐĂƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĞǁůǇŽǀĞƌŚĂƵůĞĚĞŶŐŝŶĞ ? ?674  
Service eyes and ears were therefore alert to any opportunity to acquire urgently needed 
vintage kit. 
A request has now been received through the liaison officer appointed for the Battle 
of Britain Film for authority to bring Spitfire Mark 1A K9942 and Hurricane Mark 1 
P2617 to flying condition and to fly them.  Maintenance of the memorial Flight 
aircraft is becoming increasingly more difficult due to the lack of engine life and the 
scarcity of spares, the only source of supply being the remaining Mark 2s held for 
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display. Clearly if we are to maintain the Memorial Flight in the long term it would be 
to our advantage to accede to the Spitfire Productions proposal.
675
      
Spitfire Productions agreed to re-ĞŶŐŝŶĞƚǁŽŽĨƚŚĞĨůŝŐŚƚ ?ƐŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚƚŽƉĂƐƐŽŶ
all the spares the production had gathered together from all corners of the globe.  This 
immediately increased the complement of airworthy Spitfires available to the Flight from 
three to five in addition to its single airworthy Hurricane.  11 Group, which continued to 
look after the flight on an unfunded ad hoc basis and was therefore naturally at the 
forefront of lobbying for its establishment made sure its new parent, Strike Command, 
understood precisely what this would mean. 
A Flight of this size would certainly present RAF Coltishall with an unacceptable 
servicing load if no establishment were created and an attempt were made to keep 
all aircraft in a fully flyable condition all the time.  The latter is not considered a 
practicable aim in the absence of a formal establishment but it would be sensible, 
nevertheless, to acquire the aircraft now, while the opportunity exists, in order to 
provide a suitable reserve for future years. 
The need to decide now on the acquisition of additional flyable aircraft as reserves 
for the Flight does highlight the importance of resolving the question of the 





Permanent establishment happened only two months after this missive was sent.  The 
bounty offered up by Spitfire Productions after the film was completed was not the sole 
reason for the establishment of the BBMF, an act which guaranteed its survival, but it was a 
factor.   
Fisz had successfully negotiated for the full co-operation of the RAF but it was not enough to 
satisfy the vision of either Saltzman or Guy Hamilton.   This meant a call upon the services of 
ex-bomber pilot Group Captain Hamish Mahaddie.  Mahaddie was a consultant to the film 
industry who had already worked for Saltzman on the Bond films, as well 633 Squadron and 
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Operation Crossbow.  It was to be Battle of Britain which was to prove his greatest 
procurement triumph.  Mahaddie found out that there were in total 109 Spitfires in 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?,ĞĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŚŝƌƚǇƐŝǆŽĨƚŚĞŵ ? ‘/ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ/ĐŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞƚǁĞůǀĞ
of them fly, and another twelve taxi.. ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌǁŽƵůĚďĞƵƐĞĚĨŽƌƉƌŽƉƐŽŶĂŝƌĨŝĞůĚƐ ? ?677  
Next he needed Hurricanes.  This was an altogether different order of difficulty.  He traced 
seven worldwide, so rare had they become, of which he managed to acquire three.  As for 
the Luftwaffe, it was Adolf Galland, now employed as a consultant to Spitfire Productions, 
who suggested the way forward.  He pointed out that the Spanish government still operated 
a fleet of Heinkel bombers and were only now in the process of decommissioning its fleet of 




Mahhaddie did not have the necessary contacts in Spain but, fortunately, Air Commodore 
Wallace did.  He contacted the Foreign Office who in turn contacted British air attaché, 
Group Captain R.L.S Coulson, in Madrid.  Coulson confirmed both the existence of the 
fighters and their imminent disposal.  Mahaddie had to move quickly.  In March 1966 he 
flew to Tablada, a Spanish air force base just outside Seville.  What he found there were 
eight fighters still in a flyable condition but he knew there had to be more even if they were 
ŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐƚŚŝƐĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐƉŝůĞŽĨ ƐĐƌĂƉ ?/ŚĂĚĂ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚŝƌKĨĨŝĐĞƌ
with me and some Spanish non-coms, and we picked around among the rubbish.  By the 
time I had gone through it all, I was astonished.  There was the material for a small air force 
ůǇŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?679  On behalf of Spitfire Productions he secured twenty eight Spanish-built 
Messerschmitts.  As for the Heinkel bombers, the only purchase required on behalf of 
Spitfire Productions was that of a good lunch.  This was held at the British Embassy in the 
presence of the British Ambassador, Sir Alan Williams, and the Spanish Minister for Air, his 
assistant Juan Jose Sanchez Cabal and Mahaddie.  Mahaddie made his pitch.  A week later 
came the reply. 
I am pleased to be able to tell you that approval has been given by the higher 
authority for the film company to take photographs of Heinkel aircraft in the air and 
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on the ground.  At the same time, I am happy to inform you that all the expenses 
incurred in the filming of the aircraft, i.e. the cost of flying, the cost of fuel and the 
maintenance of the aircraft will be completely free with the exception of the 
painting or changing of the markings on the aircraft.
680
        
It was quite a coup for Mahaddie, access and subsidised access too.  Fisz and Saltzman later 
calculated it probably saved the production £150,000. 
 
 
Figure 30.  Actors and extras ready to shoot the film's opening credit sequence at Tablada Airfield in Spain on 13 March, 
1968 
 
At the beginning of January 1968 construction crews flew out to Seville soon followed by the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĐƌĞǁ ?tŚĂƚǁĂƐĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝŶĂů-ĨŝŶĂů ?ƐĐƌŝƉƚǁĂƐƌĞĂĚǇďǇDĂƌĐŚ ?968 and 
filming began at Tablada airfield.  Hamilton and his first unit crew spent March and most of 
ƉƌŝůƐŚŽŽƚŝŶŐŝŶ^ƉĂŝŶ ?/ŶĞĂƌůǇDĂǇŚĞǁĂƐŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶ ?ƐĞƌŵŽŶĚƐĞǇ ?ĨŝůŵŝŶŐƐĐĞŶĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ
Blitz sequences.  At the end of May he began shuttling between Home County RAF stations.   
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The production was now based at RAF Duxford.  It was not until late September that filming 
was eventually completed with the aerial unit searching for some late summer sun in the 
south of France.  Post-production, including the commissioning and then hurried re-
commissioning of the music score, would take another year.  
The film had its world premiere at the Dominion Theatre, London, on 15 September 1969, 
Battle of Britain Day, in the presence of the Lord Mayor of London and more than 350 
members of the Battle of Britain Fighter Association.  On 20 October there followed a Royal 
Gala Performance attended by the Queen in aid of the RAF Association and the RAF 
Benevolent Fund.  The publicity campaign, taking its cue from the film itself, had 
ƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐƐĐĂůĞ ? ‘WƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶƐĨŽƌBattle of Britain are almost like battle strategy in 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?681  It all amounted to a great sense of expectation within the film industry 
itself.   
h ?Ɛ ‘ĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ŐŽƚĂǁĂǇƚŽĂƐƉĞĐƚĂĐƵůĂƌƐƚĂrt with the World premiere at 
the Dominion on Monday.  We shall have to wait until next week before we can 
really measure its strength at the box-office but in the first two days it took £5,360 in 
four performances  W absolute capacity  W and already had collected £18,700 in 
advance bookings.
682
              
Unfortunately, absolute capacity proved ephemeral.  The next week was disappointing and 
the film would prove ultimately to be a box office failure.  It never recovered its production 
costs through ticket sales.  The Treasury was left with an outstanding debt of £35,000 owed 
to it by Spitfire Productions, presumably care of the ever obliging Air Commodore Wallace.  
ĨƚĞƌŵŽŶƚŚƐŽĨƐŽůŝĐŝƚŽƌƐ ?ůĞƚƚĞƌƐĂŶĚĐĂŶĐĞůůĞĚŵĞƚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐĨŝŶĂůůǇĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?/ƚ 
ǁĂƐĂůĞƐƐŽŶůĞĂƌŶƚĂƚƚŚĞDK ? ‘/ŚĂǀĞǁĂƌŶĞĚŵǇŶĂǀǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚDƌ ?ĞŶ
Fisz is now thinking of a film about the Battle of Trafalgar  W I suspect, however, that our 
charges for re-ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ,D^sŝĐƚŽƌǇŵĂǇƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞƌĂƚŚĞƌŚŝŐŚ ? ?683    
tŚǇĚŝĚƚŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐƚĂǇĂǁĂǇŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?'ƵǇ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ? was well aware 
of the tenuous grip the Battle of Britain held on the popular imagination.  Unlike Fisz and 
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Saltzman, he had always been concerned about relying upon the story alone to carry the 
film.  Bill Altria from Kinematograph Weekly watched the premiere at the Dominion Theatre 
ĂŶĚƚŽŽŬĂƐƚƌĂǁƉŽůůĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂĚƐĂƚďĞƐŝĚĞŚŝŵ ? ‘ƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
production generally conceded that the subject had been treated with integrity and 
sincerity and that technically it was a great achievement but that it lacked emotional depth 
in depicting the behind the scenes conflicts in the conduct of the battle and the human 
ĚƌĂŵĂŽĨƚŚĞƉŝůŽƚƐĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞďůŝƚǌ ? ?684  David Austen in Films and Filming was 
more damning.   ‘dŚĞĨŝůŵŶĞǀĞƌƐƚŽƉƐũƵŵƉŝŶŐĨƌŽŵůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ
give a full account, but the story is told from so many different sides that it ends up having 
no point of view at all.  No single character is on the screen long enough to register any real 
sympathy or respect.
685
  What the film critics pointed out at the time, film historians have 
ůĂƌŐĞůǇĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚ ? ‘dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝƚŚBattle of Britain was that it tried to be too many 
things to too ŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?^ŝŵŽŶDĂĐŬĞŶǌŝĞŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚ ? 686   
There was one survivor from the reported wreckage.  Even the severest critics at the time 
ǁĞƌĞƐƵƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?/ƚŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂůƐƚĂƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?687  So said 
Graham Clarke in Kine Weekly, and the anonymous reporter in Variety ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ? ‘dŚĞ
ĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞ “ƉƵůů-ƐƚĂƌƐ ?ŽĨƚŚŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉůƵƐĨŝůŵ ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ'ƵǇ,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶĂŶĚŚŝƐ
array of technical advisors, production staff, flying stunt men, special effects boys and 
second unit aerŝĂůůĞŶƐĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞĂŵĂƐƚĞƌůǇůŽŐŝƐƚŝĐĂůũŽď ? ?688  Perhaps the most famous 
ƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŽƵƌŵŝŶƵƚĞ ‘ďŝŐĂĞƌŝĂůďĂůůĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞĂƚƚŚĞĐůŝŵĂǆŽĨƚŚĞĨŝůŵ.689  Set 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚtŝůůŝĂŵtĂůƚŽŶ ?ƐĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌŝĐƐĐŽƌĞ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽŶůǇŽƚŚĞƌƐŽƵŶĚƐŚĞĂƌĚďǇƚŚĞ
audience being those of combat, what followed was a montage of images with no obvious 
continuity.  What linked the images together instead was an emotional narrative, 
specifically, a narrative of fear.  It was a montage designed to show how terrifying and 
random combat could be.  Its authority, its sense of authenticity, was intensified by the fact 
that few models were used.  The second unit aerial lensers, those who had filmed the 
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sequences, had taken great risks and the results were on screen ? ‘tŚĞŶǇŽƵƐĞĞĂŶĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ
ƵƉĐůŽƐĞĂůůǇŽƵƐĞĞŝƐĂƐŚŽƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƐŽǁŝĚĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞůůĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŶŽƐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĂůĨƚŚĞǁŝŶŐ
ŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŝŵƚǁĞůǀĞĨĞĞƚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ďĂĐŬŽĨŽƵƌĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ?ŵƉŚ ? ?690   
,ĂŵŝůƚŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨƚŚĞĂŝƌďĂƚƚůĞƐǁĂƐƵŶ-heroic and bloody.  We might remember his 
stated intentions at the beginning of the production.   ‘tĞĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞ ? ?ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ? ‘ĂŶĚƐŚŽǁit the way it was  W really was, I mean, with real human beings 
flying those machines instead of starry-eyed knights of the air doing daring deeds to the 
ƐŽƵŶĚŽĨƐŽƵůĨƵůŵƵƐŝĐ ? ?691  What he had actually managed to do, seemingly 
counterintuitively, was make tŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĞǁĞƌ ? ‘dŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨ
ĂŶƚŝǁĂƌĨŝůŵƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƌƚŚĞǇĐŽŵĞƚŽ “ĂĐƚƵĂů ?ďĂƚƚůĞĂŶĚŝƚƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂŶǇŽĨƚĞŶĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐ )
ŚŽƌƌŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĞůĞƐƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶĞǀŽŬŝŶŐĂŶƚŝǁĂƌƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶKŵĞƌĂƌƚŽǀ
has suggested.
692
   ‘ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĚŝĚĚĞŵĂŶĚĂƐĂŶŝƚŝƐĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝ ŶĐĞĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ
ǁĂƐŵŽƌĞƐĂŶŝƚŝƐĞĚƚŚĂŶǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐ ‘ŚŽƌƌŽƌƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞĞĂƚŝŶŐƉŽƉĐŽƌŶŝŶĂŶĂŝƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ
cinema?             
The release of Battle of Britain alone would have ensured that 1969 would be remembered 
as a significant year for the warbird movement but of course it was also the year the BBMF 
was established.  It would be sometime, though, approximately another fifteen years, 
ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞD& ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĂŝƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇƐƵŵŵĞƌĐŝƌĐƵŝƚĐould be described as 
ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŵŽĚĞƐƚ ?tĞŵƵƐƚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽWĞƚĞƌƌŶŽůĚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
London premiere of the film Battle of Britain ǁĂƐ ‘ĂƐĞŵŝŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞh< ‘ǁĂƌďŝƌĚ ?
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?693  It was such for two reasons, one practical, and the other inspirational.  First 
it was material proof that piston engine fighters from the Battle of Britain era could be 
restored and flown again.  It is estimated that well over a hundred aircraft were patched up 
and returned for duty on Battle of Britain.
694
  Here was a resource ready to be exploited.  
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?Ɛgreatest triumph, its forty minutes of authentic aerial combat presented 
in widescreen Technicolor, proved inspirational to a small number of determined, well 
funded and well qualified enthusiasts.
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A good example of what happened next is offered by the story of Spitfire MH434.
695
  This 
particular MK IX example first took to the air in August 1943 and was soon in action over 
northern France, whose skies it would continue to patrol right up until the end of the war.  
,ĂǀŝŶŐĨůŽǁŶŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŚƚǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĨŽƵƌ ‘ŬŝůůƐ ? ?ŝƚǁĂƐƐƚŽŽĚĚŽǁŶŝŶ
March 1945.  It was not scrapped however; instead in 1947 it was bought by the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force for ground strafing and light bombing missions.  It was then sold on to 
the Belgian air force for use in their pilot training programme.  It eventually returned to 
Britain in 1956, repatriated by airline pilot, Tim Davis, for his own personal use which 
included occasional and lucrative film work.  It was in 1956 that the film biography of 
Douglas Bader, Reach for the Sky, had topped the list of British box-office attractions.
696
  It 
might have been thought that more British film productions that focused on the RAF were 
about to take off after this success but it was not to be.  In 1962 MH434 did appear in The 
Longest Day and in 1964 in Operation Crossbow but these were meagre pickings for a 
Spitfire owner with less than deep pockets.  As we already know, the aircraft consultant on 
Operation Crossbow was Group Captain Hamish Mahaddie.  It should come as no surprise to 
discover that in November 1967, Spitfire MH434 joined the air force of Ben Fisz and Harry 
Saltzman.  At the end of filming of Battle of Britain in September 1968, as Fisz and Saltzman 
sold off their air fleet to appease their creditors, MH434 began a new life in the ownership 




He would, in due course, become a trustee of the RAF Museum, chairman of the RAF 
Benevolent Fund and President of the Spitfire Society.  He was knighted in 1982.  He would 
ĞǀĞŶĐŚƌŝƐƚĞŶŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚďŽƌŶƐŽŶDĞƌůŝŶ ?ƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĞŶŐŝŶĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ
Battle of Britain.  In the spirit of a nascent warbird movement, Swire had no intention of 
putting his new purchase on display in a museum.  Instead, he approached one of the finest 
display pilots of the time, Ray Hanna.  It was good timing because Squadron Leader Hanna 
was on the verge of leaving the RAF after what had been a highly successful career as a 
display pilot.  Hanna was a member of the team that had established the Red Arrows and 
ǁĂƐŝƚƐůĞĂĚĞƌĨŽƌĂŶƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚĨŽƵƌǇĞĂƌƐ ?,ĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ^ǁŝƌĞ ?ƐŽĨĨĞƌĂŶĚďĞŐĂŶ
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with exceůůĞŶĐĞŝŶĨůǇŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚĂƚĂŝƌƐŚŽǁƐ ? ?698  Hanna, like many of the pilots 
displaying vintage aircraft in the 1970s, did it in their spare time; his day job was as a 
commercial airline pilot.  In 1981, however, he founded the Old Flying Machine Company at 
last turning his hobby into his profession.  It was a decision confirmed two years later when 
he actually bought Spitfire MH434.  The timing was propitious. 
,ĂŶŶĂ ?ƐĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŝŶ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞD, ? ? ?ǁĂƐŚŝŐŚůǇƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚďǇĂůůǁŚŽƐĂǁŝƚ ?
 ‘^ƉĞĐƚĂtors would watch in total silence, with tears in many an eye, as Ray in his Spitfire 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŐƌĂĐĞĨƵůĂĞƌŝĂůďĂůůĞƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐƵŶ ? ?699  ,ĂŶŶĂ ?ƐƐŬŝůůƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?
were not shared by all who flew historic aircraft at this time.  Display flying of vintage 
ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐŚĂĚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂƉŽŽƌƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞ ‘ďĂƌŶƐƚŽƌŵŝŶŐ ?ĚĂǇƐ ?
 ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂůŝƚƚůĞĚĞǀŝůƚŚĂƚĐůŝŵďĞĚŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌĂƚĂŶĂŝƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇ ?ƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐĂ
ƉŝůŽƚŽŶĂŶĞŐŽƚƌŝƉ ? ?700  This had its inevitable consequĞŶĐĞƐ ? ‘/ŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?
seduction by the limelight, poor timing, lack of properly shaped and practised routine, 
unawareness of local hazards, negligent attention to local traffic, aerobatics too low, 
mishandling of aeroplanes with a maximum speed only about twice stalling speed resulted 
in stall/spin from low altitudes  W ĂůůŚĂĚƚĂŬĞŶƚŚĞŝƌƚŽůů ? ?701  In 1978 the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) issued what amounted to an ultimatum.  Either the warbird community put 
its house in order or the CAA would do it for them.   
The threat was noted and on the 1 April 1978, the Historic Aircraft Association (HAA) was 
launched, a club welcoming only the most distinguished members of what was now a 
burgeoning warbird movement.  An invitation was of course sent to ZĂǇ,ĂŶŶĂ ?dŚĞ, ?Ɛ
remit was to promote professional standards right across the board, from the servicing of 
old aero engines to the catering necessary to put on a successful air show.  It had one much 
more specific task to perform however.  With a weather eye on the CAA, it decided to set up 
a register of display pilots.  In an act of self-policing, it registered only those who in their 
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opinion could display both satisfactorily and safely.  It was time to weed out those with that 
 ‘ůŝƚƚůĞĚĞǀŝů ?ŽŶƚŚĞŝƌ shoulders.702     
It was in the 1980s that many of the names now synonymous with the warbird movement 
first made their appearance.  In 1981 Ray Hanna started the Old Flying Machine Company.  
In 1985 Guy Black and Angus Spencer-Naim set up Historic Aircraft Limited as a vehicle to 
restore and operate Spitfire Mk. IX TE566.  At about the same time, Historic Flying Limited 
was established by Dutch industrialist Karel Bos.  Its first task was to restore five Spitfires 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞZ& ?ƐŽǁŶƐƚŽĐŬŽĨŐĂƚĞŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƐ ?Another future significant player emerged on 
the scene about this time too.  Ex-RAF pilot Stephen Grey first registered his company the 
&ŝŐŚƚĞƌŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽďŝĚĨŽƌŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚůĞĂƐĞ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐƐŽǁĞĐŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂŵƚŚĞĂŝƌƐŚŽǁ
ĐŝƌĐƵŝƚ ? ?703  ,ĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ?ďƵƚ'ƌĞǇ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŚŝƐŶĞǁĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ
ŐƌŽǁŝŶƚŽŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚŽǁŶĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƐŽĨǁĂƌďŝƌĚƐ ? 
Moving forward into the 1990s and we meet once again Peter Teichman.  His Hangar 11 
Collection began with a Beechcraft Staggerwing and then a North American P51D Mustang 
ďƵƚŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƚŽƉƚŚĞƌĞ ? ‘tŚĂƚĞůƐĞĚŝĚĞǀĞƌǇƌŝƚŝƐŚƉŝůŽƚĚƌĞĂŵŽĨ ?tĞůůŝƚũƵƐƚŚĂĚƚŽďĞ
Ă^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ?704  dĞŝĐŚŵĂŶ ?ƐĚƌĞĂŵĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞƐƚǁŽŵĂũŽƌƚŚĞŵĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĚƌŝǀĞŶƚŚĞ
growth of the British warbird community.  The first is that it has relied overwhelmingly upon 
the effort and enthusiasm of individual entrepreneurs, men like Teichman, Grey and Ray 
Hanna.  The second has been the desire to own and fly one particular aircraft, a Spitfire.  
Peter TeicŚŵĂŶŐŽƚŚŝƐ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ? ‘tĞůůƚŚĞƌĞ/ǁĂƐĨůǇŝŶŐǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵůĂĞƌŽďĂƚŝĐƐ
ŶŽƌƚŚŽĨǇůĞƐďƵƌǇ ?ůŽŽƉƐĂŶĚŚĂůĨƵďĂŶƐĂŶĚďĂƌƌĞůƌŽůůƐǁŚŝůƐƚƐŝŶŐŝŶŐŽƵƚůŽƵĚ “/
ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌǇŽƵ ?ďǇ&ƌĂŶŬ/ĨŝĞůĚ ?ǁŽŶĚĞƌĨƵůŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?705  Even today, the warbird fleet is 
dominated by Spitfires.  The warbird community, by the early 1990s, had reached a level of 
self-ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƵƚƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŚĞŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵĂŶĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚ ?ƐŚŽďďǇŝŶƚŽĂŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝĚĞ
phenomenon required it to reach out beyond the likes of those weekend sightseers who in 
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 ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚŽƵƚƚŽƵǆĨŽƌĚĂŶĚ ‘trampled nearby cornfields to get a look at the 
ƉůĂŶĞƐ ? ?706   
dŚĞŵĞƚĂŵŽƌƉŚŽƐŝƐŽĨĂŶĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐƚ ?ƐŚŽďďǇŝŶƚŽĂŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝĚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ began in the 
late 1980s.  It certainly did for Ben Dunnell, future editor of Aeroplane.  Asked where his 
love of historic aeroplanes stemmed from, he repůŝĞĚ ? ‘Ĩor me, more than anything, it was 
Duxford and its warbird pilots.  The late 1980s and early 1990s represent the formative 
period of my enthusiasm, a time of great displays at Duxford and elsewhere.  The number of 
ĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇǁĂƌďŝƌĚƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŝƌĐƵŝƚŚĂĚƐƚĞĂĚŝůǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŽŚ ?ƚŚĞĨůǇŝŶŐ ? ?707 
Dunnell was presumably witness to the birth of the more considered, professional approach 
to display flying which was replacing the barnstorming shows characteristic of the 1970s.  
The epitome of the great vintage air display was and remains the Flying Legends airshow 
ŚĞůĚĂŶŶƵĂůůǇĂƚƵǆĨŽƌĚ ?/ƚĨŝƌƐƚĨůĞǁŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘&ůǇŝŶŐ>ĞŐĞŶĚƐŚĂƐŽƵƚůĂƐƚĞĚƚŚĞƌĞǀĞƌĞĚ
Fighter meet and 'ƌĞĂƚtĂƌďŝƌĚƐĂŝƌƐŚŽǁƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ ? ?ƐĂŶĚ ‘ ? ?Ɛ ?ƐƵďƚůǇĞǀŽ ǀŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
ǇĞĂƌƐďƵƚŶĞǀĞƌůŽƐŝŶŐŝƚƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĂƉƉĞĂů ? ?708  That unique appeal is rooted in the telling of 
ƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ‘&ůǇŝŶŐ>ĞŐĞŶĚƐŚĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐďĞĞŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌh<ĂŝƌƐŚŽǁƐ-rather than a 
succession of solos, the programme is built around a series of themed multi-aircraft set 
ƉŝĞĐĞƐ ? ?709  What lies behind that theme explains the exponential growth in audience 
attendance for airshows nationwide in the 1990s, and brings us back to the Spitfire in 
performance.        
It was all a question of identity, what it was to be English/British, fortunately a core text for 
the Spitfire as a palimpsest.
710
  /ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?ƌĞĂůŽƌ
imagined, and identity, collective or personal, which was at the root of what Jay Winter 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂŶ ‘ĞĨĨůŽƌĞƐĐĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨŵĞŵŽƌǇŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵǇĂŶĚ
beyond ŝƚ ? ?711  /ƚǁĂƐĂ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐĂŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚŝƐƐƚŝůůƌĞǀĞƌďĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ
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 We need to remember that in 1942 Leslie Howard had made a film in The First of the Few about what it was 
to be English.  Those watching it were more concerned with what it was to be British. 
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  TŚĞƐĞĞĚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?were planted in the 1960s.  It was twenty years 
since the end of the war, time enough for the narratives of resistance to the Nazis, which 
had been so necessary for national reconstruction, to be called to account.  What began as 
ĂŶĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞĐĂŵĞĂ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
identity slipped the leash of patriotism and nationalism.  A search for identity, personal and 
collective, now embraced ethnicity, multiculturalism, gender, and globalisation.  The search 
for identity had strayed beyond national borders remade after the Second World War.   
In Britain, ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ?remained firmly where it had begun, rooted in the 
ůĞŐĂĐǇŽĨǁĂƌ ? ‘&ĞǁŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǀĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞĚĂƐĨƵůůǇŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚŵŽĚĞƌŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƐƚŚĞ
^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ ? ?713   The force of the explosion of identity politics in Britain in the mid 
 ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ, and its symbiotic relatioŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ ?meant 
that temporarily the Spitfire had no need to take to the air at all.  Its practical assistance in 
the re-alignment of the myth of the Battle of Britain to suit this new priority was measured 
not in aviation fuel but beer.  It was all a consequence of a football match and an alert 
advertising agency keen for new business.  The football match in question took place on 26 
June 1996.  It was between England and Germany in the semi-final of the 1996 UEFA 
European Football Championship.  England lost the game on penalties in front of a television 
audience of 26.2 million people, at the time the highest ever for a British sports 
broadcast.
714
  What all those millions saw apart from a gripping football match, was a sea of 
^ƚ'ĞŽƌŐĞ ?ƐƌŽƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĚ-and-white painted faces.  It was a mark of identity contained 
within a strictly English identity.
715
  Richard Weight in his book Patriots (2002) has argued 
that the Second World War is a patriotic legend for the English, not the British. 
Nevertheless, he saw no patriotic mark of identity only xenophobia that Wednesday 
evening.
 716
   ‘dŚĞƐĞŵŝ-final clash against Germany seemed to prove that the new 
ŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐǁĂƐůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂŶĞǁǀĞŚŝĐůĞĨŽƌŽůĚŚĂƚƌĞĚƐ ? ?717  The Sociologist Peter 
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Beck who later wrote about the match from a German perspective agreed with Weight.  
 ‘ůĞĂƌůǇ ?ĂƌŝƚŝƐŚ-'ĞƌŵĂŶƉƌŽďůĞŵĞǆŝƐƚƐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƐŝĚĞ ? ?718   
A bout of xenophobia seemed to be confirmed by the outpourings of the tabloid press in the 
ĚĂǇƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐƵƉƚŽƚŚĞŐĂŵĞ ? ‘>d ?^>/d&Z/d ? ?719 said the Sun, but it was the Daily Mirror 
that enjoyed itself the most.  Alongside pictures of Paul Gascoigne and Stuart Pearce in tin 
ŚĞůŵĞƚƐ ?ŝƚĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚĂŶŶŐůŝƐŚǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ? ‘ACHTUNG!  SURRENDER!  FOR YOU FRITZ, ZE 
 ? ? ? ?hZK,DW/KE^,/W/^KsZ ? ?720  Piers Morgan editor of the Daily Mirror thought 
what his paper had printed was simple harmless fun, not xenophobia.
721
  Most 
commentators at the time agreed with the views of Weight and Beck not the hapless Piers 
Morgan.    ƐŽƉƉƌŽďƌŝƵŵƌĂŝŶĞĚĚŽǁŶƵƉŽŶDŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐŚĞĂĚ ?ƌǇĂŶƉƉůĞǇĂƌĚĂƚƚŚĞ
Independent was one of the few who recognised the difference between simple harmless 
fun, xenophobia and a new cultural phenomenon.   ‘/ƚŵĂǇďĞƚŚe sound of a real change in 
national sentiment, a change inspired in the English by a sudden impatience and weariness 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚƉĂƐƚ ? ? ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚĂƌĞĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐƚŽďĞŶŐůŝƐŚ ? ?722  
There was one advertising agency that, like Bryan Appleyard, had correctly identified the 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĂƚƐĞĂŽĨ^ƚ'ĞŽƌŐĞ ?ƐƌŽƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĚ-and-white painted faces.  In May 
1990, the regional brewer Shepherd Neame launched its new Spitfire Premium Kentish Ale 
at RAF Northolt.  It was a modest affair, a photo opportunity was organised as television 
presenter and former RAF fighter pilot Raymond Baxter took to the air in a Spitfire, but then 
ambitions for the new premium ale were modest too, sales of 500 barrels were hoped for 
by the end of the year.   Shepherd NeamĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽůĂƵŶĐŚĂŶĞǁďĞĞƌǁĂƐĂĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚ
move, however.  The Monopolies and Mergers Commission had recently proposed, and the 
government had accepted, a shake-up of the brewing industry which amongst other things 
required the introduction of traditional cask-conditioned beers as guest beers in national 
ďƌĞǁĞƌƐ ?ŚŽƵƐĞƐ ?ďĞĞƌƐůŝŬĞƚŚĞŶĞǁ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞWƌĞŵŝƵŵůĞ ?723      
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In 1993, a new advertising agency, RPM3, was established in central London.  In 1997, it 
approached Shepherd Neame with an idea.
724
  What that initial idea was, the foundation of 
a long and profitable association, ǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇZWD ? ?ƐĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌZƵƐƐĞůů
tĂŝůĞƐ ? ‘ZĞĂůůǇƋƵŝĐŬ-almost immediately-the Bottle of Britain came out as the end line.  It 
ũƵƐƚŐƌĞǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞ ? “EŽ&ŽŬŬĞƌŽŵĞƐůŽƐĞ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂĚƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚŝƚĂůůŝŶĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂů
ďƵƌƐƚŽĨĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŚĂƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ‘'ŽĞƌŝŶŐ ?'ŽĞƌŝŶŐ ?'ŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŽǁŶĞĚůůKǀĞƌ<ĞŶƚ ?:ƵƐƚ
>ŝŬĞƚŚĞ>ƵĨƚǁĂĨĨĞ ? ?725  The advertisements that followed would go on to win the Campaign 
magazine readers award, a Kent Business Award, and the New York Festivals Award for 
Advertising.  They also sold beer.  In 1999, Shepherd Neame was awarded a lucrative 





Figure 31.  Advertisement for Spitfire Ale, 1997 
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dŚĞŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞŚŝŶĚZƵƐƐĞůůtĂŝůĞƐ ?ŝŶŝƚŝĂůŝĚĞĂ ? ‘ƚŚĞďŽƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?is not hard to spot 
even if both advertising agency and brewer remain a little coy on the point.
727
  It was the 
lexis of the comic strip in ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŽĨĂ ‘ŶĞǁŶŐůŝƐŚŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĂƐƵƐĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇďǇWŝĞƌƐ
Morgan at the Daily Mirror, which we can reasonably assume inspired RPM3.  The evidence 
is circumstantial but suggestive.  RPM3 approached Shepherd Neame only months after the 
Euro 96 semi-final between England and Germany and both Piers Morgan and Russell 
Wailes were targeting exactly the same audience, 18-35 year old males.  Tabloid headlines 
ůŝŬĞ ‘>d ?^>/d&Z/d ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘,dhE' ?^hZZEZ ?&KZzKh&Z/d ? ? ? ? ?hZK
CHAMPIONSHIP IS OVEZ ? ?ďĞĐĂŵĞ ‘EŽ&ŽŬŬĞƌŽŵĞƐůŽƐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘'ŽĞƌŝŶŐ ?'ŽĞƌŝŶŐ ?'ŽŶĞ ? ? 
 
 
Figure 32.  Advertisement for Spitfire Ale, 1997 
 
Inspiration there was, but there was even a direct link between the two, although it may not 
have been apparent to those concerned at the time ?WŝĞƌƐDŽƌŐĂŶ ?ƐďŽŵďĂƐƚŝĐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
was to have been fronted by a Spitfire flypast.  On the day before the Euro 96 semi-final 
between England and Germany, Morgan had hired a Spitfire to dive-bomb the German 
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training camp.  When the day dawned, however, perhaps aware of the rumblings of 
discontent emerging in the more considered pages of the national press, and also after 
receiving a phone call from Kelvin MacKenzie, editor of the Sun, he thought better of it.  
 ‘dŚŝƐƵƌŐĞŶƚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐŵŽƐƚĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚǁŽƌƌŝĞĚŵĞŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚĂŶĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ? ?728  Whatever the exact reason, Morgan at least had the savvy to 
recognise a publicity stunt going wrong.   
This was knowledge denied to the British National Party (BNP) in 2009 when they seized 
upon the Spitfire as a symbol of national identity.  They were ridiculed for fronting an anti-
immigration campaign in the European Elections with a picture of a Spitfire which had in 
fact been flown by Polish pilots in the Battle of Britain.
729
  Attempts to offer the Spitfire as a 
symbolic answer to the question of British identity have not stopped.  On 9 May 2016 Prime 
Minister David Cameron stood up at the British Museum to give a speech on the 
forthcoming referendum on whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union.  
,ĞƐƉŽŬĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ? ‘tŚĞŶ/ĨůǇƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƵŵŵŝƚƐŝŶƌƵƐƐĞůƐĨƌŽŵZ&EŽƌƚŚŽůƚ ?
I pass a Spitfire just outside the airfield, a vital base for brave RAF and Polish pilots during 
the Battle of Britain.  I think of the Few who saved this country in its hour of mortal danger, 
and who made it possible for us to go on and help liberate Europe.  Like any Brit, my heart 
swells with pride at the sight of that aircraft, or wherever I hear the tell-tale roar of those 
DĞƌůŝŶĞŶŐŝŶĞƐŽǀĞƌŽƵƌƐŬŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌ ?ĞĨŝĂŶƚ ?ďƌĂǀĞ ?ŝŶĚĞĨĂƚŝŐĂďůĞ ? ?730  The details 
ŽĨĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĚĂǇĂƌĞƵŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŝƐƚŚĞůŝŶŬ ?ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ
that he was addressing a British audience and his speech was about identity, sovereignty 
and the nation state.  It should be noted he was not talking strictly about the English.  He did 
lose the argument.        
TheƐĞƚŚƌĞĞĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉŽƐƚ-war career are instructive because of the fact 
that none involve the Spitfire in action, in the air, in performance.   In 1997, the Spitfire 
found itself at the epicentre of a cultural storm.  Because of the resonance in British modern 
culture of the Second World War and in the eye of that storm, there was no need for the 
extra emotional charge of a performance for the Spitfire to effect the necessary re-
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configuration of the myth of the Battle of Britain to include this new priority.  Twelve years 
later, however, and with the storm subsided, the BNP found out to their cost that that 
charge was now necessary.  It was necessary once again in 2016 when David Cameron called 
upon the Spitfire.  Under normal circumstances, it is only in performance, with that extra 
emotional charge, that the Spitfire has had influence upon the myth of the Battle of Britain, 
to make it mean what contemporary audiences require of it.           
What has continued to be required of it has been to answer this question of identity.  In 
performance the Spitfire has had the answer.  We have already noted the establishment of 
the annual airshow Flying Legends in 1993.  Such has been its success that it has been joined 
over the years by a host of others.   It is fair to say that the star of almost every one of these 
airshows has been a Spitfire; such has been its ubiquity.  Let us concentrate on one 
particular year, 2015, the 75
th
 anniversary of the Battle of Britain.  It was a year of 
particularly spectacular crowds.  Flying Legends itself, blessed with fine July weather, 
attracted a crowd of 20,000.
731
  Its opening sequence was a mass take-off of ten Spitfires 
which formed up into four-ship and three-ship groups for flypasts and tail chasing.  The 
ƐŚŽǁ ?Ɛclimax was a Battle of Britain sequence featuring swooping weaving Spitfires.  It was 
a stunning show, according to the later reviews, but it was to be outshone that summer.   
Biggin Hill chose 18 August for its celebration of the 75
th
 anniversary of the Battle of Britain.  
 ‘ƉŝǀŽƚĂůŵŽŵĞŶƚŝŶƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁĂƐĐŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƵŶŝƋƵĞĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĂƚŝŐŐŝŶ
Hill...as groups of Spitfires and Hurricanes re-created the sights seen at this most famous of 
ĂůůZ&ĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚĞƐƚĚĂǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ?732  The recreation 
began at exactly 12:45 hours, the same time as Biggin Hill ?ƐĨŝŐŚƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƐĐƌĂŵďůĞĚƐĞǀĞŶƚǇ 
ĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ‘/ƚǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ?ƚĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ?ǁŝƚŚ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞƐ
flying the courses they did while intercepting the Luftwaffe, and passing over many of the 
Fighter Command airfields that were operational in the south-east during the summer of 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?733  On their return they maintained a standing patrol over Biggin Hill and then broke 
off in defence of the airfield against simulated attacks.  Spitfire pilot Stephen Stead was 
ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ‘/ǁĂƐƐƚƌƵĐŬďǇƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĞvent, yet how much emotion it stirred in 
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the pilots, ground crews, organisers and the public.  I loved the crowd at the end of runway 
03 Union waving their flags, and the feeling of pride I had at being a participant in such a 
momentous occasion. ?734  What he was describing of course was not simply a recreation but 
a performance, with the question of identity at its heart.   
A momentous occasion was certainly an appropriate description of 'ŽŽĚǁŽŽĚ ?ƐBattle of 
Britain Day on 15 September.  A 32,000 capacity crowd enjoyed the largest gathering of 
ĂŝƌǁŽƌƚŚǇ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞƐĂŶĚ,ƵƌƌŝĐĂŶĞƐƐĞĞŶƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ‘dŚĞŝĚĞĂǁĂƐƚŽŐŝǀĞĂƐŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ
as possible a chance to see the aircraft in their individual formations, looking much as they 
ĚŝĚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?735  At Duxford four days later the plan was to re-create the 
ƵǆĨŽƌĚ ‘ŝŐtŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌŝƚƐBattle of Britain Anniversary Air Show.  Jeanne Frazer, Flying 
Display DŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽŶƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?ůŽŽŬĞĚŽŶĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŝŐtŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĚ ? ‘ůůŽƚŚĞƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽŶƚŚĞ
airfield ceased as the 17 Spitfires started engines, taxied, lined up and took off in stream to 
the west.  This in itself was a spectacle, but as the formation later re-approached from the 
ĞĂƐƚĂŶĚĨůĞǁĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞĐƌŽǁĚůŝŶĞ ?Ă ‘DĞǆŝĐĂŶǁĂǀĞ ?ŽĨĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝǀĞĂƉƉůĂƵƐĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚŝƚ ? ?736  
Watching on was an un-credited reporter from Aeroplane.  He was overwhelmed by what 
he saw ? ‘ƵǆĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ ‘ŝŐtŝŶŐ ?ǁĂƐĂŶĞŵŽƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŽƵů-stirring triumph.  The sight of this mass 
formation bearing down on Duxford was unforgettable...for me, this was one of the most 
ŽƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĞŵŽƌĂďůĞĂŝƌƐŚŽǁŵŽŵĞŶƚƐĞǀĞƌ ? ?737         
The sight and sound of so many Spitfires, and it was overwhelmingly Spitfires in attendance 
across all four airshows, was a spectacle but it was more than that.  That un-credited 
Aeroplane ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞƌǁƌŽƚĞŽĨ ‘ĂŶĞŵŽƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŽƵů-ƐƚŝƌƌŝŶŐƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ ? ?738   Here is one clue that 
that reporter was watching a performance, where emotional content is always to the fore.  
Using simple narratives, storytelling, such as starting at 12:45 sharp at Biggin Hill, copycat 
ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨůǇŝŶŐĂƚ'ŽŽĚǁŽŽĚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŐtŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƵǆĨŽƌĚ ?ĂůůǁĞƌĞtrying to create that 
privileged space, a  ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚƐŽŶĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉůĂŶĞĨƌŽŵ “ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ? ?739  
Successful performances are also signified by  ‘ĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐŽĨĚŽƵďůĞŶĞƐƐ ?.740  The crowd 
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ĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨŝŐŐŝŶ,ŝůů ?ƐƌƵŶǁĂǇ ? ?ǁĞƌĞǁĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌhŶŝŽŶĨůĂŐƐ ?dŚŽƐĞĨůĂŐƐŚĂĚas much 
to do with present concerns, the politics of identity, as they had to do with the fact of a 
battle seventy five years before.   
'ĞŽĨĨůĞǇĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ “ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐ ?tŽƌůĚtĂƌ//ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŶŽŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ƚŚŽƐĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?741  Memory is about the past in the present.  Myth too is about the past in the 
present if it is to be continued to be believed.  For the many thousands of boys who  ‘ĨůĞǁ ?
their Airfix Spitfires in the 1960s and 1970s, the Battle of Britain took its place in a pleasure 
culture of war.  In terms of the Airfix Spitfire, it was all the more exciting for its sense of 
authenticity.   ‘/ƚ ?ƐĂƌĞĂůĂĞƌŽƉůĂŶĞĂŶĚǇŽƵ ?ƌĞĨůǇŝŶŐŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƌĞĂůůǇĂƌĞďĂŶĚŝƚƐĂƚƚŚƌĞĞ
Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƐŚŽŽƚǇŽƵĚŽǁŶ ? ?742  If they did manage to shoot you down, of course, 
there was no harm done.  Forty-five years later, and for many members of the warbird flying 
community, the agenda was much the same.   ‘KƵƌĞƚŚŽƐŝƐƚŽŚŽŶŽƵƌƚŚĞƉĂƐƚĂŶĚĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞ
these wonders of engineering; flying in a manner that closely and safely emulates the role 
ĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚĂŶĚďƵŝůƚ ? ?743  There is more than a hint of a pleasure culture 
in such an ethos.  
The warbird audience, however, which today is counted in millions, has had a very different 
agenda.   At all the summer shows in 2015 celebrating the 75
th
 anniversary of the Battle of 
Britain they paid close attention to the Spitfire.   ‘WƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŽƚŚĞƌĂƚƚůĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ
types also flew on most of these occasions, it was the Spitfires which once again attracted 
the glory ? ?744  The reason why is explained by tŚĞĐƌŽǁĚĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨŝŐŐŝŶ,ŝůů ?ƐƌƵŶǁĂǇ ? ?
waving their Union flags.  They were expressing a collective identity.  Thanks to the Spitfire 
in performance, the myth of the Battle of Britain now accommodated that idea, just as, 
again thanks to the Spitfire in performance, forty five years before the myth also 
comfortably accommodated the concerns of twelve year old boys intent on the thrill of 
 ‘ďĂŶĚŝƚƐĂƚƚŚƌĞĞŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƐŚŽŽƚǇŽƵĚŽǁŶ ? ?745   
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Angus Calder was inspired to work on his The Myth of the Blitz (1991) when he began to 
reconsider his original thesis of Britain at war, as presented in his seminal account of the 
Home Front, The WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ (1969), in terms of myth.  As Paul Addison noted in his 
obituary of Calder, he became his own revisionist.
746
  This was revisionism with a gentle 
touch, however.  Calder turned his original thesis inside out.  His original interpretation of a 
war fought in a ferment of participatory democracy, what he believed to be true, now 
became what was believed to be true by the wartime generation itself, a myth.  His re-
interpretation did not meet with universal critical acclaim; nevertheless, it had far-reaching 
consequences for the historiography of wartime Britain in 1940.
747
  Calder was interested in 
ǁŚŽĚƵƉĞĚǁŚŽ ? ‘ĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐƵůture of the period...is 
ƚĂŬĞŶƚŽƚĂƐŬ ? ?748  But those historians who have followed in his footsteps, thematically as 
well as methodologically, have been more interested in the logical consequences of his new 
approach.
749
   
Those consequences are a function of how modern scholarship approaches myth.  A myth is 
 ‘ŶŽƚĂůŝĞŽƌĂĨĂůƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚƌƵƚŚŽƌƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽƌĨĂĐƚŽƌŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ?Ă
myth is above all a story that is believed, believed to be true ?.750  Myths are sustained; they 
continue to be culturally relevant by reflecting contemporary cultural priorities.
751
  These do 
change.  In fact, the moment a myth becomes inert is the moment it turns into a narrative 
relic.  What this has meant for historians following in the footsteps of Calder and coming 
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anew to the mythic narrative of 1940 is a decision has to be made about beginnings and 
endings, about construction and re-construction of the mythic narrative.       
Sometimes that decision appears a little arbitrary.  Gary Campion, the most recent historian 
of the myth of the Battle of Britain, halts his enquiry on the death of Winston Churchill in 
1965.
752
  He gives two reasons for this.  The first is that in his opinion official support for the 
valorisation of the Battle comes to an end on the establishment of the Ministry of Defence 
in 1964.  His second reason is that the death of Churchill the following year marks the end of 
an age.  Both points are debatable.  Campion does not tell us anything else about this age, 
but of more moment here is his view that official support for the valorisation of the Battle 
came to an end in 1964.  This was a time when plans for a Royal Air Force Museum at 
Hendon were accelerating, and the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight was soon to be 
established.  The valorisation of the Battle of Britain, the promotion of the idea that victory 
in the Battle was fundamental to the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany, both officially and 
unofficially, continues to this day.   
Belief in all the myths of 1940 Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz is in fact as strong 
ƚŽĚĂǇĂƐŝƚŚĂƐĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ?^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇ
ďŽŽŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŵǇƚŚ-history of 1940 has become politically charged.  It has 
become embroiled in the politics of identity.  Who speaks on behalf of the wartime myths 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐǁŚĞŶǁŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌĞĚ ?ŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĂĐůĂŝŵƵƉŽŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ ? ‘ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?753  This is the place of the myths in contemporary British culture.  
It may change and thanks to the diachronic nature of myth, what is believed of the wartime 
myths will change accordingly too.  Such change does require an engine, however.  What 
this thesis has argued, and where it finds its place in the historiography of the myth of the 
Battle of Britain, is that the Spitfire has been one such engine of change, and that the 
evolution of that myth can be identified in performance.             
In chapter one, we discovered how the Spitfire acquired the necessary flexibility to carry out 
this task.  Almost from the day of its public debut it has been able to behave as a palimpsest, 
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 ‘ĂƚŚŝŶŐ...having been reused or altered while still retaining traces of its earlier form; a multi-
ůĂǇĞƌĞĚƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?754  The creation of this multi-layered record began almost a year before the 
Battle of Britain.  We can even put a date on it, 20 May 1939, Empire Air Day.  This was the 
ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚŵĂũŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŶŽƚŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐĚĞďƵƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
time a major audience, invited by the RAF and amounting to over a million people 
countrywide, first saw it in action.   It was a coming of age party for the RAF, the service had 
been established on 1 April 1918, but the occasion also had a more practical purpose, to 
boost recruitment after five years of accelerated RAF expansion.  Its chief recruiter on the 
day was its brand new fighter, the Spitfire.  The Hurricane had had its moment in the 
spotlight over a year before.  Press reports suggest that the RAF succeeded in showing off 
the Spitfire to its best advantage.  It was greeted with an unprecedented reception which 
was all to do with timing.  In May 1939 war clouds were gathering.  What the public was 
cheering at was a potential war-winning weapon, a champion.  This was the first layer of 
what would become a multi-layered record.     
The second layer was gained in the summer of 1940, during the Battle of Britain itself.  It 
was a result of an idea first mooted in a Jamaican newspaper the Gleaner.  That idea was for 
a fund to buy a fighter plane for the RAF as a replacement for those being shot down by the 
Luftwaffe over the beaches of Dunkirk and the Channel.  It was an idea that quickly gained 
purchase in Jamaica and beyond.  In Britain, the Spitfire Funds, as they soon came to be 
known, became a nationwide phenomenon.  They offered a unique opportunity.  They gave 
the civilian population, in a time of national crisis, the opportunity to fight back.  This sense 
of empowerment now became the second layer.         
dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůĂǇĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐŵƵůƚŝ-layered record was gained almost two years 
after the Battle of Britain was fought  It was the occasion of the nationwide release of the 
film The First of the Few in the autumn of 1942.  The film starred Leslie Howard and David 
EŝǀĞŶĂŶĚƚŽůĚƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇŽĨZ ?: ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?It was a big box 
office hit and what audiences saw and enjoyed, was not a factual account of the 
development of the Spitfire.  It was instead a fable, a story of good triumphing over evil.  
Leslie Howard ?ƚŚĞĨŝůŵ ?ƐĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĐĞ was more than a patriot, however.  He was an 
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ardent nationalist.  What he had achieved in his tribute to Mitchell and the Spitfire was to 
stamp both with a makers-mark, thĂƚŽĨƚŚĞŶŐůŝƐŚ ?>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁĂƐ
rooted in his sense of English ethnicity.  The cinema-going British public may not have 
agreed with him ŽŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĞƚŚŶŝĐŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚŐŽŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƚhe Spitfire 
was now a vehicle for a conversation about identity.   
By the end of 1942 the Spitfire as a symbol was a multi-layered text, a palimpsest.  To be put 
to good use post-war demanded one more special feature of the Spitfire.  It could not be 
bound to one dominant cultural construction, specifically, the mores and strictures of the 
wartime generation.  It had to be free from any such entanglements.  In chapter two we 
discovered the reasons behind that useful lack of provenance.  The Spitfire was developed in 
the early to mid 1930s away from the public gaze.  The critical phase, between May and 
November 1934, was even out of sight of those who were in charge of its development both 
ĂƚƚŚĞŝƌDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇĂŶĚĂƚsŝĐŬĞƌƐǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǀĞŶĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐ
mattered because R. J. Mitchell died in 1937 aged only 42, leaving no written account of the 
^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚďĞŚŝŶĚ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽĂŶŝ ĚƵƐƚƌǇǁŝĚĞĚĞƐŝŐŶŽĨĨŝĐĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞ
1930s of poor record keeping, there is very little surviving evidence that can help us trace 
the development of the Spitfire from drawing board to prototype.
755
   
tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂůůŵĞĂŶƚǁĂƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐƉƌŽǀĞŶĂŶĐĞĐĂŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
court of public opinion in the summer of 1957, nothing was settled.  It was the occasion of 
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐŝůŽůůŝĞƌ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨ>ŽƌĚŽǁĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝƚƐƐĞƌŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ
Sunday Times.  One interested reader was the ex-chairman of Vickers Aviation, Sir Robert 
DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?DĐ>ĞĂŶ ?ƐŽǁŶĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƚsŝĐŬĞƌƐǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĞŶĚĞĚŝŐŶŽŵŝŶŝŽƵƐůǇin October 
1938, a year after Mitchell died, when he was forced to resign following pressure on the 
Vickers Board from the Air Ministry.  What McLean now read in his copy of the Sunday 
Times in August 1957 opened old wounds.  He entered into correspondence with The Times 
and Sunday Times, and the more incendiary extracts were duly published.   
The claim and counter claim that the public now read, through the month of August, drew a 
veil over the origins of the Spitfire.  McLean disputed any idea that the Air Ministry or 
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Dowding personally, should receive credit for developing the Spitfire.  When The Times 
asked the Air Ministry to adjudicate on the matter, they declined.   Why did the Air Ministry 
refuse to comment?  The answer is in two parts.  First, any official endorsement of either 
side would have caused offense to parties the Air Ministry might not have wished to offend. 
/ĨƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĚŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ĂƐƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚďǇŽůůŝĞƌŚŝƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŶŝŶ
disavowing McLean they would have been seen to be casting aspersions on the reputation 
ŽĨDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ŶŽǁĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞƌŽƚŚĂŶŬƐƚŽ>ĞƐůŝĞ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ?ƐďŝŽƉŝĐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?/ĨƚŚĞǇŚĂĚ
chosen to endorse McLean then this would have been seen as another slight upon 
ŽǁĚŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶďǇĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂƉŽŽƌ track record on the matter.  The second 
reason why the Air Ministry chose silence in 1957 is still visible in the Air Ministry archives.  
dŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂĐŽŐĞŶƚĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽŐŝǀĞ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚŽƐĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĨŽƵƌŵŽŶƚŚƐŝŶƚŚĞ
summer and early autumn of 1934 are all but blank in the Ministry archives.  The verdict 
from all this epistolary obfuscation was provenance not proven.  The legacy of the Spitfire 
was confirmed as free from entanglements, it belonged to no-one and so it belonged to 
everyone.   
The value of this legacy lay in what it could do.  It could sustain the myth of the Battle of 
Britain so as to be credible to contemporary audiences. These audiences turned out to have 
very different requirements of the myth than the wartime generation.  How this value was 
to be realised brings us to chapter three.  It was done in action, in the air, specifically in 
performance.  This is performance not as theatre but as a cultural production, a means of 
making meaning  ‘ĨƌŽŵĂƉůĂĐĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶǁŽƌĚ ? ?756  A Spitfire flypast for 
instance, is for those watching on a moment of comparison, the past in the present.  In that 
moment, one is subjectively re-aligned to better match the other.  What was required to 
make this performance a success was authentic airworthy Spitfires.  The past appears all the 
more clearly if it is considered authentic.  Keeping original Spitfires airworthy, right up until 
the 1980s, was ĂůŵŽƐƚƚŚĞƐŽůĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞZ&ĂŶĚƚŚĞZ& ?ƐĞŶƚŚƵƐŝĂƐŵĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĂ
task seemed most unlikely when it began to scrap its Spitfire fleet after the war.  In chapter 
three we discovered what changed its mind, and saved a bare handful of airworthy Spitfires 
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along with the knowledge and resources to keep them flying.  It was a belated recognition of 
the power of advocacy the past has in the present, in a suitably appropriate narrative form.   
In chapter three we discovered the Spitfire in performance; in chapter four we watched as 
those performances helped the war-made myth of the Battle of Britain to evolve post-war.  
Beginning in the mid 1950s, there was a new generation drawn to the myth, boys born after 
 ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƉĂůŝŵƉƐĞƐƚŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?ƐůĞŐĂĐǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŵƵůƚŝ-layered text, now came to 
the fore.  This new young audience wanted to experience the Battle as entertainment.  In 
'ƌĂŚĂŵĂǁƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐƉŚƌĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŝŶĚƵůŐĞŝŶ Ă ‘ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ-ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?757  
The Spitfire was able to satisfy this desire in the guise of the champion that flew on Empire 
Air Day in May 1939, the fighter that was prima inter pares during the Battle itself.  There is 
a certain irony here considering the endeavours of the RAF to keep Spitfires flying.  The 
Spitfire in the hands of small boys was a plastic one, an Airfix kit.  Its ability to perform, 
however, was not impaired.  This was performance dependent not on an authentic Spitfire 
ĨůǇŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚŽŶĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐŝƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂƌĞĂů^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞĨůǇŝŶŐ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞďŽǇ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨ
view, his ŝƌĨŝǆŬŝƚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂ ‘ƌĞĂů ?^ƉŝƚĨŝƌĞ ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĞƐƐĂŐĞŽŶƚŚĞďŽǆŝƚĐĂŵĞ
in, thanks to the skills of graphic artists like Roy Cross. 
The work of the RAF as trustees of the material legacy of the Spitfire had its reward at the 
beginning of the 1990s with the birth of the warbird movement.  Civilian interest in flying 
restored original Spitfires had been smouldering since the 1960s, sparked not least by the 
flying sequences in the 1969 film Battle of Britain, but it only truly burst into flame twenty 
years later.  It was then that the warbird movement, by now a small community of owner 
operators of historic aircraft, but mainly Spitfires, found a paying audience.  That audience 
ǁĂƐŶŽǁƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĐŽŵĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐƐĂǁƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞŵŽƌǇďŽŽŵ ? ?
The myth was now sustained by the politics of identity.  The Spitfire with that mark of 
Englishness already stamped upon it by Leslie Howard in 1942 was perfectly placed to 
answer the questions about citizenship addressed to the myth.           
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The Spitfire, with its ability to behave as palimpsest, flies in performance to this day in 
response to the diachronic nature of the myth of the Battle of Britain.  The nature of myth 
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